scholarly journals Struktura rewolucji relatywistycznej i kwantowej w fizyce, czyli o systematyczności badań naukowych i roli kantyzmu we współczesnej filozofii nauki

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 51-58
Author(s):  
Marek Sikora

The article is a voice in the discussion on Wojciech Sady’s book Struktura rewolucji relatywistycznej i kwantowej w fizyce [The Structure of Relativistic and Quantum Revolution in Physics]. The author points out that the central idea of this book directly refers to the works of Thomas Kuhn, who emphasized the role of revolutions in the process of scientific development. Sady criticizes this position, claiming that the development of science is primarily determined by systematic research. The author also argues with Sady’s thesis that an important consequence of the relativistic and quantum revolution in physics is the fundamental questioning of the value of Kant’s philosophy. The text tries to show that Kantism is still present in contemporary philosophy of science.

Author(s):  
Ronald Hoinski ◽  
Ronald Polansky

David Hoinski and Ronald Polansky’s “The Modern Aristotle: Michael Polanyi’s Search for Truth against Nihilism” shows how the general tendencies of contemporary philosophy of science disclose a return to the Aristotelian emphasis on both the formation of dispositions to know and the role of the mind in theoretical science. Focusing on a comparison of Michael Polanyi and Aristotle, Hoinski and Polansky investigate to what degree Aristotelian thought retains its purchase on reality in the face of the changes wrought by modern science. Polanyi’s approach relies on several Aristotelian assumptions, including the naturalness of the human desire to know, the institutional and personal basis for the accumulation of knowledge, and the endorsement of realism against objectivism. Hoinski and Polansky emphasize the promise of Polanyi’s neo-Aristotelian framework, which argues that science is won through reflection on reality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 69-74
Author(s):  
Mateusz Kotowski

In his book Struktura rewolucji relatywistycznej i kwantowej w fizyce [The Structure of Relativistic and Quantum Revolution in Physics] Wojciech Sady presents a view on the thesis of underdetermination, according to which it should be regarded as a pseudoproblem of contemporary philosophy of science. I reject this view and suggest that Sady’s argumentation against the thesis of underdetermination is tantamount to attacking a straw man. This is because he argues against its correctness by pointing to the incorrectness of the conclusions he unjustifiably draws from it.


2010 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-26
Author(s):  
Svetozar Sindjelic

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to answer the question is it possible to speak about some kind of Kantian turn in the transition from the traditional philosophy of science to the contemporary one. Second, and more important, to describe the main points of the new philosophy of science just through the discussion of above question. The author is of the opinion that it is possible to speak about Kantian turn in the new philosophy of science (the philosophy which underlines the role of an a priori and conventional conceptual framework), but he also indicates certain important differences between Kantian original position and the new philosophy of science.


Author(s):  
Eric Schliesser

This chapter articulates Adam Smith’s philosophy of science. The first section emphasizes the significance of Smith’s social conception of science—science takes place, not always comfortably, within a larger society and is itself a social enterprise in which our emotions play a crucial role. Even so, in Smith’s view science ultimately is a reason-giving enterprise, akin to how he understands the role of the impartial spectator. The second and third sections explain Smith’s attitude to theorizing and its relationship, if any, to Humean skepticism. Smith distinguishes between theory acceptance and the possibility of criticism; while he accepts fallibilism, he also embraces scientific revolutions and even instances of psychological incommensurability. His philosophy is not an embrace of Humean skepticism, but a modest realism. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of Smith’s analysis of scientific systems as machines.


Author(s):  
Alexander Reutlinger ◽  
Juha Saatsi

What is a scientific explanation? This has been a central question in philosophy of science at least since Hempel and Oppenheim’s pivotal attempt at an answer in 1948 (also known as the covering-law model of explanation; Hempel 1965: chapter 10). It is no surprise that this question has retained its place at the heart of contemporary philosophy of science, given that it is one of the sciences’ key aims to provide ...


Explanations are very important to us in many contexts: in science, mathematics, philosophy, and also in everyday and juridical contexts. But what is an explanation? In the philosophical study of explanation, there is long-standing, influential tradition that links explanation intimately to causation: we often explain by providing accurate information about the causes of the phenomenon to be explained. Such causal accounts have been the received view of the nature of explanation, particularly in philosophy of science, since the 1980s. However, philosophers have recently begun to break with this causal tradition by shifting their focus to kinds of explanation that do not turn on causal information. The increasing recognition of the importance of such non-causal explanations in the sciences and elsewhere raises pressing questions for philosophers of explanation. What is the nature of non-causal explanations—and which theory best captures it? How do non-causal explanations relate to causal ones? How are non-causal explanations in the sciences related to those in mathematics and metaphysics? This volume of new essays explores answers to these and other questions at the heart of contemporary philosophy of explanation. The essays address these questions from a variety of perspectives, including general accounts of non-causal and causal explanations, as well as a wide range of detailed case studies of non-causal explanations from the sciences, mathematics and metaphysics.


The concept of a law of nature, while familiar, is deeply puzzling. Theorists such as Descartes think a divine being governs the universe according to the laws which follow from that being’s own nature. Newton detaches the concept from theology and is agnostic about the ontology underlying the laws of nature. Some later philosophers treat laws as summaries of events or tools for understanding and explanation, or identify the laws with principles and equations fundamental to scientific theories. In the first part of this volume, essays from leading historians of philosophy identify central questions: are laws independent of the things they govern, or do they emanate from the powers of bodies? Are the laws responsible for the patterns we see in nature, or should they be collapsed into those patterns? In the second part, contributors at the forefront of current debate evaluate the role of laws in contemporary Best System, perspectival, Kantian, and powers- or mechanisms-based approaches. These essays take up pressing questions about whether the laws of nature can be consistent with contingency, whether laws are based on the invariants of scientific theories, and how to deal with exceptions to laws. These twelve essays, published here for the first time, will be required reading for anyone interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the histories of these disciplines.


Author(s):  
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger

AbstractHub Zwart’s article is about the idea—and the practice—of an embedded philosophy of science, that is, a philosophy participating in and at the same time reflecting about the current state of the sciences facing the Anthropocene, to which I am very sympathetic. There are, however, two caveats. The first is that participation is always in danger to end up in a more or less uncritical eulogy, in the present case of synthetic biology. The second is that I have doubts about packing the historical path of scientific development into the Procrustes bed of Hegelian dialectics. This usually leads to one or the other form of teleology.


Crystals ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 286
Author(s):  
Edward R.T. Tiekink

A search of the Cambridge Structural Database was conducted for pyridyl-substituted dithiocarbamate ligands. This entailed molecules containing both an NCS2− residue and pyridyl group(s), in order to study their complexation behavior in their transition metal and main group element crystals, i.e., d- and p-block elements. In all, 73 different structures were identified with 30 distinct dithiocarbamate ligands. As a general observation, the structures of the transition metal dithiocarbamates resembled those of their non-pyridyl derivatives, there being no role for the pyridyl-nitrogen atom in coordination. While the same is true for many main group element dithiocarbamates, a far greater role for coordination of the pyridyl-nitrogen atoms was evident, in particular, for the heavier elements. The participation of pyridyl-nitrogen in coordination often leads to the formation of dimeric aggregates but also one-dimensional chains and two-dimensional arrays. Capricious behaviour in closely related species that adopted very different architectures is noted. Sometimes different molecules comprising the asymmetric-unit of a crystal behave differently. The foregoing suggests this to be an area in early development and is a fertile avenue for systematic research for probing further crystallization outcomes and for the rational generation of supramolecular architectures.


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