The Church and the Doctrine of National Security

1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Calvo

In a book which has circulated rather widely in Latin America (Lieuwen, 1960), it was stated that, with the passage of time, Latin American military men would intervene less and less in politics. This was not an altogether mistaken belief, considering that in 1961 Paraguay was a “military island” in a sea of Latin American civilian governments. Today the situation has radically changed in many ways. On the one hand, more than half the population of Latin America lives under military regimes; on the other, military domination has a different cast: it is no longer a caudillo who takes over, but the armed forces, which have institutionalized their access to the government. Linked to the foregoing is the emergence of an authoritarian ideological platform—the military call it a doctrine of national security—which provides the armed forces with the necessary rationale for their political activities.

1981 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mark Ruhl

In spite of the reestablishment of civilian democracy in Ecuador and Peru, military government continues to be the norm in Latin America. In recent years, many scholars have examined the rise of military regimes in the region in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of civil-military relations. Few analysts, however, have studied civil-military relations in the handful of nations where civilian government has persisted. The purpose of this analysis is, therefore, to contribute to a broader understanding of Latin American military behavior by attempting to explain the Colombian armed forces’ atypical obedience to civilian authority.


1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Gilbert

In the early morning hours of July 27, 1974, the military government of Peru employed riot police to seize control of the country's principal daily newspapers. The government announced that the newspapers were being transferred to independent organizations representative of broad sectors of Peruvian society. Peru's “Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces,” which came to power in 1968, had already surprised students of the Latin American military with a series of radical measures which included an extensive land reform, the expropriation of a number of foreign companies, reorganization of the financial sector, and the creation of a system of worker control for industry. Now President Juan Velasco Alvarado presented the press takeover as an integral part of a fundamental reordering of the existing society along progressive nationalist lines.


Author(s):  
Marco Bünte

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-120
Author(s):  
Andrea Győrffy ◽  
Ákos Jozwiak

Public health belongs to the “One Health” umbrella. As military veterinary medicine evolved, it became embedded in national security. Many armed forces still have active veterinary services, both regular and reserve components. The military veterinarian can serve as an interface between civilians and civil organizations, can handle complex and interdisciplinary cases. Introducing the “One Health” concept both in practice and education has encountered many difficulties. Over time, “One Health” has been judged to be a “buzz word” in civilian areas; however, it is a weighty concept. Its importance is pronounced in military areas where practicing along One Health principles were present before the appearance of the term itself. Nevertheless, military “One Health” has not penetrated into the overwhelming “One Health” literature. Emphasizing the military aspects of One Health not only reveals an obscure corner but might help to regain the proper importance of the “One Health” concept.


Author(s):  
Brian E. Loveman

Latin America’s armed forces have played a central role in the region’s political history. This selective annotated bibliography focuses on key sources, with varying theoretical, empirical, and normative treatments of the military governments in the region, from the Cuban Revolution (1959) until the end of the Cold War (1989–1990). The article is limited to those cases in which military governments or “civil-military” governments were in power. This excludes personalist dictatorships, party dictatorships, and civilian governments in which the armed forces exercised considerable influence but did not rule directly. No pretense is made of comprehensiveness or of treating the “causes” of military coups (a vast literature) and of civil-military relations under civilian governments. Likewise, the closely related topics of guerrilla movements during this period, human rights violations under the military governments, US policy and support for many of the military governments, and the transitions back to civilian government (including “transitional justice”) are not covered in depth, but some of the selections do treat these topics and direct the reader to a more extensive literature on these subjects. Long-term military governments, with changing leadership in most cases, controlled eleven Latin American nations for significant periods from 1964 to 1990: Ecuador, 1963–1966 and 1972–1978; Guatemala, 1963–1985 (with an interlude from 1966–1969); Brazil, 1964–1985; Bolivia, 1964–1970 and 1971–1982; Argentina, 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; Peru, 1968–1980; Panama, 1968–1989; Honduras, 1963–1966 and 1972–1982; Chile, 1973–1990; and Uruguay, 1973–1984. In El Salvador the military dominated the government from 1948 until 1984, but the last “episode” was from 1979 to 1984. Military governments, though inevitably authoritarian, implemented varying economic, social, and foreign policies. They had staunch supporters and intense opponents, and they were usually subject to internal factionalism and ideological as well as policy disagreements. The sources discussed in this article reflect that diversity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-272
Author(s):  
Anaís Medeiros Passos ◽  
Igor Acácio

Abstract Latin America has been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, prompting its governments to take action. In this context, countries within Latin America have used their armed forces for an array of tasks to serve citizens. But how militarized is the response to COVID-19 in Latin America? This paper proposes a typology of tasks provided by the armed forces as a response to COVID-19. The descriptive findings allow us to map these tasks, attributing scores to the fourteen Latin American democracies. We also show evidence for the potential consequences of some tasks. Policing the streets to enforce stay-at-home orders may lead to the military committing human rights violations, assuming eminently civilian posts to manage the public health crisis can result in long term implications for the civil-military balance that are detrimental to the democratic control over the military.


1992 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 463-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Patrice McSherry

AbstractThe transition from military to civilian rule in Latin America has thrown a searchlight upon the legacy of military repression from the era of the national security states, and the problem of still-powerful and unrepentant armed forces. These intertwined problems have profound implications for the possibility of fundamental change in a region long characterized by extreme social inequality and political instability. As Rouquié notes, civilianization of the military state does not necessarily mean the democratization or demilitarization of power. How to deal with the perpetrators of state terror is a burning and controversial issue throughout the region. During the process of transition, the major demand of the military in virtually all states was for guarantees against accountability for human rights crimes—widely called impunity in the region—a demand that implicitly places the military above the law. This issue strikes at the very heart of the transformation of national security states and the democratization of power. Additionally, despite the transition from military rule, structures of the national security apparatus remain embedded within the civilian regimes. An examination of the question of impunity and those embedded structures exposes the tensions between democratization and persisting military prerogatives and power.


Author(s):  
Paula Andrea Echeverri-Sucerquia ◽  
Carlos Tobon

The historic agreement signed between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government, as well as the peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), mark the beginning of an end to decades of raw violence in Colombia. Against all odds, Colombia has found ways to survive the pain, to heal, and to begin anew. The Colombian experience mirrors that of many other Latin American nations, as well as others around the world, where a history built in the midst of war, violence, and resilience has shaped people’s ways of interpreting the world and building knowledge. Evidence of this is the focus of conference papers, theses, and dissertations presented at international conferences by and about Latin Americans. Undeniably, in spite of the particularities that describe the Latin American social experience, the hemispheric North has exerted a great epistemological influence in the South. However, Southerners have imprinted their idiosyncrasies, their own ways of understanding, creating, and transforming. A review of educational qualitative research in Colombia illustrates this tension: on the one hand is the focus on evidence-based research, highly influenced by academic work in the North, and, on the other hand, there is a struggle for research that strives for social justice. Such complex tension entails both challenges and opportunities for qualitative research in education.


1982 ◽  
Vol 38 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 289-301
Author(s):  
Ram Rattan

The Military is one institution that has managed to gain “stability and power” in most Latin American countries.1 Except in Costa Rica which has no military establishment, and Mexico, which has succeeded in bringing the “soldiers firmly to heel,”2 the Military dominates the politics of more than half of them. They are, as Stephen Clissold puts it, “a familiar feature of the political scene.”3 Military's intervention in the politics of major Latin American countries has had a number of common features, which are at once unique and interesting. To Willard Beaulac, the most notable feature is that the armed forces “rarely act alone.”4 They are often invited to “intervene” by the civilians themselves who “prefer victory with military support to defeat without it.”5 And, once they are in power, they no longer consider their intervention in political life as “provisional” or “transitory” between two civilian administrations.6 They are then in no hurry to quit or give in, they tend to stay on and consolidate their position! Over the years, military intervention in Latin American countries has also come to wear “an increasingly anti-Communist face.”7 Rather, “communist” became a convenient label for any civilian politician whom the Military wanted to remove. The major exception to this anti-communist stance is provided by Fidel Castro's Communist State of Cuba which keeps fighting for “liberation from Yankee imperialism.”8 In most Latin American countries where the Military rules the roost, the men-in-uniform are no longer satisfied with their role either as “moderators” or ruthless “directors.” They see themselves as “monitors” of the government's performance.9 And, their monitoring role has come to be sanctioned not only by tradition, but also by law. As Beaulac says: “Some fifteen of the Latin American Constitutions designate the Military as guardians of the Constitution.”10 This monitoring role gives them an informal veto power over the decisions of civilian agencies, including those of the presidency itself. Consequently, today the Military in Latin America does not confine its role merely to being “the upholders of order” and “guardians of the nation's constitution;”11 they increasingly emphasize their role as “promoters of progress” or “instruments of economic and social change.”12 They engage themselves in “civic action” rather seriously. As “development” is the major problem of the Third World the Military's increasing willingness to undertake this task of “nation-building” has made its position more secure than that of its civilian counterparts. What is surprising in their eagerness to take up this role is the fact that they have been encouraged in this effort by their own war colleges whose, primary aim is to “militarize” civilians, rather than “civilianize” the Military.13 That, probably, may be the reason as to why Latin America “still spends proportionately less on arms than any other developing area of the world, apart from Africa south of the Sahara.”14 Infact, Latin America needs every penny of its money for its development. It is in view primarily of their contribution in the area of “nation-building” that the Military in several Latin American Republics cannot just be talked or written out of existence. Johnson has aptly concluded, that the Military in Latin America will continue to have “a spoon in every soup.”15 With these common features as a backgrounder, the present paper would attempt to study the changing roles of the Military, particularly the Brazilian military-elite vis-a-vis their civilian counterparts in the politics of Brazil, the largest and the most populous state in Latin America.


1971 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh B. Stinson ◽  
James D. Cochrane

The post-World War II period in Latin America, as elsewhere, has been marked by the presence of two somewhat contradictory phenomena in the field of armaments. On the one hand, most of the countries have continued their long-standing tradition of devoting a substantial portion of their national budgets to the military and have expanded their arsenals of weapons and stocks of military equipment. On the other hand, several governments have suggested various arms control measures for the Latin American countries. The aim of some of these suggestions has been a reduction in the level of armaments, equipment, and force size; the aim of other suggestions has been more modest—to freeze armaments and forces at existing levels; and the aim of still other suggestions has been to ban nuclear weapons from the region.


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