Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and Venezuela

2000 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold A. Trinkunas
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Transition ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Theoretical Argument ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Emerging Democracies ◽  
The Military

Democratic transitions create an opportunity for elected officials to maximize their leverage over the armed forces and create institutions that permanently shift power away from the military. This article develops a theoretical argument about how civilian control- is established. Venezuela institutionalized weak civilian control in the wake of its 1958 democratic transition, allowing the regime to survive the 1992 coup attempts. Argentina moved close to strong civilian control by 1995, although such control is exercised through questionable institutional channels.

Virtual Legality

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 555-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTHONY W. PEREIRA
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Democratic Transition ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Military Justice ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
Legal Justification ◽  
The Military ◽  
Relevant Factors

Authoritarian regimes in Latin America frequently expanded military court jurisdiction to prosecute political opponents and protect members of the armed forces and police engaged in repression. What happened to the military courts after the recent transitions to democracy in the region? Why did some democratic transitions produce broad reform of military justice while most did not? This article first reviews contending theoretical explanations that offer answers to these questions, comparing those answers with actual outcomes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. It then argues that the “mode of transition” perspective, which attributes variation in the extent of military justice reform to the autonomy and strength of the military in the democratic transition, best explains the outcomes in these cases. However, the military's autonomy and strength should be specified. In the area of military justice, the relevant factors are the military's propagation of an accepted legal justification for past uses of military courts and the creation of congressional support for the maintenance of existing military court jurisdiction. Both of these factors are present in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, where little or no reform of military justice took place under democratization, and absent in Argentina, where broad reform did occur.

Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 686-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN A.T. GRAHAM ◽  
MICHAEL K. MILLER ◽  
KAARE W. STRØM
Keyword(s):  
Minority Group ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Emerging Democracies ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Ethnic Quotas ◽  
Democratic Survival ◽  
Constitutional Protections

Democracy is often fragile, especially in states recovering from civil conflict. To protect emerging democracies, many scholars and practitioners recommend political powersharing institutions, which aim to safeguard minority group interests. Yet there is little empirical research on whether powersharing promotes democratic survival, and some concern that it limits electoral accountability. To fill this gap, we differentiate between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining powersharing institutions and analyze their effects on democratic survival from 1975 to 2015 using a global dataset. We find sharp distinctions across types of powersharing and political context. Inclusive powersharing, such as ethnic quotas, promotes democratic survival only in post-conflict settings. In contrast, dispersive institutions such as federalism tend to destabilize post-conflict democracies. Only constraining powersharing consistently facilitates democratic survival regardless of recent conflict. Institution-builders and international organizations should therefore prioritize institutions that constrain leaders, including independent judiciaries, civilian control of the armed forces, and constitutional protections of individual and group rights.

scholarly journals The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha
Keyword(s):  
Third World ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Military ◽  
Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-282
Author(s):  
Sarah Sewall
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Gray Zone ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
The Face ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

The Expanding Domestic Role of Western Armed Forces and its Implications

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jori Pascal Kalkman
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Police ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Domestic Roles

Abstract The domestic roles of Western armed forces are expanding. Although there is broad academic agreement that this trend is widespread, research on its implications has been relatively scarce. Here, I examine three debates that have emerged in the wake of expanding domestic military roles. They include: discussion on the origins of this trend between functionalists and politically-oriented scholars; its implications for civilian control and civil rights; and its effects on military-police convergence. This is followed by a call for more research on how the expanding domestic roles of Western armed forces relate to domestic civil-military collaboration, the management of military organizations, military visibility and reputation, perceptions of new tasks within the military, and the scale of this trend. A concluding section makes a case for drawing more academic attention to this phenomenon.

Controlling Blue Berets: The Consequences of Political Neglect in the Case of Uruguay’s Participation in Peacekeeping

2019 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1987721 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julián González Guyer ◽  
Nicole Jenne
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Test ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Policy Management ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Democratic Rule ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of Uruguay, today a fully democratic state that has consistently ranked among the world’s top peacekeeping contributors per capita. Specifically, we ask whether participation in peacekeeping has increased civilian control over the military. To answer this question, we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight, civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to political neglect by civilian authorities, the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.

Military Politics and Democratic Transition: Combining Rationality, Culture, and Structure

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hicham Bou Nassif
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Transition ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
The Political ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Political Dynamics ◽  
The Status ◽  
Multiple Material ◽  
Transitional Times ◽  
Military Politics

Rationality, culture, and structure provide useful insights into military politics by stressing self-centered motivations, norms, and large impersonal forces, respectively. The armed forces can transform popular uprisings into democratic transitions, or, alternatively, uphold the status quo. Furthermore, officers can allow nascent democratic experiments to consolidate, or they can resurrect authoritarianism. Whatever they choose to do, multiple material and ideational factors will inform their agency, and by extension, the political dynamics unfolding in transitional times.

Honduras: All-Purpose Militarization

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina Mani
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The State ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Civic Action ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
The Public ◽  
History Of ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
The Military

The Honduran military has a long history of established roles oriented toward both external defense and internal security and civic action. Since the end of military rule in 1982, the military has remained a key political, economic, and social actor. Politically, the military retains a constitutional mandate as guarantor of the political system and enforcer of electoral rules. Economically, its officers direct state enterprises and manage a massive pension fund obscured from public audit. Socially, the military takes on numerous civic action tasks—building infrastructure, conserving forests, providing healthcare, and policing crime—that make the state appear to be useful to its people and bring the military into direct contact with the public almost daily. As a result, the military has ranked high in public trust in comparison with other institutions of the state. Most significantly, the military has retained the role of arbiter in the Honduran political system. This became brutally clear in the coup of 2009 that removed the elected president, Manuel Zelaya. Although new rules enhancing civilian control of the military had been instituted during the 1990s, the military’s authority in politics was restored through the coup that ousted Zelaya. As no civilian politician can succeed without support for and from the military, the missions of the armed forces have expanded substantially so that the military is an “all-purpose” institution within a remarkably weak and increasingly corrupt state.

Between Scylla and Charybdis

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Democratic Development ◽  
The Military ◽  
Better Than

Following most democratic coups, the military manages to secure exit benefits, which, depending on their degree, may foster various dysfunctions in the political system and undermine long-term democratic development. The dose determines the toxicity. A democratic regime can mature even with prerogatives for the military, as long as those prerogatives don’t interfere with democratic notions of civilian control of the armed forces. Although these prerogatives are often undesirable from civilians’ perspective, any attempts by civilians to immediately march the military back to the barracks empty-handed can prompt a backlash from the military leaders. They may dig in, rather than give in, and derail the transition process. And from civilians’ perspective, the military’s exit with benefits is often better than no exit at all.

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