Virtual Legality

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 555-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTHONY W. PEREIRA
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Democratic Transition ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Military Justice ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
Legal Justification ◽  
The Military ◽  
Relevant Factors

Authoritarian regimes in Latin America frequently expanded military court jurisdiction to prosecute political opponents and protect members of the armed forces and police engaged in repression. What happened to the military courts after the recent transitions to democracy in the region? Why did some democratic transitions produce broad reform of military justice while most did not? This article first reviews contending theoretical explanations that offer answers to these questions, comparing those answers with actual outcomes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. It then argues that the “mode of transition” perspective, which attributes variation in the extent of military justice reform to the autonomy and strength of the military in the democratic transition, best explains the outcomes in these cases. However, the military's autonomy and strength should be specified. In the area of military justice, the relevant factors are the military's propagation of an accepted legal justification for past uses of military courts and the creation of congressional support for the maintenance of existing military court jurisdiction. Both of these factors are present in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, where little or no reform of military justice took place under democratization, and absent in Argentina, where broad reform did occur.

Transitions to Democracy: Unpredictable Elite Negotiation or Predictable Failure to Achieve Class Compromise?

1998 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-93
Author(s):  
Kevin Neuhouser
Keyword(s):  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Local Market ◽  
Export Demand ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
The Military ◽  
Negotiation Literature

Can democratic transitions be predicted? The elite-negotiation literature claims that the process is so complicated and contingent that the timing and process is unpredictable. The class-compromise framework, however, identifies structural conditions that make stabilization unlikely, specifying who will oppose the authoritarian regime and why. A “triggering” event—a collapse in export demand—also is identified that intensifies and extends opposition, making a transition likely within 1–3 years. To demonstrate the usefulness of the class-compromise framework, two very different authoritarian regimes are compared. In the Brazilian regime (1964–1985), the military ruled as an institution and pursued state-led development; the Chilean regime (1973–1989) was dominated by one general and was radically neo-liberal. Despite these differences, structural conditions pushed both regimes toward export-led growth and wage constraint, hurting workers and capitalists producing for the local market. When exports collapsed in the early 1980s, opposition spread and forced democratic transitions.

Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and Venezuela

2000 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold A. Trinkunas
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Transition ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Theoretical Argument ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Emerging Democracies ◽  
The Military

Democratic transitions create an opportunity for elected officials to maximize their leverage over the armed forces and create institutions that permanently shift power away from the military. This article develops a theoretical argument about how civilian control- is established. Venezuela institutionalized weak civilian control in the wake of its 1958 democratic transition, allowing the regime to survive the 1992 coup attempts. Argentina moved close to strong civilian control by 1995, although such control is exercised through questionable institutional channels.

The army and the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918

2021 ◽  
pp. 235-244
Author(s):  
Vladimir V. Mironov
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Habsburg Monarchy ◽  
Military Justice ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Military ◽  
Military Units ◽  
Marxist Tradition ◽  
Russian Model ◽  
National Issue

The process of disorganization of the armed forces of Austria-Hungary in 1918 is considered through the prism of the national issue and the prospects for the further preservation of the Habsburg Monarchy. It is concluded that the military and diplomatic victories won in the early 1918 by Austria-Hungary were illusory and only put off the inevitable defeat of its army. Investigation of the first cases of mass withdrawal from obedience of military units in the spring and summer of 1918, showed that they were an interweaving of social, national-political and military reasons proper. At the same time, a serious discrepancy was revealed between Slovenian and Italian researchers in the interpretation of the reasons for the uprising in the 97th infantry regiment stationed in the Slovenian Radkersburg (Radgon). If for the former it was typical, following the Marxist tradition, to emphasize the social contradictions that led to the revolutionization of the army according to the “Russian model”, the latter praised the participants in the uprising from the Italian side as genuine national patriots. It is shown that the “shock force” of all the soldiers’ uprisings that broke out in the spring and summer of 1918 in the Austro-Hungarian army were servicemen who returned from Russian captivity in the spring of 1918, where some of them were imbued with revolutionary ideas. The conclusion is drawn about the extreme severity of military justice, which condemned many of the insurgents to death, which became the reason for deputy inquiries.

scholarly journals The Militarization of Law Enforcement: Evidence from Latin America

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo A. Flores-Macías ◽  
Jessica Zarkin
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Law Enforcement Agencies ◽  
Police Reform ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Military Law ◽  
The Military

What are the political consequences of militarizing law enforcement? Across the world, law enforcement has become increasingly militarized over the last three decades, with civilian police operating more like armed forces and soldiers replacing civilian police in law enforcement tasks. Scholarly, policy, and journalistic attention has mostly focused on the first type, but has neglected the study of three main areas toward which we seek to contribute: 1) the constabularization of the military—i.e., when the armed forces take on the responsibilities of civilian law enforcement agencies, 2) the extent to which this process has taken place outside of the United States, and 3) its political consequences. Toward this end, we unpack the concept of militarized law enforcement, develop theoretical expectations about its political consequences, take stock of militarization in Latin America, and evaluate whether expectations have played out in the region. We show that the distinction between civilian and military law enforcement typical of democratic regimes has been severely blurred in the region. Further, we argue that the constabularization of the military has had important consequences for the quality of democracy in the region by undermining citizen security, human rights, police reform, and the legal order.

The Armed Forces in Latin America: Potential for Changes in Political and Social Functions

1972 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 375-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Kossok
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Social Functions ◽  
Military Dictatorship ◽  
Political Role ◽  
Number Of Publications ◽  
The Military ◽  
Coups D'etat

At the beginning of this study of military dictatorship and the political role of the intellectuals in Latin America, Florestan Fernandes (1970: 1) makes the following statement: “The idea that Latin America is a region in which the coups d'état are a political routine has become a commonplace.” Without doubt, such an opinion is justified and also explains—at least to a certain extent—the wealth of “routine” verdicts on the function of the military in Latin America. A contradiction, however, seems evident at this point: while the number of publications on the political and social position of the armed forces is rapidly increasing (McAlister, 1966; Rouquié, 1969), there is an evident lack of comprehensive analyses that go beyond detailed description, and which explain in a reliable and sound manner the phenomenon of the cyclically increasing militarization of politics. It cannot be overlooked that research on the role of the military in Latin America is in a really critical situation which calls for a reexamination of the facts according to new criteria.

Democratic transitions and monetary policy: are democratic central banks different?

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-180
Author(s):  
Christian Bjørnskov ◽  
Martin Rode
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Market Institutions ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
Electoral Democracy ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Competing Hypotheses

Empirical studies have shown democracies to be more supportive of pro-market institutions than authoritarian regimes; however, to date, it is virtually unknown through which channel democracy might actually create institutional improvements. In addition, causality between democracy and economic institutions is anything but clear, as competing hypotheses highlight. In this article, we examine the possible association of democratisation and political instability with sound monetary policy and the independence of central banks, both of which can be considered central pillars of an economic policy aimed at producing overall prosperity. Results mainly indicate that stable transitions to democracy are followed by strongly improved access to sound money and more independent central banks, probably because stable shifts to electoral democracy create incentives for policymakers to refrain from using monetary policy for short-run gains. Conversely, we also find evidence that especially unstable democratic transitions could impede the establishment of a more independent central bank, making inflationary policies and high money growth more likely.

scholarly journals Coup Agency and Prospects for Democracy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Albrecht ◽  
Kevin Koehler ◽  
Austin Schutz
Keyword(s):  
Military Intervention ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Research Note ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
The Political ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Military Interventions ◽  
Security Personnel ◽  
The Military ◽  
Global Data

Abstract This research note introduces new global data on military coups. Conventional aggregate data so far have conflated two distinct types of coups. Military interventions by leading officers are coups “from above,” characterized by political power struggles within authoritarian elite coalitions where officers move against civilian elites, executive incumbents, and their loyal security personnel. By contrast, power grabs by officers from the lower and middle ranks are coups “from below,” where military personnel outside of the political elite challenge sitting incumbents, their loyalists, and the regime itself. Disaggregating coup types offers leverage to revise important questions about the causes and consequences of military intervention in politics. This research note illustrates that coup attempts from the top of the military hierarchy are much more likely to be successful than coups from the lower and middle ranks of the military hierarchy. Moreover, coups from the top recalibrate authoritarian elite coalitions and serve to sustain autocratic rule; they rarely produce an opening for a democratic transition. Successful coups from below, by contrast, can result in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and generate an opening for democratic transitions.

scholarly journals YURISDIKSI PERADILAN TERHADAP PRAJURIT TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA SEBAGAI PELAKU TINDAK PIDANA

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Niken Subekti Budi Utami ◽  
Supriyadi ,
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Qualitative Methods ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Military Justice ◽  
Empirical Law ◽  
The Military

<p align="center"><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p><em>This research intends to find the answers of two problems. First, the factors that led to the unimplemented jurisdiction of the General Court of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) that perform general crime as mandated by Decree No. VII / MPR / 2000 and Act No. 34 of 2004. Second, the perception of the military conception of justice with jurisdiction over soldiers who committed the crime. This study is a normative- empirical law that uses secondary data and primary data. The data collected by the study of documents and interviews. The data analysis using qualitative methods. The results showed that first the jurisdiction of the General Court of the soldiers who committed the crime can not be implemented because of the general Act No. 31 of 1997 on Military Justice has not been revised by Law Military Justice as new, second that some of the military still wants the soldiers who committed the crime, criminal acts both military and general crime, is in the jurisdiction of Military Justice.</em></p><p><strong>Keywords: </strong><em>Jurisdiction Court, Indonesian Army Forces (TNI)l, Crime.</em></p><p align="center"><strong>Abstrak</strong></p><p>Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menemukan jawaban atas dua permasalahan. Pertama, faktor-faktor yang menyebabkan belum diimplementasikannya yurisdiksi Peradilan Umum terhadap prajurit Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) yang melakukan tindak pidana umum sebagaimana diamanatkan oleh Ketetapan MPR Nomor VII/MPR/2000 dan  Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004. Kedua, persepsi kalangan militer mengenai konsepsi peradilan yang berwenang mengadili prajurit TNI yang melakukan tindak pidana. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum normatif-empiris yang menggunakan data sekunder dan data primer. Pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan studi dokumen dan wawancara. Analisis data dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa, pertama yurisdiksi Peradilan Umum terhadap prajurit TNI yang melakukan tindak pidana umum belum dapat diimplementasikan karena Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 1997 tentang Peradilan Militer belum direvisi dengan Undang-Undang Peradilan Militer yang baru, kedua bahwa beberapa kalangan militer tetap menghendaki agar prajurit TNI yang melakukan tindak pidana, baik tindak pidana militer maupun tindak pidana umum, berada pada yurisdiksi Peradilan Militer.</p><strong>Kata Kunci: </strong>Yurisdiksi Peradilan, Prajurit TNI, Tindak Pidana

Military Politics and Democratic Transition: Combining Rationality, Culture, and Structure

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hicham Bou Nassif
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Transition ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
The Political ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Political Dynamics ◽  
The Status ◽  
Multiple Material ◽  
Transitional Times ◽  
Military Politics

Rationality, culture, and structure provide useful insights into military politics by stressing self-centered motivations, norms, and large impersonal forces, respectively. The armed forces can transform popular uprisings into democratic transitions, or, alternatively, uphold the status quo. Furthermore, officers can allow nascent democratic experiments to consolidate, or they can resurrect authoritarianism. Whatever they choose to do, multiple material and ideational factors will inform their agency, and by extension, the political dynamics unfolding in transitional times.

Demilitarization after Central American Civil Wars

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip J. Williams ◽  
J. Mark Ruhl
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
El Salvador ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Constant Feature ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Military

This chapter considers how the armed forces declined in power throughout Latin America in the early 1990s, but the processes of demilitarization in El Salvador and Guatemala were unique. While demilitarization followed civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, these are the only two cases in Latin America in which the United Nations played a major role in brokering negotiated settlements to end the armed conflicts and in monitoring peace agreements that set in motion processes of demilitarization. In both countries political opposition to continued military domination, including armed insurgencies, was a constant feature from the 1960s onward. Moreover, economic elites who traditionally looked to the military to protect their business interests increasingly expressed concern about the liability of supporting a large, well-equipped military without a mission.

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