scholarly journals Husserl's phenomenological philosophy in Russia

2003 ◽  
Vol 46 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 59-68
Author(s):  
Radomir Djordjevic

The paper reviews phaenomenological influences on Russian philosophical thought. Before the bolyshevique revolution of 1917, Husserl's ideas had attracted the attention of many Russian theoreticians, and during the last two decades effects of this impact are closely investigated. First of all there were several philosophers under very direct influence of phenomenology: N. O. Lossky, the author of numerous books, in his work on logic; S. L. Frank, who had developed an intuitionistic theory of knowledge Gustav Spet, logician, aesthetician, linguist etc, who accepted Husserl's conceptions in his books on interpretation, philosophy of history and philosophy of language; Alexiy Lossev, who wrote some thirty books, and in his early period (works on ancient dialectics, philosophy of language and logics) was phenomenologically oriented; etc. Husserl's philosophy has traced or affected the ideas of several other Russian thinkers, so in USSR as in exile throughout Europe (for instance, Georges Gurvitch).

1991 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 125-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump

Aquinas is sometimes taken to hold a foundationalist theory of knowledge. So, for example, Nicholas Wolterstorff says, “Foundationalism has been the reigning theory of theories in the West since the high Middle Ages. It can be traced back as far as Aristotle, and since the Middle Ages vast amounts of philosophical thought have been devoted to elaborating and defending it‥ ‥ Aquinas offers one classic version of foundationalism.” And Alvin Plantinga says, “we can get a better understanding of Aquinas … if we see [him] as accepting some version of classical foundationalism. This is a picture or total way of looking at faith, knowledge, justified belief, rationality, and allied topics. This picture has been enormously popular in Western thought; and despite a substantial opposing ground-swell, I think it remains the dominant way of thinking about these topics.”


Author(s):  
James Dodd

This chapter sketches the trajectory of Jan Patočka’s philosophical development against the background of the conflicts and crises that marked the history of the twentieth century, and which profoundly affected the Czech philosopher. The relevant period spans from the 1930s, when Patočka studied under Edmund Husserl in Freiburg, to the philosopher’s activities as a dissident in 1970s Czechoslovakia. Particular attention is paid to Patočka’s deep reading of the history of philosophy; the complexities of his appropriation of the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger; and the philosophy of history developed late in his career. The chapter ends with a consideration of Patočka’s influence on contemporary phenomenological philosophy, suggesting that his most promising contribution lies in his challenging engagement with the problem of Europe, above all his call for a post-European philosophical perspective.


Japanese philosophy is now a flourishing field with thriving societies, journals, and conferences dedicated to it around the world, made possible by an ever-increasing library of translations, books, and articles. The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Philosophy is a foundation-laying reference work that covers, in detail and depth, the entire span of this philosophical tradition, from ancient times to the present. It introduces and examines the most important topics, figures, schools, and texts from the history of philosophical thinking in premodern and modern Japan. Each chapter, written by a leading scholar in the field, clearly elucidates and critically engages with its topic in a manner that demonstrates its contemporary philosophical relevance. The Handbook opens with an extensive introductory chapter that addresses the multifaceted question, “What Is Japanese Philosophy?” The first fourteen chapters cover the premodern history of Japanese philosophy, with sections dedicated to Shintō and the Synthetic Nature of Japanese Philosophical Thought, Philosophies of Japanese Buddhism, and Philosophies of Japanese Confucianism and Bushidō. Next, seventeen chapters are devoted to Modern Japanese Philosophies. After a chapter on the initial encounter with and appropriation of Western philosophy in the late nineteenth-century, this large section is divided into one subsection on the most well-known group of twentieth-century Japanese philosophers, The Kyoto School, and a second subsection on the no less significant array of Other Modern Japanese Philosophies. Rounding out the volume is a section on Pervasive Topics in Japanese Philosophical Thought, which covers areas such as philosophy of language, philosophy of nature, ethics, and aesthetics, spanning a range of schools and time periods. This volume will be an invaluable resource specifically to students and scholars of Japanese philosophy, as well as more generally to those interested in Asian and comparative philosophy and East Asian studies.


LingVaria ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2(32)) ◽  
pp. 259-279
Author(s):  
Mateusz Kowalski

Can History and Philology Competently Address Their Tasks without a Close Connection with Philosophy, Namely Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Language? The thesis by Jan Baudouin de Courtenay published here is probably the oldest of the texts by the Polish linguist. The text was submitted in 1864 as a part of the logic and philosophy course taught at the Warsaw Main School by Henryk Struve. It clearly shows an attempt by the young researcher to embark on a scholarly path, which turns out to be far from the one Baudouin de Courtenay took later in his academic activity. The future linguist argues here in defence of linguistics as a so-called physical science (a natural skill, as he often calls it in his dissertation), thus contrasting it with philology and history.


Author(s):  
Greg Soetomo

Historian has been preserving a historical unity and continuity as a truth. There is an assumption that history has a ‘constant’. This paper explains and proves otherwise. This writing understands history is in fact filled with various ruptures, differences, and deviations. This uncertainty has taken place when ‘language’ becomes a focus of the study of history. In his L’Archeologie du savoir (1969), Michel Foucault (1926-1984) rejected the preconception of history as unity and continuity. He believed the history as a journey with various ruptures, differences, and irregularities that reveal uncertainty. This reversal has taken place when language as the focus’ study in the history of knowledge. Foucault has called this method as the Archaeology of Knowledge. This is the question which this paper is going to respond: “How does Michel Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge, the analytical philosophy of language, elucidate the diversity within Marshall G.S. Hodgson’s history of Islam?” These three below mentioned questions respectively reflect a three-fold dimension of the  diversity in Foucault’s thoughts as explained in his  L’Archeologie du savoir (poststructuralism-structuralism, postmodernism, and philosophy of history). First, how does Hodgson, as a structuralist, write the history of Islam by way of developing system of discourses to reveal meaning; at the same time, as a poststructuralist, he reveals incoherence of discourses and its plurality of meanings? Second, how do we understand that the social structure in the history cannot be simply detached from the chains of power as a constitutive dimension of discourse? Third, how do we comprehend, that in every stages of history, they have its distinctive episteme and diversity of thoughts that support the formation of discourses? This research is essentially to explain the three perspectives of Foucault’s philosophy. At the same time, the three approaches in Hodgson’s writing on the history of Islam are also being explored. Both points of convergence and of divergence have become the whole study of this paper.  


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Francisco Naishtat

Invisible, but suggestive and fruitful; deprived of any reference to doctrine or ultimate assertive foundations, but nevertheless used in Benjamin like written images, crystallized as “images of thought”; as doctrinally mute as it is heuristically audible, Benjamin’s use of theology reminds us of the ironical use that Jorge Luis Borges himself made of theology and metaphysics as part of his own poetic forms. As such, these images of thought are located both in the place of philosophical use and in the one of methodological cunning or Metis, across the various levels of the corpus: a metaphysics of experience, literary criticism, philosophy of language, theory of history and Marxism. Therefore, accepting that criticism (Kritik) is the visible organon and the object of Benjaminian philosophy, is not theology, then, its invisible organon? What seems to be particular to Benjamin, however, is the agonistic but nevertheless heuristic way in which he intends to use theology in order to upset, disarray, and deconstruct the established philosophy, and specially its dominant trends in the field of the theory of history: historicism, positivism, and the evolutionary Hegelian–Marxist philosophy of history. In this article we try to demonstrate how this theological perspective is applied to a Benjaminian grammar of time. We conclude agonistically, confronting the resulting Benjaminian notion of historical past against Heiddeger’s own vision of historical time.


Author(s):  
Arif Ahmed

Saul Kripke is one of the most influential philosophers to have written on logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind in the twentieth century. In logic, he made an early and seminal contribution to the formal treatment of modality, that is, thoughts and statements about how things might have been or must have been (§2). In metaphysics, his work on modality has also been important, contributing as it did to the revival of the Aristotelian idea that the ways a thing might have been or must be (its contingent and its essential properties) were features of that very thing itself. This was in opposition to the view, prevalent in various forms throughout the first half of the twentieth century, that necessity was always relative to some classification or description of the object (§3). In the philosophy of language, he attacked– – in Naming and Necessity – the Russellian idea that proper names are simply abbreviated descriptions of the things that they name, arguing that instead they can refer directly to things via causal connections of which the users of language might be unaware (§4). Again, in the philosophy of language, his work on Wittgenstein on rule-following evinced what seemed to be a radical and devastating skepticism about the very possibility of the meaningful use of language (§6). And his proposed solution constituted a novel re-interpretation of Wittgenstein’s "private language argument," one that seemed to reveal the essentially social character of language (§8). In the philosophy of mind, he used the semantic machinery developed in Naming and Necessity to revive the long-discredited Cartesian argument against identifying mental and physical states (§5). Saul Kripke has also written ground-breaking works on the theory of truth (1975), the theory of knowledge (2011), and the semantics of fictional discourse (2013).


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