The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration of 1899

1950 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 682-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clifton J. Child
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
British Guiana ◽  
The Press ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
Day By Day

In his note on “The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute,” (this JOURNAL, Vol. 43 (1949), pp. 523–530), Judge Otto Schoenrich publishes a memorandum by the late Severo Mallet-Prevost which, if it were the only evidence upon which the fairness of the arbitration of 1899 could be judged, would bring the justice of the award seriously into question. Fortunately, however, it is not necessary to rely either upon the recollections of Mr. Mallet-Prevost or upon the construction placed upon these and other facts relating to the boundary dispute by Judge Schoenrich in order to learn the truth of how the Tribunal came to make its award. There are the voluminous files of the British Foreign Office on the arbitration to which reference may be made and there is the verbatim record of the Tribunal, taken down by six shorthand writers, printed day by day as the Tribunal sat, and then issued in 54 parts. There are also the files —often most informative—of contemporary newspapers (for the arbitration took place at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the watchful eye of the press).

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asle Toje
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Present State ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The Sun ◽  
Policy Debate ◽  
Imperial Germany ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
German Parliament

We do not want to place anyone into the shadow, we also claim our place in the sun.” In a foreign policy debate in the German parliament on December 6. 1897 the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow, articulated the foreign policy aspirations of the ascendant Wilhelmine Germany. This proved easier said than done. In 1907, Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office penned his famous memorandum where he accounted for “the present state of British relations with France and Germany.” He concluded that Britain should meet imperial Germany with “unvarying courtesy and consideration” while maintaining “the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe.”...

The Personnel of the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, 1851–1929

1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert T. Nightingale
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Public Affairs ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Government Action ◽  
The People ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
The Great War

The connection between public opinion and public policy is slighter in foreign affairs than in any other sphere of politics. In normal times, international relations have little palpable impact upon the life of the people, and are obscured by more vivid domestic issues until war or some sudden crisis throws a high light on their significance. Even since the Great War, although public realization of the importance of foreign affairs has begun to be aroused in the late belligerent countries—in England at any rate—direct contact between popular opinion and government action is still both sporadic and uncertain.What is true of the British nation is almost equally true of its representative assembly. Parliament has but little power over foreign affairs. Some of the most momentous changes in the country's relations with other Powers have, in the present century, been accomplished without reference to the House of Commons, and often without even its knowledge. Like the people themselves, the people's representatives exercise only an inconsiderable control over that branch of public affairs which is at present of more vital concern than any other.Most British foreign secretaries, indeed, regard their actions as matters of exclusively executive concern. A cabinet of twenty ministers, already overworked in their own departments, is not, however, a body which can conduct the country's foreign relations. On his own subject, the Foreign Secretary dominates his ministerial colleagues. Experience shows that he can avoid consultation with all the cabinet save two or three of the principal ministers.

CONCLUSION: ‘BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND RETREAT’

2004 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 228-238
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Domestic Policy ◽  
World War ◽  
Historical Significance ◽  
The Press ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Postponement

On returning from his visit to Germany and Czechoslovakia from 6 to 15 August 1938, Lord Allen wrote that he had engaged in ‘hours and hours of talk and NOTHING else whatever’. Could the same assessment also be true of the All Souls Foreign Affairs Group? The group, in fact, never reconvened after the postponement notice sent out on 4 July 1938. What then can be asserted with regard to the impact and historical significance of the All Souls Foreign Affairs Group? Indeed, what was its ‘true character and influence’? Although its history was documented in the papers accumulated during the nine meetings from 18 December 1937 to 15 May 1938, what subsequent role did the more prominent members play in the period leading up to the outbreak of World War II? In reality, the group served precisely the purposes designed by Salter and Allen, essentially acting as a ‘Brains Trust’. The discussions helped the individual members, with diverse experience and with divergent views, to clarify their positions on foreign and domestic policy. They then spoke, wrote publicly, and lobbied the press and the Foreign Office, confident that the issues had been analysed by some of the best elite minds of the period.

Expedition turned Invasion: The 1888 Sikkim Expedition through British, Indian and Chinese eyes

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
YI MENG CHENG
Keyword(s):  
English Language ◽  
British Government ◽  
British India ◽  
Intelligence Gathering ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
British Foreign Policy ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
The Subject ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
Chinese And English

Abstract A fresh look at the 1888 Sikkim Expedition using both Chinese and English language sources yields very different conclusions from that of previous research on the subject. During the course of policymaking, the British Foreign Office and the British Government of India did not collaborate to devise a plan to invade Tibet; conversely, their aims differed and clashed frequently. During the years leading to war, the largest newspapers in British India gave plenty of coverage to the benefits of trade with Tibet, thus influencing British foreign policy and contributing indirectly to the outbreak of war. The Tibetan army was soundly defeated in the war, while the British troops suffered only light casualties. Although the Tibetan elites remained committed to the war, the lower classes of Tibetan society quickly grew weary of it. During the war, the British made much use of local spies and enjoyed an advantage in intelligence gathering, which contributed greatly to their victory. Finally, although the war was initially fought over trade issues, the demarcation of the Tibetan-Sikkim border replaced trade issues as the main point of contention during the subsequent peace negotiations. During the negotiations, Sheng Tai, the newly appointed Amban of Tibet, tried his best to defend China's interests.

Cultural diplomacy and the British Council: 1934 — 1939

1978 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 244-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip M. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Diplomacy ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
British Government ◽  
International Peace ◽  
British Council ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Political Form

In November, 1934, the British Council for Relations with Other Countries was founded on the initiative of the Foreign Office. The decision to establish a body specifically designed to conduct cultural propaganda overseas on behalf of the British Government was, perhaps, the most constructive peacetime response to the growing realization that more positive measures were required to counter the detrimental effects of aggressive foreign propaganda upon British interests and prestige. The British Council, which continued to operate under the auspices of the Foreign Office, offered a new and alternative approach to the traditional conduct of foreign affairs: the practice of cultural diplomacy. It was believed that cultural propaganda — broadly interpreted as the dissemination of British ideals and beliefs in a general rather than specifically political form – would not only serve to enhance British influence and prestige abroad, but would also effectively further the wider ideals of international peace and understanding.

Geopolitical Reflections of Sino-Indian Conflict and its Implication on Nepal’s Survival Strategy

Unity Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 81-96
Author(s):  
Gaurav Bhattarai
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Survival Strategies ◽  
New Delhi ◽  
Survival Strategy ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Repeated Calls ◽  
The Press ◽  
India And China

Border disputes between China and India in June 2020 almost lead South Asian countries to take a side. But, Nepal, situated between India and China, has always expressed a stern belief in neutrality and non-alignment. Even though New Delhi doubted Nepal’s neutrality and non-alignment citing China’s growing footprints in Nepal, Kathmandu reckoned such suspicion as the result of a new map row between two countries connected by open borders. While Nepal’s repeated calls to diplomatically resolve India-Nepal border problems remained unheeded by New Delhi, it provided room for the ruling communist party in Nepal to reap geopolitical benefits out of the Sino-Indian dispute. But, interestingly, such geopolitical benefits are usually targeted in tempering Indian influence in Nepal, by getting closer with China. Apprehending the same, this study aims to assess the geopolitical implication of Sino-Indian conflict on the survival strategy of Nepal. To fulfill the same objectives, the Chinese perception of Nepal-India relations, and Indian perception of Sino-Nepal ties have been critically assessed in this study. This study is methodologically based on the information collected from the secondary sources. In order to critically evaluate the geopolitical expression of Sino-Indian conflict in Nepal, this study reviews India’s perception of Nepal-China relations, and China’s perception of Nepal-India relations. Also, the reports and the press releases of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, historical facts, treaties, government reports and decisions have been studied and analyzed. Media sources are also reviewed to understand the diverse narratives produced on the geopolitical reflection of Sino-Indian conflict. The themes that emerged from the reviews are thematically analyzed and interpreted, to discover that cultivating relations with one country at the expense of the other may be counterproductive to Nepal’s survival strategies.

‘The true author of European Peace’: The Foreign Office, the League and Locarno, December 1924–December 1926

1995 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 263-298
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Considerable Degree ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Risks ◽  
Foreign Office

Since his early student travels to France and Germany Chamberlain believed that he had been in training for the Foreign Office. Although he had accepted the shadow portfolio for foreign affairs on his return to the Conservative front bench in February, however, he did not consider the Foreign Office as a possibility until Baldwin first raised the question in October 1924. At this juncture, daunted by the expense, the exacting burden of work with which he was unfamiliar and the attendant political risks, Chamberlain had been inclined to prefer a return to the India Office. In the event, his wife recommended the Foreign Office and, rather uncharacteristically, he was soon confiding to his sisters that he had ‘rapidly found [his] feet’. Within a year he was rejoicing in afar greater sense of fulfilment from the Foreign Office than he could ever have expected from being Prime Minister. To a considerable degree this satisfaction was derived from the very special nature of the position enjoyed by a British Foreign Secretary. As he noted when the offer was first made, the Foreign Office ‘is the highest office in the public estimation’: a status reflected in the special pomp and dignity which surrounded its holder. As Eden later recalled, the Foreign Secretary's journey to Geneva was ‘something of an event and took place at a measured pace. The top-hatted stationmaster and the Foreign Office representatives at Victoria, the harbourmaster at Dover bowing us on to the ship, the préfect and the mayor of Calais, then the drive across Paris and dinner at the Embassy, the night train at the Gare de Lyon, where M. Briand and some other of Sir Austen's colleagues were also embarking for Geneva. Finally, the arrival at Geneva, about 7.30 in the morning, when the whole staff was paraded to meet their chief at the station’. In many respects, Chamberlain was ideally suited by character and temperament to fulfil such a role as a model British Foreign Secretary.

Arab League

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-620
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The Political ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
The Press ◽  
Arab League ◽  
Syrian Conflict

On May 14, 1951 meetings were held of the Council and Political Committee of the Arab League in Damascus. Press reports indicated that the meeting of the Political Committee concerned the question of whether or not the Arab states should put into effect a real military alliance. On the same day the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies had discussed the ratification of the Arab collective security pact. Egypt had been the originator of the pact which although initialled by six of the seven Arab nations had only been ratified by Saudi-Arabia. The press deduced from these reports that Syria wanted to know where it stood in case the Israeli-Syrian conflict became more serious. Iraq had already offered any support Syria asked for and sent some military detachments and an anti-aircraft unit through Syrian territory to the Israeli border. The Acting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel (Sharett), however, in an address to the Knesset Parliament in Jerusalem, warned the Political Committee that Israel was firmly resolved to defend every inch of her territory against encroachment or domination by Syria.

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