Communication with aliens, as an opening of the horizon of a scientific Humanity. A philosopher's reflections

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-270
Author(s):  
J.-L. Petit

AbstractIn this article, we reflect on the motives underlying the search for extraterrestrial intelligent life (SETI) with a view to show that far from turning away from humanity it is profoundly rooted in human aspirations. We suggest that those motives derive their driving force from the fact that they combine two powerful aspirations of humanity. On the one hand, there is the transcendental motive that drives history of science, the human enterprise that claims to escape any communitarian closure of horizon and brings our humanity to transcend itself toward the other, which was formerly referred to under the title Universal Reason. On the other hand, there is the anthropological motive by virtue of which the human being tends to project on the other and even in inanimate nature a double of himself. The mixture of both motives is deemed responsible for a remarkable bias in the current understanding of the SETI programme. Despite the fact that such a programme might well be aimed at any biological formation which could be arbitrarily different from all known forms, it is focused instead on a very special kind of being: beings that possess both the natural property of the type of mentality we identify with: intelligence, and the ideal one of being possible co-subjects for a Science of Nature.

Author(s):  
Elena V. Glukhova ◽  

The article discusses the modification of the “estate topos” of Russian sym- bolism in Andrei Bely’s memoir prose. The estates Shakhmatovo, Dedovo, Serebrianyj Kolodez played a key role in the cultural history of Russian symbolism. The peculiarity of Bely’s “estate text”, on the one hand, is that he found an original neo-mythological mode in the image of these estates, on the other hand, gave them heterotopic properties. The article shows how the tonality of his memoirs about Alexander Blok changes from the first edition in journal “Notes of Dreamers” (1922) to the last part of his memorial trilogy “The Beginning of the Century” (1932). If in the first version “Shakhmatovo” appears in neo-mythological meaning and a number of significant symbolic universals are realized, then in the latter version this way of representing the estate is practically erased. The image of Alexander Blok as a spiritual and symbolic center of estate cul- ture is changing: if originally he had the folklore features of Ivan Tsarevich, the ideal symbolist poet on a background of nature, and his wife was Tsarevna, the embodiment of Sophia the Wisdom of God, then later Blok appears as a Lord, carried away only by the issues of managing the estate, and his wife gets the features of an ordinary woman. The estate Serebrianyj Kolodez appears as a heterotopic space, and the features of the estate Dedovo are recognizable in the novel “The Silver Dove”.


Author(s):  
Florin Leonte

This chapter argues that, despite the differences of form, the seven orations included in this collection constituted a unitary collection and, for this reason, one should consider their interrelations as well as their distinctive features. Furthermore, the seven orations establish a tight connection with the preceding work, the Foundations, with which they share several themes. Admittedly, far from being a text focused on kingship, the Orations are rather geared towards the presentation of an individual’s acquisition of moral values. The correlation between ethics, the rulers’ virtues and rhetorical skills is framed in a tradition that originated in the writings of the rhetoricians of Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman times. Yet in Manuel’s case, through the development of the idea of a special kind of imperial behaviour, the presentation of moral virtues reflects, on the one hand, such a tradition and, on the other hand, an insight that could only have come with practical experience. Drawing on multiple philosophical sources, this formulation of imperial behaviour was based on the ideal of tolerance, with strong bonds of friendship and values such as education and moderate enjoyment of life.


Author(s):  
Onésimo T. Almeida

In following a sequence of articles published in the last thirty years which discuss, on the one hand, a series of Portuguese exaggerations, and on the other, attempt to shed contemporary historiographic light on some important omissions regarding the era in which Portugal its discoveries, the present article discusses what are currently understood as the Portuguese contributions to scientific modernity. Though this recognition is generally accepted by Portuguese historians, this article locates these accomplishments within the global framework of the development of a scientific mentality and methodology, and within the general history of science.


2021 ◽  
pp. 85-107
Author(s):  
Silvia Niccolai

Criticizing the modern, rationalistic temptation to legislate on language, this article argues that issues of 'political correctness' are an aspect of the eternal problem of definitions in law. This problem has in its turn profound connections, on the one hand, with the need, entirely human, for a correct (not one-sided or arbitrary) relationship with reality; and, on the other hand, with the insidious attempt –  which is all the same typically human – to deny reality, with its conflicts and ambiguities, and to replace it with a false,  less challenging reality of 'objective' certainties. In law, the problem of definitions has historically followed many and different itineraries; this article briefly traces some, trying to show that the ideal of an objective definition – an ideal epitomized in the 'norm' idealized by legal positivism – has always co-existed, in the legal experience, with the different ideal of a subjective definition (dialectical, controversial, negative, refutative), of which the ancient maxims of equity, the regulae iuris, offer a model. The problem of legal definitions in law is then a matter of forms of reason that confront each other throughout the history of law, the one investing on a calculating and instrumental rationality, the other relying on a more porous and flexible reason. In the legacy of this second point of view – which, the article maintains, has more than one analogy with the paths of contemporary Feminist 'Radical' Thought – antidotes can be found to the temptation to legislate on language, which is risky. If objectivity tries to suppress subjectivity, in fact, this is in the name of the illusion, that problems that trouble the human conditions can be fixed, defined, solved once and for all. It is instead the open texture of these problems, which cannot be defined once and for all, that encourages the work of language and thought. And these latter are the resources for a living together really capable of freedom and equality, of change and future.


KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dániel Bárdos

It is a basic question of evolutionary theory what sort of connections there are between microevolutionary and macroevolutionary processes, i. e. between changes below the level of species in the present and changes above the level of a given species in the long run. The paper argues that this question about the structure of evolutionary theory cannot be answered just by comparing arguments by modern synthesis theory on the one hand and those of paleobiology on the other. Modern synthesis theory remains sceptical of the use of microevolutionary mechanisms, while paleobiology maintains their importance. The paper claim that the question can only be answered within the context of the history of science that has been shaping it since the publication of Darwin’s The Origin of Species. So the question about the use of microevolutionary mechanisms should be considered to be a struggle about the scope of evolutionary science and its methodologies rather than a scientific question about the reducibility of macroevolution.


2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Adolfo Bonaccini

A relação de Hegel com o ceticismo está longe de ser clara. A par de existirem alguns poucos trabalhos sobre o assunto, e de Hegel abordar o tema em várias obras, não está bem determinado se Hegel possui uma teoria global sobre o ceticismo ou se apenas é um mero crítico de posturas céticas clássicas na antiguidade e na modernidade. Em que pese Hegel ser um crítico ferrenho do ceticismo moderno (por ex., em textos como Sobre a relação do Ceticismo com a Filosofia, as Preleções sobre História da Filosofia e a Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas), a sua crítica não se restringe a esta ou aquela forma de ceticismo, mas se funda numa teoria geral do saber que compreende o ceticismo como uma atividade negativa constitutiva da consciência e pretende refutá-lo enquanto ele reifica essa negatividade numa pretensão de verdade. A refutação consiste na descrição do modo como o ceticismo filosófico seria um saber parcial, e por isso auto-refutativo. O presente trabalho pretende sugerir que isto ocorre, sobretudo, na Fenomenologia do Espírito, cujo caráter “fenomenológico” propriamente dito não parece poder ser bem compreendido, sem tomar como pano de fundo o problema do ceticismo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Hegel. Fenomenologia. Ceticismo. Refutação. ABSTRACT Hegel’s position towards skepticism is far from being clear. On the one hand, there are just a few studies on the subject and Hegel faces the issue in several of his writings; on the other hand, it is not established yet if Hegel has a global theory about skepticism or if he is just a critic of Ancient and Modern skeptical attitudes. In spite of Hegel being known as a sharp critic of Modern skepticism (for example, in works like On the relationship of skepticism to philosophy, Lectures on the history of philosophy and Encyclopedia of philosophical sciences), his criticism is not restricted to specific forms of skepticism, but it is rather founded upon a general theory of knowledge which takes skepticism as a negative activity constitutive of our natural consciousness and intends to refute the skeptical attitude as that negative activity of self-consciousness is reified and turned out into a special kind of truth claim. Hegel’s refutation consists in describing the way philosophical skepticism would be understood as a partial and self-defeating attitude of knowing. The present study suggests that this procedure is to be seen above all in the Phenomenology of Mind, whose “phenomenological” character cannot be rightly understood without taking properly into account the problem of skepticism. KEY WORDS: Hegel. Phenomenology. Skepticism. Refutation.


Author(s):  
José M.C. Belo

Resumo De que falamos quando pretendemos falar da história da ciência no ensino? Falamos do ensino da(s) ciência(s)? Falamos do ensino da história da ciência? Falamos de ambos? Se falamos do ensino de história da ciência, então poderíamos falar de todas as disciplinas (unidades curriculares) que constituem o currículo porque, de algum modo, a ciência – a sua história – é transversal a todas. Por outro lado, se falamos da história da ciência como adjuvante do ensino das ciências - do lugar que a história da ciência deve ocupar no quadro do ensino das ciências - então estaremos a falar de algo bem diferente que tem merecidamente ocupado muitos dos que se preocupam com estas questões. Pela nossa parte, na necessariamente breve reflexão que vamos efetuar, tentaremos pôr em relevo, por um lado, a importância do conhecimento do desenvolvimento histórico da atividade científica como elemento agregador e motivador para todos os estudantes de ciências, ao mesmo tempo que evidenciaremos o modo como o discurso didático está carregado de elementos causadores de ruído no processo de comunicação didática. Palavras-chave: história da ciência; comunicação didática; paradigmas Abstract What do we talk about when we want to talk about the history of science in education? Are we talking about science(s) teaching? Are we talking about the teaching of the history of science? Are we talking about both? If we talk about the teaching of the history of science, then we could speak of all the disciplines (curricular units) that constitute the curriculum because, in some way, science - its history - is transversal to all of them. On the other hand, if we speak of the history of science as an adjunct to science teaching - the place that history of science must occupy in science teaching - then we are talking about something quite different that has deservedly occupied many of those who care about these issues. On our part, in the necessarily brief reflection that we are going to make, we will try to highlight, on the one hand, the importance of the knowledge of the historical development of scientific activity as an aggregator and motivator for all students of science, and, at the same time, we will try to show the way as the didactic discourse is loaded with elements that cause noise in the process of didactic communication. Keywords: history of science; didactic communication; paradigms


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-49
Author(s):  
Pietro Daniel Omodeo

AbstractThis contribution interprets the intertwined issues of science, epistemology, society, and politics in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks as a culturalist approach to science that does not renounce objectivity. Gramsci particularly criticized the scientist positions taken by the Bolshevik leader Nikolai Bukharin in Historical Materialism (1921) and the conference communication he delivered at the International Congress of History of Science and Technology in London in 1931. Gramsci did not avoid, at least implicitly, engaging with the theses of Lenin’s Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1909). Gramsci’s reception of these Russian positions was twofold: on the one hand, he agreed with the centrality of praxis (and politics) for a correct assessment of the meaning of epistemological positions; on the other hand, he disagreed with the reduction of the problem of epistemology to the dichotomy of materialism and idealism at the expense of any consideration of the ideological dimension of science.


Author(s):  
Colby Dickinson

In his somewhat controversial book Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben makes brief reference to Theodor Adorno’s apparently contradictory remarks on perceptions of death post-Auschwitz, positions that Adorno had taken concerning Nazi genocidal actions that had seemed also to reflect something horribly errant in the history of thought itself. There was within such murderous acts, he had claimed, a particular degradation of death itself, a perpetration of our humanity bound in some way to affect our perception of reason itself. The contradictions regarding Auschwitz that Agamben senses to be latent within Adorno’s remarks involve the intuition ‘on the one hand, of having realized the unconditional triumph of death against life; on the other, of having degraded and debased death. Neither of these charges – perhaps like every charge, which is always a genuinely legal gesture – succeed in exhausting Auschwitz’s offense, in defining its case in point’ (RA 81). And this is the stance that Agamben wishes to hammer home quite emphatically vis-à-vis Adorno’s limitations, ones that, I would only add, seem to linger within Agamben’s own formulations in ways that he has still not come to reckon with entirely: ‘This oscillation’, he affirms, ‘betrays reason’s incapacity to identify the specific crime of Auschwitz with certainty’ (RA 81).


1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (8) ◽  
pp. 301-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Govert D. Geldof

In integrated water management, the issues are often complex by nature, they are capable of subjective interpretation, are difficult to express in standards and exhibit many uncertainties. For such issues, an equilibrium approach is not appropriate. A non-equilibrium approach has to be applied. This implies that the processes to which the integrated issue pertains, are regarded as “alive”’. Instead of applying a control system as the model for tackling the issue, a network is used as the model. In this network, several “agents”’ are involved in the modification, revision and rearrangement of structures. It is therefore an on-going renewal process (perpetual novelty). In the planning process for the development of a groundwater policy for the municipality of Amsterdam, a non-equilibrium approach was adopted. In order to do justice to the integrated character of groundwater management, an approach was taken, containing the following features: (1) working from global to detailed, (2) taking account of the history of the system, (3) giving attention to communication, (4) building flexibility into the establishing of standards, and (5) combining reason and emotions. A middle course was sought, between static, rigid but reliable on the one hand; dynamic, flexible but vague on the other hand.


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