New Factors of Stability in Soviet Collective Leadership

1967 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 563-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome M. Gilison
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
Collective Leadership ◽  
Power Drive ◽  
Nikita Khrushchev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Long Run ◽  
New Phase ◽  
Leadership Pattern

With the reluctant retirement of Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union entered a new phase of collective leadership. Past experience with such periods has led many Western specialists to expect that the collective leadership pattern will lead to the emergence of a single leader, who will hold preponderant power and who will seek to consolidate and strengthen that power, ultimately acquiring something approaching dictatorial authority. The assumptions of this “conventional wisdom” (to borrow a phrase from John Galbraith) are that (i) there is something inherently unstable in a collective leadership pattern, given Soviet conditions; (2) the personal ambitions and power drive of Soviet leaders prevent, in the long run, their acceptance of a situation of shared power; and (3) historical evidence of past breakdowns of collective leadership is applicable to present conditions.

The top-heavy shape of authoritarian bureaucracy: evidence from Russia and China

2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232110588
Author(s):  
Tao Li ◽  
Zhenyu M. Wang
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Tournament Theory ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Public Sector Reforms ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Heavy Structure ◽  
Theory Framework

The prevalence of top-heavy bureaucracies in non-democracies cannot be explained by the theories of Parkinson, Tullock, Niskanen, or Simon or by classical managerial theories. When bureaucracy positions carry rents, the competition for promotion becomes a rent-seeking process. Borrowing the career-tournament theory framework from managerial scholarship, we argue that top-heavy bureaucracy resembles a tournament with too many finalists. When rent is centralized at the top (i.e. power centralization), as is the case in many non-democracies, the optimal bureaucracy should be top-heavy, accommodating and encouraging relatively more finalists at the top to compete for the final big prize. We provide suggestive evidence by analyzing ministry organizations in China (1993–2014) and Russia (2002–2015). After some fluctuations, the shape of Russian ministries eventually converged with that of China. In the steady state, their ministry shapes are far more top-heavy than what is prescribed by managerial theories. At the micro-level, ministry power centralization, measured by the perceived influence of the ministers, is correlated with ministry top-heaviness in Russia. Points for practitioners Our theory suggests that a top-heavy authoritarian bureaucratic structure naturally follows from a back-loaded sequential career tournament and an effort-maximizing bureaucratic leader. Our findings also suggest that Chinese and Russian ministries both converge to a highly top-heavy structure in the long run. We demonstrate that the top-heavy structure first arose during the planned-economy experiment in the Soviet Union. Our research sheds new light on public-sector reforms that aim to reduce bureaucracy top-heaviness in autocracies.

Wars

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Baberowski
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Cycle Of Violence ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Full Potential ◽  
Nikita Khrushchev ◽  
World Power ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Great Patriotic War ◽  
Red Army ◽  
The Town

This chapter looks at Stalinism during the Great Patriotic War. It first discusses Joseph Stalin's changing approaches to terror following the end of his policy of exterminatory violence. This shift is well illustrated by two incidents, one in September 1939 when Nikita Khrushchev traveled with Marshal Timoshenko to the town of Vynnyky. This episode shows that the Stalinist terror was also an instrument of ethnic cleansing with which the Stalinist regime did its best. The other incident was in 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The front-line soldiers of the Red Army were trapped in a cycle of violence from which there was no escape. This chapter considers how the Great Patriotic War allowed Stalinism to develop to its full potential. The Soviet Union had become a world power, and yet it could offer its subjects nothing but misery and slavery. Only the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953 put an end to Stalinism and with it, despotism.

Understanding Russia’s Low Rate of Acquittal: Pretrial Screening and the Problem of Accusatorial Bias

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter H. Solomon
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Prosecutorial Discretion ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
History Of ◽  
Soviet Russia ◽  
Low Rate

The Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia alike have had extremely low rates of acquittal in criminal cases, which conventional wisdom associates with an accusatorial bias. But other countries like Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, and France also have low rates of acquittal without the perception of bias. This article argues that the key difference lies in the presence or absence of pretrial screening—through the withdrawal of charges, diversion, and/or dispositions imposed by prosecutors. After a brief history of the low acquittal rate in Russia, the article documents the use of prosecutorial discretion to screen cases before trial in those four Western countries, especially through the exercise by prosecutors of quasi-judicial functions. The article goes on to demonstrate the absence of significant pretrial filtering of cases in Russia and to explore the implications for understanding the rate of acquittal.

Žurnāla „Inostrannaja Literatura” rezonanse Latvijas literārajā telpā politiskā atkušņa laikā

2021 ◽  
pp. 137-146
Author(s):  
Zanda Gūtmane
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Socialist Realism ◽  
Communist Regime ◽  
New Historicism ◽  
Foreign Literature ◽  
Nikita Khrushchev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Russian Literary ◽  
Thaw Period

The paper is devoted to a parallel description of the literary processes in the Soviet Union and Soviet Latvia during Nikita Khrushchev’ reign, also known as the period of political thaw or the liberalisation of the communist regime (1953–1964). The main object of the research is the literary magazine Inostrannaja literatura (Иностранная литература), issued in the Soviet Union since 1955, dedicated to foreign literature and its translations; the principles of creating its content and structure during the political thaw period. The aim of the research: with concrete examples, to show the role of this legendary Russian literary periodical in the Iron Curtain period, expansion of freedom of thought, decanonization of socialist realism dogmas in general in the USSR, and also in the Latvian SSR. The methodological basis of the research consists of a comparative literature approach and a new historicism position that the literary text is important in studying different lines of history. The analysis of the publications clearly shows the replacement of the so-called periods of thaw and freezing. The article proves that the appearance of translations, reviews, previews, and research articles of foreign literature in this journal is closely connected with various political peripeteia of the USSR. In Latvia, there is a great resonance of Inostrannaja literatura, and it had an eventual influence on overcoming the dogmas of socialist realism in Latvian literature. The publications about the journal in Latvian literary editions and the study of the reception of one text example, a comparison of various editions of the writer Ēvalds Vilks’s (1923–1976) story “Twelve Kilometers”, prove it.

Reagan’s Military Buildup

2019 ◽  
pp. 40-58
Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
The West ◽  
High Ranking ◽  
Military Buildup ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Long Run

Did President Reagan launch a military buildup so as toforce the USSR to collapse, as triumphalists claim?In this view Reagan sought to entice Moscow into an arms race that it could not afford, thus forcing it into bankruptcy. This argument rests on two assumptions. The first is that Reagan officials believed the Soviet Union to be so fragile that it could be nudged to collapse. The second is that the administration intended to force the USSR to implode. This chapter finds both assumptions wanting. Although the president believed the USSR was unsustainable in the long run, virtually all of his advisers disagreed. They viewed Moscow as a formidable adversary that would continue to challenge the West for the foreseeable future. Moreover, high-ranking officials in the Reagan administration have rejected the claim that they sought to force the USSR to collapse.The objective was to pressure the Soviets to agree to arms reduction. President Reagan sought to eliminate nuclear weapons, and officials mistakenly believed that Moscow would not agree to reduce its arsenal until confronted with a strong and menacing adversary. Paradoxically, the buildup was intended to lead to arms reductions.This policy was called “peace through strength.”

6. Maintaining the Spheres of Influence

2020 ◽  
pp. 159-177
Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Spheres Of Influence ◽  
Nikita Khrushchev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
East West

This chapter examines how the United States and the Soviet Union tried to maintain their respective spheres of influence during the Cold War, especially in three regions: Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Latin America. The death of Joseph Stalin and the assumption of power by the triumvirate of Lavrenti Beria, Nikita Khrushchev, and Georgi Malenkov resulted in a fresh approach to domestic issues and to the nature of Soviet control over its European satellites. The apparent change produced a new Soviet approach to East–West relations. The chapter first considers how the new Soviet leadership addressed the crisis in East Germany before analysing American influence in Western Europe and US relations with Latin America. The discussion covers themes and events such as the Soviet policy on Hungary and Poland, the Messina Conference and the Spaak Committee, nuclear cooperation and multilateral force, and the US response to the Cuban Revolution.

Castro and “New Thinking” in Latin America

1990 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kline
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Latin American ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Long Run ◽  
New Thinking

This article will argue that general agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union on their foreign policy toward Latin America is likely over the long run, despite (a) Fidel Castro's condemnation of perestroika and glasnost, and (b) his obvious attempt to embarrass Soviet Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev during the latter's state visit to Cuba in April 1989. Serious obstacles — such as differences over Cuban domestic policy and Castro's personal ambitions — remain to be overcome, but foreign policy disagreements between the two countries are likely to prove less intractable than is frequently assumed.This article will start with (1) an overview of Cuban Latin American foreign policy since the 1970s; then proceed to (2) an interpretation of Soviet “new thinking;” and finally (3) argue that this particular interpretation of “new thinking” is consistent with, and not contradictory to, Castro's foreign policy.

Religion under Communism

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Madsen
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Catholic Church ◽  
Organizational Structures ◽  
Religious Practice ◽  
Roman Catholic Church ◽  
Russian Orthodox Church ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Communist Countries

Lenin began and Stalin completed the organizational structures and the repertoire of strategies and tactics that would be used as a model by almost all subsequent communist movements for suppressing religion. This model was primarily constructed to overcome the challenges posed to the revolution by a powerful Russian Orthodox Church. As such it did not fit the religious circumstances of other communist countries. It was poorly adapted to the decentralized patterns of religious practice in Asia, and it was unable to eliminate resistance from the Roman Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, especially when that church was connected with nationalism. Even though the Stalinist model initially seemed successful in eliminating political opposition from religion in the Soviet Union, it was in the long run a failure on its own terms.

At the edge of Soviet state control

AJS Review ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-188
Author(s):  
Gennady Estraikh
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
State Control ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
Totalitarian Regime ◽  
Nikita Khrushchev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Crimea ◽  
State Of Israel ◽  
Jewish Intellectuals

In August 1956, Nikita Khrushchev took part in a meeting with a delegation of Canadian communists. Discussing the wave of repression against Jewish intellectuals during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Soviet leader mentioned that he had supported Stalin's decision not to give the Crimea to Jews because it would have created a springboard for attacks on the Soviet Union. Apart from being paranoid about the Soviet Jews' loyalty to the young state of Israel and its imperialist backers, Khrushchev had, as his remark revealed, another paranoia that was characteristic of the Kremlin decision-makers: distrust of the peripheries. Khrushchev and his advisors knew that their totalitarian regime was not such a monolith as it might appear in the eyes of foreign observers, especially because visitors were seldom allowed to travel to the outskirts of the Soviet empire and did not know that some areas had features of fiefdoms. The post-Soviet disintegration of the communist empire confirmed the Kremlin denizens' misgivings.

History and Individual Memory: The Story of Eva Dawes

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 126-143
Author(s):  
M. Ann Hall ◽  
Bruce Kidd
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Early Life ◽  
Political Involvement ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Individual Memory ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Athletic Career

Eva Dawes Spinks (1912–2009) was an outstanding Canadian high jumper in the 1930s. The present paper traces her early life, successful athletic career, and her decision in 1935 to join a group of athletes on a goodwill tour of the Soviet Union organized by the Workers’ Sports Association of Canada. Upon her return, Dawes was suspended by the Women’s Amateur Athletic Union of Canada. She retired from competition and became involved in the Canadian campaign to boycott the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Much later, Dawes adamantly denied any political involvement. The purpose of this paper is to examine and possibly explain the incongruity between the historical evidence and Dawes’s later denials. More broadly, it is a discussion about the relationship between history and individual memory.

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