Military Power, Impunity and State-Society Change in Latin America

1992 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 463-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Patrice McSherry

AbstractThe transition from military to civilian rule in Latin America has thrown a searchlight upon the legacy of military repression from the era of the national security states, and the problem of still-powerful and unrepentant armed forces. These intertwined problems have profound implications for the possibility of fundamental change in a region long characterized by extreme social inequality and political instability. As Rouquié notes, civilianization of the military state does not necessarily mean the democratization or demilitarization of power. How to deal with the perpetrators of state terror is a burning and controversial issue throughout the region. During the process of transition, the major demand of the military in virtually all states was for guarantees against accountability for human rights crimes—widely called impunity in the region—a demand that implicitly places the military above the law. This issue strikes at the very heart of the transformation of national security states and the democratization of power. Additionally, despite the transition from military rule, structures of the national security apparatus remain embedded within the civilian regimes. An examination of the question of impunity and those embedded structures exposes the tensions between democratization and persisting military prerogatives and power.

1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Calvo

In a book which has circulated rather widely in Latin America (Lieuwen, 1960), it was stated that, with the passage of time, Latin American military men would intervene less and less in politics. This was not an altogether mistaken belief, considering that in 1961 Paraguay was a “military island” in a sea of Latin American civilian governments. Today the situation has radically changed in many ways. On the one hand, more than half the population of Latin America lives under military regimes; on the other, military domination has a different cast: it is no longer a caudillo who takes over, but the armed forces, which have institutionalized their access to the government. Linked to the foregoing is the emergence of an authoritarian ideological platform—the military call it a doctrine of national security—which provides the armed forces with the necessary rationale for their political activities.


2013 ◽  
Vol 55 (04) ◽  
pp. 143-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas C. Bruneau

Abstract This article argues that civil-military relations should be conceptualized not only in terms of democratic civilian control but also for effectiveness in implementing a spectrum of roles and missions. It also argues that achieving effectiveness requires institutional development as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Currently in Latin America, the focus in civil-military relations remains exclusively on civilian control. While there is a growing awareness of the need for analysis beyond asserting control over the armed forces, so far nobody has proposed or adopted a broader analytical framework. This article proposes such a framework, and employs it to analyze differences among four major South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The explanation for the differences identified by use of the framework is found in the incentives of civilian elites in Chile and Colombia, who have recognized serious threats to national security and defense.


2019 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-505
Author(s):  
Eyal Weinberg

As young medical students at Guanabara State University, Luiz Roberto Tenório and Ricardo Agnese Fayad received some of the best medical education offered in 1960s Brazil. For six years, the peers in the same entering class had studied the principles of the healing arts and practiced their application at the university's teaching hospital. They had also witnessed the Brazilian military oust a democratically elected president and install a dictatorship that ruled the country for 21 years (1964–85). After graduating, however, Tenório and Fayad embarked on very distinct paths. The former became a political dissident in opposition to the military regime and provided medical assistance to members of the armed left. The latter joined the armed forces and, as a military physician, participated in the brutal torture and cruel treatment of political prisoners. At the end of military rule, Brazil's medical board would find him guilty of violating the Brazilian code of medical ethics and revoke his license.


2009 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boubacar N'Diaye

ABSTRACTThe 3 August 2005 military coup was Mauritania's best opportunity to turn the page on decades of the deposed quasi-military regime's destructive politics. This article critically analyses relevant aspects of the transition that ensued in the context of the prevailing models of military withdrawal from politics in Africa. It also examines the challenges that Mauritania's short-lived Third Republic faced. It argues that the transition process did not escape the well-known African military junta leader's proclivity to manipulate transitions to fulfil suddenly awakened self-seeking political ambitions, in violation of solemn promises. While there was no old-fashioned ballot stuffing to decide electoral outcomes, Mauritania's junta leader and his lieutenants spared no effort to keep the military very much involved in politics, and to perpetuate a strong sense of entitlement to political power. Originally designed as an ingenious ‘delayed self-succession’ of sorts, in the end, another coup aborted Mauritania's democratisation process and threw its institutions in a tailspin. This only exacerbated the challenges that have saddled Mauritania's political system and society for decades – unhealthy civil-military relations, a dismal ‘human rights deficit’, terrorism, and a neo-patrimonial, disastrously mismanaged economy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-78
Author(s):  
Federico Battera

This article explores the differences between two North African military regimes—Egypt and Algeria—which have been selected due to the continuity of military dominance of the political systems. Still, variations have marked their political development. In particular, the Algerian army’s approach to civilian institutions changed after a civilian president was chosen in 1999. This was not the case in Egypt after the demise of the Hosni Mubarak regime of 2011. Other important variations are to be found in the way power has been distributed among the military apparatuses themselves. In the case of Egypt, a principle of collegiality has been generally preserved within a body, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is absent in the case of Algeria, where conflicts between military opposed factions are more likely to arise in case of crisis. How differences generally impact the stability of military rule in these two cases is the main contribution of this paper.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-120
Author(s):  
Andrea Győrffy ◽  
Ákos Jozwiak

Public health belongs to the “One Health” umbrella. As military veterinary medicine evolved, it became embedded in national security. Many armed forces still have active veterinary services, both regular and reserve components. The military veterinarian can serve as an interface between civilians and civil organizations, can handle complex and interdisciplinary cases. Introducing the “One Health” concept both in practice and education has encountered many difficulties. Over time, “One Health” has been judged to be a “buzz word” in civilian areas; however, it is a weighty concept. Its importance is pronounced in military areas where practicing along One Health principles were present before the appearance of the term itself. Nevertheless, military “One Health” has not penetrated into the overwhelming “One Health” literature. Emphasizing the military aspects of One Health not only reveals an obscure corner but might help to regain the proper importance of the “One Health” concept.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo A. Flores-Macías ◽  
Jessica Zarkin

What are the political consequences of militarizing law enforcement? Across the world, law enforcement has become increasingly militarized over the last three decades, with civilian police operating more like armed forces and soldiers replacing civilian police in law enforcement tasks. Scholarly, policy, and journalistic attention has mostly focused on the first type, but has neglected the study of three main areas toward which we seek to contribute: 1) the constabularization of the military—i.e., when the armed forces take on the responsibilities of civilian law enforcement agencies, 2) the extent to which this process has taken place outside of the United States, and 3) its political consequences. Toward this end, we unpack the concept of militarized law enforcement, develop theoretical expectations about its political consequences, take stock of militarization in Latin America, and evaluate whether expectations have played out in the region. We show that the distinction between civilian and military law enforcement typical of democratic regimes has been severely blurred in the region. Further, we argue that the constabularization of the military has had important consequences for the quality of democracy in the region by undermining citizen security, human rights, police reform, and the legal order.


Author(s):  
Acar Kutay

The continued influence of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) on politics characterized the political history of the Turkish Republic, until such influence was first bridled and then ultimately broken by the Justice and Development Party governments during the 2000s. When the new regime was established in 1923, the military identified itself with its founding ideology, namely Kemalism, which was built on the ideas of modernism, secularism, and nationalism. Because the TAF assumed the roles of guardian of the regime and vanguard of modernization, any threat to the foundational values and norms of the republican regime was considered by the military as a threat to the constitutional order and national security. As a self-authorized guardian of the regime and its values, the TAF characterized itself as a non-partisan institution. The military appealed to such identity to justify the superiority of the moral and epistemological foundations of their understanding of politics compared with that of the elected politicians. The military invoked such superiority not only to intervene in politics and take power (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007). They also used such identity to monitor and control political processes by means of the National Security Council (established after the 1960 military intervention) and by more informal means such as mobilizing the public against the elected government’s policy choices. In the context of the Cold War, domestic turmoil and lasting political polarization helped legitimate the military’s control over security issues until the 1980s. After the end of the Cold War, two threats to national security drew the TAF into politics: the rising power of Islamic movements and the separatist terrorism of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which posed threats to the constitutional order. Turkey’s EU membership bid is one of the most important aspects that bridled the influence of the TAF on politics. Whereas the democratic oversight of the military and security sector constituted a significant dimension of the EU reforms, events that took place around the nomination of the Justice and Development Party’s candidate, Abdullah Gül, for the presidency created a rupture in the role and influence of the military on politics. Two juristic cases against members of the TAF in 2008 and 2010 made a massive impact on the power of the military, before the ultimate supremacy of the political sphere was established after the coup attempt organized by the Gülenist officers who infiltrated the TAF during the 2000s.


1972 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 375-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Kossok

At the beginning of this study of military dictatorship and the political role of the intellectuals in Latin America, Florestan Fernandes (1970: 1) makes the following statement: “The idea that Latin America is a region in which the coups d'état are a political routine has become a commonplace.” Without doubt, such an opinion is justified and also explains—at least to a certain extent—the wealth of “routine” verdicts on the function of the military in Latin America. A contradiction, however, seems evident at this point: while the number of publications on the political and social position of the armed forces is rapidly increasing (McAlister, 1966; Rouquié, 1969), there is an evident lack of comprehensive analyses that go beyond detailed description, and which explain in a reliable and sound manner the phenomenon of the cyclically increasing militarization of politics. It cannot be overlooked that research on the role of the military in Latin America is in a really critical situation which calls for a reexamination of the facts according to new criteria.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTA PHILP

Resumen: En el trabajo se analizan las intervenciones de los militares que gobernaron la Argentina  durante la dictadura cá­vico-militar en Argentina en el perá­odo 1976-1983, destinadas a lograr una  tarea central de todo régimen polá­tico: la justificación del poder. A partir de la exclusión de la  polá­tica, declamada pero no practicada, se apropiaron de distintos escenarios para construir maneras  de definir el orden polá­tico, nombrado como democracia sustancial, democracia de los mejores en  oposición a la demagogia, causa de su nueva irrupción en la historia polá­tica argentina el 24 de  marzo de 1976. La imperiosa necesidad de concluir con esta democracia desvirtuada era presentada  como eje de su tarea central: reorganizar la nación, tarea que originó su autodenominación como  ”Proceso de Reorganización Nacional”. Esta reconstrucción de los esfuerzos de los militares en el  poder para legitimar su accionar pretende aportar a la comprensión y explicación de las rupturas  institucionales en América Latina, seguidas de la instauración de gobiernos autoritarios.Palabras clave: Dictadura cá­vico-militar, Justificación del poder, Orden polá­tico.  THE POLITICAL ORDER ACCORDING TO THE ARGENTINE CIVIC-MILITARY DICTATORSHIP 1976-1983Abstract: The paper discusses the interventions by the military which ruled the Argentina during  the military dictatorship in Argentina during the 1976-1983, aimed at achieving a central task of any  political regime: the justification of power. From the exclusion of the policy, recited but not  practiced, they appropriated various scenarios to build ways to define the political order, named as  substantial democracy, democracy of the best as opposed to demagoguery, cause of the new  outbreak in Argentine political history on March 24, 1976. The urgent need to conclude with this  democracy undermined was presented as the core of its central task: reorganizing the nation, task  which originated its self-designation as "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional". This reconstruction  of the efforts of the military power to legitimize their actions intended to contribute to the  understanding and explanation of institutional ruptures in Latin America, followed by the  establishment of authoritarian governments.Keyswords: Civic-military dictatorship, Justification of the power, Political order.


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