Security Estimations in South Asia: Alliance Formation or Balance of Power

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Farhan Hanif Siddiqi
Asian Survey ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 402-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Brewster

The long-standing strategic disconnect between South Asia and the Korean Peninsula is breaking down. Driven by the changing balance of power in Asia, India and South Korea have developed a strong economic partnership, and taken small but significant steps toward a political and security relationship that refects their numerous shared strategic interests. This article explores the contours of this evolving relationship.


2017 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 463-480
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Yang

The United States’ South Asia strategy has been based on the calculation of its overall national security priorities. In practice, when U.S. priorities are at odds with those of other regional powers, Washington tends to adopt a “no-expectations” psychological approach toward its regional partners to avoid disappointment, a technical “de-hyphenation strategy” to improve policy efficiency, and practical cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of its South Asia strategy. However, Washington often has to come to terms with the realities on the ground with regard to its leadership role in South Asia. For the time being, Washington has articulated its strategic objective in South Asia, that is, a regional balance of power in favor of the United States vis-a-vis its perceived competitor, China. Therefore, it has conducted conditional cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan on land, and committed support for India on security issues in the Indian Ocean, so as to hedge against China’s growing presence in South Asia. The enhancement of U.S.-India defense and security cooperation has fueled China’s suspicion of India’s intention to join the U.S.-led coalition against it. By the logic of balance of power, the United States will continue to regard India as a strategic counterweight to China, which is likely to increase the possibility of strategic tensions and conflicts between China and India that may finally entangle the United States.


Itinerario ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard Blussé

Certain stages of the European expansion process into Asia during the Age of Commercial Capitalism lend themselves well to the comparative historical approach because of the startling similarities and contrasts they offer. The Dutch and English commercial leaps forward into the Orient, for instance, occurred at the same time in the organisational framework of chartered East India Companies - the English East India Company (EIC) and the Dutch Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) — which, moreover, chose the same theatre of action: Southeast Asia (Banten, Spice Islands) and South Asia (Surat and Coromandel). But although the aims, modes of operation and organisation of the two companies had much in common, these nonetheless each finally carved out their own sphere of influence in the trading world of Asia - the Dutch in Southeast Asia and the English in South Asia. While this consolidation process was taking place, the EIC and VOC gradually shed their semblance of being purely maritime trading organisations and, towards the second half of the eighteenth century, acquired the character of territorial powers. A shift in the balance of power also occurred between the two companies: if the Dutch were still paramount in the seventeenth century, the English totally overshadowed them as powerbrokers in Asian waters during the eighteenth. Did this transition of maritime hegemony occur gradually or should we rather speak of a ‘passage brusque et rapide’ as Fernand Braudel has suggested? Was it, as the traditional explanation has it, the inevitable outcome of the decline of the Dutch Republic to a second-rate power in Europe, or were local Asian developments, be they political or commercial, also involved?


1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 859-870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick J. McGowan ◽  
Robert M. Rood

This paper is a partial systematic test of Morton A. Kaplan's “theory” of alliance behavior in balance of power international systems first proposed in his well-known System and Process in International Politics (1957). Three hypotheses are inferred from Kaplan's writings predicting that in a stable balance of power system, (a) alliances will occur randomly with respect to time; (b) the time intervals between alliances will also be randomly distributed; and (c) a decline in systemic alliance formation rates precedes system changing events, such as general war. We check these hypotheses by applying probability theory, specifically a Poisson model, to the analysis of new data on fifty-five alliances among the five major European powers during the period 1814–1914. Because our research questions are so general, our findings should not be regarded as definitive; however, the data very strongly support our hypotheses. We conclude that Kaplan's verbal model of a balance of power international system has had its credibility enhanced as a result of this paper.


1988 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Walt

The question “what causes alignment?” remains a basic issue in international relations theory. Moreover, competing hypotheses about alliance formation underlie many recurring policy debates. Balance-of-power theory predicts states will ally to oppose the strongest state; the “bandwagoning hypothesis” predicts that alignment with the stronger side is more likely. These two hypotheses are usually framed solely in terms of the distribution of capabilities (that is, the balance of power), which neglects several other important factors and leads to faulty predictions about alliance choices. A careful examination of the alliance policies of Iran, Turkey, India, and Pakistan reveals that “balance-of-threat theory” provides a better explanation of alliance choices than these other conceptions. This theory predicts that states balance against the most threatening state, rather than the most powerful. Threats are a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and perceived intentions. Thus, balance-of-threat theory is an important refinement of structural balance- of-power theory.


Subject Varying power of judiciaries across South Asia. Significance Spats involving supreme courts are increasingly a feature of South Asian politics. The balance of power between the judiciary and other branches of governments varies across the region’s different countries. Impacts Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi may issue more ordinances, despite the Supreme Court urging limits to their use. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League will register more legal cases against opposition politicians. Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen will face rising international pressure to ensure free and fair elections later this year. Ahead of Pakistan’s elections, Nawaz Sharif’s movement against the judiciary may garner support for the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. Sri Lanka’s new law empowering the chief justice to establish special courts for bribery cases may assuage public concerns over corruption.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-152
Author(s):  
Dogachan Dagi

AbstractThe Ottoman alliance politics before the Great War has not been explored for theorizing alliance politics though it presents a unique example of alliance formation under external threat. Thus, in this article, a neo-realist balance of threat theory is utilized to examine the Ottoman decision to align with Germany in the Great War. Unlike a historical account as to why the Ottomans sided with the German-Austrian alliance, this article develops a theoretical approach that takes insights from ‘alliance theories’ to explain the Ottomans’ fateful alignment. Such an alliance theory approach underlines the dilemmas of the Ottoman decision makers and demonstrates ‘rational’ elements of their strategy of balancing the main source of the threat. By bringing alliance theories and Ottoman historiography together it is argued that the Ottomans, in their search for an alliance before the Great War, sought a “balance of threat” politics rather than a “balance of power” politics.


1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 1288-1303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Y. Li ◽  
William R. Thompson

This article attempts to examine alliance formation behavior as a stochastic process amenable to systems interpretation. We test two hypotheses linking the systems characteristics of bipolar distribution/tightly knit bloc structure to serial dependence and stability of alliance formation behavior and multipolar distribution/loosely knit bloc structure to randomness and process instability.For testing these hypotheses, we have introduced a modeling strategy whereby identification of serial dependence and parameter estimation are accomplished by means of stochastic difference equations and time series autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions, and systems interpretation is facilitated by employing its continuous analogue in differential equation form.We analyze data on three sets of observations corresponding to three distinct periods of international relations: 1815–1914, 1919–1939, 1945–1965. The results do confirm the proposed hypotheses revealing randomness and instability of alliance formation behavior in the multipolar/loosely knit periods of 1815–1914 and 1919–1939 and serial dependence and stability in the bipolar/tightly knit 1945–1965 period. Finally, we consider the implications of these results for the earlier findings, the balance of power model, and the probability of war.


2019 ◽  
pp. 193-221
Author(s):  
Zorawar Daulet Singh

This chapter reconstructs Indira Gandhi’s role conception by analysing the Prime Minister and her core advisors’ public and private communication record. Indira Gandhi’s regional role conception of India as a security seeker, it is contended, was shaped by three core inter-related beliefs: a definition of India’s interests in more narrow terms compared to Nehru’s beliefs, and, a regional image centred on the subcontinent rather than on an extended Asian space that lay at the heart of Nehru’s image; a divisible conception of security rather than an indivisible one, and an inclination to leverage the balance of power for geopolitical advantage rather than to reform Asia’s interaction culture as per Nehru’s role conception; and, an inclination to employ coercive means to solve disputes or to pursue geopolitical ends in South Asia rather than a preference for ethical statecraft and strategic restraint embodied in Nehru’s worldview.


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