scholarly journals Hierarchical analysis of personal authonomy and the problem of manipulation

2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Milos Kovacevic
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Systemic Approach ◽  
Hierarchical Analysis ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Borderline Cases ◽  
Final Goal ◽  
Gerald Dworkin ◽  
Definition Of

In the first part of the paper I investigate a hierarchical analysis of personal autonomy which is developed through Harry Frankfurt?s theory of free will and Gerald Dworkin?s theory of personal autonomy. Hierarchical analysis of personal autonomy considers person autonomous regarding desire A if he has the desire to have desire A. One of the main advantages of hierarchical analysis of autonomy is that it does not require a person to have any specific values to be considered autonomous. In spite of this and other advantages, hierarchical analysis of personal autonomy is facing the problem of manipulation which I will discuss in the second part of paper. Frankfurt`s theory is purely structural and ahistoric because it does not take in consideration a way of acquiring second order desires or desire to desire or not desire A. That allows the possibility of influences on a person that would diminish their autonomy. On another hand, Dworkin apparently avoids the problem of manipulation by introducing a requirement for procedural independence which protects a person from influences which are paradigmatic cases of violating of autonomy. However, Dworkin`s contribution is not theoretically satisfying because it is not enough for acceptable analysis of autonomy to just list few intuitive examples of constraining personal autonomy, but it is necessary to propose a reason why that kind of influences is considered dangerous for personal autonomy viz to establish some kind of criteria. Such criteria will enable us to evaluate borderline cases about which people have different intuitions according to it. That is the reason why the final goal of this paper is to contribute to the definition of criteria on which procedural independence will be based, through a systemic approach to the problem of manipulation.

AUTONOMY, DURESS, AND COERCION

2003 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Stacey Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
The Past ◽  
Intuitive Appeal ◽  
Gerald Dworkin

For the past three decades philosophical discussions of both personal autonomy and what it is for a person to “identify” with her desires have been dominated by the “hierarchical” analyses of these concepts developed by Gerald Dworkin and Harry Frankfurt. The longevity of these analyses is owed, in part, to the intuitive appeal of their shared claim that the concepts of autonomy and identification are to be analyzed in terms of hierarchies of desires, such that it is a necessary condition for a person to be autonomous with respect to (to identify with) a desire that moves her to act, that she desires that this desire so move her. (Conversely, on these analyses, a person will not be autonomous with respect to a desire that she is moved by, she will not identify with it, if she does not want to be so moved.) Despite the intuitive appeal of these analyses, however, Irving Thalberg has argued that they should be rejected. This is because, he argues, a person who is forced to perform an action by being subjected to duress of a certain degree of harshness will desire to be moved by her desire to submit. Thus, he continues, the proponents of hierarchical analyses of autonomy and identification will be forced to hold that such a person acted willingly, and did not suffer from any impairment in her autonomy. This, Thalberg concludes, is so counterintuitive as to justify rejecting hierarchical analyses.

Ex Meritis Praevisis: Predestination, Grace, and Free Will in intra-Jesuit Controversies (1587-1613)

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-150
Author(s):  
Eleonora Rai
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Society Of Jesus ◽  
Modern Age ◽  
Sovereign Authority ◽  
Theological Debate ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
God’S Foreknowledge ◽  
Catholic Theological

AbstractThis article retraces the intra-Jesuit theological debates on the theology of salvation, including the relationship between the elements of predestination, God’s foreknowledge, Grace, and free will, in the delicate passage between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, and within the debates on Augustine’s theological legacy. Specifically, it explores the Flemish Jesuit Leonard Lessius’ theology and the discussions raised by it within the Society of Jesus, in order to show how soteriology has been central in the process of self-definition of the Jesuit identity in the Early Modern Age. This is particularly clear from the internal debates developed between Lessius, on the one hand, and General Claudio Acquaviva and curial theologian Roberto Bellarmino, on the other hand. Not only does the article investigate little known aspects of intra-Catholic theological debate in the post Tridentine period, but it also shows how deep pastoral and moral concerns strongly contributed to the rise of Lessius’ open-minded theology of salvation, which seemed to deprive God’s sovereign authority in favour of humankind’s free will, and human agency in the process of salvation.

Recht und Pflicht – Einschränkungen von Freiheit?

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Klaus Vieweg
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The State ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Emergency Situations ◽  
The Will ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Abstract Can one speak philosophically of a justified limitation of freedom? Hegel’s logically founded definition of free will and his understanding of right and duty can contribute to a clarification of the concept of freedom. Important is a precise differentiation between freedom and caprice (Willkür) – the latter being a necessary but one-sided element of the free will. In caprice, the will is not yet in the form of reason. Rational rights and duties are not a restriction of freedom. Insofar as individual rights can collide (e. g. in emergency situations), there can be a temporary and proportionate restriction of certain rights in favour of higher rights, such as the right to life. Dictatorships are instances of capricious rule which restrict freedom; the rationally designed state, by contrast, restricts only caprice. What is tobe defined are the duties and the rights of the state and the duties and the rights of the citizens.

scholarly journals A note on symmetries of diffusions within a martingale problem approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (02) ◽  
pp. 1950011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco C. De Vecchi ◽  
Paola Morando ◽  
Stefania Ugolini
Keyword(s):  
Diffusion Processes ◽  
Martingale Problem ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Lie Symmetries ◽  
Definition Of

A geometric reformulation of the martingale problem associated with a set of diffusion processes is proposed. This formulation, based on second-order geometry and Itô integration on manifolds, allows us to give a natural and effective definition of Lie symmetries for diffusion processes.

A Large Scale Cross-Validation of Second-Order Personality Structure Defined by the 16PF

1986 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 683-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel E. Krug ◽  
Edgar F. Johns
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Common Factor ◽  
Geographic Location ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Personality Factor ◽  
Personality Factor Questionnaire ◽  
Normal Males ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Factor Estimation

The second-order factors structure of the 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF) was cross-validated on a large sample ( N = 17,381) of normal males and females. Subjects were sampled across a broad range of ages, socioeconomic levels, education, geographic location, and ethnicity. The purposes of this investigation were (1) to provide a precise definition of 16PF second-order factor structure, (2) to shed additional light on the nature of two second-order factors that have been previously identified but described as “unstable” and “poorly reproduced,” and (3) to determine the extent to which common factor estimation formulas for men and women would prove satisfactory for applied work. The resulting solutions were congruent with previous studies and showed a high degree of simple structure. Support was provided for one, but not both, of the two additional second-order factors. Results also supported the use of simplified estimation formulas for applied use.

scholarly journals Systemic approach to the choice of optical methods of forensic examination of micro-objects

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (69) ◽  
pp. 564-580
Author(s):  
Liudmyla Havryliuk ◽  
Valentyna Drozd ◽  
Olena Nenia ◽  
Anatolii Kyslyi ◽  
Andrii Niebytov
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Approach ◽  
Systemic Approach ◽  
Optical Methods ◽  
Structural Method ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Holistic View ◽  
Legal Method ◽  
Logical Method ◽  
Examination Methods ◽  
Definition Of

The aim of the article is to analyze theoretical and methodological provisions related to the definition of directions and principles of implementation of a systematic approach to the use of optical research methods, in particular micro-objects. Subject of research is substantiation and formulation of the classification characteristics of such systematic approach, considering the requirements of forensic techniques. Methodology: The study applies such methods of scientific knowledge as dialectical method, system and structural method, logic and legal method, methods of systematic analysis, logical method. Research results: The article studies the problematic issues of a systematic approach to the choice of scientific and technical methods and means for micro-object examination. Practical consequences: The authors argue that optical methods of the micro-object examination require classifying and systematizing to provide a holistic view of their potentials, as well as the nature of the information that can be obtained about the object being examined. Value / originality: The analysis of clarified classification characteristics and requirements for examination methods in forensic science enables to propose the algorithm of the systemic approach to the creation of the open system classification of methods of micro-object examination and to make justified conclusions.

scholarly journals Ad Hoc or Institutional Arbitration - A Clear-Cut Distinction? A Closer Look at Borderline Cases

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich G. Schroeter
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
Borderline Cases ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Core Characteristics ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Mix And Match

It is generally accepted in both theory and practice of arbitration that there are two basic forms of arbitration, ad hoc and institutional. This long established dichotomy has rarely been questioned, and it has mostly worked well in international arbitration practice.The present contribution investigates the traditional distinction between ad hoc and institutional arbitration in more detail by looking at "borderline cases", i.e. constellations that cannot easily be allocated to one of these two categories. Four groups of borderline cases are discussed: (1) UNCITRAL arbitrations, in particular those administered by arbitral institutions; (2) cases in which the parties have chosen institutional rules, but not the issuing institution (and vice versa), (3) the modification of institutional rules by the parties and the identification of a possible "mandatory" core of institutional rules, and (4) "mix and match" (or "hybrid") arbitrations combining one arbitral institution's rules with the case's administration by a different arbitral institution. By identifying the factors that were decisive for these borderline cases being regarded as institutional or ad hoc, the article is trying to gain insight into the core characteristics underlying each arbitration category. Drawing on these insights, it develops and explains a novel definition of "institutional arbitration".

Frankfurt and the Problem of Self-Control

2020 ◽  
pp. 421-433
Author(s):  
Ryan Cummings ◽  
Adina L. Roskies
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Structural Account ◽  
The Will

Frankfurt’s compatibilist account of free will considers an individual to be free when her first- and second-order volitions align. This structural account of the will, this chapter argues, fails to engage with the dynamics of will, resulting in two shortcomings: (1) the problem of directionality, or that Frankfurtian freedom obtains whenever first- and second-order volitions align, regardless of which desire was made to change, and (2) the potential for infinite regress of higher-order desires. The authors propose that a satisfying account of the genesis of second-order volitions can resolve these issues. To provide this they draw from George Ainslie’s mechanistic account of self-control, which relies on intertemporal bargaining wherein an individual’s self-predictions about future decisions affect the value of her current choices. They suggest that second-order volitions emerge from precisely this sort of process, and that a Frankfurt-Ainslie account of free will avoids the objections previously raised.

A Positive View of Freedom?

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-161
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Positive View ◽  
Textual Evidence ◽  
External Influences ◽  
Positive Valence ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Persuasive Definition ◽  
Do So

This chapter reviews the textual evidence that Nietzsche retains a positive conception of “freedom.” Interpretive proposals due to Gemes and Poellner are shown not to be borne out by the texts. The chapter concludes that Nietzsche offers a “persuasive definition” of freedom, attaching the term’s positive valence to a sense of freedom unfamiliar in the modern Humean or Kantian traditions, but having echoes in Spinoza: “freedom” as acting from one’s inner nature rather than from external influences, something one can only do if fated to do so. The Spinoza-type view is shown not to be a kind of Control view of free will, so not one that vindicates moral responsibility.

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