scholarly journals Russian foreign policy: From ‘new thinking’ to multidirectional strategy

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 985-1001
Author(s):  
Nadezhda P. Sidorova

This article is devoted to the description and analysis of the Russian foreign policy as it has evolved from a more pro-Western line after 1991-1992 to a more balanced and nationalistic version by the mid-1990s. In addition, as a part of this article certain projections are made for the future of Russian relations with the West. The author argues that in many ways the foreign policy of the new Russia during the early 1990s was continuation of the Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking.’ Gorbachev had hoped to put the Soviet Union on the path of partnership with the Western alliance through clearing away the military and political baggage of Stalinism-Brezhnevism. This strategy enjoyed full support of the pro-western democratic movement headed by Yeltsin. The Russian democrats saw Western nations as their chief ideological and political allies, and a possible source of economic aid and a model for Russia’s economic development. However, over time, a number of internal and external factors started to influence the original Yeltsin’s strategy. Internally, the failure of ‘shock therapy’ led to the weakening of democrats and strengthening of the communists and nationalists. Furthermore, Yeltsin’s foreign policy became the target of intense criticism. Moreover, as a result of the internal and external influences and specifically the national debates, Russia’s foreign policy was gradually modified. Russia again puts an emphasis on security, and on the strength of its armed forces, and forging strategic partnerships in various parts of the world. In addition, nationalism would be expressed through the protection of the Russian diaspora, the glorification of Russia’s imperial past, and the scaling down the policy of repentance for the misdeeds of the Communist regime. Russia’s great power ambitions could be observed through Russia’s attempt to play pivotal role throughout the former Soviet Union, and a desire to show the Russian flag across the world. Moreover, ideology does not influence Kremlin’s relations with other states anymore, instead economic interests encourage Moscow to restore cooperation with many Third World nations. It can be expected that Russia will continue to compete for predominance with the West in the post-soviet republics and in the field of security and at the same time Russia will promote its partnership with China and other non-Western actors. However, despite these shifts, a multidirectional strategy will likely be preserved.

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Dr.Sc. Samet Dalipi

The Cold War, characterized by its bipolar ideological rivalry, did not resolve centuries-old hostilities between the West and Russia. In order to regain the lost influence and reincarnation of regional hegemony, President Putin wanted a casus-belli. The international humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and the latter’s declaration of independence were Russia’s weak justifications for resuming the old clashes. Interventions in the territories of the former Soviet Union inhabited by Russian speakers, the annexation of Crimea, and direct involvement in the interethnic disputes in the eastern part of Ukraine and the Syrian wars show that Russia is determined to challenge and test the Western commitment to the spread of democracy. The similarities between Kosovo and Crimea, loudly echoed by Russia and their supporters, cannot be academically binding, except in some aspects of tertiary nature.The brutal prevention of Chechnya’s independence in the 1990s and failure to recognize Kosovo while applauding the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia present Putin’s political inconsistency and Real politic orientation. The Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, and threats to destabilize countries that “do not respect” the rights and interests of Russians wherever they are, exemplify Putin’s policy.The article aims to analyze the volatility of Russian foreign policy by comparing the case of Kosovo’s independence to the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s paternalist intentions abroad. 


Subject Russian foreign policy in 2016. Significance Russian foreign policy is driven by an amalgam of realpolitik, nationalism and anti-Western ideology, and consists of both defensive and offensive strategies. The robust, confrontational approach championed by President Vladimir Putin in recent years has produced successes in such areas as the military campaign in Syria, but an undecided outcome in Ukraine and mixed results in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Impacts A NATO summit this July may result in a tougher, more coordinated stance on Russia. Following its official partial withdrawal from Syria, the Russian military will conduct selective attacks. Russia will need careful diplomacy to keep Belarus and Kazakhstan from drifting away as allies.


Author(s):  
Simon Miles

This chapter covers Ronald Reagan's first meeting with Mikhail Gorbache in Geneva in November 1985, exploring the internal and external roots of the nascent new thinking in Soviet foreign-policy and its impact on East–West relations. It recounts how superpower relations over a five-year period became messy and contradictory as Moscow and Washington exchanged harsh words and engaged in more dialogue than is commonly thought. It also mentions how the process of ending the Cold War had begun as US policymakers regained confidence in their place in the world and their Soviet counterparts took drastic measures to deal with a deteriorating situation. The chapter refers to policymakers in Washington and Moscow who struggled with the dualities of the Cold War. It describes that the policymakers witnessed a strong and rising United States and a Soviet Union that was on a grim downward trajectory.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-37
Author(s):  
Amadu Sesay ◽  
Charles Ukeje

The end of the cold war has made democratization, and its barest essential component elections, imperative for all nondemocratic forms of government. This is to be expected, given the dismal failure of the socialist alternative even in the first socialist country, the former Soviet Union. The United States, which is not only the foremost democracy in the world but also the only superpower, has been in the vanguard of democracy salesmanship. Africa, the continent with the least democratic space, has not been left out, as witnessed by President Bill Clinton’s unprecedented tour of the continent in March 1998.Understandably, Nigeria, arguably the most important country in Africa, was left out of the tour, since it was then under the obnoxious, undemocratic, and oppressive military regime of the late General Sani Abacha.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 198-226
Author(s):  
Jardar Nuland

This article argues that the West’s neoliberal ‘dignity promotion’ in other parts of the world is counter-productive and leads to the resurgence of a primordial culture of honour, a concept too often an ignored in international relations research. The author shows how the West has hijacked and neoliberalized the concept of dignity to include abstract notions of individual freedom and, above all, property rights and free trade. The concept of dignity is thus deprived of any social content. The strategy of dignity promotion, i.e. the effort to spread the idea of every individual’s inherent, inalienable worth, is based on the conviction that this will lead to a more secure world. However, sociological and anthropological research on moral cultures and honour has shown that security shapes moral cultures, not the other way round. The rise of dignity culture in the modern West was possible only when security, including social security, was provided. Conversely, honour dominates in insecure environments and resurfaces quickly when security disappears. The case study is Russia, where radical neoliberal restructuring in the early 1990s led to an anarchic brutalization of society, giving rise to a widespread culture of honour in Russian politics. On another level, Western dignity promotion in the former Soviet Union, epitomized by its support for ‘colour revolutions’, is perceived as an affront threatening Russian security by damaging its reputation for resolve. Within the culture of honour, the only moral answer to this is aggressive counter-attack.


Kavkaz-forum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Р. ФОЛЬЦ

Большинство специалистов согласятся с тем, что Васо Абаев является величайшим ученым, областью научных интересов которого было, прежде всего, осетиноведение, рассматривавшееся им под углом иранистики. Уже при жизни он, несомненно, пользовался международной известностью и признанием среди иранистов, о чем свидетельствует публикация 540-страничного юбилейного сборника в его честь, выпущенного Итальянским институтом стран Африки и Востока в Риме [1]. Но в какой степени эта репутация основывалась на том, что его западные коллеги действительно имели возможность глубоко вникать в содержание его исследований? Из огромного количества материалов, созданных Абаевым за его долгую жизнь, практически все были написаны на русском языке, которым мало кто из иранистов владеет как на Западе, так и в самом Иране. Если говорить о переводах, то было переведено и опубликовано лишь несколько статей и одна книга по грамматике, и они, к тому же, существуют в крошечном количестве копий, хранящихся в университетских и государственных библиотеках. Принимая во внимание огромный вклад Абаева в науку, вызывает сожаление тот факт, что большинство иранистов за пределами бывшего Советского Союза имели такой ограниченный доступ к его трудам. В статье поднимается актуальная проблема интеграции русскоязычной иранистики в мировое академическое пространство, вскрываются основные причины слабой вовлеченности советских/российских осетиноведческих исследований в международную иранистику. Кроме того, дается краткий обзор тех немногих работ по осетинской тематике, которые вышли за пределами России. Most experts will agree that Vaso Abaev is the greatest scientist, whose area of ​​scientific interests was, first of all, Ossetian studies, which he considered from the angle of Iranian studies. During his lifetime, he undoubtedly enjoyed international fame and recognition among Iranian scholars, as evidenced by the publication of a 540-page anniversary collection in his honor, published by the Italian Institute of African and Oriental Countries in Rome [1]. But to what extent was this reputation based on the fact that his Western colleagues did indeed have the opportunity to delve deeply into the content of his research? Of the huge amount of materials created by Abaev during his long life, almost all were written in Russian, which few Iranian scholars speak either in the West or in Iran itself. In terms of translation, only a few articles and one book on grammar have been translated and published, and they also exist in tiny numbers of copies held in university and government libraries. Given Abaev's enormous contribution to science, it is regrettable that most Iranian scholars outside the former Soviet Union had such limited access to his writings. The article raises the actual problem of integrating Russian-language Iranian studies into the world academic space, reveals the main reasons for the weak involvement of Soviet / Russian Ossetian studies in international Iranian studies. In addition, a brief overview is given of the few works on Ossetian topics that have appeared outside of Russia.


Author(s):  
P. Cherkasov

The article describes the debate on foreign policy of the post-Soviet Russia, which took place at the Academic Council of IMEMO in 1992–1994. What are the national interests of the Russian young democracy? What should be Russian foreign policy in the new geopolitical situation, after the collapse of the USSR? To what extent the transformation of socio-political system in Russia changed the nature of its foreign policy? What should be its principles and priorities after the end of the Cold War? All these and other questions were in the focus of IMEMO experts immediately after the collapse of the communist regime in 1991. From the outset, the discussions were marked by different approaches to the issues. Some experts put forward as a priority the relations with the U.S. and the West in general, some put Europe in the first place, and others  - the Commonwealth of Independent States, which brought together some of the former Soviet republics. But all IMEMO experts in general agreed on the negative evaluation of the new Russian foreign policy quality: the default of a senior management for clear understanding of strategic and tactical foreign policy goals, low professional level of those who were called to form and implement foreign policy, the absence of a single center for decision-making, the lack of coordination between various authorities involved in the development of a foreign policy strategy  - Presidential Administration, Security Council, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Parliament, etc. As mentioned in the discussions, the initial stage of idealistic notions and expectations of the West prevalent in Russian society and in the new ruling elite circles after the fall of the Soviet regime was soon replaced by disappointment and even irritation towards the West. Both of these trends were equally dangerous to the interests of the Russian foreign policy, which was in great need of a pragmatic, professional understanding of realities. This policy had to achieve two main objectives  - full integration of Russia into the world community of developed democracies, and protection of its own national interests within this community. One should have been inextricably linked with the other. Academic understanding of national interests in the field of foreign, defense and economic policies, the development of specific proposals and recommendations on these issues for the state leadership has become one of priorities for IMEMO analysts. Acknowledgements. The publication was prepared as part of the President of Russian Federation grant to support the leading scientific schools NSh-6452.2014.6.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 193-211
Author(s):  
A. A. Krivopalov

This paper looks at a series of analytical reports published in 2015– 2020 by the RAND Corporation focused on Russia, its armed forces and the policies pursued by Moscow on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The assumption by the author is that the expert community in the United States can exert greater influence on US foreign policy than is generally accepted in Russia. Historically, in the United States, there has been a strong link between expert consideration of any given policy and its subsequent implementation. Reports published by RAND help assess the role that Russia and the former Soviet Union play on the list of US national security priorities. Does Washington understand the domestic-policy motives of Russia’s actions on the international stage? What is America’s overall assessment of Russia’s military capabilities? Finally, what is the extent of Washington’s willingness to seek compromise with Moscow and its foreign policy aspirations? The source analyzed in the paper can shed some light on how the political community in the United States views the future of the rivalry between Russia and America.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-31
Author(s):  
Hikmat Shah Afridi ◽  
Sumayya Bibi ◽  
Bilal Muhammad

Gwadar Port is the mega project of ongoing developmental projects in Balochistan which is shaping the economy of the World. The port is creating opportunities and possibilities for promoting regional and international shipping and it will resuscitate trade links between China and CARs being the closest route to warm waters. Gwadar Port has vast region to influence; stretching up to several breakaway states of the former Soviet Union in the north, to Iran, the Gulf, the Middle East and East Africa in the west, to India and Sri Lanka in the south. Moreover, this deep port is serving the Gulf and East African ports with fast feeder services. It has deep-water sea complementary to Karachi and Bin Qasim ports for enhancing cargo shipments and therefore it will be a mother port for Asia in the coming years.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-37
Author(s):  
Amadu Sesay ◽  
Charles Ukeje

The end of the cold war has made democratization, and its barest essential component elections, imperative for all nondemocratic forms of government. This is to be expected, given the dismal failure of the socialist alternative even in the first socialist country, the former Soviet Union. The United States, which is not only the foremost democracy in the world but also the only superpower, has been in the vanguard of democracy salesmanship. Africa, the continent with the least democratic space, has not been left out, as witnessed by President Bill Clinton’s unprecedented tour of the continent in March 1998. Understandably, Nigeria, arguably the most important country in Africa, was left out of the tour, since it was then under the obnoxious, undemocratic, and oppressive military regime of the late General Sani Abacha.


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