Dollar Diplomacy in the Light of the Guatemalan Loan Project, 1909-1913

1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. H. Dinwoodie
Keyword(s):  
Financial Structure ◽  
State Department ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Central American ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
National Economic ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
American Policy ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
Strategic Interest

While historians have shown unusual agreement in their critical assessment of the results of Philander Knox's Central American policy, they have frequently disagreed on the reasons for this failure, as well as on the goals of the Secretary of State. An examination of one of Knox's loan projects — the Guatemalan refunding scheme — throws light on these two issues. The record of this futile four-year attempt to reorganize the country's financial structure reveals a State Department approach relying eventually on the use of coercive diplomatic methods. These techniques were resourceful, but ineffectual, and contributed to an unproductive and acrimonious diversion with the British Foreign Office. The negotiations suggest that the Secretary and other Department officers sought goals broader in nature than national economic or strategic interest. The extent of their objectives may have contributed to the unsatisfactory outcome of the case.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asle Toje
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Present State ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The Sun ◽  
Policy Debate ◽  
Imperial Germany ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
German Parliament

We do not want to place anyone into the shadow, we also claim our place in the sun.” In a foreign policy debate in the German parliament on December 6. 1897 the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow, articulated the foreign policy aspirations of the ascendant Wilhelmine Germany. This proved easier said than done. In 1907, Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office penned his famous memorandum where he accounted for “the present state of British relations with France and Germany.” He concluded that Britain should meet imperial Germany with “unvarying courtesy and consideration” while maintaining “the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe.”...

Sir Lionel Carden's Proposed Agreement on Central America, 1912

1959 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-295
Author(s):  
Walter V. Scholes
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Central America ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Central American ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Department Of State ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Early Twentieth Century ◽  
Foreign Office

As American economic interests expanded in Central America in the early twentieth century, many British representatives concluded that the Foreign Office would have to devise some method to protect existing British investments against American encroachment. When Secretary of State Knox visited Central America in 1912, he and Sir Lionel E. G. Carden, the British Minister to Central America, discussed Central American affairs when they met in Guatemala on March 16. Knox could scarcely have been very sympathetic as Carden expounded the British point of view, for the Department of State believed that the greatest obstacle to the success of its policy in Central America was none other than the British Minister. As early as April, 1910, Knox had unsuccessfully tried to have Carden transferred from his post; the attempt failed because Sir Edward Grey backed up his Minister.

The Origins of U.S. Support for an Autocratic Iran

1983 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Habib Ladjevardi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
State Department ◽  
The United States ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Government ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
The U.S

At a time when the history of relations between the United States and the former Iranian regime (as well as other autocratic states) is being reconsidered, it is important to recognize that U.S. support for one-man rule in Iran did not commence in 1953 subsequent to the fall of the government of Dr. Mossadegh. A study of the diplomatic records of the U.S. State Department and the British Foreign Office indicates an earlier beginning.

The Present Status of Neutrality

1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quincy Wright
Keyword(s):  
Present Status ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
League Of Nations ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
The World ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
British Foreign Office

President Wilson asserted in 1917 that “neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its people.” In March, 1920, at its second session, the League of Nations Council affirmed that “the conception of neutrality of the members of the League is incompatible with the principle that all members will be obliged to cooperate in enforcing respect for their engagements.” In 1929 the British Foreign Office officially declared that “as between members of the League there can be no neutral rights because there can be no neutrals.” And in 1932 Secretary of State Stimson declared in reference to the Pact of Paris that “hereafter when two nations engage in armed conflict either one or both of them must be wrongdoers—violators of the general treaty. We no longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the punctilios of a duelist’s code. Instead we denounce them as law-breakers.”

Expedition turned Invasion: The 1888 Sikkim Expedition through British, Indian and Chinese eyes

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
YI MENG CHENG
Keyword(s):  
English Language ◽  
British Government ◽  
British India ◽  
Intelligence Gathering ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
British Foreign Policy ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
The Subject ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
Chinese And English

Abstract A fresh look at the 1888 Sikkim Expedition using both Chinese and English language sources yields very different conclusions from that of previous research on the subject. During the course of policymaking, the British Foreign Office and the British Government of India did not collaborate to devise a plan to invade Tibet; conversely, their aims differed and clashed frequently. During the years leading to war, the largest newspapers in British India gave plenty of coverage to the benefits of trade with Tibet, thus influencing British foreign policy and contributing indirectly to the outbreak of war. The Tibetan army was soundly defeated in the war, while the British troops suffered only light casualties. Although the Tibetan elites remained committed to the war, the lower classes of Tibetan society quickly grew weary of it. During the war, the British made much use of local spies and enjoyed an advantage in intelligence gathering, which contributed greatly to their victory. Finally, although the war was initially fought over trade issues, the demarcation of the Tibetan-Sikkim border replaced trade issues as the main point of contention during the subsequent peace negotiations. During the negotiations, Sheng Tai, the newly appointed Amban of Tibet, tried his best to defend China's interests.

The United States and the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez

1971 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Grieb
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
El Salvador ◽  
Central America ◽  
American Politics ◽  
State Department ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Central American ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
The Military

The militarycoup d'étatwhich installed General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez as President of El Salvador during December 1931 created a crisis involving the 1923 Washington Treaties. By the terms of these accords, the Central American nadons had pledged to withhold recognition from governments seizing power through force in any of the isthmian republics. Although not a signatory of the treaty, the United States based its recognition policy on this principle. Through this means the State Department had attempted to impose some stability in Central America, by discouraging revolts. With the co-operation of the isthmian governments, United States diplomats endeavored to bring pressure to bear on the leaders of any uprising, to deny them the fruits of their victory, and thus reduce the constant series ofcoupsandcounter-coupsthat normally characterized Central American politics.

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