A Synthesis of Fraud-Related Research

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (Supplement 1) ◽  
pp. 287-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory M. Trompeter ◽  
Tina D. Carpenter ◽  
Naman Desai ◽  
Keith L. Jones ◽  
Richard A. Riley

SUMMARY We synthesize academic literature related to fraudulent financial reporting with dual purposes: (1) to better understand the nature and extent of the existing literature on financial reporting fraud, and (2) to highlight areas where there is need for future research. This project extends the work of Hogan et al. (2008), who completed a similar synthesis project, also sponsored by the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association, in 2005. We synthesize the literature related to fraud by examining accounting and auditing literature post-Hogan et al. (2008) and by summarizing relevant fraud literature from outside of accounting. We review publications in accounting and related disciplines including criminology, ethics, finance, organizational behavior, psychology, and sociology. We synthesize the research around a model that illustrates the auditor's approach to fraud. The model incorporates auditors' use of the fraud triangle (i.e., management's incentive, attitude, and opportunity to commit fraud), their assessment of the existence and effectiveness of the client's anti-fraud measures (e.g., corporate governance mechanisms and internal controls), and their consideration of possible fraud schemes and concealment techniques when making an overall fraud risk assessment of the client. The model further illustrates how auditors can incorporate this assessment into an overall strategy to detect fraud by implementing appropriate fraud-detection procedures. We summarize the recent literature of each component of the model and suggest avenues for future research.

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 1143-1159
Author(s):  
Hafiza Aishah Hashim ◽  
Zalailah Salleh ◽  
Izzati Shuhaimi ◽  
Nurul Ain Najwa Ismail

Purpose A number of highly publicised scandals such as Enron, Lehman Brothers, Parmalat, Satyam, Toshiba and 1MDB (to name a few) have heightened the awareness of the effects of fraudulent financial reporting. While enormous measures have been taken to curb the fraudulent activities among large and small businesses, the issues are still alarming worldwide. Thus, this study aims to explore the extent to which the prevalence of fraud risk in state-controlled companies and to enhance understanding of the underlying reasons of the fraudulent activities. Design/methodology/approach As this study is a descriptive and exploratory in nature, an exploratory case study method was used in four state-controlled companies. Using the fraud triangle theory to underpin this study, the qualitative face-to-face interviews were carried out with top management of the companies. Findings The study reveals a high risk of fraud occurrence at state-controlled companies that involve dealing with various suppliers, governments, customers and shareholders, even when standard operating procedures and rules and regulation are in place. The apparent reason for this phenomenon is attributed to not only opportunities but also incentives and rationalisations in engaging fraudulent activities. Originality/value As there are relatively few qualitative studies conducted in this area specifically among Malaysian state-controlled companies, this study extends the fraud literature by examining risk exposure and reasons underlying the fraudulent activities. The findings demonstrate that to a certain extent, the fraud triangle theory explains the motivations behind the fraudulent activities. The finding from this study is relevant to regulators, investors, companies and academicians in understanding, preventing and combating fraud.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 21-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Wilbanks ◽  
Dana R. Hermanson ◽  
Vineeta D. Sharma

SYNOPSIS This study examines audit committee (AC) oversight of fraudulent financial reporting (FFR) risk and management integrity, and how such oversight varies with AC social ties, professional ties, and governance characteristics. Specifically, based on a survey of 134 U.S. public company AC members, we find that AC participants with social ties (i.e., personal ties) to the CEO are negatively associated with AC actions to assess FFR risk and management integrity. Further, the AC appears to cut back on more observable FFR and MI actions when the responding AC member has a social tie to the CEO, consistent with socially connected ACs being reluctant to engage in observable monitoring actions that could jeopardize a social tie to the CEO. However, AC participants with professional ties to other independent directors and those with professional experience as corporate controllers are positively related to such actions. We also find that AC size is positively related to FFR risk assessment, while female AC participants and those serving on boards with greater independence are more likely to report engaging in AC activities to assess management integrity. Finally, when asked more broadly about who they rely on and who is responsible for assessing the risk of FFR, AC members mainly point to the external audit partner, CFO, and head of internal audit. We discuss implications and directions for future research.


Author(s):  
Yung-I Lou ◽  
Ming-Long Wang

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-justify: inter-ideograph; text-align: justify; line-height: 12pt; margin: 0in 36.1pt 0pt 0.5in; mso-line-height-rule: exactly;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">This research examines risk factors of the fraud triangle, core of all fraud auditing standards, for assessing likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Significant variables, including analyst&rsquo;s forecast error, debt ratio, directors&rsquo; and supervisors&rsquo; stock pledged ratio, percentage of sales related party transaction, number of historical restatements, and number of auditor switch, belong to pressure/incentive, opportunity and attitude/rationalization.</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: DFKai-SB;"> Results indicate </span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">fraudulent reporting</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: DFKai-SB;"> positively correlated to one of the following conditions: more financial pressure of a firm or supervisor of a firm, higher percentage of complex transactions of a firm, more questionable integrity of a firm&rsquo;s managers, or more </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">deterioration in relation between a firm and its auditor</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: DFKai-SB;">. A</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> simple logistic model based on examples of fraud risk factors of ISA 240 and SAS 99 gauges the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting and can benefit practitioners.</span></span></p>


2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Jeffrey Wilks ◽  
Mark F. Zimbelman

This commentary examines academic research that can assist auditors in detecting and preventing fraudulent financial reporting. We review theoretical and empirical research from game theory, social psychology, judgment and decision making, and auditing to identify improvements in audit practice and promising areas for future research. This review focuses on the strategic fraud setting and suggests modifications in auditing standards that should facilitate auditors' use of strategic reasoning in this setting. We emphasize three critical audit tasks—fraud risk assessment, audit planning, and audit plan implementation—and recommend changes to current auditing standards and identify potential research questions for each task.


Author(s):  
Nguyen Tien Hung ◽  
Huynh Van Sau

The study was conducted to identify fraudulent financial statements at listed companies (DNNY) on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE) through the Triangular Fraud Platform This is a test of VSA 240. At the same time, the conformity assessment of this model in the Vietnamese market. The results show that the model is based on two factors: the ratio of sales to total assets and return on assets; an Opportunity Factor (Education Level); and two factors Attitude (change of independent auditors and opinion of independent auditors). This model is capable of accurately forecasting more than 78% of surveyed sample businesses and nearly 72% forecasts for non-research firms.  Keywords Triangle fraud, financial fraud report, VSA 240 References Nguyễn Tiến Hùng & Võ Hồng Đức (2017), “Nhận diện gian lận báo cáo tài chính: Bằng chứng thực nghiệm tại các doanh nghiệp niêm yết ở Việt Nam”, Tạp chí Công Nghệ Ngân Hàng, số 132 (5), tr. 58-72.[2]. Hà Thị Thúy Vân (2016), “Thủ thuật gian lận trong lập báo cáo tài chính của các công ty niêm yết”, Tạp chí tài chính, kỳ 1, tháng 4/2016 (630). [3]. Cressey, D. R. (1953). Other people's money; a study of the social psychology of embezzlement. New York, NY, US: Free Press.[4]. Bộ Tài Chính Việt Nam, (2012). Chuẩn mực kiểm toán Việt Nam số 240 – Trách nhiệm của kiểm toán viên đối với gian lận trong kiểm toán báo cáo tài chính. [5]. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.[6]. Võ Hồng Đức & Phan Bùi Gia Thủy (2014), Quản trị công ty: Lý thuyết và cơ chế kiểm soát, Ấn bản lần 1, Tp.HCM, Nxb Thanh Niên.[7]. Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance 26 (11): 55-67.[9]. Skousen, C. J., Smith, K. R., & Wright, C. J. (2009). Detecting and predicting financial statement fraud: The effectiveness of the fraud triangle and SAS No. 99. Available at SSRN 1295494.[10]. Lou, Y. I., & Wang, M. L. (2011). Fraud risk factor of the fraud triangle assessing the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Business and Economics Research (JBER), 7(2).[11]. Perols, J. L., & Lougee, B. A. (2011). The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud. Advances in Accounting, 27(1), 39-53.[12]. Trần Thị Giang Tân, Nguyễn Trí Tri, Đinh Ngọc Tú, Hoàng Trọng Hiệp và Nguyễn Đinh Hoàng Uyên (2014), “Đánh giá rủi ro gian lận báo cáo tài chính của các công ty niêm yết tại Việt Nam”, Tạp chí Phát triển kinh tế, số 26 (1) tr.74-94.[13]. Kirkos, E., Spathis, C., & Manolopoulos, Y. (2007). Data mining techniques for the detection of fraudulent financial statements. Expert Systems with Applications, 32(4), 995-1003.[14]. Amara, I., Amar, A. B., & Jarboui, A. (2013). Detection of Fraud in Financial Statements: French Companies as a Case Study. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 3(3), 40-51.[15]. Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 443-465.[16]. Beneish, M. D. (1999). The detection of earnings manipulation. Financial Analysts Journal, 55(5), 24-36.[17]. Persons, O. S. (1995). Using financial statement data to identify factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 11(3), 38-46.[18]. Summers, S. L., & Sweeney, J. T. (1998). Fraudulently misstated financial statements and insider trading: An empirical analysis. Accounting Review, 131-146.[19]. Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary accounting research, 13(1), 1-36.[20]. Loebbecke, J. K., Eining, M. M., & Willingham, J. J. (1989). Auditors experience with material irregularities – Frequency, nature, and detectability. Auditing – A journal of practice and Theory, 9(1), 1-28. [21]. Abbott, L. J., Park, Y., & Parker, S. (2000). The effects of audit committee activity and independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance, 26(11), 55-68.[22]. Farber, D. B. (2005). Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter?. The Accounting Review, 80(2), 539-561.[23]. Stice, J. D. (1991). Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. Accounting Review, 516-533.[24]. Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V., & Hermanson, D. R. (1999). COSO's new fraud study: What it means for CPAs. Journal of Accountancy, 187(5), 12.[25]. Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. (1990). Applied statistical models.Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Burr Ridge, IL.[26]. Gujarati, D. N. (2009). Basic econometrics. Tata McGraw-Hill Education.[27]. McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualita-tive Choice Behavior," in Frontiers in Econometrics, P. Zarenm-bka, ed. New York: Academic Press, 105-42.(1989). A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response Models Without Numerical Integration," Econometrica, 54(3), 1027-1058.[28]. DA Cohen, ADey, TZ Lys. (2008), “Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre-and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods”. The accounting review.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin W Hoffman ◽  
John L. Campbell ◽  
Jason L. Smith

We investigate the stock market's reaction to events leading up to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) 2007 regulatory changes that reduced the scope of and documentation requirements for assessments of firms' internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR), as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The stated goal of these regulations was to reduce firms' and auditors' compliance costs with mandatory ICFR assessments, while maintaining the effectiveness of these assessments. We examine abnormal returns surrounding key dates leading to the passage of these regulations and offer two main findings. First, investors reacted negatively on key event dates, suggesting that investors viewed the regulations as likely to reduce financial reporting quality rather than to drive firm and audit efficiencies. Second, this negative market reaction is larger when ICFR effectiveness should matter most - when firms are more complex, have higher litigation risk, and greater fraud risk. In additional analysis, we find that restatements increase in the post-regulation time period, consistent with investors' concerns that the effect of the legislation would be a reduction in ICFR effectiveness. Overall, our results may imply that investors prefer stronger government regulation when it comes to the assessments of a firm's internal controls over financial reporting.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 353-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leisa L. Marshall ◽  
James Cali

ABSTRACT This case focuses on fraudulent financial reporting as related to the tone at the top, primarily the chief operating officer, Carole Argo, of SafeNet, Inc. (SafeNet). This case provides students a real-world example by which to apply basic fraud concepts including the fraud triangle, fraud prevention, and red flags (fraud symptoms). Students analyze SafeNet to identify deficiencies and prevention methods, from the perspective of COSO's (2013) Internal Control—Integrated Framework's internal control objectives, components, and principles. Students also analyze SafeNet's corporate governance structure by comparing SafeNet's Board of Directors and its subcommittees pre- and post-SOX. Students learn of stock options as a form of compensation. However, this case does not focus on the details of accounting for stock options. This case is appropriate for students with the financial accounting principles course background. This case was classroom tested in a basic fraud examination course and an internal auditing course. Students' responses in both courses support the use of the case as a learning tool.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 283
Author(s):  
Sri Astuti ◽  
Zuhrohtun Zuhrohtun ◽  
Kusharyanti Kusharyanti

This study investigates the determinants of fraudulent financial reporting in Indonesia and the responsibility of auditor for fraudulent financial reporting. This study posits that fraud triangle affects the fraudulent financial reporting, and auditors do not give unqualified opinion for fraud firms. The sample consists of 380 firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. The 39 of 380 firms have received punishment from BAPEPAM during 2007-2010 periods. This study uses logistic regression to test the first hypothesis and correlation to test the second hypothesis. The finding suggests that: 1) fraud triangle (opportunity, pressure, and rationalization) does not affect the fraudulent financial reporting; 2) auditor opinion has a positive correlation towards fraudulent financial reporting.


Author(s):  
Gilles Serra

The way political parties select their candidates should be considered a fundamental topic in political science. In spite of being profoundly consequential in several regards, candidate selection methods were understudied for a long time in the academic literature. A renewed awareness of the implications of different nomination rules, along with an increased use of primary elections around the world, has accelerated this research in the last two decades. This chapter reviews the main areas of inquiry regarding candidate selection as reflected in contemporary research. It surveys the most recent literature asking four broad questions about candidate selection methods: What types are there? What consequences do they have? What are their origins? What questions can be formulated for future research? The chapter aims to convey that research on candidate selection is important, growing, and full of open questions.


Author(s):  
Sana Masmoudi Mardessi ◽  
Yosra Makni Makni Fourati

Recently, numerous financial scandals (WorldCom, Enron, Parmalat, eToys) have shown that plentiful companies produce manipulated financial information. Consequently, regulators have prescribed corporate governance structures to protect investors and to avoid fraudulent financial reporting which are likely to control managers and limit their opportunistic behavior. Thus, there has been much debate over the extent to which corporate governance is playing a crucial role in increasing financial reporting quality from the theoretical perspective of agency theory, signaling theory, and stakeholder theory. This chapter aims at scrutinizing the internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance mainly the audit committee in the Dutch context. Firstly, the authors expose the numerous corporate governance mechanisms. Secondly, they focus on the audit committee as the main component of corporate governance, and they present the theoretical background, the role, and the characteristics of audit committee. Eventually, they exhibit the regulatory background of the Dutch context of the audit committee.


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