scholarly journals PENGARUH PEMEGANG SAHAM PENGENDALI TERHADAP KOMPENSASI DIREKSI DENGAN MEKANISME PEMEGANG SAHAM INSTITUSIONAL SEBAGAI VARIABEL PEMODERASI

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 315
Author(s):  
Andre Bustari
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Quantitative Method ◽  
Listed Company ◽  
Statistical Test ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

<p class="Default"><em>Penelitian ini bertujuan </em><em>untuk membuktikan</em><em> </em><em>pemegang saham pengendali terhadap kompensasi direksi dengan </em><em>mekanisme </em><em>pemegang saham </em><em>institusional sebagai variabel pemoderasi</em><em>. Sampel penelitian ini adalah </em><em>22 perusahaan</em><em> </em><em>yang menjadi emiten tetap terbesar termasuk kedalam Likuiditas 45 (LQ45) </em><em>dari </em><em>periode 2011 sampai dengan 2015</em><em>. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode kuantitatif. Uji statistik yang gunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah Regresi Linear Berganda. </em><em>Teori keagenan memperediksi bahwa pemegang saham pengendali berpengaruh positif terhadap kompensasi direksi. Hasil penelitian pertama tidak dapat membuktikan </em><em>pengaruh </em><em>pemegang saham </em><em>pengendali </em><em>terhadap kompensasi </em><em>direksi</em><em> dikarenakan fungsi pemegang saham pengendali dilaksanakan oleh Komite Independen sesuai yang diisyaratkan oleh peraturan-peraturan yang diterbitkan oleh Otorita Jasa Keuangan </em><em>sehingga </em><em>pemegang saham </em><em>pengendali tidak mempengaruhi pemberian kompensasi kepada direksi. Hasil penelitian kedua tidak membuktikan </em><em>pengaruh </em><em>pemegang saham </em><em>institusional dalam memperlemah pengaruh </em><em>pemegang saham </em><em>pengendali </em><em>terhadap kompensasi </em><em>direksi</em><em>.</em><em> Ini diduga </em><em>pemegang saham </em><em>institusional menilai pemberian kompensasi dan pengawasnya sudah dilaksanakan dengan adanya </em><em>komite </em><em>independen internal perusahaan.</em><em></em></p><p class="Default"> </p><p class="Default"><em>This study aims to prove the controlling shareholder to the compensation of the directors with the mechanism of institutional shareholders as a moderating variable. The sample of this research is 22 companies which become the biggest listed company including into Liquidity 45 (LQ45) from period 2011 to 2015. The research method used is quantitative method. The statistical test used in this study is Multiple Linear Regression. The agency theory predicts that the controlling shareholders positively influence the compensation of the board of directors. The results of the first study cannot prove the influence of the controlling shareholder on the compensation of the directors because the controlling shareholder function is carried out by the Independent Committee in accordance with the rules issued by the Financial Services Authority so that the controlling shareholder does not affect the compensation to the directors. The results of the second </em><em>study</em><em> do not prove the influence of institutional shareholders in weakening the influence of the controlling shareholder on the compensation of the directors. It is alleged that the institutional shareholders assess the compensation and the supervisor has been implemented with the company's internal independent committee.</em></p>

Pengaruh Dewan Direksi, Dewan Komisaris Independen. Kepemilikan Manajerial, Kepemilikan Institusional, Dan Dewan Pengawas Syariah Terhadap No Performing Financing (Studi Kasus Pada Bank Umum Syariah Yang Terdaftar Di OJK Periode 2015-2019)

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yugi Maheswari ES ◽  
Iwan Fakhruddin ◽  
Azmi Fitriati ◽  
Bima Cinintya Pratama
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Commercial Bank ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Board Of Directors

Tujuan penelitian ini untuk mengetahui pengaruh penerapan Good Corporate Governance (GCG) yang diproksikan oleh dewan direksi, dewan komisaris independen, kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan institusional, dan dewan pengawas syariah terhadap risiko pembayaran yang diukur dengan rasio Non Performing Financing (NPF) pada Bank Umum Syariah. Populasi penelitian adalah Bank Umum Syariah Yang Terdaftar di Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. Data yang digunakan adalah data sekunder berupa laporan tahunan Bank Umum Syariah periode 2015-2019. Sampel yang dikumpulkan adalah 14 bank syariah sebayak 70 data. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dewan direksi berpengaruh negative erhadap NPF. Dewan komisaris independen, kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan institusional, dan dewan pengawas syariah tidak berpengaruh terhadap NPF.  The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of the implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) which is proxied by the board of directors, the board of independent commissioners, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and the sharia supervisory board against payment risk as measured by the Non Performing Financing (NPF) ratio at the Bank Sharia General. The study population was a Sharia Commercial Bank Registered at Financial services Authority. The data used was secondary data in the form of reports annual Sharia Commercial Bank for the period 2015-2019. The samples collected were 14 Islamic banks as much as 70 data. The results showed that the board of directors has a negative effect on NPF. Independent board of commissioners, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and sharia supervisory board have no effect on NPF.

scholarly journals PROGRESIFITAS HUKUM PENGEMBALIAN DEVIDEN SAHAM INTERIM PERSEROAN TERBATAS PADA UUPT NO.40 TAHUN 2007

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Bella Mutiara Wahab
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Limited Liability Company ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Dividend Distribution ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Annual Book

AbstractProgressive law must place the law in a very close position with the law's community or stakeholders. This position is called responsive, progressive law and is always associated with stakeholders' reality and needs to create justice and happiness as law aspired itself. Also, progressive law emphasizes social integration to overcome public moral insularity.Starting from the viewpoint of progressive law, the author looks at the laws and regulations that discuss the return of interim dividends as stated in the Limited Liability Company Law No. 40 of 2007, article 72, article 72 states that companies allow rules related to dividend distribution in a temporary (interim) way. The article is then interpreted as that if the company has positive profits, the company is allowed to distribute dividends before the company closes the book at the end of the year, provided that the board of directors officially announces the distribution with the approval of the GMS that the positive profits obtained by the company before closing the book will come as dividends interim. As a result, the company competes to distribute interim dividends to increase and show its credibility to investors. It was recorded on the Indonesian stock exchange (IDX) that in September 2020, 73 companies distributed interim dividends.However, article 72 paragraph 5 of the Limited Liability Company Law No. 40 of 2007 explains that if after the company distributes interim dividends to shareholders and at the end of the closing of the annual book the company suffers a loss, the shareholders must return the dividends they have received. If the shareholder does not return it, the directors and commissioners are jointly responsible for covering the company's losses.This viewpoint is the basis for finding the location of the value and form of legal progressivity regarding the mechanism of interim share dividends in limited liability companies as stated in UUPT No.40 of 2007 Article 72 using a normative research method with a conceptual approach. 

scholarly journals Rights issues, private benefits and negative-NPV investments

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-245
Author(s):  
Michele Meoli ◽  
Stefano Paleari ◽  
Giovanni Urga
Keyword(s):  
Listed Company ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Equity Issues ◽  
Abuse Of Power ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Rights Issue ◽  
Rights Issues

This paper discusses the use of rights issues when interest conflicts between controlling shareholders and minorities exist, due to the existence of private benefits that the former can extract from the value of listed company. While the literature considers the issue of pre-emptive rights as an essential tool to protect minorities from expropriation, we propose that pre-emptive rights are used to enforce the subscription of seasoned equity issues. We define an abuse condition as the case when a controlling shareholder choose discretionally an issuing price, granting a discount with respect to the market price, and "enforce" minorities to undertake a negative-NPV investment. Minorities do so because they are minimizing an exit cost that is greater than zero. As the rights issue never fails under these conditions, we define this phenomenon as "enforced subscription". This model fits the Italian legal framework and many other international contexts where rights issues are dominant. We report the case of Alitalia’s rights issue in 2005 as a typical example of "enforcement at work". As rights issues at a high discount often involve an abuse of power by the controlling shareholders, we argue that their use should be carefully regulated.

scholarly journals Research on the Influence of the Characteristics of the Board of Directors of Listed Companies on the Growth of the Company

2021 ◽  
Vol 292 ◽  
pp. 02049
Author(s):  
Gao Ruirui
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Listed Company ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Dynamic Perspective ◽  
A Share

The board characteristics are an important factor affecting the growth of the company. This paper selects the data of A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the five-year period from 2014 to 2019, and analyzes whether the board characteristics will affect the growth of the company from a dynamic perspective. The research found that: ① the scale of the board of a listed company has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the company’s growth; ② the proportion of independent directors has a positive correlation with the company’s growth; ③ the director’s salary has a positive correlation with the company’s growth.

Authentication of Deed of Minutes of General Meeting of Shareholders Implemented With The Concept of Cyber Notary Reviewed From Article 16 Paragraph (1) Letter M of Law No. 2 of 2014 On Notary Department

Authentica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Reza Amrullah
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Computer Networks ◽  
Research Method ◽  
General Meeting ◽  
Electronic Media ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Electronic Documents ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Notary Public

Cyber Notary is the use or utilization of information technology such as computers, computer networks, and/or other electronic media, such as teleconferences or video conferences in carrying out the tasks of the authority of a Notary Public. This study analyzes the authentication of electronic documents in the form of the minutes of the General Meeting of Shareholders in the Cyber Notary concept and the proof of the minutes of the General Meeting of Shareholders held with the concept of Cyber Notary. The research method used in this study is normative juridical. The source of legal material in this research is secondary legal material. This Legal Material Analysis Method is Normative Qualitative. Based on the results of the study found that Authentication of electronic documents in the form of the minutes of the General Meeting of Shareholders in the concept of Cyber Notary can be done by means of a Notary does not need to be present during the General Meeting of Shareholders of the Cyber Notary takes place. If the Notary is present directly at the meeting then it is actually dangerous for the Notary, because in the Cyber Notary RUPS there are meeting participants who attend using teleconferences or video conferences that do not allow the Notary to get to know all meeting participants who were present at the meeting. Making Deed of Minutes of the meeting is sufficient to be made by a Notary based on the Minutes of Meeting under the hand of the authorized shareholders to the Board of Directors to be drawn up by a Notary. Keywords: Strength of Proof; GMS Deed; Cyber Notary.

scholarly journals PERLUASAN PENGATURAN PENGURUSAN PERSEROAN TERBATAS DALAM PEMBAHARUAN HUKUM PERSEROAN TERBATAS

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 1495
Author(s):  
Pande Putu Indahyani Lestari ◽  
I Gede Agus Kurniawan
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
Legal Entity ◽  
Study Results ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
A Company

Tujuan studi ini untuk mengkaji perluasan pengaturan pengurusan perseroan terbatas dalam pembaharuan hukum Perseroan Terbatas. Dalam UUPT menyebutkan bahwa Direksi berwenang dan bertanggung jawab penuh untuk menjalankan pengurusan Perseroan. Studi ini menggunakan metode penelitian hukum normatif, yakni suatu penelitian menggunakan berdasarkan dengan pendekatan bahan hukum, baik hukum primer dan hukum sekunder. Hasil studi menunjukkan bahwa Direksi sebagai organ perseroan bertanggung jawab atas kepentingan Perseroan, apabila dalam suatu Perseroan tidak memiliki Direksi maka Perseroan tidak akan bisa berjalan atau beroperasional dengan baik selayaknya sebuah badan hukum. Kemudian dalam hal ini ketika masa jabatan Direksi sudah habis mengakibatkan terjadinya kekosongan kepengurusan Direksi, di dalam UUPT tidak ada yang mengatur manakala suatu Perseroan sudah tidak memiliki Direksi. The purpose of this study is to examine the expansion of management arrangements for limited liability companies in the legal renewal of Limited Liability Companies. The UUPT states that the Directors are authorized and fully responsible for carrying out the management of the Company. This study uses a normative legal research method, which is a research using based on the approach of legal materials, both primary and secondary law. The study results show that the Board of Directors as a corporate organ is responsible for the interests of the Company, if in a Company does not have a Board of Directors, the Company will not be able to operate or operate properly as a legal entity. Then in this case when the term of office of the Board of Directors has expired resulting in a vacancy in the management of the Board of Directors, in the Company Law no one regulates when a Company does not have a Board of Directors.

scholarly journals Deed Legal Ad / ART PT Perkebunan Nusantara IX After The Consolidated PTP XV-XVI (Persero) With PTP XVIII (Persero)

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 687
Author(s):  
Meilyna Dwijanti ◽  
Amin Purnawan
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Qualitative Method ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Limited Liability Company ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
Dividend Distribution ◽  
The Board Of Directors

The purpose of this study was to determine the legality of the deed of AD / ART PT Perkebunan Nusantara IX after the consolidation of PTP XV-XVI (Persero) with PTP XVIII (Persero). This research method using normative legal research. The data used is secondary data that is material that provides an explanation of primary legal materials; in the form of deed of AD / ART PT Perkebunan Nusantara IX. Data were analyzed by descriptive qualitative method. The results showed Deeds AD / ART PT Perkebunan Nusantara IX Post-Consolidation PTP XV-XVI (Persero) With PTP XVIII (Persero), in accordance with the process and the provisions of the legislation in force. In the Deed clearly contain 1) the name and domicile of the Company; 2) the purpose and objectives and business activities of the Company; 3) The period of the founding of the Company; 4) the amount of the authorized, issued and paid-up capital; 5) the number of shares, class of shares if there is a following for each classification number of shares, the rights attached to each share, and the nominal value of each share; 6) the name of position and the number of members of the Board of Directors and Board of Commissioners; 7) determination of the place and manner of implementation of the GMS; 8) procedures for the appointment, replacement, dismissal of members of the Board of Directors and Board of Commissioners; 9) procedures for the use of profits and dividend distribution. replacement, dismissal of members of the Board of Directors and Board of Commissioners; 9) procedures for the use of profits and dividend distribution. replacement, dismissal of members of the Board of Directors and Board of Commissioners; 9) procedures for the use of profits and dividend distribution.Keywords: Legality; Deeds; AD / ART; Limited Liability Company; BUMN.

Institutional Investors' Representativeness and Earnings Management

2021 ◽  
pp. 27-45
Author(s):  
Pietro Fera ◽  
Nicola Moscariello ◽  
Michele Pizzo ◽  
Giorgio Ricciardi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Mere Presence ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

In contexts characterized by high ownership concentration, institutional investors may lose their monitoring role and might not be effective in constraining earnings management. So, this study investigates whether directors appointed by institutional shareholders are more effective in inhibiting earnings management for companies with a high ownership concentration, rather than the mere presence of institutional investors. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, findings suggest a negative relationship between minority directors appointed by institutional shareholders and abnormal accruals, while no relationship is found between the latter and the mere presence of institutional investors. Moreover, results also highlight that the difference between strategic and no strategic institutional investors does not count in a context characterized by high ownership concentration. Overall, this study suggests that institutional investors, regardless of their characteristics, are more effective in constraining earnings management when they can count on an agent on the board of directors.

scholarly journals ASAS FIDUCIARY SKILL AND CARE DALAM PENGELOLAAN BUMD GUNA MEWUJUDKAN GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Agus Suhendra ◽  
Muhammad Taufiq
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Management And Development ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Government Interference

One of the problems in the management and development of BUMD is that the legal aspects of regulation of BUMD do not specifically provide direction and guidance in the management of a business owned by the region. The identification of this research are: 1) How is the application of the fiduciary skill and care principles in the management of BUMD to realize the principles of good corporate governance? 2) What are the obstacles faced in applying the principle of fiduciary skills and care in the management of BUMD to realize the principles of good corporate governance? The research method used in this study is a normative juridical approach. The results of this study are: 1) In the management and representation of the company, the Board of Directors in carrying out actions or actions that violate the authority limit or something that has been stipulated in the articles of association, can be held accountable. BUMD, namely: unclear legal status and organizational structure of BUMD, BUMD is not managed by the principles of good corporate governance as a result of too large or dominant regional government interference in the company's operations.

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