An Analysis of the Legal Systems and Mechanisms Introduced in the European Union in the Fight Against Cyberspace Threats

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Anna Kańciak

The ability to conduct attacks in cyberspace from any location in the world, together with a high level of anonymity for the perpetrator, underlines the global nature of this issue. Consequently, threats within cyberspace have become one of the most serious challenges for the national and economic security of countries. The immaterial character of cyberspace and the threats emerging from within its framework transcend borders in respect of both the subject and territorial dimension. The illegal activities conducted in cyberspace are also connected with the low, and constantly decreasing, costs of initiating and conducting attacks along with the relatively high possibility of by the attacking entity remaining anonymous.3 Cyber-security strategies are the response of the European Union and its Member States to the emerging threats. Developing national strategies is a relatively new trend. In such documents Member States present their national perspective in respect of cyberspace protection as well as the rules of conduct, perception of the threat, risk assessment and a strategic objective complemented by other specific objectives. These documents help national decision-makers with policy making in terms of cyberspace protection and the allocation of the resources essential for its development. Apart from cyberspace, strategies designate crucial areas of the state’s functioning as principal area of the protection that require special preventive action, i.e. critical infrastructure, economic development, national security, social development and a sense of security as a component within information-communications technologies applications.

Author(s):  
Artur Nowak-Far

AbstractAt present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.


2014 ◽  
Vol 66 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 35-50
Author(s):  
Nikola Jokanovic

This paper will discuss the economic relations between the European Union and the People?s Republic of China. The introductory part will make an insight into the position of China in the contemporary global economy. The following part of the paper will analyze China-EU trade relations. The topics included will be a general overview of these relations since their establishing in 1975 as well as the European Union?s attitude towards the Chinese WTO membership. The Sino-EU partnership and competition will also be described and it will be followed by an overview of the Sino-EU High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (HED). The concluding topics in this part of the paper will include Sino-EU trade flows, perceived obstacles to trade and investment as well as recent trade disputes between two trading partners. The third part of the paper will deal with Sino-EU investment flows (with an emphasis on Chinese investments in EU member states). After the introductory remarks concerning the EU investments originating from China, the paper will shed light on particular EU member states which are preferred for Chinese investment as well as the industries in which Chinese companies are willing to invest. The concluding part of this paper will offer possible development of relations between the EU and China in the near future.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-424
Author(s):  
Artur TIM

The issue of economic security and fiscal matters are closely connected to each other, especially taking into account the massive non-taxation of the digital business models, which can be observed in the present economic reality. The non-effective taxation of the digital business models together with fiscal losses caused by this phenomenon are nowadays as high on the international, political agenda as e.g. climate change. European Union has been even called as “vulnerable” to tax planning activities, made by digital enterprises. The essence of the discussed in the Article issue is that the fundamental rules of the international tax law were created in the late 19th century and well-established during the 20th century – in the reality, in which the digital business models could not have been even predicted. As a result of application of these outdated rules, the income generated in the source state cannot be there taxed. Furthermore, this activity does not constitute a breach of tax law and cannot be perceived as tax evasion or tax avoidance. The European Commission initiated the proceedings against Ireland for illegal state aid, received by Apple in the amount of 13 billion EUR (taxes unpaid in relation to transfer pricing rules, unlawfully approved by the Irish tax authorities). Almost at the same time, as a result of D. Trump’s tax reform, Apple agreed to pay voluntary in the U.S. 38 billion USD in taxes, invest350 billion USD and create there over 20.000 jobs. In Spring 2018, as a result of the demand requested by the Member States, the European Commission presented a project to overcome non-effective taxation of the digital business models in the European Union. However, the adoption of the project is unlikely to happen– for the reason of the requirement to reach unanimity between states (until now some states expressed objections or even rejected the project), as well as grounding the long-term solution on the idea, which has already been rejected by the Member States in 2011.In the article the Author describes the reasons for a lack of effective taxation of the digital business models in the source state, outlines the essence of the economic security and influence on it made by the tax planning schemes, applied by digital enterprises, as well as drafts the particular position of the Multi-National Enterprises in the post-globalised world. In the article are also presented means of reaction, coined on the international and European level to overcome that challenge, posed before the modern societies. The Author stresses also that having regard these particularities of the income taxation, in the international tax law doctrine more and more often the idea of abolishing income taxes is taken into consideration, especially in relation to the CIT (corporate income tax).


Author(s):  
A. Stavytskyy

The paper considers the issue of ensuring the level of economic security in Europe. Based on the panel gravity model, a regression was estimated for 49 European countries for 1991–2017. The investigation tested six different hypothesis about the channels of dissimilation of economic security level in Europe. The results provided an opportunity to determine the factors affecting the spread of a high level of economic security to neighbouring countries. It was stated that some factors play an important role in the process of exchanging best practices, technologies, human capital, etc. In particular, such factors can be mentioned: the economic security index of the neighbouring country, the difference in the indices of economic security between countries, the distance between countries, the existence of common borders, the country’s participation in the European Union, the introduction of the euro in the country. It was shown that European countries have not yet exhausted the potential of developing their own economic security. For example, the expansion of the European Union, of course, subject to the principles of its functioning, can increase the general security level by about 1,5 %. Also, it was stated that distances cease to play a decisive role for the spreading the technologies, goods, services. This means that taking into account the development of Europe’s transport infrastructure, it is possible to quickly disseminate the latest trends in economic security among countries. Economic growth and equalization in economic conditions offset the differences between countries. The growth of the economic security index in neighbouring countries is sufficiently significant. Thus, it is beneficial for all countries to have prosperous neighbours around them. At the same time, an increase in the economic security index is possible only with a significant increase in competition.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrián González-Marrón ◽  
Jose M Martínez-Sánchez

AbstractThe Angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) protein is the receptor for different coronaviruses, including Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the causative agent of Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Previous studies suggested the hypothesis that nicotine could downregulate the expression of the ACE2. Due to the high level of nicotine intake, the objective of this preliminary study was to assess, at the ecological level, the correlation between tobacco smoking and the attack rate and severity of COVID-19 in the European Union (EU). We have found that there is a statistically significant negative correlation between the age-standardized prevalence of tobacco smoking and the attack rate of COVID-19 in member states of the EU [Spearman’s correlation coefficient = −0.476 (95% confidence interval −0.117, −0.725) (p-value = 0.012)], meaning that in member states with a higher age-standardized prevalence of tobacco smoking the attack rate of COVID-19 has been so far lower. Further research is needed to understand the possible effect of nicotine exposure in the expression of the ACE2 protein.


2001 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 256-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maeve McDonagh

There has been a high level of activity in the development of standards concerning access to public sector information in Europe in recent years. At domestic level, freedom of information (FOI) legislation has been introduced to the overwhelming majority of member states of the European Union and to a number of former Eastern bloc countries. Freedom of Information has also increased its impact at supra national level, both in terms of progress towards the development by international bodies such as the European Union and the Council of Europe of FOI norms for their Member States and with respect to the opening up of access to documents of the international institutions themselves. There is, however, considerable variation in the content and scope of the various FOI measures introduced. The aim of this paper is to assess the scope and operation of two contrasting examples of recently introduced or proposed FOI measures, namely the Irish FOI Act and the proposed Regulation on Access to Documents of the European Institutions. The overall theme of the paper is that strong FOI measures are needed to combat the tendency toward secrecy in public administration in Europe but that even where access measures are relatively strong in their formulation, their effectiveness can be limited through under-funding or more direct interference with the operation of the access scheme.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Kitti Füzesi

The EU–Brazil Strategic Partnership established in 2007 was the result of a long process. Within the framework of the Strategic Partnership the negotiations were carried out in three levels, between the Union and Brazil, the EU and Mercosur, and Brazil and the Member States of the Union. From the several important objectives specified at the yearly organised high-level summits the paper emphasises two areas, the economic and trade cooperation, and the energy cooperation. In the past thirteen years significant improvement could be experienced in both sectors.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Cesarec

States, organizations and individuals are becoming targets of both individual and state-sponsored cyber-attacks, by those who recognize the impact of disrupting security systems and effect to people and governments. The energy sector is seen as one of the main targets of cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure, but transport, public sector services, telecommunications and critical (manufacturing) industries are also very vulnerable. One of most used example of cyber-attack is the Ukraine power grid attack in 2015 that left 230,000 people without power for up to 6 hours. Another most high profile example of a cyber-attack against critical infrastructure is the Stuxnet computer virus (first used on Iranian nuclear facility) which could be adapted to attack the SCADA systems (industrial control systems) used by many critical infrastructures in Europe.Wide range of critical infrastructure sectors are reliant on industrial control systems for monitoring processes and controlling physical devices (sensors, pumps, etc.) and for that reason, physical connected devices that support industrial processes are becoming more vulnerable. Not all critical infrastructure operators in all sectors are adequately prepared to manage protection (and raise resilience) effectively across both cyber and physical environments. Additionally there are few challenges in implementation of protection measures, such as lack of collaboration between private and public sector and low levels of awareness on existence of national key legislation.From supranational aspect, in relation to this papers topic, the European Union has took first step in defense to cyber threats in 2016 with „Directive on security of network and information systems“ (NIS Directive) by prescribing member states to adopt more rigid cyber-security standards. The aim of directive is to improve the deterrent and increase the EU’s defenses and reactions to cyber attacks by expanding the cyber security capacity, increasing collaboration at an EU level and introducing measures to prevent risk and handle cyber incidents. There are lot of other „supporting tools“ for Member States countries, such as European Union Agency for Network and Information Security – ENISA (which organize regular cyber security exercises at an EU level, including a large and comprehensive exercise every two years, raising preparedness of EU states); Network of National Coordination Centers and the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre; and Coordinated response to major cyber security incidents and crises (Blueprint) with aim to ensure a rapid and coordinated response to large-scale cyber attacks by setting out suitable processes within the EU.Yet, not all Member States share the same capacities for achieving the highest level of cyber-security. They need to continuously work on enhancing the capability of defense against cyber threats as increased risk to state institutions information and communication systems but also the critical infrastructure objects. In Southeast Europe there are few additional challenges – some countries even don't have designated critical infrastructures (lower level of protection; lack of „clear vision“ of criticality) and critical infrastructures are only perceived through physical prism; non-EU countries are not obligated to follow requirements of European Union and its legislation, and there are interdependencies and transboundary cross-sector effects that needs to be taken in consideration. Critical infrastructure Protection (CIP) is the primary area of action, and for some of SEE countries (like the Republic of Croatia) the implementation of cyber security provisions just complements comprehensive activities which are focused on physical protection.This paper will analyze few segments of how SEE countries cope with new security challenges and on which level are they prepared for cyber-attacks and threats: 1. Which security mechanisms they use; 2. The existing legislation (Acts, Strategies, Plan of Action, etc.) related to cyber threats in correlation with strategic critical infrastructure protection documents. Analysis will have two perspectives: from EU member states and from non-EU member states point of view. Additionally, for EU member states it will be analyzed if there were any cyber security legislation before NIS directive that meets same aims. The aim of research is to have an overall picture of efforts in region regarding cyber-security as possibility for improvement thorough cooperation, organizational measures, etc. providing also some recommendations to reduce the gap in the level of cyber-security development with other regions of EU.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Andreea DRAGOMIR

The article aims to highlight issues related to the risks to both the European Union and the Member States, but at the same time seeks to highlight current legislative and political approaches applicable in cyberspace. This set of tools used in cyber diplomacy includes the concepts of cooperation and diplomatic dialogue (common cyber network of EU states, common cyber defense unit) but also measures to prevent cyber-attacks (European Union Cyber Security Strategy), as well as sanctions. Throughout this presentation, the main idea is supported by the cross-border nature of cyberspace.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-173
Author(s):  
Paulina Pukin

This article discusses connections between dimensions of culture and the size of the shadow economy in the European Union member states. Critical perusal of the literature led to the development of the theoretical ground, while statistical analysis revealed connections between the shadow economy and the dimensions of culture. The research findings suggest a strong stochastic relation of the culture in a given country and the size of its shadow economy. Countries with a high level of complacency, distrust of the authorities, collectivism and aversion to uncertainty are characterized by shadow economies of a substantial size.


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