Soviet Criminal Justice and the Great Terror

Slavic Review ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 46 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 391-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter H. Solomon

Years ago Harold Berman observed that for many people in the west the term Soviet law represented a contradiction. Popular imagination found little place for law or criminal justice in a society where terror or extralegal coercion played a major role. Yet, as Berman argued, even in Stalin's Russia law and force existed side by side, and there was a “surprising degree of official compartmentalization of the legal and the extra-legal.” Berman recognized that the separation of law and terror was no accident; rather it was a product of the regime's commitment to law and the functions it could perform for a stable, conservative social order. Three decades later western Sovietologists are only starting to come to terms with the conservative phase of Stalin's rule; and, despite a fine essay by Robert Sharlet, the promotion of law has yet to be incorporated into the standard portrait of Stalinism. A major reason is the continuation of doubts about the possibilities for law where terror also reigns.

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Leo

This article reflects on the author’s 2005 article, “Rethinking the Study of Miscarriages of Justice,” which sought to describe what scholars empirically knew at that time about the phenomenon, causes, and consequences of wrongful convictions in America. The 2005 article argued that the study of wrongful convictions constituted a coherent academic field of study and set forth a vision for a more sophisticated, insightful, and generalizable criminology of wrongful conviction. In this current article, the author revisits the ideas first developed in “Rethinking the Study of Miscarriages of Justice” to evaluate what scholars have learned about wrongful convictions in the last decade, and what challenges lie ahead for developing a more robust criminology of wrongful conviction. The article concludes that there have been significant theoretical, methodological, and substantive advances in the last decade, but that a root cause analysis of wrongful convictions has yet to come to fruition and urges empirical scholars to begin to study other sources of error and inaccuracy in the criminal justice system. Scholars should develop a criminology of erroneous outcomes, not just of erroneous conviction. By studying both sets of outcomes, scholars can improve accuracy and reduce errors across the board.


2019 ◽  
pp. 244-271
Author(s):  
Martin Pugh

This chapter discusses how, misled by Islamophobic propaganda, Britain and America were unable to come to terms with what they called ‘Islamism’. The origins of what is variously known as Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, and radical Islamism lie in the 1960s, in the ideas of a handful of Muslims in Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran who believed that Muslims had been led astray from their religion by nationalist movements. Although some Muslims were critical of Western morality and politics, Islamism was not primarily anti-Western: it was essentially a reaction against what were widely seen as the corrupt, authoritarian, and secular regimes that controlled much of the Muslim world. The aim was to evict them, return to a purer form of Islam and re-create an Islamic state. In view of the exaggerated reputation it enjoys in the West, it is worth remembering that this movement has largely been a failure. Yet while fundamentalism appeals to only a small minority, it is also the case that large numbers of Muslims have become aggrieved by the policies of the Western powers. The explanation for this can be found in long-term frustration with the consistently pro-Israeli policy of Britain and the United States over Palestine, in addition to the proximate causes in the shape of two Afghan wars, the genocide in Bosnia, the Rushdie affair, and the first Gulf War in 1990, which made many Muslims see themselves as the victims of Western aggression and interventionism.


ALQALAM ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
MASRUKHIN MUHSIN

The word hermeneutics derives from the Greek verb, hermeneuin. It means to interpret and to translate. Hermeneutics is divided into three kinds: the theory of hermeneutics, the philosophy hermeneutics, and the critical hermenmtics. Hasan Hanfi is known as the first scholar who introduces hermeneutics in the Islamic World through his work dealing with the new method of interpretation. Nashr Hamid Abu-Zaid is another figure who has much studied hermenmtics in the classical interpretation. Ali Harb is a figure who also much involved in discussing the critism of text even though he does not fully concern on literature or art, but on the thoughts. Muslim thinker who has similar view with Ali Harab in seeing that the backwardness of Arab-Islam from the West is caused by the system of thoguht used by Arah-Muslim not able to come out of obstinary and taqlid is Muhammad Syahmr. On the other side, ones who refuse hermeneutics argue that since its heginning, hermeneutics must be studied suspiciously because it is not derived from the Islamic tradition, but from the unbeliever scientific tradition, Jews and Chrtians in which they use it as a method to interpret the Bible. Practically, in interpreting the Qur'an, hermeneutics even strengthens something, namely the hegemony of scularism-liberalism in the Muslim World that Muslims must actually destroy. Keywords: Hermeneutics, Tafsir, al qur'an


1986 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 195-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Keynes

IN the gallery of Anglo-Saxon kings, there are two whose characters are fixed in the popular imagination by their familiar epithets: Alfred the Great and ÆEthelred the Unready. Of course both epithets are products of the posthumous development of the kings' reputations (in opposite directions), not expressions of genuinely contemporary attitudes to the kings themselves: respective personalities. In the case of Alfred, it was the king’s own resourcefulness, courage and determination that brought the West Saxons through the Viking invasions, for it was these qualities, complemented by his concern for the well–being of his subjects, that inspired and maintained the people’s loyalty towards the king and generated their support for his cause. Whereas in the case of jEthelred, it was the king’s incompetence, weakness and vacillation that brought the kingdom to ruin, for it was these failings, exacerbated by his displays of cruelty and spite, that alienated the people and made them abandon his cause. Few historians, perhaps, would subscribe to such a view expressed as bluntly as that, and more, I suspect, would consider such comparisons to be futile and probably misconceived in the first place. I would maintain, however, that something is to be gained from the exercise of comparing the two kings in fairly broad terms: by juxtaposing discussions of the status of the main narrative accounts of each king’s reign we can more easily appreciate how their utterly different reputations arose, and see, moreover, that in certain respects the apparent contrast between them might actually be deceptive; by comparing the predicament in which each king was placed we can better understand how one managed to extricate himself from trouble while the other succumbed; and overall we can more readily judge how much, or how little, can be attributed to personal qualities or failings on the part of the kings themselves.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 230-250
Author(s):  
Kai Marchal

In this essay, I argue for a historical-critical perspective on rationality. In our global age, we in the West need to come to terms with the fact that non-Western traditions have developed complex forms of practical rationality. I will first give an overview of what I call the “Confucian standards of reasoning.” Secondly, I will explain how the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) has rearticulated the earlier understanding of practical reasoning. Thirdly, I will demonstrate why a comparative perspective may enrich our reasoned engagement with individuals in the Chinese-speaking world. In developing forms of global reasoning, we should make sure that these are neither parochial nor difference-blind.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-129
Author(s):  
Bilquis Ghani ◽  
Lucy Fiske

Afghans and Afghanistan have, since September 11, risen to prominence in Western popular imagination as a land of tradition, tribalism and violence. Afghan women are assumed to be silent, submissive, and terrorised by Afghan men, who are seen as violent patriarchs driven by an uncompromising mediaeval religion. These Islamophobic tropes also inform perceptions of Afghans seeking asylum. In transit, identities are further reduced; asylum seekers lose even a national identity and become a Muslim threat – criminals, terrorists or invaders. These narrative frames permeate political discourse, media, and reports of non-governmental organisations (seeking donor funds to ‘save’ Afghan women). Drawing on fieldwork in Afghanistan and Indonesia, this article looks at how Afghans in Kabul and Indonesia are using art and other forms of cultural production to challenge over-simplified hegemonic narratives in the West, to open spaces for dialogue and expression within their own communities, and to offer a more nuanced account of their own identities.


Author(s):  
Harris Mylonas

Nation-building may be defined as the process through which the boundaries of the modern state and those of the national community become congruent. The desired outcome is to achieve national integration (Reference Works: Concepts and Definitions). The major divide in the literature centers on the causal path that leads to national integration. Thus, nation-building has been theorized as a structural process intertwined with industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, etc. (Structural Explanations); as the result of deliberate state policies that aim at the homogenization of a state along the lines of a specific constitutive story—that can and often does change over time and under certain conditions (State-Planned Policies); as the product of top-bottom processes that could originate from forces outside of the boundaries of the relevant state; and as the product of bottom-up processes that do not require any state intervention to come about (Contingency, Events, and Demonstration Effects). Since the emergence of nationalism as the dominant ideology to legitimate authority and the template of the nation-state as an organizational principle of the international system, state elites have pursued different policies toward the various unassimilated groups within their territorial boundaries (Seminal Case Studies) with variable consequences (Nation-Building and Its Consequences). Thus, scholars have suggested that the nation-building experience of each state—or lack thereof—has had an impact on patterns of State Formation and Social Order, Self-Determination Movements, War Onset, and Public Goods Provision.


Author(s):  
Stefan Machura

Criminal justice and its institutions are key objects of popular culture and attract extensive media attention. The portrayal of the justice system, its rules, professions, and institutions has been invigorated with the invention of new media technology. The authorities’ reaction to wrong doing has proven not less exciting to the audience than the criminal acts themselves. French sociologist Emile Durkheim emphasized that every member of society has an interest in social cohesion and wishes to see perpetrators appropriately punished. The media plays to this basic inclination. From the reactions of the justice system to crime people take clues not only for its effectiveness but the public also wants to see its basic values represented in the work of officials and their decisions. Therefore, aspects of procedural and distributive justice are picked up by popular imagination and exploited to the full by media producers. Beyond recognition that media depictions of criminal justice will follow media conventions and will therefore be distorted in systematic ways, it has to be acknowledged that those representations and the expectations they formed have become a major force in society. Political repercussions and influences on how crime is dealt with are a consequence.


2001 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 139-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carola Lentz ◽  
Hans-Jürgen Sturm

For a vegetation geographer and an anthropologist to come together to write on the settlement histories of segmentary societies in the West African savanna is unusual or at least rare. A few words on the origin of this cooperation therefore seem appropriate. For over ten years, in the context of an interdisciplinary research program at the Universität Frankfurt am Main, archeologists, anthropologists, linguists, botanists and geographers have been working together on the history of cultures, languages, and natural environment of the West African savanna, especially the interaction between human activity and the natural environment. That one should actually be speaking in many cases of a culturally mediated “landscape” rather than a “natural environment” is one of the outcomes of the research projects, which have focused mainly on different regions of Burkina Faso (in the sahel and Sudanese zone) and the Lake Chad area of northeast Nigeria.The present paper has emerged from a botanical and an anthropological-historical project on the history of vegetation and of settlement in south and southwest Burkina Faso. This history has been shaped by the great expansion of the Dagara-speaking population. In the last two hundred years (possibly longer), small groups of Dagara patrilineages, related and allied to one another, have migrated north and northwest, probably from the region around Wa in present-day Ghana, and have founded numerous new settlements—a process of land appropriation that is still going on today, though with changed circumstances regarding land rights (see map 1).


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document