Fiscal Stabilisation Policy and Fiscal Institutions

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Campbell Leith ◽  
Simon J.Q. Wren-Lewis
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Institutions ◽  
Stabilisation Policy

The Impact of Nonpartisan Fiscal Institutions on Budgetary Delay

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-183
Author(s):  
Colin Emrich
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Fiscal Institutions ◽  
Governmental Institutions ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Can the design of governmental institutions promote timely governance? This article investigates this question by examining the relationship between the design of fiscal institutions and budgetary delays across the fifty states. These budgetary offices are created by lawmakers to advance sound fiscal policy and sustainable public finance. This article argues that the unbiased information provided by nonpartisan budget offices minimize the likelihood of budgetary delay as well as lessen how long budgetary stalemate persists when a delay occurs. The findings suggest that nonpartisan fiscal institutions do not prevent budgetary delay but substantially reduce the duration of budgetary gridlock.

Macroeconomic Theory and Stabilisation Policy.

1988 ◽  
Vol 98 (393) ◽  
pp. 1209
Author(s):  
Brian Silverstone ◽  
Andrew Stevenson ◽  
Vitantonio Muscatelli ◽  
Mary Gregory
Keyword(s):  
Macroeconomic Theory ◽  
Stabilisation Policy

scholarly journals The euro area's common default risk: Evidence on the Commission's impact on European fiscal affairs

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 507-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Goldbach ◽  
Christian Fahrholz
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
Default Risk ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Fiscal Institutions ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Daily Data ◽  
Political Events ◽  
The Stability

Sovereign creditworthiness within the euro area hinges upon the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). We analyse whether political events that worsen the SGP's credibility result in a shared default risk premium for all euro members, therefore leading to a joint deterioration of creditworthiness. We especially examine the decisions and statements of the Commission and the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers. Analysing daily data through the 1999–2005 period with an ARMA-GARCH model, we find the Commission plays a decisive role in affecting investor evaluations, where its credibility-strengthening decisions decrease volatility and statements signalling a weakening of fiscal credibility spark uncertainty on financial markets. Our results stress the importance of creating credible fiscal institutions that preserve sovereign creditworthiness within the euro area.

scholarly journals FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SIZE AND INTER-REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC REDISTRIBUTION

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raul A Ponce-Rodriguez ◽  
Juan Medina-Guirado
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Regional Distribution ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Fiscal Institutions ◽  
National Budget ◽  
Public Transfers ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Redistribute Income

Abstract Fiscal institutions, which are responsible for the delegation of tax and spending powers among different tiers of governments, are important determinants of the size and efficiency of public redistribution. In this paper we develop a comparative analysis of the impact of fiscal decentralization vis-à-vis tax revenue sharing on the government’s effort to redistribute income. The main findings are: first, the size of the national budget for public redistribution is the same under fiscal decentralization and tax revenue sharing. Second, different fiscal institutions lead to different regional distributions of public transfers. Third, when choosing between decentralization and tax revenue sharing, there is a tradeoff between the efficiency and the regional effort of the government to redistribute income. Resumen Las instituciones fiscales, que determinan la responsabilidad del diseño de impuestos y gasto entre los diferentes niveles de gobierno, son importantes determinantes del tamaño y eficiencia de la redistribución pública. En este artículo, se desarrolla un análisis comparativo del impacto en el esfuerzo del gobierno en redistribuir el ingreso, entre la descentralización fiscal en y una política de compartir el ingreso fiscal. Los principales resultados son: primero, el tamaño del presupuesto en redistribución es el mismo para una economía con descentralización o en la que se comparte el ingreso fiscal. Segundo, las instituciones fiscales implican una asignación diferente en la distribución regional de transferencias públicas. Tercero, al escoger entre descentralización y el compartir el ingreso fiscal, existe un intercambio entre la eficiencia y la distribución regional de las transferencias públicas.

Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe

2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK HALLERBERG ◽  
SAMI YLÄOUTINEN
Keyword(s):  
Central And Eastern Europe ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Political Climate ◽  
Fiscal Institutions ◽  
East European ◽  
Debt Burden ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Form Of Government ◽  
Political Commitments

AbstractThis paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998–2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country's debt burden.

Fiscal Crisis and Structural Change in the Late Ottoman Economy

2015 ◽  
pp. 23-38
Author(s):  
Murat Birdal
Keyword(s):  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Ottoman Empire ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Fiscal Crisis ◽  
Tax Reforms ◽  
Foreign Markets ◽  
Fiscal Institutions ◽  
The Government ◽  
Late Ottoman

This chapter examines institutional change in the Ottoman economy with a focus on its financial crises and subsequent reform attempts. Traditional fiscal institutions functioned well until the late sixteenth century when the state introduced tax reforms and dismantled the traditional tımar system. In the nineteenth century, the administration sought solutions such as the debasement of the coinage and domestic borrowing to finance its deficits. In 1854, the government resorted to foreign borrowing and initiated reforms to improve its financial accounting to gain credibility in foreign markets. After twenty years of borrowing, the Porte defaulted in 1875, and in 1881 signed the Decree of Muharrem, which led to the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA). The OPDA era saw unprecedented levels of foreign direct investment and played a pivotal role in the integration of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy.

Data and Fiscal Institutions of the Surveyed Countries

2012 ◽  
pp. 71-151
Author(s):  
Christian Seidl ◽  
Kirill Pogorelskiy ◽  
Stefan Traub
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Institutions
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