The Expanding Domestic Role of Western Armed Forces and its Implications

Author(s):  
Jori Pascal Kalkman

Abstract The domestic roles of Western armed forces are expanding. Although there is broad academic agreement that this trend is widespread, research on its implications has been relatively scarce. Here, I examine three debates that have emerged in the wake of expanding domestic military roles. They include: discussion on the origins of this trend between functionalists and politically-oriented scholars; its implications for civilian control and civil rights; and its effects on military-police convergence. This is followed by a call for more research on how the expanding domestic roles of Western armed forces relate to domestic civil-military collaboration, the management of military organizations, military visibility and reputation, perceptions of new tasks within the military, and the scale of this trend. A concluding section makes a case for drawing more academic attention to this phenomenon.

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 137-142
Author(s):  
ALEXEY ROMAKHIN ◽  

This article reveals the problem of the role of the religious factor in the formation of the value orientations of the military personnel of the Russian army from its inception to the present state. In the article, the author reveals the significance of the Church in the formation of the value orientations of military personnel. The problem of religious situation in foreign armies is considered. The article presents data from sociological studies confirming the increase in the number of religious servicemen in the modern Armed Forces. The concept of “religious factor” is revealed. The author suggests considering the influence of the religious factor on the formation of value orientations through the functions of religion. The article provides examples of the influence of religion on the formation of value orientations of military personnel from the time of the Baptism of Russia to the present. Examples of writers of Russian classical literature about the influence of religion on the morale of troops are given. Examples of religious participation in major battles and wars of the past years are shown. The significance of the religious factor in uniting the people and the army is shown. The work of officials of the Ministry of defense of the Russian Federation in strengthening values among military personnel in modern conditions is demonstrated. The role of the Minister of defense of the Russian Federation, General of the army S.K. Shoigu in strengthening the faith of the Russian army is outlined. Issues related to the construction of the Main Temple of the Armed Forces and its impact on the public masses were discussed. In this study, the author aims to show the significant role of religion in the formation of value orientations in Russian military personnel. The analysis shows an increasing role of religion in the minds of military personnel in modern conditions.


2021 ◽  
pp. bmjmilitary-2020-001740
Author(s):  
Erin G Lawrence ◽  
N Jones ◽  
N Greenberg ◽  
N T Fear ◽  
S Wessely ◽  
...  

Organisations including the United Kingdom Armed Forces should seek to implement mental health interventions to increase the psychological well-being of their workforce. This editorial briefly presents ten key principles that military forces should consider before implementing such interventions. These include job-focused training; evaluating interventions; the use of internal versus external training providers; the role of leaders; unit cohesion, single versus multiple session psychological interventions; not overgeneralising the applicability of interventions; the need for repeated skills practice; raising awareness and the fallibility of screening.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (22) ◽  
pp. 66-73
Author(s):  
Mahfutt Mahfutt ◽  
Khairil Anwar ◽  
Billi Belladona Matindas

The position of the Military Court is a body that executes the judicial power in the circle of the Indonesian National Armed Forces to enforce the law and justice with due observance of the interest in the state defense and safety. The Military Court is authorized to try the crimes committed by someone who when committing such crime is a soldier of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, a member of a group or office or body or equal to a soldier pursuant to the Law and someone is not included in the said group as set forth in the Law Number 31 of 1997 on Military Court. Following the reform of 1988, the existence of the Military Court is developed by some activists and the public that observe the Military Court, insisting the Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia to revise Law Number 31 of 1997 on Military Court, with the focus point for a soldier of the Indonesian National Armed Forces who commits a general crime to be tried in the General Court with the reason that the Military Court practice is closed in nature, and another reason is the equalization of rights before the law. The method used in this research is the normative law research that is carried out to obtain the necessary data relating to the problem. The data used is secondary data consisting of primary law materials, secondary law materials, and tertiary law materials. In addition, primary data is also used as the support of the secondary data law materials. The data is analyzed by the qualitative juridical analysis method. The results of the research show that the Military Court is one of the mechanisms that are always tried to be maintained. The outcome from the research discovers that the role of the Martial Court in Indonesia remains effective, fair, and democratic to this date realistically marked by fair punishment within the jurisdiction offended, which corresponds to the need of TNI institution in the aspects of Culture, Benefit, Assurance, and Fairness. It is recommended that the RI Government continuously develop and improve the same by maintaining the role of the Martial Court in punishing criminal offenses committed by military members on the Martial Court system currently in force.


1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.


Author(s):  
Sarah Sewall

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.


2019 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1987721 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julián González Guyer ◽  
Nicole Jenne

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of Uruguay, today a fully democratic state that has consistently ranked among the world’s top peacekeeping contributors per capita. Specifically, we ask whether participation in peacekeeping has increased civilian control over the military. To answer this question, we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight, civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to political neglect by civilian authorities, the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.


Author(s):  
Oren Barak

Since Lebanon’s independence in the mid-1940s, its military—the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)—has played a pivotal role in the country’s politics. The political role of the LAF in Lebanon might seem surprising since the Lebanese state did not militarize, and its political leaders have continuously managed to keep their military relatively weak and small. Indeed, in this respect Lebanon has been markedly different from its close neighbors (Syria and Israel), but also from several other Middle Eastern states (especially Egypt and Iraq), where the military, which was large and powerful, was continuously involved in politics. Additionally, both Lebanon and the LAF have persistently striven to distance themselves from regional conflicts since 1949, particularly in relation to the Palestinian issue, albeit not always successfully. Still, and despite these ostensibly unfavorable factors for the military’s involvement in politics in Lebanon, the LAF has played an important political role in the state since its independence. This role, which has been marked by elements of continuity and change over the years, included mediation and arbitration between rival political factions (in 1945–1958, 2008, 2011, and 2019); attempts to dominate the political system (in 1958–1970 and 1988–1990); intervention in the Lebanese civil war (in 1975–1976 and 1982–1984); attempts to regain its balancing role in politics (in 1979–1982 and 1984–1988); and facilitating the state’s postwar reconstruction (since 1991). The political role of the military in Lebanon can be explained by several factors. First, the weakness of Lebanon’s political system and its inability to resolve crises between its members. Second, Lebanon’s divided society and its members’ general distrust towards its civilian politicians. Third, the basic characteristics of Lebanon’s military, which, in most periods, enjoyed broad public support that cuts across the lines of community, region, and family, and found appeal among domestic and external audiences, which, in their turn, acquiesced to its political role in the state.


Author(s):  
Sofia K. Ledberg

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a key political actor in the Chinese state. Together with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese state institutions, it makes up the political foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the early years after the founding of the PRC in 1949, the military played an important role in state consolidation and the management of domestic state affairs, as is expected in a state founded on Leninist principles of organization. Since the reform process, which was initiated in the late 1970s, the political role of the PLA has changed considerably. It has become less involved in domestic politics and increased attention has been directed toward military modernization. Consequently, in the early 21st century, the Chinese military shares many characteristics with the armed forces in noncommunist states. At the same time, the organizational structures, such as the party committee system, the system of political leaders, and political organs, have remained in place. In other words, the politicized structures that were put in place to facilitate the role of the military as a domestic political tool of the CCP, across many sectors of society, are expected to also accommodate modernization, professionalization, and cooperation with foreign militaries on the international arena in postreform China. This points to an interesting discrepancy between form and purpose of the PLA. The role of the military in Chinese politics has thus shifted over the years, and its relationship with the CCP has generally been interpreted as having developed from one marked by symbiosis to one of greater institutional autonomy and independence. Yet these developments should not necessarily be seen as linear or irreversible. Indeed, China of the Xi Jinping era has shown an increased focus on ideology, centralization, and personalized leadership, which already has had consequences for the political control of the Chinese armed forces. Chances are that these trends will affect the role of the PLA in politics even further in the early decades of the 21st century.


1995 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang S. Heinz

The article looks at the motives of military governments in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay to introduce ‘disappearances’ as a new method to fight ‘subversion’ and thereby commit human rights violations. Five variables are taken as a point of departure, the country's previous experience with use of state violence, the selection of victims, the role of international public opinion, the selection of methods within the state and ideological factors. Among the key elements were in two countries the shift of responsibility for the use of violence to the military before the coup (except Chile), a lack of civilian control and influence in the formulation and control of internal security policies and an overwhelming, confused ideological definition in Argentina and in Chile (to a lesser degree in Uruguay) of the armed conflict as a war between good and evil and against World Communism which endangered the survival of the nation.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document