scholarly journals Evolutionary Games and Dynamics in Public Goods Supply with Repetitive Actions

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (15) ◽  
pp. 1726
Author(s):  
Simo Sun ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
Guanghui Yang ◽  
Jinxiu Pi
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Stable Operation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Discount Factors ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Based on a tripartite game model among suppliers of public goods, consumers, and the government, a tripartite repeated game model is constructed to analyze the evolution mechanism of which suppliers supply at low prices, consumers purchase, and the government provides incentives, and to establish the dynamics system of a repeated game. The equilibrium points of the evolutionary game are solved, and among them, the equilibrium points are found to satisfy the parameter conditions of ESS. The numerical simulation is employed to verify the impact of penalty coefficients and discount factors on the stability of strategies, which are adopted by the three players in a tripartite repeated game on public goods, and scenario analyses are conducted. The research results of this paper could provide a reference for the government, suppliers, and consumers to make rapid decisions, who are in the supply chain of public goods, especially quasi-public goods, such as coal, water, electricity, and gas, and help them to obtain stable incomes and then ensure the stable operation of the market.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals Simulation Analysis of the Evolution of Sustainable Operation of Transport Infrastructure Projects under Government Regulation Based on Prospect Theory and BP Neural Network

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chongsen Ma ◽  
Yun Chen ◽  
Yinghui Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Deep Learning ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Learning Algorithms ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Transportation Infrastructure ◽  
Transport Infrastructure ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

The decisions and actions of operators in the operation of transport infrastructure play a crucial role in the sustainability of the project but are influenced by factors such as the strength of government regulation and the frequency of use by users. The influence of social recognition and acceptance by the authorities on the decisions of the various parties involved in a project is becoming increasingly significant. To address this issue, this paper attempts to apply prospect theory to characterize the impact of changes in recognition on the decisions of project managers and the government from the perspective of recognition and to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model for the government, the operator, and the users, taking into account the combined effect of multiple factors, to explore the evolutionary law of the operator’s strategy choice. Evolutionary game theory, in which each person is considered irrational and behavior is changeable, is more realistic. The addition of prospect theory allows the model to more realistically reflect the decisions of each participant in the game process when faced with risk. The results of the study show that there is an optimal level of external regulation to maximize the benefits for all three parties in the game, strong government regulation does not necessarily improve service quality, operators tend to provide low-quality services in the game process and incentives should be increased, and that attempts should be made to provide users with a variety of transport infrastructure options to ensure that users’ interests are maximized. The paper further analyzes the indicators established by sensitive factors using BP neural networks on the basis of the analysis of transportation infrastructure operation and impact sensitive factors using evolutionary games and finds that the conclusions obtained by deep learning algorithms are more consistent with those obtained using evolutionary games, achieving cross-validation of the results. The reliability of the result is improved, and it is demonstrated that deep learning algorithms can be introduced as a supplement in the process of future analysis of transportation infrastructure operations. Finally, management suggestions are made in light of the actual situation.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Innovation Behavior of Industrial Cluster Based on Subject Adaptability

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cooperative Innovation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

2008 ◽  
pp. 306-323
Author(s):  
Katia Sycara ◽  
Paul Scerri ◽  
Anton Chechetka
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Information Diffusion ◽  
Large Population ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact

In this chapter, we explore the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Weibull, 1995; Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Nowak & May, 1993) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for large population of players. In particular, we explore effects of information propagation through social networks in Evolutionary Games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. We present experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution and Stability Analysis of Joint Distribution Alliance Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Under the Background of Green and Low-Carbon

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Government

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

scholarly journals Security Regulation and Enterprise Innovation in Communication Industry

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Kai Gao ◽  
Lijun Ma
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Communication Industry ◽  
The Social ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
Security Regulations ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Government Security

This paper conducted an evolutionary game model of the interaction between the governments and communication enterprises and analyzed the impact of the government’s communication security regulation on the innovation decision-making of communication enterprises. The results show that the behavior of the governments depends on the social benefits, rent-seeking benefits, and regulating costs in strict and de security regulations. The communication enterprises’ behavior depends on the benefits of innovation and the costs in R&D and rent-seeking. When government subsidies are relatively inadequate, the communication enterprises’ strategy under government security regulation swings from not-innovation finally to innovation. The policy implications of this study indicate that appropriate de security regulation by the government will help communication enterprises generate a good atmosphere for innovation, and the appropriate increase in subsidies will be more conducive to driving enterprise innovation.

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