scholarly journals DWUGŁOS W SPRAWIE POJĘCIA ŚWIADCZENIA W POLSKIM PRAWIE CYWILNYM – CHARAKTER PRAWNY SPEŁNIENIA ŚWIADCZENIA

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Marek Antas ◽  
Jakub M. Łukasiewicz

A dialogue Concerning the Notion of Service in Polish Civil Law: the Legal Nature of Accomplishment of ServiceSummary This paper is the second part of an article constructed on the basis of a dialogue between J.M. Łukasiewicz and M. Antas. The authors attempt to answer the question whether a service is a factual action or a legal action. Next they present the problem of services against a historical background i.e. in Roman Law, in the German and Roman system, and in Polish law. Finally they discuss the question of the causality of legal actions.

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Loska

A LEGACY IN THE ROMAN LAWSummary A notion of a legacy did not exist in the archaic Roman law as a homogenous concept of law and it developed as late as in the pre-classical Roman law. Even then, however, only particular types of legacies, rather than their general concept, were defined. Nevertheless, one may say that a legacy was a civil law instrument by means of which a testator left a certain economic benefit to a particular person, not making him\her an inheritor.At the beginning there were four basic types of legacy in the Roman law: legatum per vindicationem, legatum per praeceptionem, legatum per damnationem and legatum sinendi modo. The first two types had an effect of a disposition while the two latter ones of an obligation only. In sources there also exist two other types: legatum optionis and legatum partitionis. This last mentioned is similar to a later established concept of a fideicommissum, an informal legacy, which became actionable in the times of the Emperor August.Already in the ancient times one may observe a decrease in the significance of these types of legacy, the effects of which directly related to the ownership of objects (legatum per vindicationem and legatum per praeceptioneni).They were connected with the notion o f an ownership according to ius civile and formal means of transferring the ownership. They lost its significance when - beside the oldest civil law - praetorian law and emperors’ constitutions appeared and when the ownership was standardised. After the issuance of senatusconsultum Neronianum in the 1st century AD it became possible to retain the legal effectiveness of the legacies which until then were considered invalid due to a failure to preserve an appropriate form; an ex /^ con version took place. It resulted most probably in converting invalid legacies into legatum per damnationem.In the subsequent centuries, emperors’ constitutions led to a harmonisation o f the concept of legacy (while the division between the legacy having an effect of a disposition and an obligation was still preserved), and later on to equalisation in the legal effect of formal and informal legacies. The most important regulations were: the constitution of the Emperor Constantinus dated 339 AD, which abolished the requirement of solemnitas verbum and two constitutions of the Emperor Iustinianus - the first - dated 529 AD - introduced an identical legal nature of all legacies, the other - dated 531 AD - completely equalised legacies with fideicommissa. 


Author(s):  
H. O. Urazova

The variety of fiduciary legal relations in the civil law of Ukraine requires the study of their individual elements, in particular, the fiduciary duty. Therefore the purpose of this article is to clarify the legal nature of the fiduciary duty, in order to avoid legal uncertainty, which leads to difficulties in law enforcement and, as a result, ineffective legal protection of violated rights of a person due to non-fulfillment or improper fulfillment of such an obligation in relation to her.Analyzed such concepts as "fides", "fiducia", duty in civil law. It has been established that the first, respectively, in Roman law had several meanings, but the main thing is the trust of the participants in civil relations to each other. The second have to understood as the proper behavior of the subject of civil relations, the content and model of which are determined by the requirements of the rule of law, the will or persons authorized by the transaction or other legal facts.It was found that the fiduciary duty is the proper behavior of the subject of a trust relationship, due to the conclusion of certain agreements (for example, commissions, property management, joint activities, the provision of lawyer services, etc.), or the occurrence of legal facts (election of a body or person of a legal entity, who (who) has the right to act on her behalf, the establishment of guardianship or trusteeship, the death of an individual, etc.).


2021 ◽  
Vol III (III) ◽  
pp. 7-32
Author(s):  
Kamil Zaradkiewicz

The article presents the basic solutions to be applied in the so-called annuity real rights. These are limited real rights (iura in rem), which permit obtaining certain revenues from real property on a regular basis. Their essential purpose is to secure specified periodical benefits, primarily those of a pecuniary nature. These rights show some similarities, on the one hand, to pledge-type rights (especially mortgage) and, on the other hand, to easements. Currently, no annuity real charges of any kind have been regulated under the Polish civil law (since the entry of the Civil Code into force in 1965), as they were perceived, albeit incorrectly, as a reminiscence of the epoch of feudalism. However, they are still popular in other European civil law legislations, for example in the German, Swiss, Austrian, Spanish, Czech, Estonian, Slovenian or Croatian laws. The prototype for this category of rights is the real burden (German: Reallast). This paper presents various solutions for the latter institution as well as related institutions, such as the Swiss “annuity letter” (German: Gült, French: lettre de rente) and the German annuity land charge (German: Rentengrundschuld). Different concepts for the legal nature of the annuity rights have been presented, in particular the German real burden, which formed the basis for proposals of solutions in the work of the Polish Civil Law Codification Committee at the beginning of the 21st century. The potential usefulness of the real burden rights indicated in this article confirms the legitimacy of introducing this type of legal institution into the Polish law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
Marzena Dyjakowska

‘Superficies’: The Roman Origins Of The Right To Build Upon A Plot Of LandSummaryThe aim of this paper is to present the Roman origin of the right of superficies (the right to erect a building on a plot of land), which is thesubject of a bill drafted by the Polish Civil Law Codification Committee. This right is to replace the institution of perpetual usufruct, which has been extant in Polish civil law since the 1960s. Superficies has been present in many European systems of law (for example in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch German Civil Code of 1896, and the Austrian law of 1919). The author compares the subject and object of the right in question, the legal situation of the superficiarius and the rights of the owner of the land in Roman law and in the Polish draft bill. The main difference between the Roman superficies and the right proposed in the draft bill is the deviation from the principle of accession (superficies solo cedit): under the Polish draft bill the superficiarius will become the owner of the building. Furthermore, the Roman superficies was perpetual; in Poland it will be constructed as temporary (30-100 years). Both rights (in Roman and Polish law) share many other similarities: they are hereditary, and the superficiarius is to pay the owner of the land. The conclusion which may be drawn is that Roman institutions can still inspire the contemporary legislator.


1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W Cairns

This article, in earlier versions presented as a paper to the Edinburgh Roman Law Group on 10 December 1993 and to the joint meeting of the London Roman Law Group and London Legal History Seminar on 7 February 1997, addresses the puzzle of the end of law teaching in the Scottish universities at the start of the seventeenth century at the very time when there was strong pressure for the advocates of the Scots bar to have an academic education in Civil Law. It demonstrates that the answer is to be found in the life of William Welwood, the last Professor of Law in St Andrews, while making some general points about bloodfeud in Scotland, the legal culture of the sixteenth century, and the implications of this for Scottish legal history. It is in two parts, the second of which will appear in the next issue of the Edinburgh Law Review.


Author(s):  
Detlef Liebs

Abstract Four kinds of Romans in the Frankish kingdoms in the 6th to 8th centuries. Roman law texts from Merowingian Gaul make a difference between cives Romani, Latini and dediticii, all considered as Romans. This difference mattered only to slaves who had been freed. The status of Latin and dediticius was hereditary, whereas the descendants of one who had been freed as civis Romanus were free born Romans, who should be classified as a proper, a fourth kind of beeing Roman; it was the standard kind. The difference was important in civil law, procedural law and criminal law, especially in wergeld, the sum to be payed for expiation when somebody had been killed: Who had killed a Roman, had to pay different sums according to the status of the killed.


Author(s):  
Iryna I. Banasevych ◽  
Ruslana M. Heints ◽  
Mariia V. Lohvinova ◽  
Oksana S. Oliinyk

Theoretical and applied research of the features of the legal status of the subjects of civil law remains debatable today. Doctrinal and legislative analysis of this subject points to unresolved issues in this area. In particular, the provision on defining the state as a party to civil law remains controversial. There is no consensus on the definition of individuals and legal entities as subjects of civil law among scholars. Furthermore, the legal regulation of certain types of entities is somewhat unsystematic and chaotic. This is largely due to the insufficient development of theoretical issues related to the subjects of civil law. The above issues determine the relevance of the study of the features of the legal status of subjects of civil law. The purpose of the study is to investigate the features of the legal status of subjects of civil law based on doctrinal and legislative analysis. The study is based on a systematic approach, which lies in studying a complex system of relationships between subjects of civil law. Furthermore, the study is based on the laws and principles of dialectics, which contribute to the study of the legal status of the subjects of civil law. Systemic and structural-functional analysis was used to comprehensively describe the legal status of subjects of civil law. The historical method contributed to the study of the evolution of research on the subjects of civil law. The formal legal method helped identify the special features of the provisions of regulations concerning the subjects of civil law. With the help of the comparative legal method, the study analysed the provisions of the Civil Code of Ukraine in terms of regulation of subjects of civil law and such regulation was compared with other countries. The study defined the concepts and types of subjects of civil law and considered the features of the legal status of individuals, legal entities, as well as the state as a special participant of civil law. Special attention was paid to the historical analysis of the development of approaches to the definition of subjects of law, starting with Roman law


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-107
Author(s):  
M.D. TYAZHBIN

The article is dedicated to the category of subordination agreements. Based on the concept of conflict of rights in personam, the author makes an attempt to integrate this category into the system of private law, to determine the legal nature of subordination, and from these positions to assess the effectiveness of Art. 309.1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, implemented in the course of the civil law reform.


Author(s):  
E.V. Titov ◽  

The purpose of the article is a critical assessment of the established in the legal literature and practice the concept and characteristics of a legal action and criteria for distinguishing legal actions and events. The main problem identified by the author is that, despite the huge number of sources on this subject, jurisprudence has not progressed in the study of this phenomenon since the early 19th century. The definition and characteristics of a legal action «migrate» from one work to another, as a rule, without any critical analysis at all and are taken by lawyers as a given, which leads to stagnation in the development of the relevant field. At the same time, studies of specific varieties of legal actions often reach a deadlock precisely because of the incorrectly defined general characteristics of a legal action. The author defines the classification criterion of differentiation of legal facts, and argues the necessity of two-member division of legal facts into events and actions. It is proved that facts-states cannot be distinguished within the classification of legal facts on the volitional ground and they are not legal facts at all. The concept of legal action and its characteristics are given. The concept of will as a key element of legal action is discussed in the article and it is substantiated that «involuntary» actions are not legal facts. The author analyzes the classification of events into absolute and relative, and offers an algorithm for determining whether a certain legal fact refers to events or actions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 62
Author(s):  
Bede Xavier Harris ◽  
Elizabeth Pearl Harris

The interpretation given by the courts to the word ‘matter’ in sections 75 and 76 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, and the restrictive approach taken by the courts to what amounts to a sufficient interest in a matter, have led to the consequence that only litigants who can demonstrate a personal interest can bring an action to challenge a breach of the Constitution. This provides insufficient protection for constitutionalism because it means that the enforcement of the Constitution is contingent on there being a self-interested applicant who will bring an action – and, conversely, creates the risk that breaches of the Constitution will be allowed to stand in cases where those who do have standing find it in their political interests to refrain from taking action. With its focus on personal interest, the current approach excludes the altruistic applicant and runs counter to the theory that all citizens have a right to ensure that the Constitution is complied with. This paper examines the way in which the actio popularis of Roman law served the ideal of the engaged citizen by enabling citizens to initiate legal action to enforce public duties, and how modern equivalents of the actio in a number of jurisdictions achieve the same purpose. The paper draws on John Rawls’ theory of justice in arguing for reform of the law on standing in Australia so as to confer open standing in constitutional cases.


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