scholarly journals Ownership and control in Germany: do cross-shareholdings reflect bank control on large companies?

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 54-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Onetti ◽  
Alessia Pisoni
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Personal Relationships ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Industrial Firms ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
And Control ◽  
Cross Shareholdings

This paper aims to analyse the relationships (equity and non-equity) between German banks and German firms, which are the peculiarities of the German institutional system of corporate governance. Scholars agree on the fact that cross shareholdings among banks, insurance companies and institutional firms (Charkham 1994, Baums 1993), combined with long term shareholdings (Gerschenkron 1989), and close relationships and interlocking between board members of different companies (Tilly 1969, Hopt and Prigge 1998), are the main features of bank-firms relationships in Germany. Specifically the main purpose of the paper is to demonstrate, for the panel of German companies investigated, that bank-firm relationship relies not only on patrimonial linkages but also on personal relationships. In the light of the sweeping changes that this model has undergone since the late 1990s, an empirical study has been carried out regarding relationships (patrimonial and personal) among the first 100 German companies with the highest turnover and the 6 main German financial institutions, showing the evolving trend along a period of 8 years and comparing the collected data with previous research. Therefore, in order to try to measure the extent of the banks role in Corporate Governance and to evaluate in a deeper sense the effective influence they have on the industry management, we carried out two different analyses. The first, takes into consideration the equity relationships between banks/insurances and the German industrial firms, the second analyses the number of seats held by the same banks in the correspondent supervisory board. In particular, in our opinion, the analysis of the composition of the supervisory boards can help to outline the personal relationships above mentioned. Therefore is understood, that we consider the presence of bank’s representatives in others than banks’ supervisory boards as signal of banks’ opportunity to exert power and influence

How Do Politicians Capture a State? Evidence from State-Owned Enterprises

2020 ◽  
pp. 088832542095348
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Szarzec ◽  
Bartosz Totleben ◽  
Dawid Piątek
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Government Administration ◽  
State Capture ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
The Government

This article discusses political state capture in the context of party patronage. Evidence of this is delivered from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the rotations of members of their management and supervisory boards. In this case, it is deemed that an interest group, which consists of politicians and representatives in the government administration, decides about the appointment and dismissal of board members through the corporate governance of SOEs and ownership policy of the state. We analyzed the scale and intensity of rotations in Poland of about twelve thousand joint-stock companies in the years 2001–2017 according to their ownership structure. We show that changes of managers and supervisory board members in state-owned enterprises are higher than in private companies and are related to political elections. We estimated that on average three months after a new government is formed, a peak of changes in the composition of boards is observed, though they are earlier in the case of a supervisory board. We conclude that this can be regarded as an example of state capture by politicians.

Corporate Governance and Family-owned Companies

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prem Sikka
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Shareholder Capitalism ◽  
And Control

It is often claimed that the ownership structure and the close involvement of family members alleviates agency problems and gives them a long-term orientation compared to a corporation with dispersed shareholding and control. Through a case study relating to the demise of BHS, one of the biggest UK retailers, the chapter probes these claims. BHS was an epitome of shareholder capitalism. It was owned and controlled by Sir Philip Green and his family. The control enabled the Green family to extract large amounts of cash from BHS through dividends and complex intragroup transactions, with virtually no questions from board members, regulators or auditors. The flawed corporate governance of BHS inflicted considerable hardship on other stakeholders. The demise of BHS should encourage reflections on the claims (agency theory) that an alignment of the interests of shareholders and directors somehow leads to better governance and socially responsible management.

Does gender diversity in supervisory boards affect gender diversity in management boards in Germany? An empirical analysis

2021 ◽  
pp. 239700222199714
Author(s):  
Dennis Fleischer
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Management Board ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
Gender Quota ◽  
The Impact

Social aspects like gender diversity in the boardroom are becoming increasingly relevant and are a popular topic of public debate in the context of gender equality in business. However, there is little clarity about the potential spill-over effects of gender diversity. Both theory and empirical results have led to ambiguous conclusions with respect to the effect of gender diversity in the supervisory board on gender diversity in the management board. In addition, it is not clear whether the German gender quota legislation positively affects this relationship. This study analyses whether gender diversity in the supervisory board supports the gender diversity of the management board, and whether this relationship is affected by the gender quota legislation, focusing on the unique case of Germany. To cope with endogeneity concerns, this study employs a cross-lagged panel model with fixed effects using maximum likelihood structural equation modelling. The results of the analysis of the impact of the number of female supervisory board members on the number of female management board members do not support the view of positive spill-over effects of gender diversity in the environment of the German two-tier corporate governance system. Furthermore, this study finds no evidence of an effect of the German gender quota on this relationship. JEL Codes G38, M12, M14, M51

Poor Claims Settlement And Demand For Insurance Policies In Nigeria

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 53-64
Author(s):  
Omowumi Ayoni Momoh ◽  
Oyefemi Ismail O. Oyetunji
Keyword(s):  
Insurance Industry ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Demand For Insurance ◽  
Insurance Policies ◽  
Chi Squared ◽  
Insurance Firms ◽  
And Control ◽  
Structured Questionnaire

This study investigates the poor claims settlement and demand for insurance policies in Nigeria to provide empirical evidence which would assist not only the insurance companies but also the policymakers by using these findings to design future insurance services and policies that can be geared towards promoting insurance market development. The population focused in the study included few licensed insurance firms in Nigeria. This is due to the fact that they dominate and control the larger interest in the market share. Primary data was used for this study through well-structured questionnaire. Chi- squared statistics and correlation with the tabulated contingency table on the basis of an assumptions were employed. The results show that poor claim settlement has significant effect on demand for Insurance policies in Nigeria and that there is long term and significant relationship between poor claim settlement and demand for insurance policies in Nigeria. The study therefore, recommends that insurance industry should be redefined through appropriate Acts, introducing competitions and innovations in the services so as to compete effectively and meet consumer needs by dealing with changing expectations of policyholders so as to ensure that satisfaction of all the parties are guaranteed.

scholarly journals Classical and modern concepts of corporate governance (Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory)

Management ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beata Glinkowska ◽  
Bogusław Kaczmarek
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Stewardship Theory ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Modern Approach ◽  
Management Board ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
A Company

Summary The main issues in efficiency of a company as an organisation are relations between the Supervisory Board and the Management Board of a company, and the methods of functioning of Supervisory Boards in governance systems of a company. The classical and modern approach to the role, place, and importance of corporate governance presented in this article, is yet another prompt to continue searching for the optimum in the organisational, economical, and social meaning.

scholarly journals Corporate governance of German growth companies. Empirical analysis of the corporate governance quality and the structure of supervisory boards of companies listed on TEC-DAX

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 128-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Bassen ◽  
Maik Kleinschmidt ◽  
Christine Zöllner
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
High Importance ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
High Level ◽  
Agency Risk

This article analyses the importance of corporate governance for growth companies, derives specific requirements for them and evaluates the corporate governance quality for companies listed on TecDax. Growth companies’ characteristics imply a comparatively high importance of corporate governance due to a high level of business and agency risk. Several corporate governance elements are therefore particularly important for growth companies. Overall, the empirical results imply a high conformity of the Tec-Dax companies with the GCGC criteria with some exceptions for specific companies and criteria. But the analysis of the quality of their supervisory boards delivers a differentiated result as in some of the analysed companies the effectiveness of the supervisory board is questionable.

scholarly journals Characteristics of Shari’ah Governance and Incidence of Charity: A case of Pakistan

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-91
Author(s):  
Mohammad Ayaz ◽  
◽  
Noman Arshed ◽  
Ikram ul Haq ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
Unbalanced Panel Data

Characteristics of Shari’ah Governance and Incidence of Charity: A case of Pakistan There are several studies which have evidenced the role of Shari’ah governance on the profitability of Islamic banks for different countries in different data setup. The main purpose of Shari’ah governance is derived from the concept of corporate governance to avoid any non-compliant transactions and book charity against any non- compliant income. There are two kinds of Shari’ah supervisory boards. First is the proactive type that follows the rule of ‘Hisba’ which restricts any non-compliant transaction before it happens. The second type is reactive which detects and reacts to the non-compliant transactions following the Islamic legal system when they happen. The first type would conclude to a reduction in the incidence of charity transactions. In contrast, the second type would conclude to increase in the incidence of charity transaction. The objective of this study is to explore whether the Shari’ah governance of Islamic banks of Pakistan is jointly proactive or reactive. This study is deductive and uses quantitative methods. This study builds an unbalanced panel data of full-fledged Islamic banks of Pakistan using the available data from financial statements. This study is one of its kinds to see the nature of Shari’ah governance based on empirical patterns using Panel FGLS model. The results show that board size, board expertise, and reputation are the reactive factors while the others are proactive factors. Keywords: Shari’ah Supervisory Board, Panel Data Analysis, Shari’ah Disclosure, Shari’ah Controls.

scholarly journals Board committee practices in Ukraine

2005 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kostyuk
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
The State ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Management Board ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Audit Commission ◽  
Financial Transactions

International board practice concerning establishing committees on the board is still not spread in the Ukraine. The state obliged Ukrainian joint stock companies to establish an audit commission. But the commission is not on the supervisory board. It is not an integral part of the board. Members of the audit commission are prohibited to be members of the supervisory board at the same time. Although the audit commission reports to the supervisory board, objectives of the audit commission are narrowed only to controlling financial transactions executed by the management board. Therefore, it is worth of establishing an audit committee on the supervisory board with a broader spectrum of functions and equipped with the deepest knowledge on corporate governance mechanisms.

scholarly journals Board size and composition: The main tradeoffs

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander N. Kostyuk ◽  
Victoria Koverga ◽  
Helen V. Kostyuk
Keyword(s):  
Transition Economy ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Strong Dependence ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Supervisory Boards

The purpose of this research is to find the factors influencing size and composition of the supervisory boards in a transition economy with application to Ukraine. This paper is based on the research of 50 largest companies in Ukraine. Period of research is 1998-2005. Methodology of research is based on observations (the first stage) and questionnaires (the second stage). The research found that there is strong dependence of the size of supervisory boards in Ukraine on the degree of concentration of corporate ownership and origin of the controlling shareholder. Size of the company has a very conditional influence on the board size. Professional skills diversification as a fact that could contribute to the efficient work of the supervisory board is still very weakly developed in Ukraine. Particularly this concerns such expertise as auditing, finance, executive compensation. Experience of the supervisory board members in Ukraine is quite poor. Only 24 percent of members of supervisory boards have a five and more year experience as supervisory board members. the supervisory board members had the strong links with the company in the past as executives. Thus, about 74 per cent of members of the supervisory boards in Ukraine worked as executives of the same company at least during a year for the last ten years. This makes the negative impact on the independence of the members of the supervisory boards.

scholarly journals Related-party disclosures in the two-tier board system in China: Influences of ownership structure and board composition

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuan George Shan ◽  
Dennis W. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
High Concentration ◽  
Corporate Context ◽  
Supervisory Boards ◽  
Board System

This study concerns related-party disclosures by listed companies in China, in a corporate context of a high concentration of government-linked ownership, a two-tier board system, and the engagement of directors, key managers and major shareholders in direct and indirect transactions and business relationships with their company. Using content analysis of annual reports of listed companies in China over 5-years from 2001 to 2005, results show that the comprehensiveness of related-party disclosures is positively affected by companies’ domestic ownership concentration and the proportion of independent directors on the corporate board. But the proportion of supervisory board members with professional knowledge and experience is, unexpectedly, found to have a significant inverse relationship with the extent of related-party disclosure. Reasons peculiar to the context in China are proffered, particularly the likelihood of internal censorship of the more professionally qualified members of supervisory boards.

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