scholarly journals La captura del Estado peruano por el narcotráfico: el caso de los “cuello blanco del puerto”

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Laura Zúñiga Rodríguez

Since the 1980s, Peru has been a key player in the international drug trafficking scenario. The second largest producer of cocaine in the world and one of the countries where the main input, the coca leaf, is grown, the port of El Callao, being one of the main ports in Latin America due to its volume, is presumed to be where important cargoes of this drug leave from. The interception of communications in 2018 to investigate the violent organized crime that was taking place in that province revealed a network of judges, prosecutors, congressmen, and businessmen who were collaborating with drug traffickers, favoring them with impunity. This is not the first attempt to capture the Peruvian State for drug trafficking. In the 1990s, the government of Fujimori-Montesinos used drug trafficking money -among others- to bribe the country's highest authorities: military chiefs, the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the media, and businessmen, all of whom were close to the government. The "narco-indulgence" of Alan García's second administration is another symptom of the seriousness of the collaboration of authorities from the highest spheres of the State with the powerful drug traffickers. The "double standard" of the Peruvian Criminal Policy against international drug trafficking is made evident, strong for the weak and weak for the strong: high penalties for small-scale traffickers and impunity for those at the apex of the criminal organizations. In addition, the enormous corrupting capacity of money from drug trafficking (money laundering) to capture members of the powers of the State: Executive, Legislative and Judicial, is of concern. The "case of the white collars of the port" is an empirical example of the intersection of judicial corruption -and its minions- within the Peruvian State and the organized crime criminal organizations. In order to conjure up these alliances, it is necessary to emphasize the punishment against the white-collar criminals of drug trafficking and their collaborators: lawyers, judges, prosecutors, etc., who use their profession as a cover to enrich themselves personally to the detriment of the common good.

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Salawati Mat Basir ◽  
Mohammad Naji Shah Mohammadi ◽  
Elmira Sobatian

<p>The main objective of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is economic development in its region but directly unproductive profit seeking activities such as drug trafficking is the prominent barrier to reach this goal. All members spend lots of money to fight against drug trafficking, as all of them suffer from drug addiction and drug related problems. The first step to cope with this problem is to identify the factors and incentives that make this region vulnerable for drug trafficking activities and to unearth what makes this region a haven for drug traffickers. A bulk of literature supports the concept that organized criminal organizations are not able to operate when there are not any forms of corruption since they are strongly interrelated. In this paper, we analyze the link between drug trafficking and corruption in ECO region in order to develop ECO strategies to hamper and interrupt these transnational crimes. Corruption has posed major challenges to the efforts taken to control drug and also has seriously damaged the ECO members’ image in international community. One of the practical solutions is the responsibility of ECO organization in implementing rule of law in the region. Undoubtedly, fighting against corruption in ECO region is a joint responsibility of international and intercontinental community and this responsibility requires collective action and cooperation among countries in the region.</p>


Author(s):  
Manuel Cancio Meliáá

Though always present in penal codes, offenses based on belonging to a criminal organization occupy a vanguard position in today's evolution of penal law systems: organized crime is located at one of the most prominent places in the criminal policy agenda. Nevertheless, neither criminal law theory nor the actual content of criminal provisions nor the putting of theory into practice enables an adequate restriction of the interpretation of the laws against criminal organizations. Therefore we need to investigate the wrongfulness at the base of this offense. European legal scholarship has proposed two basic approaches: to consider that this offense anticipates the possibility of punishing and prosecuting such behavior (anticipation theory) or to consider that it harms a collective interest ("public security," "public peace"). From our perspective, it is necessary to underline the collective wrongfulness embedded in a criminal organization and that, beyond the actual crimes committed, it questions the monopoly of violence exercised by the state. It represents the constitution of a violent organization that counters the basis of state political organization (arrogation of political organization). This approach opens a possibility to adequately define the offense of belonging to a criminal organization.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 827-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Desroches

This article examines research on upper level drug traffickers in the U.S., the UK, Canada, and the Netherlands. Included is an analysis and critique of typologies of drug traffickers and theoretical models of organized crime as they apply to upper level drug networks. Studies of higher level drug trafficking indicate that drug markets represent informal and loosely organized associations of relatively small syndicates or crews of independent drug entrepreneurs. They compete for market share and deal primarily or exclusively with trusted associates chosen from ethnic, kinship, and friendship networks. Most dealers are highly cautious, eschew the use of violence, typically make huge profits, attempt to maintain a low profile, rationalize their conduct as business activity, and operate within geographically niche markets.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-241
Author(s):  
A D Kerimov ◽  
E V Halipova

The article, in fact, a response to the ideas contained in the monograph A.I.Aleksandrova "evil philosophy and the philosophy of Crime (questions of philosophy of law, criminal policy and criminal procedure)." Readers are invited to meditation, inspired by philosophical and legal views A.I.Aleksandrova on such fundamental issues as the understanding and the ratio of good and evil crimes and atrocities, socially approved, lawful and unlawful conduct, political and moral responsibility of the government of the state of affairs in the field of the fight against crime, the intrinsic value of education, education and education not only youth, but also all citizens of the state of organized society, and others.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-186
Author(s):  
Airton Roberto Guelfi ◽  
Gisele Tafarelo Guelfi ◽  
Nathalia Horizonte Bacelar

This article introducea theoretical discussion that starts from the historical-social moment present in the face of the pandemic caused by COVID-19 in face of the uncontrolled increase in contamination worldwide and, consequently, the increasing number of deaths. It became necessary to go beyond the field of health sciences for a legal analysis, tracing a path that is established with governmental measures through administrative acts edited by the Federal and State Executive as means to confrontthe pandemic. With the publication of these administrative acts, there are important criminal consequences that must in fact be observed so that they do not become a dead letter in the legal system. All efforts by the State asthe manager of a health policy must be supported in that State as the manager and executor of a criminal policy. Based on this factor, the study written here seeks to conduct a discussion on the repercussions that affect the field of Criminal Law as a result of non-compliance with the measures imposed by the Government and the consequent liability of the offending agent.


1945 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-463
Author(s):  
Albert B. Saye

Fully as interesting as the provisions of the proposed new constitution that will be submitted to the voters of Georgia at a special election on August 7, 1945, is the method by which the document was framed. The constitution of the state now in force, adopted in 1877 soon after the state was freed from carpet-bag rule, is a long and complicated document, filled with detailed limitations on the government, particularly in the field of finance. As a result of the inclusion of numerous provisions statutory in nature, the document has been amended three hundred and one times in a period of sixty-eight years. Recognizing the need for a new constitution, the Institute of Public Affairs of the University of Georgia drew up A Proposed Constitution for Georgia in 1931. This document proposed a thorough revision of the structure of the government, including such radical changes as the substitution of 30 districts for the existing 161 counties as the basis of representation in the General Assembly. The widespread publicity given the document served to stimulate interest in constitutional revision, and most of the press of the state, notably the Atlanta Journal, has in recent years actively supported the movement.In March, 1943, the General Assembly passed a resolution, sponsored by Governor Ellis Arnall, providing for a commission of twenty-three members to revise the constitution. The commission was to be composed of the governor, the president of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, three members of the senate appointed by the president, five members of the house appointed by the speaker, a justice of the supreme court designated by the court, a judge of the court of appeals designated by the court, the attorney general, the state auditor, two judges of the superior courts, three practicing attorneys-at-law, and three laymen to be appointed by the governor. The resolution provided that the report of this commission should be submitted to the General Assembly either in the form of proposed amendments to the constitution or as a proposed new constitution, to be acted upon by the General Assembly and submitted to the people for ratification or rejection.


Author(s):  
Barbara Jane Holland

Organized crime groups are involved in all kinds of transnational crimes. Lawbreakers can victimize people in other countries through international scams and cyber theft of financial information. Moreover, much of the harm from transnational crimes stems from activities of formal criminal organizations or criminal networks that connect individuals and organizations who undertake specific criminal acts together. According to the United Nations, annual proceeds from transnationally organized crime activities amount to more than $870 billion dollars with drug trafficking producing the largest individual segment of that total amount. One of the most difficult forms of transnational crime to combat is cybercrime. This article will review transnational cybercrime and it's technology.


Initially, mine workers would be rather reluctant to invest their wages in means of production (in agriculture and in transport) within the Mozambican rural economy. Up to 1980/81, government policies were not favourable to such investments. However, thereafter, miners were specifically encouraged to plough back their wages into production and commerce. Rural unemployment was widespread and, hence, the conditions for private accumulation were favourable on this count. Generally, miners would invest in transport and commerce, but some did invest in agriculture. Indeed, in the latter years, peasants with resources were allowed to operate on unutilised ex-settler farms. In other cases, the more permanent and better paid state farm workers could use their specific position to strengthen their own farm, often supplemented by hired labour. As mechanics or tractor drivers, etc. they had access to cer-tain resources such as seeds, fertiliser, fuel and consumer goods which they could buy either from the state farm or, not unfrequently, merely take from stocks on the state farms. Border areas were another such case of differentiated access to resources by means of barter trade cross the border. Due to the political criticality of such areas within a general condition of war, the government distribution policy would grant a certain priority to supplying these areas with commodities which would then provide a basis for further barter trade with the neighbouring country. Further, areas located more closely to the main food markets (either towns or plantations) would be subject to a much more dispersed and intensive barter and money trade, thereby raising the producer prices which would benefit those peasants who had sufficient resources to produce surpluses. More distant food producing areas were much more within the grip of the commercial traders who provided the link with the market. Hence, while some strata within the peasantry managed to create some room for themselves by producing for the parallel markets, the majority of rural producers (either as wage labourers or small-scale producers) confronted declining real incomes as a result of the inflation on the parallel markets to which they had to turn not only for industrial commodities but also to supplement their food needs. Hence, their problem was not one of having too much money at hand with too few commodities to buy; rather, they experi-enced an acute shortage of both money and goods. The poorer peasantry were the main suppliers of seasonal labour to the state sector. However, although rural unemployment was high, the supply of labour was by no means elastic. The reasons for this were the following. First, the pattern of labour demand of the state farms and plantations was in most cases highly seasonal and, hence, did not provide an all-round income for the worker. Second, money wages earned on the state farm did not guarantee any access to commodities, and often did so only at speculative prices. For both reasons, the real basis of security of the rural worker still remained his family farm, however fragile that may have been. The state sector may have become dominant in terms of area and in terms of production (regarding monetary output), but it certainly was not the dominant aspect in securing the livelihood of rural producers. In most cases, the pattern of peak demand for labour on the state farms coincided with the peak demand for labour in family agriculture. For example,


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-164
Author(s):  
Wil G. Pansters

This article examines the emergence of self-defense forces (autodefensas) in Michoacán (Mexico) in the context of relationships between drug trafficking and the state, concentrating on the recent history of fragmentation, disorder, and violence. It traces how these processes generated comprehensive criminal sovereignty projects, which then triggered the emergence of armed defense forces in both indigenous and mestizo communities. Recent developments in Michoacán are described in light of anthropological theorizing about the relations between sovereignty, state-making, and (dis)ordering. The analysis elucidates the triangular dynamics of sovereignty-making among organized crime, the state, and armed citizens. Special attention is given to state interventions to dismantle de facto self-defense sovereignties because these have created an unstable and violent situation. It is argued that sovereignty-making is territorial and historical, and that it is embedded in political, economic, and cultural identities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 676 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriella E. Sanchez ◽  
Sheldon X. Zhang

The violence afflicting the Mexican migration corridor has often been explained as resulting from the brutal takeover of migrant smuggling markets by organized crime, specifically Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Through the testimonies of twenty-eight migrants who traveled with smuggling facilitators on their journeys into the United States and who interacted with drug traffickers during their transit, we argue that the metamorphosis taking place may be even more radical, involving the proliferation of actors with little or no criminal intent to operate along the migration trails. Far from market coalescence, the increasing flattening of criminal markets along the migration trail and the proliferation of individuals struggling to survive is the result of increasingly limited paths toward mobility and is not attributable to feared cartels or traficantes alone. The interactions among clandestine actors are not only likely to become more common but also to reflect flexibility and adaptation that hierarchical DTOs cannot explain.


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