scholarly journals Political morality and neutrality

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-414
Author(s):  
Michal Sládecek

The article gives the reasons why a distinction between political morality and ethical conceptions needs to be drawn, as well as the reasons for which political liberalism is a substantial moral conception, and as such in tension with certain understandings of the neutrality. Further, the text analyzes the definition of personality through capacity for action (above all ethical). Recognition of this capacity is necessary, but not sufficient to attribute to a person a special status from the standpoint of political morality, since individuals also must be capable to coordinate their ethical actions with moral principles of others. Further, the text critiques Charles Larmore?s moral grounding of the theory of justice on respect of persons by arguing that the concept of respect should be considered as part of the complex interrelationships with other moral concepts, such as equality. In this way, neutrality regarding content of respect, as well as neutrality regarding capacity for ethical action turns out to be insufficient.

Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

Rawls’ main work, A Theory of Justice (1971), presents a liberal, egalitarian, moral conception – ‘justice as fairness’ – designed to explicate and justify the institutions of a constitutional democracy. The two principles of justice outlined in this text affirm the priority of equal basic liberties over other political concerns, and require fair opportunities for all citizens, directing that inequalities in wealth and social positions maximally benefit the least advantaged. Rawls develops the idea of an impartial social contract to justify these principles: Free persons, equally situated and ignorant of their historical circumstances, would rationally agree to them in order to secure their equal status and independence, and to pursue freely their conceptions of the good. In Political Liberalism (1993), his other major text, Rawls revises his original argument for justice as fairness to make it more compatible with the pluralism of liberalism. He argues that, assuming that different philosophical, religious and ethical views are inevitable in liberal society, the most reasonable basis for social unity is a public conception of justice based in shared moral ideas, including citizens’ common comception of themselves as free and equal moral persons. The stability of this public conception of justice is provided by an overlapping consensus; all the reasonable comprehensible philosophical, religious and ethical views can endorse it, each for their own specific reasons.


Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-98
Author(s):  
Аndrii Ivanovich Abdula

The theoretical model of the open society was and remains a fruitful way of reflecting the essential links within a democratic society. Analyzing this concept from its rationality, the author tries to highlight its fundamental principles and determine their impact on the form and content of the functioning of education. The article offers a view of K. Popper’s “open society” as a way to implement the principles of criticism (critical methodology), of (potential) fallibility, egalitarianism (pluralism) as principles of social rationality. The connection between these principles, moral obligations, and the humanistic theory of justice is emphasized. Their socio-philosophical and epistemological realization in the context of educational issues is covered. The paper considers problems of state intervention in educational processes, the definition of educational goals, the methodology of social reforms (including educational reforms). The article also outlines the problem of defining the boundaries of regulation of the educational process in the value system of open society. This discussion is interpreted in terms of the theory of rationality as an attempt to avoid the extremes of absolutism (dogmatism) and relativism. Emphasis is placed on the prospects of using the critical-rationalist methodology, in the context of education and development of skills necessary for participation in democratic processes. Particular attention is paid to the problematic aspects of the implementation of the rational principles and values of the open society in the educational environment and in the process of reforming the education system in the absence of a constant critical and rationalist tradition. The paper emphasizes the importance of critical thinking in the prospect of implementing these transformations. The importance of scientific, logical and methodological, psychological and pedagogical aspects of critical thinking is emphasized; the author tries to comprehend the problematic aspects of the implementation of these principles in the process of implementing reforms in the field of education.


2021 ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Vasily I. Zhukov

The author analyzes the process of accumulation of knowledge in the field of philosophy and law in order to create an epistemological basis for the perception of justice in the paradigm of the Philosophy of Law. The analytical review is based on the analysis of philosophical, theological, historical and other theories developed from ancient times to the present. The author focuses on the works of ancient thinkers (first of all, Plato, his disciple Aristotle, their followers, Roman authors), the works of scientists who created original concepts and enriched jurisprudence in the Middle Ages, the new and the newest times. Special attention is paid to the interpretation of theories that brought science closer to the creation of a theory of justice in the context of the Philosophy of Law. The author also describes the theories of justice of law developed by the largest scientists of the XX century, J.ºRawls, H. Otfried, F. von Hayek, Ph. Selznick, etc. The article considers the contribution to the development of knowledge about justice in the paradigm of the Philosophy of Law made by the local legal scholars, Soviet scientists, the largest modern specialists in this field, including V.D. Zorkin, V.I. Khairullin, etc. Based on the results of the analytical review, the main conclusions are developed and the author's definition of justice in the format of the Philosophy of Law is given.


Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira ◽  

The aim of this article is to characterize the John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness developed in A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993), Replay to Habermas (1995) and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), with a view to identifying the convergent points between deontological conception with teleological characteristics and identify a substantive conception of justice, not purely procedural, which is universalist albeit not transcendental, making possible an approach between communitarian and liberal ethical theories.


Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Macleod

Rawls' main aim in A Theory of Justice is to provide a viable alternative to the utilitarianism which has dominated so much modern moral philosophy. Although philosophers have long recognised the difficulties in the way of acceptance of a utilitarian account of judgments of justice, they have often responded by seeking merely to reformulate the principle of utility. Other philosophers, with a juster appreciation of the seriousness of these difficulties, have been prepared to reject utilitarianism in all its guises, but they have failed (in Rawl's opinion) “to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it”. What is needed, beyond a powerful reaffirmation of the familiar objections to utilitarian accounts of justice, is the careful elaboration of a radically non-utilitarian theory of justice. It is this need which Rawls sets out to meet in his book.


2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-157
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira

O objetivo deste artigo é estabelecer algumas considerações sobre o papel dos procedimentos de posição original e equilíbrio reflexivo na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls, nas obras A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism e Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Eu pretendo mostrar que Rawls faz uso de um modelo coerentista-pragmático de justificação dos princípios de justiça em um âmbito público, que é não-fundacionalista em razão da interconexão entre estes procedimentos.


1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Moore

One of the most important and divisive issues facing heterogeneous or culturally diverse states—and most states are culturally diverse—is the relation between these different cultures and the state.This question was raised initially in contemporary liberal political philosophy in terms of the fruitful debate between liberals and communitarians. Sandel, for example, criticized Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and, by extension, all liberal theories for falsely abstracting from conceptions of the good, abstracting from culturallyspecific conceptions, and grounding his liberal principles in terms of an abstract Kantian individualism. Liberal theorists countered by complaining that communitarians falsely conceived of a single homogeneous community. Although Rawls’s revised defense of liberal justice in his 1993 book Political Liberalism does not refer directly to the liberal-communitarian debate, nevertheless, his new grounding of liberal political principles, as principles which would be acceptable to individuals with diverse conceptions of the good, seems to justify liberal principles in terms of contemporary conditions, and, at the same time, challenges the relevance of those theories which appeal to any notion of a homogeneous ‘community’.


2015 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakobus M. Vorster

In die huweliksetiek van die postmoderne era pleit verskeie christelike teoloë vir ’n eietydse inkleding van die huwelikskonsep. As beginpunt word die standpunt oorweeg dat daar nie sprake van ’n sogenaamde ‘bybelse huwelik’ kan wees nie omdat die huwelik as instelling ’n sosiale konstruk is wat kultureel en tradisioneel bepaal word. So kan alternatiewe saamblyverhoudings deur christene in die huidige postmoderne era as geldig aanvaar word. Na die bespreking van sommige van die outeurs wat hierdie mening huldig se standpunte, pleit hierdie artikel vir die siening dat die huwelik verbondsgegewe en ’n instelling van God is. As sodanig is dit ’n instelling waar man, vrou en God verbind word in ’n interdimensionele spirituele verhouding wat uitstyg bo die patriargalisme en androsentrisme wat tradisioneelaan ’n christelike huwelik toegeskryf is. Deur te let op die skeppingsaard van die huwelik (imago dei en verbond) en die christologiese en pneumatologiese perspektief op hierdie instelling, word betoog dat dit nie maar net ’n sosiale konstruk is nie, maar dat dit ’n goddelike instelling is wat deur hoër beginsels, ontgin uit bybelse openbaring, ingerig behoort te word. As kerke die gedagte van die huwelik as ’n verbondsgegewe bedien, kan hulle bydra tot die vestiging van huwelike wat deur menswaardigheid, liefde, getrouheid en die ontwikkeling van die geestesgawes van man sowel as vrou gekenmerk word.The Christian marriage – a social construct or a covenantal relation. In the postmodern ethics of marriage several christian theologians plead for a contemporary definition of the concept of marriage. They choose as a point of departure that the concept biblical marriage cannot be accepted as valid, because marriage is a social construct determined only by tradition and culture. Alternative forms of cohabitation should also be accepted by christians as valid in the contemporary postmodern environment. Following a discussion of the works of some of these authors who hold this opinion, this article attempts to make a case for the view that marriage should regarded as an institution of God and a covenantal reality, where husband, wife and God are bonded in an interdimensional relationship that overarches the patriarchalism and androcentrism that is usually ascribed to a christian marriage. By paying attention to the creational character of marriage (imago dei and covenant) and the christological and pneumatological perspectives on this institution, the article argues that marriage cannot be seen merely as a social construct, but that it is a divine institution that should be constructed according to the higher moral principles derived from the unfolding biblical revelation. If churches minister the idea of marriage as a covenantal relation, they can contribute to the establishment of christian marriages qualified by human dignity, love, faithfulness and the development of the spiritual gifts of both husband and wife.


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