scholarly journals Fraud Risk Factor Of The Fraud Triangle Assessing The Likelihood Of Fraudulent Financial Reporting

Author(s):  
Yung-I Lou ◽  
Ming-Long Wang

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-justify: inter-ideograph; text-align: justify; line-height: 12pt; margin: 0in 36.1pt 0pt 0.5in; mso-line-height-rule: exactly;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">This research examines risk factors of the fraud triangle, core of all fraud auditing standards, for assessing likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Significant variables, including analyst&rsquo;s forecast error, debt ratio, directors&rsquo; and supervisors&rsquo; stock pledged ratio, percentage of sales related party transaction, number of historical restatements, and number of auditor switch, belong to pressure/incentive, opportunity and attitude/rationalization.</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: DFKai-SB;"> Results indicate </span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">fraudulent reporting</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: DFKai-SB;"> positively correlated to one of the following conditions: more financial pressure of a firm or supervisor of a firm, higher percentage of complex transactions of a firm, more questionable integrity of a firm&rsquo;s managers, or more </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">deterioration in relation between a firm and its auditor</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: DFKai-SB;">. A</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> simple logistic model based on examples of fraud risk factors of ISA 240 and SAS 99 gauges the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting and can benefit practitioners.</span></span></p>

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (Supplement 1) ◽  
pp. 287-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory M. Trompeter ◽  
Tina D. Carpenter ◽  
Naman Desai ◽  
Keith L. Jones ◽  
Richard A. Riley

SUMMARY We synthesize academic literature related to fraudulent financial reporting with dual purposes: (1) to better understand the nature and extent of the existing literature on financial reporting fraud, and (2) to highlight areas where there is need for future research. This project extends the work of Hogan et al. (2008), who completed a similar synthesis project, also sponsored by the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association, in 2005. We synthesize the literature related to fraud by examining accounting and auditing literature post-Hogan et al. (2008) and by summarizing relevant fraud literature from outside of accounting. We review publications in accounting and related disciplines including criminology, ethics, finance, organizational behavior, psychology, and sociology. We synthesize the research around a model that illustrates the auditor's approach to fraud. The model incorporates auditors' use of the fraud triangle (i.e., management's incentive, attitude, and opportunity to commit fraud), their assessment of the existence and effectiveness of the client's anti-fraud measures (e.g., corporate governance mechanisms and internal controls), and their consideration of possible fraud schemes and concealment techniques when making an overall fraud risk assessment of the client. The model further illustrates how auditors can incorporate this assessment into an overall strategy to detect fraud by implementing appropriate fraud-detection procedures. We summarize the recent literature of each component of the model and suggest avenues for future research.


Author(s):  
Yee-Chy Tseng ◽  
Ruey-Dang Chang

<p class="MsoBodyTextIndent" style="text-justify: inter-ideograph; text-align: justify; line-height: 11.3pt; margin: 0in 37.2pt 0pt 0.5in; mso-line-height-rule: exactly;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-weight: normal; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">The Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.82, <span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit</span>, requires the auditor to assess the risk of material misstatement due to a fraud and to consider the assessment in designing appropriate audit procedures to be performed. The SAS No. 82 has thus explicitly made the detection of material fraud the auditor&rsquo;s responsibility. The purpose of the study is to use the risk factors identified in SAS No. 82 as the foundation to develop a decision aid to help auditors assess the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting and to empirically test the effects of the decision aid on assessing the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Using a sample of 45 fraud engagements and 206 nonfraud engagements, we developed and tested a logistic regression model that estimates the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. We found that the logistic model (proxied as a decision aid in the study) outperforms the practicing auditors in assessing risk for fraud and nonfraud cases.</span></span></p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 1143-1159
Author(s):  
Hafiza Aishah Hashim ◽  
Zalailah Salleh ◽  
Izzati Shuhaimi ◽  
Nurul Ain Najwa Ismail

Purpose A number of highly publicised scandals such as Enron, Lehman Brothers, Parmalat, Satyam, Toshiba and 1MDB (to name a few) have heightened the awareness of the effects of fraudulent financial reporting. While enormous measures have been taken to curb the fraudulent activities among large and small businesses, the issues are still alarming worldwide. Thus, this study aims to explore the extent to which the prevalence of fraud risk in state-controlled companies and to enhance understanding of the underlying reasons of the fraudulent activities. Design/methodology/approach As this study is a descriptive and exploratory in nature, an exploratory case study method was used in four state-controlled companies. Using the fraud triangle theory to underpin this study, the qualitative face-to-face interviews were carried out with top management of the companies. Findings The study reveals a high risk of fraud occurrence at state-controlled companies that involve dealing with various suppliers, governments, customers and shareholders, even when standard operating procedures and rules and regulation are in place. The apparent reason for this phenomenon is attributed to not only opportunities but also incentives and rationalisations in engaging fraudulent activities. Originality/value As there are relatively few qualitative studies conducted in this area specifically among Malaysian state-controlled companies, this study extends the fraud literature by examining risk exposure and reasons underlying the fraudulent activities. The findings demonstrate that to a certain extent, the fraud triangle theory explains the motivations behind the fraudulent activities. The finding from this study is relevant to regulators, investors, companies and academicians in understanding, preventing and combating fraud.


2000 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy B. Bell ◽  
Joseph V. Carcello

The auditor's responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting is of continuing importance to both the profession and society. The Auditing Standards Board has recently issued SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, which makes the auditor's responsibility for the detection of material fraud more explicit without increasing the level of responsibility. Using a sample of 77 fraud engagements and 305 nonfraud engagements, we develop and test a logistic regression model that estimates the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting for an audit client, conditioned on the presence or absence of several fraud-risk factors. The significant risk factors included in the final model are: weak internal control environment, rapid company growth, inadequate or inconsistent relative profitability, management places undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections, management lied to the auditors or was overly evasive, the ownership status (public vs. private) of the entity, and an interaction term between a weak control environment and an aggressive management attitude toward financial reporting. The logistic model was significantly more accurate than practicing auditors in assessing risk for the 77 fraud observations. There was not a significant difference between model assessments and those of practicing auditors for the sample of nonfraud cases. These findings suggest that a relatively simple decision aid performs quite well in differentiating between fraud and nonfraud observations. Practitioners might consider using this model, or one developed using a similar procedure, in fulfilling the SAS No. 82 requirement to “assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-19
Author(s):  
Samer H. Alssabagh

This paper aims to identify the most frequent fraud risk factors that affect the nature, timing, and extent of planned audit procedures. The perceptions of both international and local external auditors in the Kurdistan Region, Iraq, were investigated. In general, it was found that the respondents were more interested in assessing fraud risk factors related to misappropriation of assets (84.61%) compared with those related to fraudulent financial reporting (75.43%). Stepwise regression analysis indicates a positive and significant effect of each fraud risk factor related to fraudulent financial reporting that resulted from incentives or pressures and attitudes or rationalization, and the fraud risk factors related to the misappropriation of assets that resulted from attitudes or rationalization on the nature, timing, and extent of the planned audit procedures. However, other fraud risk factors in the study model did not show a significant effect on the audit program plan. The findings of this paper contribute to the existing literature in the area of fraud risk assessment and its effect on planning audit programs in eastern developing countries such as the Kurdistan Region, Iraq.


Author(s):  
Nguyen Tien Hung ◽  
Huynh Van Sau

The study was conducted to identify fraudulent financial statements at listed companies (DNNY) on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE) through the Triangular Fraud Platform This is a test of VSA 240. At the same time, the conformity assessment of this model in the Vietnamese market. The results show that the model is based on two factors: the ratio of sales to total assets and return on assets; an Opportunity Factor (Education Level); and two factors Attitude (change of independent auditors and opinion of independent auditors). This model is capable of accurately forecasting more than 78% of surveyed sample businesses and nearly 72% forecasts for non-research firms.  Keywords Triangle fraud, financial fraud report, VSA 240 References Nguyễn Tiến Hùng & Võ Hồng Đức (2017), “Nhận diện gian lận báo cáo tài chính: Bằng chứng thực nghiệm tại các doanh nghiệp niêm yết ở Việt Nam”, Tạp chí Công Nghệ Ngân Hàng, số 132 (5), tr. 58-72.[2]. Hà Thị Thúy Vân (2016), “Thủ thuật gian lận trong lập báo cáo tài chính của các công ty niêm yết”, Tạp chí tài chính, kỳ 1, tháng 4/2016 (630). [3]. Cressey, D. R. (1953). Other people's money; a study of the social psychology of embezzlement. New York, NY, US: Free Press.[4]. Bộ Tài Chính Việt Nam, (2012). Chuẩn mực kiểm toán Việt Nam số 240 – Trách nhiệm của kiểm toán viên đối với gian lận trong kiểm toán báo cáo tài chính. [5]. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.[6]. Võ Hồng Đức & Phan Bùi Gia Thủy (2014), Quản trị công ty: Lý thuyết và cơ chế kiểm soát, Ấn bản lần 1, Tp.HCM, Nxb Thanh Niên.[7]. Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance 26 (11): 55-67.[9]. Skousen, C. J., Smith, K. R., & Wright, C. J. (2009). Detecting and predicting financial statement fraud: The effectiveness of the fraud triangle and SAS No. 99. Available at SSRN 1295494.[10]. Lou, Y. I., & Wang, M. L. (2011). Fraud risk factor of the fraud triangle assessing the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Business and Economics Research (JBER), 7(2).[11]. Perols, J. L., & Lougee, B. A. (2011). The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud. Advances in Accounting, 27(1), 39-53.[12]. Trần Thị Giang Tân, Nguyễn Trí Tri, Đinh Ngọc Tú, Hoàng Trọng Hiệp và Nguyễn Đinh Hoàng Uyên (2014), “Đánh giá rủi ro gian lận báo cáo tài chính của các công ty niêm yết tại Việt Nam”, Tạp chí Phát triển kinh tế, số 26 (1) tr.74-94.[13]. Kirkos, E., Spathis, C., & Manolopoulos, Y. (2007). Data mining techniques for the detection of fraudulent financial statements. Expert Systems with Applications, 32(4), 995-1003.[14]. Amara, I., Amar, A. B., & Jarboui, A. (2013). Detection of Fraud in Financial Statements: French Companies as a Case Study. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 3(3), 40-51.[15]. Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 443-465.[16]. Beneish, M. D. (1999). The detection of earnings manipulation. Financial Analysts Journal, 55(5), 24-36.[17]. Persons, O. S. (1995). Using financial statement data to identify factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 11(3), 38-46.[18]. Summers, S. L., & Sweeney, J. T. (1998). Fraudulently misstated financial statements and insider trading: An empirical analysis. Accounting Review, 131-146.[19]. Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary accounting research, 13(1), 1-36.[20]. Loebbecke, J. K., Eining, M. M., & Willingham, J. J. (1989). Auditors experience with material irregularities – Frequency, nature, and detectability. Auditing – A journal of practice and Theory, 9(1), 1-28. [21]. Abbott, L. J., Park, Y., & Parker, S. (2000). The effects of audit committee activity and independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance, 26(11), 55-68.[22]. Farber, D. B. (2005). Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter?. The Accounting Review, 80(2), 539-561.[23]. Stice, J. D. (1991). Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. Accounting Review, 516-533.[24]. Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V., & Hermanson, D. R. (1999). COSO's new fraud study: What it means for CPAs. Journal of Accountancy, 187(5), 12.[25]. Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. (1990). Applied statistical models.Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Burr Ridge, IL.[26]. Gujarati, D. N. (2009). Basic econometrics. Tata McGraw-Hill Education.[27]. McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualita-tive Choice Behavior," in Frontiers in Econometrics, P. Zarenm-bka, ed. New York: Academic Press, 105-42.(1989). A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response Models Without Numerical Integration," Econometrica, 54(3), 1027-1058.[28]. DA Cohen, ADey, TZ Lys. (2008), “Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre-and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods”. The accounting review.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 353-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leisa L. Marshall ◽  
James Cali

ABSTRACT This case focuses on fraudulent financial reporting as related to the tone at the top, primarily the chief operating officer, Carole Argo, of SafeNet, Inc. (SafeNet). This case provides students a real-world example by which to apply basic fraud concepts including the fraud triangle, fraud prevention, and red flags (fraud symptoms). Students analyze SafeNet to identify deficiencies and prevention methods, from the perspective of COSO's (2013) Internal Control—Integrated Framework's internal control objectives, components, and principles. Students also analyze SafeNet's corporate governance structure by comparing SafeNet's Board of Directors and its subcommittees pre- and post-SOX. Students learn of stock options as a form of compensation. However, this case does not focus on the details of accounting for stock options. This case is appropriate for students with the financial accounting principles course background. This case was classroom tested in a basic fraud examination course and an internal auditing course. Students' responses in both courses support the use of the case as a learning tool.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-557
Author(s):  
Jesi Rizky Anindya ◽  
Desi Adhariani

Purpose This study aims to determine the fraud risk factors perceived by employees to have the greatest influence on individuals committing fraud as an unethical conduct, as well as to analyze employees’ opinions on fraud prevention program. Design/methodology/approach The fraud risk factors in this study are based on the concept of the fraud triangle as developed by Donald Cressey, as well as examples of situations set out in SAS No. 99. The samples used in this study are company employees who have been selected using the convenience sampling method. Findings A survey of 109 employees reports that none of the three factors (pressure, opportunity and rationalization) has a significant influence on fraud. However, when comparing the factors, the pressure is considered to have the highest impact. In terms of fraud prevention, the employees suggest that it is extremely important to implement all prevention tools, especially with regard to the adequate segregation of duties. Research limitations/implications Limitations of this study in terms of method and small samples are expected to inform future studies to overcome the limitations by using other methods such as interview and by collecting more respondents to gather their perceptions and opinions. Originality/value This study contributed to the literature in confirming the pressure as the dominant factor and in confirming the importance of anti-fraud programs as suggested by the agency theory.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 283
Author(s):  
Sri Astuti ◽  
Zuhrohtun Zuhrohtun ◽  
Kusharyanti Kusharyanti

This study investigates the determinants of fraudulent financial reporting in Indonesia and the responsibility of auditor for fraudulent financial reporting. This study posits that fraud triangle affects the fraudulent financial reporting, and auditors do not give unqualified opinion for fraud firms. The sample consists of 380 firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. The 39 of 380 firms have received punishment from BAPEPAM during 2007-2010 periods. This study uses logistic regression to test the first hypothesis and correlation to test the second hypothesis. The finding suggests that: 1) fraud triangle (opportunity, pressure, and rationalization) does not affect the fraudulent financial reporting; 2) auditor opinion has a positive correlation towards fraudulent financial reporting.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabnam Fazli Aghghaleh ◽  
Zakiah Muhammaddun Mohamed .

The current research studies the usefulness of Cressey’s fraud risk factor framework adopted from SAS No. 99 to prevent fraud from occurring. In accordance with Cressey’s theory, pressure, opportunity and rationalization are existing when fraud occurs. The study suggests variables as proxy measures for pressure and opportunity, and test these variables using publicly available information relating to a set of fraud firms and a sample of no-fraud firms. Two pressure proxies and two opportunity proxies are identified and suggested to be significantly related to financial statement fraud. We find that leverage and sale to account receivable are positively related to the likelihood of fraud. Audit committee size and board of directors’ size are also linked to decrease the level of financial statement fraud. A binary logistic model based on examples of fraud risk factors of fraud triangle model measures the likelihood of financial statement fraud and can assist experts.


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