Cyber Diplomacy

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Andreea DRAGOMIR

The article aims to highlight issues related to the risks to both the European Union and the Member States, but at the same time seeks to highlight current legislative and political approaches applicable in cyberspace. This set of tools used in cyber diplomacy includes the concepts of cooperation and diplomatic dialogue (common cyber network of EU states, common cyber defense unit) but also measures to prevent cyber-attacks (European Union Cyber Security Strategy), as well as sanctions. Throughout this presentation, the main idea is supported by the cross-border nature of cyberspace.

Author(s):  
Thomas Faist

Europe, and the European Union in particular, can be conceived as a transnational social space with a high degree of transactions across borders of member states. The question is how efforts to provide social protection for cross-border migrants in the EU reinforce existing inequalities (e.g. between regions or within households), and lead to new types of inequalities (e.g. stratification of labour markets). Social protection in the EU falls predominantly under the purview of individual member states; hence, frictions between different state-operated protection systems and social protection in small groups are particularly apparent in the case of cross-border flows of people and resources. Chapter 5 examines in detail the general social mechanisms operative in cross-border forms of social protection, in particular, exclusion, opportunity hoarding, hierarchization, and exploitation, and also more concrete mechanisms which need to be constructed bottom-up.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 184-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Schneider ◽  
Bernd Parusel

Political actors in the European Union and in the eu member states have arrived to maintain that managed circular migration can generate benefits both for the destination countries and for the countries of origin of the migrants. Despite the fact that Germany so far has barely engaged in fostering circular migration through distinct programmes, a not inconsiderable share of foreigners from third countries living in Germany today can be viewed as circular migrants. This paper takes an inventory of the extent and characteristics of such spontaneous back-and-forth cross border movements by providing a specific, clear-cut definition for circular migration and thus analysing stock data on third country nationals residing in Germany. Furthermore, we scrutinise the German legal framework with a view to its propensity to encourage patterns of circular migration.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 46-62
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Kudzin-Borkowska

W artykule podjęto problematykę cyberbezpieczeństwa w Grupie Wyszehradzkiej. Mimo że w nauce pojawia się wiele terminów dotyczących bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego, jednak w ostatnich latach w dokumentach strategicznych dominuje kategoria pojęciowa „cyberbezpieczeństwo”. W Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Cybernetycznego Unii Europejskiej z 7 marca 2013 r. stwierdza się, że bezpieczeństwo cybernetyczne odnosi się do zabezpieczeń i działań, które mogą być wykorzystywane do ochrony domeny cybernetycznej, zarówno cywilnej, jak i wojskowej, przed tymi zagrożeniami, które dotyczą jej współzależnych sieci i infrastruktury informatycznej oraz które mogą te sieci oraz tę infrastrukturę uszkodzić. Państwa Grupy Wyszehradzkiej wypracowały swoje własne strategie cyberbezpieczeństwa na podstawie światowych wzorców w tej dziedzinie. W tych dokumentach deklarują wprawdzie gotowość współpracy międzynarodowej, także środkowoeuropejskiej, jednak widać, że każde z nich ma ambicje odgrywania roli środkowoeuropejskiego lidera. Cybersecurity in the Visegrad Group – concepts and strategies The article discusses the issues of cybersecurity in the Visegrad Group. There is a wide spectrum of information security terminology, but the conceptual category of cybersecurity has dominated strategic documents in recent years. The European Union Cyber Security Strategy of 7, March 2013, claims that cybersecurity commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. The Visegrad Group countries have developed their own cybersecurity strategies based on global models in this field. However, in these strategic documents they declare readiness for broad international cooperation, including Central European, it can be seen that each of them strives to play the role of a leader in Central Europe.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viacheslav Lyashenko ◽  
Iryna Pidorycheva

By signing the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, Ukraine has demonstrated its intention and willingness to integrate into the system of formal institutions of the EU, to adopt the EU rules, norms, and practices, which will enable Ukraine to achieve significant economic benefits. One of those benefits is the opportunity to build a true scientific-educational and innovative partnership with the EU Member States within the European Research Area. This study considers opportunities and perspectives of creating an interstate and cross-border scientific-educational and innovative spaces between Ukraine as an associated country and the European Union Member States taking into account key priorities of the ERA and rapidly growing impact of digital technologies. Particular attention has been given to the establishment of a common Polish-Ukrainian scientific-educational space which could be complemented by the entrepreneurial component. The article has identified opportunities, existing prerequisites, directions, and priorities for building Polish-Ukrainian spaces. It has also defined the challenges of formation the European interstate and cross-border scientific-educational and innovative spaces as a whole. It has been suggested to develop hereinafter an interstate and cross-border high-tech clusters based on the interstate and cross-border scientific-educational and innovative spaces. The scheme and the main steps of formation a cross-border cluster of nano- and biotechnologies are proposed.


Author(s):  
Volodymyr Hoblyk ◽  
◽  
Maryna Resler ◽  
Yaroslava Demyan ◽  
◽  
...  

The article examines the attraction of foreign investment in the Transcarpathian region within the cross-border region. Investment cooperation with the territories bordering the countries of the European Union - Poland, Romania, and Hungary - is analyzed. Slovakia. It is established that the most intensive cooperation is carried out in the Ukrainian-Hungarian cross-border region. In addition to foreign direct investment, Hungary provides both lending assistance and through Egan Ede's Economic Development Program, strengthening economic, cultural, and historical ties with its border areas. Using statistical methods, the inflow of foreign direct investment in the Transcarpathian region is analyzed. It is established that the total volume of foreign direct investment is 243 million US dollars, including from the countries of the European Union 225.3 million US dollars, which is 92.7% of the total. It is determined that the greatest interest among foreign investors by type of economic activity is as follows: industry - 77.3% (total), wholesale and retail trade - 5.2%, then - transport, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, construction, real estate transactions. The share of Hungarian investments in the Transcarpathian region is most significant among neighboring countries. The possibilities of using the experience of Hungary in the administrative-territorial and land reform and the possibility of applying it in territorial communities are considered. It is proposed to create an association of agricultural producers in the united communities with the participation of farmers, private farms, and foreign investors. The methodology and principles of creating the association are laid down. The study identified factors that hinder the process of investing and improving the investment climate in the cross-border region. The most important is the insufficient development of border infrastructure, inadequate institutional support for investment activities, low quality of human capital, the inertia of border business.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel

This article examines the extent to which the fundamental freedom of the internal market to receive trade union services in a different Member State could be relied on to enhance labour protection within the European Union. Arguing that Article 56 TFEU and the 2006 Services Directive in theory can at least play a basic role in this regard, the article offers an overview of the scope and limits of the freedom to receive services in this context. The analysis also assesses the extent to which the cross-border receiving of trade union services could be exploited further as an additional means further to contribute to the realisation of a more social Europe


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Anna Kańciak

The ability to conduct attacks in cyberspace from any location in the world, together with a high level of anonymity for the perpetrator, underlines the global nature of this issue. Consequently, threats within cyberspace have become one of the most serious challenges for the national and economic security of countries. The immaterial character of cyberspace and the threats emerging from within its framework transcend borders in respect of both the subject and territorial dimension. The illegal activities conducted in cyberspace are also connected with the low, and constantly decreasing, costs of initiating and conducting attacks along with the relatively high possibility of by the attacking entity remaining anonymous.3 Cyber-security strategies are the response of the European Union and its Member States to the emerging threats. Developing national strategies is a relatively new trend. In such documents Member States present their national perspective in respect of cyberspace protection as well as the rules of conduct, perception of the threat, risk assessment and a strategic objective complemented by other specific objectives. These documents help national decision-makers with policy making in terms of cyberspace protection and the allocation of the resources essential for its development. Apart from cyberspace, strategies designate crucial areas of the state’s functioning as principal area of the protection that require special preventive action, i.e. critical infrastructure, economic development, national security, social development and a sense of security as a component within information-communications technologies applications.


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