The Military is one institution that has managed to gain “stability and power” in most Latin American countries.1 Except in Costa Rica which has no military establishment, and Mexico, which has succeeded in bringing the “soldiers firmly to heel,”2 the Military dominates the politics of more than half of them. They are, as Stephen Clissold puts it, “a familiar feature of the political scene.”3 Military's intervention in the politics of major Latin American countries has had a number of common features, which are at once unique and interesting. To Willard Beaulac, the most notable feature is that the armed forces “rarely act alone.”4 They are often invited to “intervene” by the civilians themselves who “prefer victory with military support to defeat without it.”5 And, once they are in power, they no longer consider their intervention in political life as “provisional” or “transitory” between two civilian administrations.6 They are then in no hurry to quit or give in, they tend to stay on and consolidate their position! Over the years, military intervention in Latin American countries has also come to wear “an increasingly anti-Communist face.”7 Rather, “communist” became a convenient label for any civilian politician whom the Military wanted to remove. The major exception to this anti-communist stance is provided by Fidel Castro's Communist State of Cuba which keeps fighting for “liberation from Yankee imperialism.”8 In most Latin American countries where the Military rules the roost, the men-in-uniform are no longer satisfied with their role either as “moderators” or ruthless “directors.” They see themselves as “monitors” of the government's performance.9 And, their monitoring role has come to be sanctioned not only by tradition, but also by law. As Beaulac says: “Some fifteen of the Latin American Constitutions designate the Military as guardians of the Constitution.”10 This monitoring role gives them an informal veto power over the decisions of civilian agencies, including those of the presidency itself. Consequently, today the Military in Latin America does not confine its role merely to being “the upholders of order” and “guardians of the nation's constitution;”11 they increasingly emphasize their role as “promoters of progress” or “instruments of economic and social change.”12 They engage themselves in “civic action” rather seriously. As “development” is the major problem of the Third World the Military's increasing willingness to undertake this task of “nation-building” has made its position more secure than that of its civilian counterparts. What is surprising in their eagerness to take up this role is the fact that they have been encouraged in this effort by their own war colleges whose, primary aim is to “militarize” civilians, rather than “civilianize” the Military.13 That, probably, may be the reason as to why Latin America “still spends proportionately less on arms than any other developing area of the world, apart from Africa south of the Sahara.”14 Infact, Latin America needs every penny of its money for its development. It is in view primarily of their contribution in the area of “nation-building” that the Military in several Latin American Republics cannot just be talked or written out of existence. Johnson has aptly concluded, that the Military in Latin America will continue to have “a spoon in every soup.”15 With these common features as a backgrounder, the present paper would attempt to study the changing roles of the Military, particularly the Brazilian military-elite vis-a-vis their civilian counterparts in the politics of Brazil, the largest and the most populous state in Latin America.
The militarization of responses to COVID-19 in Democratic Latin America