Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election

1965 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip E. Converse ◽  
Aage R. Clausen ◽  
Warren E. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Republican Party ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Theodore Roosevelt ◽  
Small Measure ◽  
Lyndon Johnson ◽  
Franklin Delano Roosevelt ◽  
General Range ◽  
Margin Of Victory

On Election Day, 1964, the aspirations of Senator Barry Goldwater and the conservative wing of the Republican Party were buried under an avalanche of votes cast for incumbent President Lyndon Johnson. The margin of victory, approaching 16 million votes, was unprecedented. Historical comparisons with other presidential landslides are left somewhat indeterminate by the intrusion of third parties. However, it is safe to observe that Johnson's 61.3 percent of the two-party popular vote put him in the same general range as the striking victories of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1936, Harding in 1920, and Theodore Roosevelt in 1904.Before the fact, the election was also expected to be the most intensely ideological campaign since 1936, in no small measure because of Goldwater's reputation as a “pure” conservative. After the fact, doubts existed as to whether this expectation had been fulfilled. Goldwater supporters, in particular, expressed disappointment that President Johnson had refused to join battle on any of the fundamental ideological alternatives that were motivating the Goldwater camp.

Third Parties

2020 ◽  
pp. 218-245
Author(s):  
Robert C. McMath
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Party System ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Theodore Roosevelt ◽  
Minor Parties ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Legislative Districts ◽  
Egalitarian Ethos ◽  
Take All

Since the 1830s the American two-party system has included other minor parties. This essay describes eleven of them, beginning with the Anti-Masonic Party and ending with Ross Perot’s Reform Party. The most noteworthy of the group include the American (Know-Nothing), Free Soil, People’s (Populist), Progressive, American Independent, and Reform parties. Third parties in America have always suffered from structural arrangements that included single-member legislative districts and “winner take all” election rules, and yet they have persisted. Between the 1830s and 1890s most parties grew out of populistic movements that espoused an egalitarian ethos and railed against entrenched elites. Around 1900, movement-based parties began to give way to “interest group” organizations, but in the twentieth century three third parties led by strong individuals (Theodore Roosevelt [1912], George C. Wallace [1968], and H. Ross Perot [1992]) received 27, 13, and 19 percent of the popular vote for president, respectively.

The American Election: Another Reagan Triumph

1989 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-38
Author(s):  
Harvey C. Mansfield
Keyword(s):  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
The Political ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
George Bush ◽  
Martin Van Buren ◽  
Michael Dukakis ◽  
Margin Of Victory

THE ELECTION OF GEORGE BUSH TO THE PRESIDENCY IN 1988 was a triumph for Ronald Reagan. The margin of victory was substantial (54 per cent to Bush over 46 per cent to Michael Dukakis in the popular vote) — though not of Reaganesque proportions. But then the master might not wish his apprentice to do as well as himself. Reagan has not only brought peace and prosperity in his own terms while in office, but also has succeeded in leaving a legacy. And the legacy is not only in the political changes he instituted but partly in the person of his immediate successor, the first vicepresident to succeed as president by election since Martin Van Buren in 1837.

Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election

1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1083-1105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip E. Converse ◽  
Warren E. Miller ◽  
Jerrold G. Rusk ◽  
Arthur C. Wolfe
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Primary Elections ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Continuity And Change ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Revolving Doors ◽  
Lyndon Johnson ◽  
Striking Success

Without much question, the third-party movement of George C. Wallace constituted the most unusual feature of the 1968 presidential election. While this movement failed by a substantial margin in its audacious attempt to throw the presidential contest into the House of Representatives, in any other terms it was a striking success. It represented the first noteworthy intrusion on a two-party election in twenty years. The Wallace ticket drew a larger proportion of the popular vote than any third presidential slate since 1924, and a greater proportion of electoral votes than any such movement for more than a century, back to the curiously divided election of 1860. Indeed, the spectre of an electoral college stalemate loomed sufficiently large that serious efforts at reform have since taken root.At the same time, the Wallace candidacy was but one more dramatic addition to an unusually crowded rostrum of contenders, who throughout the spring season of primary elections were entering and leaving the lists under circumstances that ranged from the comic through the astonishing to the starkly tragic. Six months before the nominating conventions, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had been the expected 1968 protagonists, with some greater degree of uncertainty, as usual, within the ranks of the party out of power. The nominating process for the Republicans followed the most-probable script rather closely, with the only excitement being provided by the spectacle of Governors Romney and Rockefeller proceeding as through revolving doors in an ineffectual set of moves aimed at providing a Republican alternative to the Nixon candidacy. Where things were supposed to be most routine on the Democratic side, however, surprises were legion, including the early enthusiasm for Eugene McCarthy, President Johnson's shocking announcement that he would not run, the assassination of Robert Kennedy in the flush of his first electoral successes, and the dark turmoil in and around the Chicago nominating convention, with new figures like Senators George McGovern and Edward Kennedy coming into focus as challengers to the heir apparent, Vice President Hubert Humphrey.

Queue the Music: Cohan's Yellowface Substitution in Little Johnny Jones

2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-220
Author(s):  
Brynn Shiovitz
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
New York City ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Republican Party ◽  
Theodore Roosevelt ◽  
Broadway Musical ◽  
Recent Success ◽  
Political Views ◽  
William Mckinley ◽  
First Time

It is 7 November 1904, 7:55 p.m. New York City theatregoers anxiously await the opening of George M. Cohan's newest production, Little Johnny Jones. The house is just about filled, but the well-dressed ushers hustle a few stragglers to their seats. Some of the theatre's usual patrons have been held up late at work, while others are too consumed by Clifford Berryman's political cartoons in the Washington Star to attend the performance. This particular Monday evening marks an important moment for America: polls for the thirtieth presidential election will be opening in fewer than twelve hours. Theodore Roosevelt represents the Republican Party, and Alton B. Parker heads the Democratic ticket. Although results will not be known for sure until the close of the 8 November election, Roosevelt's recent success in office upon the assassination of William McKinley gives him a political boost. New York City's predominantly Republican values leave little doubt about which name a majority of tonight's audience will be checking off on the ballot come morning; Roosevelt has carried every region but the South in his campaigning efforts thus far. Nonetheless, Broadway occasionally attracts a few guests from the slightly less liberal states of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and this evening's house is no different; the Liberty Theatre is filled with men of opposing political views. A nervous excitement fills the room; a combination of political gossip, predictions about how Cohan's first Broadway musical will compare to his earlier comedic works and vaudeville skits, and occasional gasps and awestruck sighs from spectators who are seeing the inside of the Liberty Theatre for the first time since its very recent grand opening at 234 West 42nd Street. The twenty-thousand-square-foot theatre, with its dramatic stage, extensive balconies, and striking cathedrallike ceilings is the perfect home for the unfolding of Broadway, a theatrical form and style that America will come to call its own. As the house lights dim and the violins hum a piercing A note, other members of the orchestra slowly begin tuning their individual instruments. As the oboists finish adjusting their pitch, the conductor taps his music stand: musicians tilt their gaze to the front of the pit, audience members sink into the velvet of their plush seats and begin to quiet their chatter. Blackout.

Electoral College Winner's Advantage

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (02) ◽  
pp. 353-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack E. Riggs ◽  
Gerald R. Hobbs ◽  
Todd H. Riggs
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Election ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Electoral Vote ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All ◽  
Margin Of Victory

Compared to the popular vote, the Electoral College magnifies the perception of the winner's margin of victory. In this analysis, a method of quantifying the magnitude of the advantage given to the winner due to the Electoral College's two electoral vote add-on and winner-take-all methodologies is presented. Using the electoral vote distribution that was present in the 2000 U.S. presidential election, we analyzed one million random two-candidate simulated elections. The results show that the net effect of the Electoral College is to give the winning candidate an average 29.45 electoral vote advantage per election due to the winner-take-all methodology. This winner's advantage includes an average 0.42 electoral vote advantage given to the winner per election due to the two electoral vote add-on.

scholarly journals The Rebounding of the People’s Action Party of Singapore in 2015: An Electoral Analysis of Three Hotly Contested Constituencies

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-197
Author(s):  
Mustafa Izzuddin
Keyword(s):  
Group Representation ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Electoral Outcome ◽  
Parliamentary System ◽  
General Elections ◽  
Party Dominance ◽  
Margin Of Victory

The 2015 Singapore General Elections (GE) produced a puzzling outcome. Although it was predicted by analysts that the People’s Action Party (PAP) would rebound, the depth of victory by way of popular vote of 69.9 percent was confoundding. Given also that the Workers’ Party of Singapore (WP) was expected to retain Aljunied Group Representation Constituency (GRC) as well as the Single Member Constituency (SMC) of Hougang and Punggol East, it further flummoxed analysts when the WP lost Punggol East to the PAP, and WP had its margin of victory reduced in both Aljunied and Hougang. Epitomising PAP’s rebound was also the increased margin of victory in the PotongPasir SMC. Although the opposition, namely, the WP was expected to further pluralise the parliamentary system in Singapore by winning more seats in GE2015, the reverse took place in that the PAP not only rebounded from the 60.1 percent it received in GE2011, but also further entrenched its one-party dominance in governing Singapore. Based on an electoral analysis of three constituencies, Punggol East, PotongPasir and Aljunied, this article argues that these constituencies illustrate how the PAP rebounded while the WP retrogressed in GE2015. Pursuant to the electoral outcome, this article makes the case that there needs to be a re-evaluation when applying the concept of authoritarianism to Singapore’s context.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan W. Keating
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Republican Party ◽  
Abraham Lincoln ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
The North ◽  
The People ◽  
Commander In Chief ◽  
Precarious Situation

In April 1861, newly elected president Abraham Lincoln found himself in a precarious situation. Although he had won the presidency in the November elections, his victory was by no means a mandate from the people for the Republican Party platform. The nation was perilously divided. Winning less than half the popular vote in 1860, the tall, gaunt lawyer from Illinois looked on as his nation teetered on the brink of civil war. To keep the nation together, the new commander in chief drew support from a rather tenuous alliance of political rivals openly divided in their opinions about the actions of their southern brethren. The attack on Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina, however, galvanized public opinion throughout the north and fostered, at least momentarily, a powerful wartime alliance between Republicans and Democrats that allowed Lincoln to carry out a war to preserve the Union. As Federal troops lowered the Stars and Stripes in surrender from the ramparts of the bastion in Charleston Harbor, banners were hoisted in towns and cities across the North as men of all ages, ethnicities, classes, and backgrounds rushed to the defense of their flag and their nation....

Resisting Redemption

2011 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Hogan
Keyword(s):  
Structural Analysis ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Republican Party ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Divide And Conquer ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Convict Labor ◽  
Racial Change ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Explained Variance

Analysis of the Republican Party popular vote in Georgia county congressional elections of 1876 suggests that Charles Tilly's (1978) model of interest-based collective action would be useful if embedded in the dynamic model of political processes and mechanisms that Tilly (2007) proposes. Specifically, class (petit bourgeois), status (black), and party (liberal Republican) interests explain 25 percent of the variance in the election returns. Adding a racial-change variable increases the explained variance to 32 percent but fails to distinguish the yeoman and freedman constituencies and the process through which the Democratic Redeemers divided and conquered the opposition in the process of “de-democratization” (ibid.). By embedding the structural analysis in the analysis of process (quantitatively and qualitatively), we can appreciate how yeoman and freedman constituencies experienced contract/convict labor differently and expressed opposition to Redeemers in qualitatively different ways, ultimately facilitating divide-and-conquer efforts.

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