Linking Interdisciplinary Approaches: Key to Integrated Knowledge

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Villa Soto ◽  
Norma Blazquez Graf

<span>The history of science shows in what directions we may move to open fruitful new paths in scientific research. One of the most attractive is the one that leads to the re-formulation of the problems affecting knowledge, and involves the re-conceptualization of study objects and the development of new strategies (of discovery and invention) to resolve them...</span>

Itinerario ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-115
Author(s):  
H.L. Wesseling

Is history science or art? This is a problem which has been on people's minds for more than a century and certainly it is an interesting question. But within the framework of this contribution it is not really important, for, whether one practises art history or history of science, one faces the same problem. On the one hand such a history is first and foremost a history of the work and achievements of individuals. A history of science which does not deal with the work of Copernicus, Newton and Einstein is as useless as a history of art in which Rembrandt, Rubens and Michelangelo do not figure. Art and history are and will remain foremost the work of individuals of genius. On the other hand it is also true that a history of art or science which confines itself exclusively to a series of sketches of individuals and their work is not satisfactory either. Artists and scientists do not work within a vacuum. As one discerns tendencies and trends in art, likewise within the field of science one finds schools and paradigms. In order to understand works of art and science we have to look closely at influences and examples, at the time-spirit, the spiritual climate, et cetera.


2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 179-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ladyman

According to logical positivism, so the story goes, metaphysical questions are meaningless, since they do not admit of empirical confirmation or refutation. However, the logical positivists did not in fact reject as meaningless all questions about for example, the structure of space and time. Rather, key figures such as Reichenbach and Schlick believed that scientific theories often presupposed a conceptual framework that was not itself empirically testable, but which was required for the theory as a whole to be empirically testable. For example, the theory of Special Relativity relies upon the simultaneity convention introduced by Einstein that assumes that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions of space. Hence, the logical positivists accepted an a priori component to physical theories. However, they denied that this a priori component is necessarily true. Whereas for Kant, metaphysics is the a priori science of the necessary structure of rational thought about reality (rather than about things in themselves), the logical positivists were forced by the history of science to accept that the a priori structure of theories could change. Hence, they defended a notion of what Michael Friedman (1999) calls the ‘relativised’ or the ‘constitutive’ a priori. Carnap and Reichenbach held that such an a priori framework was conventional, whereas Schlick seems to have been more of a realist and held that the overall relative simplicity of different theories could count as evidence for their truth, notwithstanding the fact that some parts of them are not directly testable. All this is part of the story of how the verification principle came to be abandoned, and how logical positivism transmuted into logical empiricism.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 32-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Krasnyak ◽  
Mik Fanguy ◽  
Elena Tikhonova

History of Science and Technology (HST) courses are increasingly becoming part of core curriculums for undergraduate students due to an increased emphasis on scientific literacy. HST courses should aim to help students gain an understanding of the nature of science and should enable them to reflect epistemologically. The authors suggest teaching HST courses through several interchangeable content blocks, and herein, present the material and discussion topics that they believe should be implemented in a content block on cognitive sciences through a linguistic component. Language has a special meaning for humankind as it indicates its unique ability in the evolutionary development and in creating a new social environment. Therefore, paying special attention to the linguistic component when teaching HST courses helps students obtain a basic level of linguistic knowledge as its interdisciplinary approaches are increased through the study of cognitive sciences such as evolutionary psychology, behavioral genetics, and artificial intelligence.In order to represent a practical meaning of linguistics in the processes of constructing social environment, the authors conducted an empirical study based on the analysis of media texts. We asked 63 sophomores majoring in social sciences and humanities, who are affiliated with the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations to choose 60 media texts, both broadsheets and tabloids, on social and political content. Estimating and analyzing the surveys allowed the authors to determine students’ abilities to identify communicative strategies that were used in the media texts, to understand the role of the strategies in forming the social environment of a person or a group, and to recognize how using the tools of cognitive linguistics enhances sophisticated thinking and develops synergetic perceptions of every individual.


Author(s):  
Onésimo T. Almeida

In following a sequence of articles published in the last thirty years which discuss, on the one hand, a series of Portuguese exaggerations, and on the other, attempt to shed contemporary historiographic light on some important omissions regarding the era in which Portugal its discoveries, the present article discusses what are currently understood as the Portuguese contributions to scientific modernity. Though this recognition is generally accepted by Portuguese historians, this article locates these accomplishments within the global framework of the development of a scientific mentality and methodology, and within the general history of science.


2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 179-201
Author(s):  
James Ladyman

According to logical positivism, so the story goes, metaphysical questions are meaningless, since they do not admit of empirical confirmation or refutation. However, the logical positivists did not in fact reject as meaningless all questions about for example, the structure of space and time. Rather, key figures such as Reichenbach and Schlick believed that scientific theories often presupposed a conceptual framework that was not itself empirically testable, but which was required for the theory as a whole to be empirically testable. For example, the theory of Special Relativity relies upon the simultaneity convention introduced by Einstein that assumes that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions of space. Hence, the logical positivists accepted an a priori component to physical theories. However, they denied that this a priori component is necessarily true. Whereas for Kant, metaphysics is the a priori science of the necessary structure of rational thought about reality (rather than about things in themselves), the logical positivists were forced by the history of science to accept that the a priori structure of theories could change. Hence, they defended a notion of what Michael Friedman (1999) calls the ‘relativised’ or the ‘constitutive’ a priori. Carnap and Reichenbach held that such an a priori framework was conventional, whereas Schlick seems to have been more of a realist and held that the overall relative simplicity of different theories could count as evidence for their truth, notwithstanding the fact that some parts of them are not directly testable. All this is part of the story of how the verification principle came to be abandoned, and how logical positivism transmuted into logical empiricism.


2018 ◽  
pp. 2-20
Author(s):  
János Laki

The historicist approach to science has been accompanied by a spatial one in the last decade or two. Referring to the cultural origin of the fundamental standards, advocates of the “geographical turn” claim that “just as there is a rich history of science, so there is a rich geography of science” (Withers and Livingstone, 2011: 3). The emerging localism is perpendicular to the old historical segmentation and the combination of the two present science as a bunch of quasi-independent cognitive endeavours scattered in time and space. Taking the debate about the existence of the N-ray as an instructive example, I argue that by developing location-independent disciplinary communities, history made the community-structure of science culturally unique. Different historical eras may use incompatible concepts, methodological norms, and epistemological standards, but as this diversity does not extend onto its synchronous dimension, relativism remains one-dimensional in science.


Metagnosis ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 12-57
Author(s):  
Danielle Spencer

This chapter describes the narrative medicine methodology of this project, comprising three pillars. First is interdisciplinarity, bridging clinical and scientific research; history of science and medicine; literature and film; literary criticism and theory; and philosophy, among others. The use of rhetoric in such discourses is discussed, as well as the opportunity for meaningful critique in truly transdisciplinary work. Second is narrative attentiveness toward creative and clinical texts, illuminating and critiquing their rhetorical forms and effects. Third is the creation of a challenging writerly text—in this case, in moving between different roles, such as that of diagnostician, patient, critic—and highlighting the author’s own embodied experience, inviting the reader’s active involvement. This orientation shifts the narrative medicine emphasis on the clinician as reader/listener/interpreter to a mutually participatory engagement in which those in the patient role are understood as writerly readers. Finally, the figure of blindsight as a “prescription” for metagnosis is introduced.


2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-270
Author(s):  
J.-L. Petit

AbstractIn this article, we reflect on the motives underlying the search for extraterrestrial intelligent life (SETI) with a view to show that far from turning away from humanity it is profoundly rooted in human aspirations. We suggest that those motives derive their driving force from the fact that they combine two powerful aspirations of humanity. On the one hand, there is the transcendental motive that drives history of science, the human enterprise that claims to escape any communitarian closure of horizon and brings our humanity to transcend itself toward the other, which was formerly referred to under the title Universal Reason. On the other hand, there is the anthropological motive by virtue of which the human being tends to project on the other and even in inanimate nature a double of himself. The mixture of both motives is deemed responsible for a remarkable bias in the current understanding of the SETI programme. Despite the fact that such a programme might well be aimed at any biological formation which could be arbitrarily different from all known forms, it is focused instead on a very special kind of being: beings that possess both the natural property of the type of mentality we identify with: intelligence, and the ideal one of being possible co-subjects for a Science of Nature.


KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dániel Bárdos

It is a basic question of evolutionary theory what sort of connections there are between microevolutionary and macroevolutionary processes, i. e. between changes below the level of species in the present and changes above the level of a given species in the long run. The paper argues that this question about the structure of evolutionary theory cannot be answered just by comparing arguments by modern synthesis theory on the one hand and those of paleobiology on the other. Modern synthesis theory remains sceptical of the use of microevolutionary mechanisms, while paleobiology maintains their importance. The paper claim that the question can only be answered within the context of the history of science that has been shaping it since the publication of Darwin’s The Origin of Species. So the question about the use of microevolutionary mechanisms should be considered to be a struggle about the scope of evolutionary science and its methodologies rather than a scientific question about the reducibility of macroevolution.


Author(s):  
José M.C. Belo

Resumo De que falamos quando pretendemos falar da história da ciência no ensino? Falamos do ensino da(s) ciência(s)? Falamos do ensino da história da ciência? Falamos de ambos? Se falamos do ensino de história da ciência, então poderíamos falar de todas as disciplinas (unidades curriculares) que constituem o currículo porque, de algum modo, a ciência – a sua história – é transversal a todas. Por outro lado, se falamos da história da ciência como adjuvante do ensino das ciências - do lugar que a história da ciência deve ocupar no quadro do ensino das ciências - então estaremos a falar de algo bem diferente que tem merecidamente ocupado muitos dos que se preocupam com estas questões. Pela nossa parte, na necessariamente breve reflexão que vamos efetuar, tentaremos pôr em relevo, por um lado, a importância do conhecimento do desenvolvimento histórico da atividade científica como elemento agregador e motivador para todos os estudantes de ciências, ao mesmo tempo que evidenciaremos o modo como o discurso didático está carregado de elementos causadores de ruído no processo de comunicação didática. Palavras-chave: história da ciência; comunicação didática; paradigmas Abstract What do we talk about when we want to talk about the history of science in education? Are we talking about science(s) teaching? Are we talking about the teaching of the history of science? Are we talking about both? If we talk about the teaching of the history of science, then we could speak of all the disciplines (curricular units) that constitute the curriculum because, in some way, science - its history - is transversal to all of them. On the other hand, if we speak of the history of science as an adjunct to science teaching - the place that history of science must occupy in science teaching - then we are talking about something quite different that has deservedly occupied many of those who care about these issues. On our part, in the necessarily brief reflection that we are going to make, we will try to highlight, on the one hand, the importance of the knowledge of the historical development of scientific activity as an aggregator and motivator for all students of science, and, at the same time, we will try to show the way as the didactic discourse is loaded with elements that cause noise in the process of didactic communication. Keywords: history of science; didactic communication; paradigms


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