Why North Korea Chooses Self-Sufficiency: Changes in the North Korean Economy in the First Quarter of 2021

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jangho Choi
2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-87
Author(s):  
Jeong-Yong Kim

This article presents the model of 'business-track diplomacy' to test a state's utilization of economic engagement strategy as security policy. The model provides ways to think around security issues and alternative security options that go beyond the traditional military containment approach to security in international relations. As a case study, the article investigates Hyundai Group's Mountain Kumgang tourism with North Korea. In this case study, it demonstrates that not only the Kim Dae-Jung government's strong policy-making will of business-track diplomacy towards North Korea but also the Hyundai Group's business will and vulnerability of the North Korean economy played important roles in realizing the tour project and thus, enhanced inter-Korean economic cooperation.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-46
Author(s):  
Seok-Hyang Kim

For more than a half century, the international community largely ignored North Korea. Since 1990, however, the situation has changed dramatically and North Korea has begun to attract increasing international attention. Throughout the 1990s, scenarios of a North Korean collapse were in vogue. Yet, these estimations were proved to be wrong. It is now widely accepted that North Korea is relatively stable in the sense that it seems to have little trouble keeping its political system intact and functioning. By now, the most striking aspect of the North Korean political system is its extraordinary resilience. Why then has the North not yet collapsed, despite the chronic shortages of food, energy, and foreign currency? In this paper, I would like to raise two main questions. The first question is: “How serious are the difficulties of the North Korean economy?” And the second is: “What actions has the North Korean regime taken to resolve these difficulties and how effective those actions have been?” The North Korean regime has been striving to readjust and improve its economic strucrure since the 1970s. The regime has sought foreign capital and technology. However, the regime has been attempting to reformulate its economic structure within the strict framework of the existing political system whose survival was its paramount concern, and therefore it has failed to link the domestic economy with the world economy. What the regime has been doing is, on the one hand, to map out policy measures designed to open up its doors, while on the other hand escalating its ideological and political campaigns to prevent the people from being “contaminated” by a capiralist culture which it anticipated would develop as a result of such measures. It is no wonder that, under these conditions, all attempts at reforming met with only limited success at best. The North Korean regime, however, has negotiated with its people the expansion of its second economy, despite its reluctance to do so. In fact, the regime explicitly defined farmers' markets as remnants of “backward” capitalism which would become extinct as socialism reached a higher stage of development. It is expected that the ruling hierarchy in North Korea will be able to survive for a considerable period of time, despite the threatening economic crisis. So far in North Korea, the need to safeguard the existing political regime has been given far greater priority than the need to bring about reform. However, the North Korean regime, if it intends to survive, will be compelled to carry out full-scale reforms sooner or later.


Author(s):  
N. I. Matveeva ◽  

This article looks at the Soviet-North Korean alliance from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, with a focus on the often understudied connection between international politics and domestic economic development strategies. It traces and explains the changes in bilateral relations, from a relatively disinterested provision of assistance on the Soviet part and the desire to emulate the USSR on the part of North Korea, to an investment interest of the Soviet Union in the North Korean economic policies, and back to the Soviet Union as a donor of aid aiming to retain the DPRK within its orbit, with North Korea striving to assert self-sufficiency and distance itself. The article also explores the differences in the position of North Korea and the Soviet Union on economic matters and the disputes over prioritizing heavy industry development that took place at the time. Based on a variety of primary sources, it shows how the alliance dynamics was reflected in the economic sphere. It argues that economic matters played a significant role in the cooling of bilateral relations by the mid-1960s.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (02) ◽  
pp. 212-231
Author(s):  
Theofilus Jose Setiawan ◽  
Maria Sukmaniara ◽  
Jain Komboy ◽  
Darynaufal Mulyaman

The purpose of the paper is to analyze North Korea's efforts to obtain economic capital through the enrichment of nuclear weapons amid the various sanctions imposed on it. This paper uses a constructivism approach in accordance in term of give arguments regarding North Korea's struggle to gain economic capital is an all-out struggle. Since the communist regime took control of North Korea, North and South Korea have continued to conflict to this day. Supported by the Soviet Union and aided by China during the Cold War era, North Korea was still able to survive. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and China's lack initiatives from helping North Korea, the North Korean economy worsened. In this paper, we found that North Korea used its nuclear capability as a bargaining chip to get what it wanted, especially for economic reasons.


Asian Survey ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 859-881
Author(s):  
Terence Roehrig

Efforts to denuclearize North Korea continue, but it is highly doubtful whether this goal will be reached. An often-expressed fear of a nuclear-armed North Korea is that it might use this capability to coerce reunification with the South on its terms. Though its leaders often speak of the desire for reunification, North Korea will not and could not pursue a successful nuclear coercion strategy because it carries an inordinate amount of risk, even for Pyongyang, which raises serious doubts about the credibility of its nuclear threats, the possibility of success, and the likelihood of pursuing such a strategy in the first place. And even if North Korea were to succeed, its efforts to integrate the South Korean economy would be a disaster, leading to the end of the North Korean regime.


2018 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Andrew Jackson

One scenario put forward by researchers, political commentators and journalists for the collapse of North Korea has been a People’s Power (or popular) rebellion. This paper analyses why no popular rebellion has occurred in the DPRK under Kim Jong Un. It challenges the assumption that popular rebellion would happen because of widespread anger caused by a greater awareness of superior economic conditions outside the DPRK. Using Jack Goldstone’s theoretical expla-nations for the outbreak of popular rebellion, and comparisons with the 1989 Romanian and 2010–11 Tunisian transitions, this paper argues that marketi-zation has led to a loosening of state ideological control and to an influx of infor-mation about conditions in the outside world. However, unlike the Tunisian transitions—in which a new information context shaped by social media, the Al-Jazeera network and an experience of protest helped create a sense of pan-Arab solidarity amongst Tunisians resisting their government—there has been no similar ideology unifying North Koreans against their regime. There is evidence of discontent in market unrest in the DPRK, although protests between 2011 and the present have mostly been in defense of the right of people to support themselves through private trade. North Koreans believe this right has been guaranteed, or at least tacitly condoned, by the Kim Jong Un government. There has not been any large-scale explosion of popular anger because the state has not attempted to crush market activities outright under Kim Jong Un. There are other reasons why no popular rebellion has occurred in the North. Unlike Tunisia, the DPRK lacks a dissident political elite capable of leading an opposition movement, and unlike Romania, the DPRK authorities have shown some flexibility in their anti-dissent strategies, taking a more tolerant approach to protests against economic issues. Reduced levels of violence during periods of unrest and an effective system of information control may have helped restrict the expansion of unrest beyond rural areas.


Author(s):  
Martin Weiser

The position of law in North Korean politics and society has been a long concern of scholars as well as politicians and activists. Some argue it would be more important to understand the extra-legal rules that run North Korea like the Ten Principles on the leadership cult as they supersede any formal laws or the constitution.1 But the actual legal developments in North Korea, which eventually also mediate those leading principles and might even limit their reach, has so far been insufficiently explored. It is easy to point to North Korean secrecy as a main reason for this lacuna. But the numerous available materials and references on North Korean legislation available today have, however, not been fully explored yet, which has severely impeded progress in the field. Even publications officially released by North Korea to foreigners offer surprisingly detailed information on legal changes and the evolution of the law-making institutions. This larger picture of legal developments already draws a more detailed picture of the institutional developments in North Korean law and the broad policy fields that had been regulated from early on in contrast to the often-assumed absence of legislation in important fields like copyright, civil law or investment. It also shows that different to a monolithic system, various law-making institutions exist and fulfil discernably different legal responsibilities. Next to this limitation in content, scholars in the field currently also have not used all approaches legal developments in the North Korea could be analysed and interpreted with. Going beyond the reading of legal texts or speculating about known titles of still unavailable legislation, quantitative approaches can be applied ranging from the simple counting of laws to more sophisticated analysis of legislative numbering often provided with legislation. Understanding the various institutions as flexible in their roles and hence adoptable to shifts in leadership and policy agendas can also provide a more realistic picture of legal practices in North Korea.


Author(s):  
O.V. Cherkasova ◽  
◽  
A.S. Strokov ◽  
E.V. Tsvetnov ◽  
O.A. Makarov ◽  
...  

The article assesses the food security of municipalities in the Volgograd region based on indicators of self-sufficiency in agricultural products. It was proposed to adapt the methodology for calculating self-sufficiency indicators, replacing indicators of consumption of basic products in municipalities that are not publicly available with indicators of necessary production volumes in accordance with rational norms. This makes it possible to better assess the extent to which municipalities are able to provide the population with basic food supplies, as well as to identify bottlenecks in order to develop proposals to address them. The highest self-sufficiency ratios for the main types of products was noted in the municipalities of the North-Western agricultural region with most favourable conditions for agricultural activities and, conversely, the lowest figures are typical for agricultural Zavolzhsky area – with the less favourable agricultural conditions.


2019 ◽  
pp. 4-15
Author(s):  
I. A. Korgun ◽  
G. D. Toloraya

The presented study analyzes the opportunities for North Korea to capitalize on its competitive advantages in foreign trade in the context of sanctions.Aim. The study aims to identify mechanisms that allow North Korea to engage in foreign trade in circumvention of UN sanctions and to analyze their impact on the national economy.Tasks. The authors analyze the structure of North Korea’s national economy, its initial competitive advantage, identify the specific features of North Korea’s foreign trade in the context of sanctions, and determine the consequences of illicit trade in circumvention of sanctions for the national economy.Methods. This study uses an interdisciplinary approach that combines the classical theory of competitive advantage with the concept of rent seeking, with the concept of rent seeking and analysis of trade flows.Results. The study shows that, despite the restrictions imposed by sanctions, North Korea strives to make the most of its advantages, such as resource availability and cheap labor, in global trade. The country builds its own export-import chains in circumvention of sanctions. These chains are rather mobile, flexible, and controlled by the elite. As a result, benefits from trade that could be evenly distributed among the population are concentrated in the hands of a narrow segment of society. ‘Rent seeking’ makes it possible to formulate the negative consequences of these processes for the North Korean economy and the international community.Conclusions. Solving the North Korean issue requires an economic transformation in the country through the replacement of restrictive sanctions with more constructive ones. The exclusion of North Korea from open global trade leads to the country’s marginalization and impairs the transparency of international commodity flows.


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