scholarly journals Model of public choice and political rent

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-57
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Bezat-Jarzebowska ◽  
WÅ‚odzimierz Rembisz ◽  
Agata Sielska

It can be assumed that the scope of agricultural policy and connected with its financial streams are not accidental. Selection of a particular, policy defines a mechanism in which the benefits and costs are combined. Such an effort of describing and ex plaining the mechanism was presented in the paper. We use the concept of a public choice model. Issues of including political (or admin istrative) interest in defining and shaping the policy are incorporated into the models of public choice. The authors assumed the rationality of decision makers and their goal to maximize their own utility. The analysis presented in the paper is some reference to one of the trends of political economy, according to which the emphasis is on the voters’ behaviour.   Keywords: Public choice, political rent, agricultural policy, political economic  analysis

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Pennington

Abstract:This essay offers a “nonideal” case for giving institutional priority to markets and private contracting in the basic structure of society. It sets out a “robust political economy” framework to examine how different political economic regime types cope with frictions generated by the epistemic limitations of decision-makers and problems of incentive incompatibility. Focusing on both efficiency arguments and distributive justice concerns the essay suggests that a constitutional structure that prioritizes consensual exchange is more likely to sustain a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.


The two volume Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the Public Choice literature. Volume 1 covers rational choice models of elections, interest groups, rent seeking, and public choice contributions to normative political economy. It begins with introductory chapters on rational choice politics, the founding of public choice, and the evaluation and selection of constitutions. The chapters were all written for this handbook by scholars who are well known for their contributions to research in the areas discussed.


2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER J. BOETTKE ◽  
CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE ◽  
PETER T. LEESON

Abstract:Investigations of a society's competitiveness aim to trace the causal mechanisms behind patterns in wealth and poverty across societies. This paper argues that to be productive such investigations must be comparative, historical, and political economic in nature. Comparative historical political economy is how social scientists generate useful knowledge about the wealth and poverty of nations. Our contribution is a methodology – or rather a collection of methodologies – for understanding national competitiveness and attempts to improve it: one focuses on political-economic analysis, another on historical analysis, and a third on comparative analysis.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-110
Author(s):  
Martijn Huysmans ◽  
Christophe Crombez

AbstractThis article presents a political economic analysis of exit from federations. After the federation has formed, members’ benefits from it may be different than expected. If a member ends up not benefitting, it may wish to secede i.e. exit the federation. Based on formal models, we show how state-contingent exit penalties can induce socially efficient exit decisions: they force the secessionist member to take into account the lost benefits of the federation for the other. Even if ex-ante specified exit penalties cannot be made state-contingent, they may still enhance social welfare by preventing forceful exit. Empirical evidence concerning Montenegro, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and the EU is compatible with these claims. In spite of the simplifications inherent to any modeling exercise, we hope that our results stimulate more research into exit clauses as a means to mitigate the problem of violent secessionism.


Author(s):  
Alan W. Cafruny ◽  
J. Magnus Ryner

This chapter examines European integration from the perspective of critical political economy. It first situates the belated arrival of political economy in integration studies within the context of the division of the social sciences in the late nineteenth century. It then considers the crisis of the Bretton Woods system and how it served to revive the study of political economy through the establishment of a subdiscipline of international political economy. It also explores the key strands of political economic analysis as they were imported into the study of the European Union, focusing on the ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective, neo-Marxism, and regulation theory. Finally, it discusses from the perspective of critical political economy the causes and consequences of the economic and monetary union as a case where such an approach seems particularly useful, along with Eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan J. Phillips

 Background This article employs a political economic analysis of the CBC’s Hockey Night in Canada (HNIC) program. It critically investigates both the recent Rogers Communications takeover of the popular public broadcasting program and the history of HNIC’s gendered audiences. Analysis Utilizing a feminist version of Dallas Smythe’s theory of the audience commodity, the author argues that the Rogers takeover represents the most recent manifestation of the complicity between patriarchy and capitalism that has persisted throughout the history of HNIC. Conclusion and implications  It is also argued that the general political economy of HNIC represents a site of analysis that has been largely ignored by communications scholars, and that the program’s significance as a Canadian institution thus merits further critical inquiry. RÉSUMÉ Contexte  Cet article réalise une analyse politico-économique de Hockey Night in Canada (« Soirée du hockey au Canada», CBC). Il effectue une évaluation critique du rachat par Rogers Communications de cette émission populaire sur la chaîne publique ainsi que celle de l’histoire des publics sexués de l’émission. Analyse  L’auteur recourt à une adaptation féministe de la théorie sur la part d’audience telle que développée par Dallas Smythe afin de soutenir que le rachat de Hockey Night in Canada par Rogers représente l’instance la plus récente de la complicité entre patriarcat et capitalisme qui existe depuis le tout début de l’émission. Conclusion et implications L’auteur soutient d’autre part que l’économie politique générale de Hockey Night in Canadareprésente un objet d’analyse largement ignoré par les chercheurs en communication et que l’émission mérite un examen approfondi du fait de son importance en tant qu’institution canadienne.            


Author(s):  
Nicola J. Smith

This chapter outlines the scholarly debate and theoretical architecture that underpin the rest of the book. In recent years, queer theory has come under fire for being outdated, even redundant, on the grounds that its interest in the fluidity of identity comes at the expense of political economic analysis. Contesting such claims, the chapter contends that queer theory is well suited to the study of global capitalism when pursued as a project that is both feminist and historical in approach. To this end, the author brings together the insights of Michel Foucault and Silvia Federici to develop a new framework for analyzing the intersections and contradictions between capitalism and sexuality. The chapter then explicates this framework through discussion of sex work as a particularly interesting and important site for applying the tools of queer political economy.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayo Akanbi ◽  
Niek Schoeman

This study reports on research aimed at measuring the drivers behind public expenditure with specific reference to education expenditure in Africa. The empirical estimations are carried out using a public choice model on a panel of 15 selected African countries over the period 1995-2004. The results show that government expenditure on education is resilient to shocks and the education sector is not seriously affected by allocative changes that favour corruption. Expenditure on education in the countries included in the study generally complies with the guidelines set by the IMF in terms of their fiscal adjustment programs.


2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-201

Harry de Gorter of Cornell University reviews, “Political Power and Economic Policy: Theory, Analysis, and Empirical Applications” by Gordon C. Rausser, Johan Swinnen, and Pinhas Zusman. The EconLit abstract of this book begins: “Analyzes the links between political economics, governance structures, and the distribution of political power in economic policy making. Discusses public policy—the lens of political economy; the Nash solution to the bargaining problem; the Harsanyi solution to the bargaining problem; political-economic analysis; normative political-economic analysis; dynamic political-economic analysis; political power, ideology, and political organizational structures; political power, influence, and lobbying; constitutional prescription and political power coefficients; the political economy of commodity market intervention; the political economy of public research and development; a political-economic analysis of redistributive policies and public good investments; interest groups, coalition breaking, and productive policies; policy reform and compensation; political-economic analysis of land reform; political-economic analysis of water resource systems; the political economy lens on quality and public standard regulations; political-economic analysis in transition economies; the power of bureaucracies—the European Commission and EU policy reforms; political econometrics; the political econometrics of the Israeli dairy industry; flexible policy instruments given a political-power distribution; estimating statistical properties of power weight; and the role of institutions in the joint determination of political economic resource transactions and political economic seeking transfers. Rausser is Robert Gordon Sproul Distinguished Professor at the University of California, Berkeley. Swinnen is Professor of Economics and Director of the LICOS Institute for Institutions and Economic Performance at the Catholic University of Leuven and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies. The late Zusman was Professor Emeritus in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Index.”


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