scholarly journals Public Health Events Emergency Management Supervision Strategy Considering New Media and Citizen Participation

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bingjie Lu ◽  
Lilong Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
New Media ◽  
Emergency Management ◽  
Citizen Participation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Health Events ◽  
Government Department ◽  
The Government ◽  
Pharmaceutical Enterprises

Abstract Public health events endanger the citizen health, economic development, social stability and national security seriously. Emergency management requires the joint participation of multiple parties. Therefore, we construct an evolutionary game model involving government department, pharmaceutical enterprises, citizens and new media, analyze the evolutionary stability, solve the stable equilibrium points using the Lyapunov first method and conduct the simulation analysis with Matlab 2020b. The results show that, firstly, the greater the probability of citizens making true evaluation, the more inclined the government department is to strictly implement the emergency management system, and when true evaluation causes the government department to bear more punishment, the probability that the government department doesn't strictly implement is smaller; secondly, when the probability of citizens making true evaluation decreases, new media are more inclined to report after verification, and when new media lose more pageview value or should be punished more for reporting without verification, the probability that they report without verification is smaller; thirdly, the greater the probability of citizens making false evaluation, the less enthusiasm of pharmaceutical enterprises to participate in emergency management, which indicates that false evaluation is detrimental to prompt pharmaceutical enterprises to participate; what's more, the greater the probability of new media reporting after verification, the greater the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises actively participating, which shows that new media's verification to citizens' evaluation is beneficial to emergency management. So, this paper provides suggestions for the emergency management and supervision.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals Evolution Dynamics of Agricultural Internet of Things Technology Promotion and Adoption in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Fang Wu ◽  
Junhai Ma
Keyword(s):  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Technology Selection ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Government ◽  
Internet Of Things Technology

Internet of Things is the core technology of smart agriculture and can reform and upgrade traditional agriculture for reducing cost, reducing pollution, and increasing productivity and quality in China. From government-led and market economy perspectives, promotion mechanisms and sustainable adoption of agricultural Internet of Things technology are analyzed. In the initial application phase, the promotion of Internet of Things requires government support. For investigating the relationship between the government and farmers, this study builds an evolutionary game model and finds that increases of cost subsidy, farmers’ negative feedback, government’s positive feedback, and chemical agriculture cost can make the model evolve toward the strategy set: farmer adoption and government support. For long-term development, a sustainable model in competitive market is built by competition game and exponential replication equation. This paper analyzes the equilibrium of adoption ratio, long-run profit, and the conversion between equilibrium points under capacity sharing strategy in competitive market. It is also found that the market will eventually evolve to the technology selection strategy whose long-run average profit dominates the market. The innovations are that evolutionary game is used for analyzing the initial stage and competitive game and asynchronous update mechanism are used for analyzing the sustainable development adoption. At last, references are provided for agricultural Internet of Things development policy from the perspectives of initial promotion and long-run sustainability.

Operation Canine Lifeline: Recommendations for Enhancing Prehospital Care for Government Working Dogs

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-20
Author(s):  
Teija Corse ◽  
Chelsea Firth ◽  
John Burke ◽  
Kenneth Schor ◽  
James F. Koterski ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Emergency Management ◽  
National Security ◽  
Emergency Care ◽  
Prehospital Care ◽  
Master's Program ◽  
Boston University ◽  
Working Dogs ◽  
Care Practices ◽  
The Government

AbstractOperation Canine Lifeline was a tabletop exercise developed by students and faculty of Boston University School of Medicine’s Healthcare Emergency Management master’s program. The tabletop exercise led to discussion on current protocols for canines working in the field, what occurs if a canine encounters a toxin in the field, and what to do in situations of national security that require working with civilian agencies. This discussion led to the creation of a set of recommendations around providing prehospital veterinary care to government working dogs. The recommendations include a government-run veterinary toxicology hotline for the sole use of the government, issuing handlers deployment kits and preprogrammed smartphones that contain information on the care practices for dogs, and an increased effort for civilian integration, through local emergency medical services, in the emergency care of government canines. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2017;11:15–20)

scholarly journals A Brief Analysis of News Collecting and Editing Strategies of Public Health Emergencies from the Perspective of New Media——Comparison of the SARS Epidemic and the COVID-19 Outbreak

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Bingjie Shi
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
New Media ◽  
News Coverage ◽  
Response Speed ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Media Technologies ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Media Comparison ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Government

<p>Public health emergency, especially contagion such as the SARS epidemic in 2003 and the COVID-19 outbreak recently happened, has been one of greatest challenges in human beings' history. How the government handles the epidemic situation will deeply reflect its political system and executive ability, as well as the capacity of all sectors of society to deal with public emergencies. The emergence and continuous development of new media technologies have promoted the transformation of news gathering and editing methods. Because of the experience gathered in the news coverage during SARS, the response speed of new media was greatly accelerated with the media literacy and professional level improved, which matters a great deal to the balance between the opening of information and public opinion control. Thus, government is capable of carrying out controls in a more effective way. Based on the research in the two cases, this paper aims to discuss the changes in efficiency, content transparency and form diversification of news collection and edit, with the discovery of some imperfections exposed in new media, in order to propose targeted improving measures.</p>

scholarly journals Study on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Emergency Management of Public Health Emergencies Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishments

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (16) ◽  
pp. 8278
Author(s):  
Ruguo Fan ◽  
Yibo Wang ◽  
Jinchai Lin
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Emergency Management ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
And Control ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In the context of public health emergency management, it is worth studying ways to mobilize the enthusiasm of government, community, and residents. This paper adopts the method of combining evolutionary game and system dynamics to conduct a theoretical modeling and simulation analysis on the interactions of the behavioral strategies of the three participants. In response to opportunistic behavior and inadequate supervision in the static reward and punishment mechanism, we introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism that considers changes in the social environment and the situation of epidemic prevention and control. This paper proves that the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuation problem in the evolutionary game process under static scenarios and achieve better supervision results through scenario analysis and simulation experiments.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game of Trust in Public-Private Partnership Project Networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Xiangtian Nie ◽  
Kai Feng ◽  
Guoxiang Zhao ◽  
Tianyu Fan ◽  
Shengnan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Trust Model ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Project Networks ◽  
The Government

In public-private partnership (PPP) projects, the government plays a role as both regulator and participant. Trust between the government and the private sector is important as it may affect project performance and even cause the problem of a breach of contract, which may lead to project failure. Little is known, however, about the formation and evolution mechanisms of trust in this context. This study analyses the complex evolution of trust in PPP project networks. An evolutionary game of trust model between government and the private sector is established and analysed, the strategic equilibrium points are obtained by solving the replication dynamic equation, and the Jacobian matrix and differential equation stability theory are introduced to analyse the stability of the equilibrium points. The results reveal the relationships among the stable state of trust, the initial state of trust, and the payment matrix, indicating that the payment matrix can effectively shape the evolution process and stable state of trust to influence performance. This study provides a novel contribution in solving the complex trust problem in PPP project networks and it provides a new analytical tool for PPP project management practice.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Games and Dynamics in Public Goods Supply with Repetitive Actions

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (15) ◽  
pp. 1726
Author(s):  
Simo Sun ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
Guanghui Yang ◽  
Jinxiu Pi
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Stable Operation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Discount Factors ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Based on a tripartite game model among suppliers of public goods, consumers, and the government, a tripartite repeated game model is constructed to analyze the evolution mechanism of which suppliers supply at low prices, consumers purchase, and the government provides incentives, and to establish the dynamics system of a repeated game. The equilibrium points of the evolutionary game are solved, and among them, the equilibrium points are found to satisfy the parameter conditions of ESS. The numerical simulation is employed to verify the impact of penalty coefficients and discount factors on the stability of strategies, which are adopted by the three players in a tripartite repeated game on public goods, and scenario analyses are conducted. The research results of this paper could provide a reference for the government, suppliers, and consumers to make rapid decisions, who are in the supply chain of public goods, especially quasi-public goods, such as coal, water, electricity, and gas, and help them to obtain stable incomes and then ensure the stable operation of the market.

scholarly journals Research on Government Emergency Management Strategy Based on Public Health Incidents

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjuan Yang
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Emergency Management ◽  
Latent Period ◽  
Public Safety ◽  
Management Strategy ◽  
Social Stability ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Health Safety ◽  
Key Points ◽  
The Government

It is the government's basic responsibility to ensure public health safety. However, due to the influence of the environment and human beings, some public health incidents are still inevitable, endangering public health and undermining social stability. However, any public health incident is traceable, and there will be a process from latent period to outbreak. Therefore, the government needs to grasp the key points of health incidents, strengthen emergency management, and ensure social stability and public safety.

scholarly journals Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jiangchao Li ◽  
Shilei Yang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Strategy Space ◽  
Market Sentiment ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

In a market with intense competition, cost pressures tempt enterprises to seek profits in ways that infringe on the interests of consumers. This is especially true when market sentiment is weak. In such situations, governments play a vital role in protecting consumers’ interests and helping struggling enterprises. We construct a tripartite game model that includes the government, enterprises, and consumers under a subsidy and punishment mechanism. We use this model to investigate the strategic choices made by the participants in an evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework. We present four stable equilibrium points as pure strategy solutions with the aid of a replicator dynamic system. Three main findings are presented in this paper. First, not all equilibrium points can be evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) when considering the potential motivations of the participants to change strategies. Second, there is an equilibrium point that satisfies the stability condition but changes periodically in its strategy space; strategy changes between participants are not synchronized. Third, the government prefers to subsidize enterprises when enterprise speculation is serious or when enterprise investment in improving production technology is high.

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