The Role of Historical Memory in the Socio-Political Processes of Chechnya (1986—1994)

Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (10 (108)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Cécile Druey

During the years that preceded and followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya in the south of Russia has experienced an intensive movement of civil society mobilisation, nationalist radicalisation and armed conflict. Referring to the case of the society “Kavkaz” as an example for the emerging movement of civil society, this paper traces the mobilising role of history and historical memory during the period of reform under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late-1980s, until the onset of the first Chechnya War in 1994. It argues, that the use of historical memory is not that much a cause, than it is an indicator of conflict and radicalisation in society, and that these processes of radicalisation are closely linked to their context at a local, national and international level. Drawing on data collected from interviews with representatives of the Chechen national movement, from local newspapers and legal acts, the paper tracks the evolution of civil society movements in Chechnya in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Doing so, it departs from a relational approach to conflict analysis (della Porta, 2018; Alimi, Bosi, and Demetriou, 2012; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015; Hughes and Sasse, 2016). Located at the intersection between conflict- and memory studies, the paper thus adds insights to the study of the pre-war period in post-Soviet Chechnya, and in general to the conceptual discussion about the link between historical memory, mobilisation, radicalisation and conflict.

Slavic Review ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 614-630
Author(s):  
Jan S. Adams

Historically, leaders of the Soviet Union have shown extraordinary faith in the power of bureaucratic reorganization to solve political problems. The 1985-1987 restaffing and restructuring of the foreign policy establishment indicate that Mikhail Gorbachev shares this faith. In the first sixteen months of his leadership, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replaced its minister, two first deputy ministers, seven deputy ministers, a third of all Soviet ambassadors, and created four new departments. In addition, important changes were made in the central party apparat, affecting three of the CPSU Central Committee departments: The International Information Department was abolished. The Propaganda Department gained added prominence in international affairs with the appointment of a new chief, Aleksandr Iakovlev, who began playing a conspicuous role as Gorbachev's advisor at international conferences even before his elevation to the Politburo in January 1987. Of great significance for the Soviet foreign policy establishment as a whole, the International Department (ID) was given new leadership, a new arms control unit, and expanded missions.


Author(s):  
Amir H. Estebari

This paper studies the role of civil society in controlling corruption in public services in two developing countries: Russia and Iran. Research on the relationship between civil society and corruption control in these two countries is insufficient. Selecting Russia and Iran for comparison is based on similarities between them in terms of economic and political systems, and the developments of their civil societies. This paper compares the historical developments and the status of corruption and civil society in both countries; the efforts that civil society actors have made in battling corruption; and the state’s reaction to these attempts. This study covers a period of almost three decades from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to 2020. The findings of the study show that the civil societies in both countries have had limited impact on controlling corruption over the period. Although these findings do not support a prominent role for civil society in control of corruption in past, the author argues that, according to some evidence, there is a possibility of a stronger role for civil society in combatting corruption in both countries in the future.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Knight

This article examines the role of the Committee on State Security (KGB) during the turbulent six-and-a-half years under Mikhail Gorbachev, from March 1985 to December 1991. Contrary to popular impressions, the KGB was never an independent actor in the Soviet system; it acted at the behest of the Communist Party. When Vladimir Kryuchkov replaced Viktor Chebrikov as head of the KGB in 1986, the move signaled what was intended to be a new role for the KGB. But as the reforms launched by Gorbachev became more radical, and as political instability in the Soviet Union became widespread, many in the KGB grew anxious about the possible fragmentation of the country. These concerns were instrumental in the decision by Kryuchkov and other high-ranking KGB officials to organize a hardline coup in August 1991. Even then, however, the KGB was not truly independent of the party. On the contrary, KGB officials were expecting—and then desperately hoping—that Gorbachev would agree to order an all-out crackdown. Because Gorbachev was unwilling to take a direct part in mass repression, Kryuchkov lacked the authority he was seeking to act. As a result, the attempted coup failed, and the KGB was forced onto the defensive. Shortly before the Soviet state was dissolved, the KGB was broken up into a number of agencies that soon came under Russia's direct control.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 137-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Celeste A. Wallander

The role of Western governments in the disintegration of the Soviet Union was complex. The two most important factors that undermined the Soviet state were the deepening economic chaos under Mikhail Gorbachev and the rapid growth of internal political dissent. Western policies tended to magnify both of these factors. This is not to say, however, that Gorbachev's original decision to embark on an economic reform program was simply the result of pressure created by Western defense spending and military deployments. The Soviet economy was plagued by severe weaknesses, of which the misallocation of resources and excessive military expenditures were only a small part. Gorbachev's initial economic reforms were spurred by his awareness of the country's general economic problems. After the first round of reforms failed, he sensed that arms control and reductions in military spending would be helpful for the next stage. Even so, the belated cuts he made in military spending (beginning in 1990) were of relatively little consequence. The West's refusal to pour money into the Soviet system without evidence of structural reform in the last years of the Soviet regime, and Western pressure on Gorbachev not to crack down on political dissent and separatism, did hasten the Soviet collapse. These policies denied the Soviet system resources that might have prolonged its survival, and they helped to deter Gorbachev from using decisive force against elements that were splitting the Soviet Union apart.


1989 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Sakwa

The process of democratic restructuring in the Soviet Union since 1986 can be understood in terms of a revival of the democratic ideal of a participatory and self-managing society. The concept of commune democracy espoused by Marx and Lenin, however, is problematical, not least because of ambiguities in its relationship to the state, the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dirigisme of the party. Gorbachev's reforms are developing within the context of an attempt to regenerate commune democracy, and some of the hesitancies of the reform process can be attributed to the contradictions in the theory. The scope for a reconstituted civil society is limited by the inclusive tendencies of traditional commune democracy. The reform process may ultimately be able to exploit the ambiguities in commune democracy sufficiently to allow the development of a law-governed state.


1990 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 50-55
Author(s):  
Mark Pomar

There has been a tremendous proliferation of informal groups in the Soviet Union, by which I mean any organization that comes into being that is independent of the state, where citizens come together, create a group, promote their various intersts, be they political or nonpolitical. Pravda estimates approximately 60,000 of them this year alone; it gave a figure of 30,000 just one year ago. This phenomenon is hard to measure and most Soviet commentators, writers and sociologists basically throw up their arms and say that there are thousands and thousands of these various groups popping up everywhere: some small, some obviously larger with greater networks. I would like to sketch out some of the problems that I found, some of the areas that are worth investigating, and put forward some proposals that we may want to tackle in the discussion subsequent to this panel presentation.


Author(s):  
Victoria Smolkin

When the Bolsheviks set out to build a new world in the wake of the Russian Revolution, they expected religion to die off. Soviet power used a variety of tools—from education to propaganda to terror—to turn its vision of a Communist world without religion into reality. Yet even with its monopoly on ideology and power, the Soviet Communist Party never succeeded in overcoming religion and creating an atheist society. This book presents the first history of Soviet atheism from the 1917 revolution to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The book argues that to understand the Soviet experiment, we must make sense of Soviet atheism. It shows how atheism was reimagined as an alternative cosmology with its own set of positive beliefs, practices, and spiritual commitments. Through its engagements with religion, the Soviet leadership realized that removing religion from the “sacred spaces” of Soviet life was not enough. Then, in the final years of the Soviet experiment, Mikhail Gorbachev—in a stunning and unexpected reversal—abandoned atheism and reintroduced religion into Soviet public life. The book explores the meaning of atheism for religious life, for Communist ideology, and for Soviet politics.


Author(s):  
Elena A. Kosovan ◽  

The author of the publication reviews the photobook “Palimpsests”, published in 2018 in the publishing house “Ad Marginem Press” with the support of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. The book presents photos of post-Soviet cities taken by M. Sher. Preface, the author of which is the coordinator of the “Democracy” program of the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Russia N. Fatykhova, as well as articles by M. Trudolyubov and K. Bush, which accompany these photos, contain explanation of the peculiarities of urban space formation and patterns of its habitation in the Soviet Union times and in the post-Soviet period. The author of the publication highly appreciates the publication under review. Analyzing the photographic works of M. Sher and their interpretation undertaken in the articles, the author of the publication agrees with the main conclusions of N. Fatykhova, M. Trudolyubov and K. Bush with regards to the importance of the role of the state in the processes of urban development and urbanization in the Soviet and post-Soviet space, but points out that the second factor that has a key influence on these processes is ownership relations. The paper positively assesses the approach proposed by the authors of the photobook to the study of the post-Soviet city as an architectural and landscape palimpsest consisting mainly of two layers, “socialist” and “capitalist”. The author of the publication specifically emphasizes the importance of analyzing the archetypal component of this palimpsest, pointing out that the articles published in the reviewed book do not pay sufficient attention to this issue. Particular importance is attributed by the author to the issue of metageography of post-Soviet cities and meta-geographical approach to their exploration. Emphasizing that the urban palimpsest is a system of realities, each in turn including a multitude of ideas, meanings, symbols, and interpretations, the author points out that the photobook “Palimpsests” is actually an invitation to a scientific game with space, which should start a new direction in the study of post-Soviet urban space.


Author(s):  
Roman Kotsan

The article considers smuggling as economic crime in the Soviet-Polish border in the interwar period. The reasons for smuggling activities are studied and summarized. Range of smuggled goods is shown. The number of arrested smugglers, their nationality, the value of seized goods both from Poland and the Soviet Union are investigated. Smuggling as a political phenomenon in the Soviet-Polish border in 1921-1939 is under study. The use of smugglers by the intelligence agencies of both Poland and the USSR are emphasized. The role of public authorities of both abovementioned countries in the fight against smuggling, namely Border Guard Corps from Poland; border guards, customs, security services and local Soviet authorities on the part of the USSR are studied. The influence of anti smuggling measures (increased criminal liability, limitation of private capital in trade, strengthen of the state borders protection) on its amount decrease is studied. Keywords: State border, smuggling, crime, scouting, Poland, USSR


Author(s):  
Mark Edele

This chapter turns to the present and explains the implications of the current study for the ongoing debate about the Soviet Union in the Second World War and in particular about the role of loyalty and disloyalty in the Soviet war effort. It argues that this study strengthens those who argue for a middle position: the majority of Soviet citizens were neither unquestioningly loyal to the Stalinist regime nor convinced resisters. The majority, instead, saw their interests as distinct from both the German and the Soviet regime. Nevertheless, ideology remains important if we want to understand why in the Soviet Union more resisted or collaborated than elsewhere in Europe and Asia.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document