Do High Ability Managers Mitigate Litigation Related to Financial Reporting?

2020 ◽  
pp. 0000-0000
Author(s):  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Changjiang Wang ◽  
Wei Yu

We provide empirical evidence that incremental to the commonly used industry-based proxy for litigation risk and firm-level attributes, managerial ability in transforming corporate resources into revenues is associated with lower risk of litigation arising from financial reporting. The negative relation between managerial ability and litigation risk does not seem to stem from more frequent disclosure of bad news. Instead, our results suggest that high ability managers are less likely to engage in opportunistic financial reporting, i.e., lower financial statement errors and abnormal revenues. The contribution of our study is to explicitly offer a managerial human capital perspective in explaining variations in litigation risk related to financial reporting.

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Changjiang Wang

SUMMARY While prior research has examined the relation between firm-level attributes and auditors' decisions, there is little empirical evidence on whether managerial attributes are informative to auditors. We examine the relation between managerial ability, i.e., ability in transforming corporate resources to revenues, and audit fees and a going concern opinion. We use the managerial ability measure recently developed by Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012). We find that incremental to firm-level attributes, both audit fees and the likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion are decreasing in managerial ability. Collectively, our findings support the notion that managerial ability is relevant to auditors' decisions.


Author(s):  
Nguyen Tien Hung ◽  
Huynh Van Sau

The study was conducted to identify fraudulent financial statements at listed companies (DNNY) on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE) through the Triangular Fraud Platform This is a test of VSA 240. At the same time, the conformity assessment of this model in the Vietnamese market. The results show that the model is based on two factors: the ratio of sales to total assets and return on assets; an Opportunity Factor (Education Level); and two factors Attitude (change of independent auditors and opinion of independent auditors). This model is capable of accurately forecasting more than 78% of surveyed sample businesses and nearly 72% forecasts for non-research firms.  Keywords Triangle fraud, financial fraud report, VSA 240 References Nguyễn Tiến Hùng & Võ Hồng Đức (2017), “Nhận diện gian lận báo cáo tài chính: Bằng chứng thực nghiệm tại các doanh nghiệp niêm yết ở Việt Nam”, Tạp chí Công Nghệ Ngân Hàng, số 132 (5), tr. 58-72.[2]. Hà Thị Thúy Vân (2016), “Thủ thuật gian lận trong lập báo cáo tài chính của các công ty niêm yết”, Tạp chí tài chính, kỳ 1, tháng 4/2016 (630). [3]. Cressey, D. R. (1953). Other people's money; a study of the social psychology of embezzlement. New York, NY, US: Free Press.[4]. Bộ Tài Chính Việt Nam, (2012). Chuẩn mực kiểm toán Việt Nam số 240 – Trách nhiệm của kiểm toán viên đối với gian lận trong kiểm toán báo cáo tài chính. [5]. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.[6]. Võ Hồng Đức & Phan Bùi Gia Thủy (2014), Quản trị công ty: Lý thuyết và cơ chế kiểm soát, Ấn bản lần 1, Tp.HCM, Nxb Thanh Niên.[7]. Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance 26 (11): 55-67.[9]. Skousen, C. J., Smith, K. R., & Wright, C. J. (2009). Detecting and predicting financial statement fraud: The effectiveness of the fraud triangle and SAS No. 99. Available at SSRN 1295494.[10]. Lou, Y. I., & Wang, M. L. (2011). Fraud risk factor of the fraud triangle assessing the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Business and Economics Research (JBER), 7(2).[11]. Perols, J. L., & Lougee, B. A. (2011). The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud. Advances in Accounting, 27(1), 39-53.[12]. Trần Thị Giang Tân, Nguyễn Trí Tri, Đinh Ngọc Tú, Hoàng Trọng Hiệp và Nguyễn Đinh Hoàng Uyên (2014), “Đánh giá rủi ro gian lận báo cáo tài chính của các công ty niêm yết tại Việt Nam”, Tạp chí Phát triển kinh tế, số 26 (1) tr.74-94.[13]. Kirkos, E., Spathis, C., & Manolopoulos, Y. (2007). Data mining techniques for the detection of fraudulent financial statements. Expert Systems with Applications, 32(4), 995-1003.[14]. Amara, I., Amar, A. B., & Jarboui, A. (2013). Detection of Fraud in Financial Statements: French Companies as a Case Study. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 3(3), 40-51.[15]. Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 443-465.[16]. Beneish, M. D. (1999). The detection of earnings manipulation. Financial Analysts Journal, 55(5), 24-36.[17]. Persons, O. S. (1995). Using financial statement data to identify factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 11(3), 38-46.[18]. Summers, S. L., & Sweeney, J. T. (1998). Fraudulently misstated financial statements and insider trading: An empirical analysis. Accounting Review, 131-146.[19]. Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary accounting research, 13(1), 1-36.[20]. Loebbecke, J. K., Eining, M. M., & Willingham, J. J. (1989). Auditors experience with material irregularities – Frequency, nature, and detectability. Auditing – A journal of practice and Theory, 9(1), 1-28. [21]. Abbott, L. J., Park, Y., & Parker, S. (2000). The effects of audit committee activity and independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance, 26(11), 55-68.[22]. Farber, D. B. (2005). Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter?. The Accounting Review, 80(2), 539-561.[23]. Stice, J. D. (1991). Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. Accounting Review, 516-533.[24]. Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V., & Hermanson, D. R. (1999). COSO's new fraud study: What it means for CPAs. Journal of Accountancy, 187(5), 12.[25]. Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. (1990). Applied statistical models.Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Burr Ridge, IL.[26]. Gujarati, D. N. (2009). Basic econometrics. Tata McGraw-Hill Education.[27]. McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualita-tive Choice Behavior," in Frontiers in Econometrics, P. Zarenm-bka, ed. New York: Academic Press, 105-42.(1989). A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response Models Without Numerical Integration," Econometrica, 54(3), 1027-1058.[28]. DA Cohen, ADey, TZ Lys. (2008), “Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre-and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods”. The accounting review.


1986 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy S. Doupnik

Accounting for inflation is one of the more controversial topics in financial reporting. This paper traces the evolution of the system of inflation accounting used in one of the most highly inflationary economies in the world—Brazil. The history of inflation accounting in Brazil (known as monetary correction) is divided into three time periods: pre-1964, 1964 to 1976, and 1976 to the present. The events pertinent to the system of monetary correction in each of these periods are first discussed and then evaluated. It is shown that the system of monetary correction has been subject to massive political pressures since its inception, but gradual improvements have taken place over the years.


2000 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather M. Hermanson

The purpose of this study is to analyze the demand for reporting on internal control. Nine financial statement user groups were identified and surveyed to determine whether they agree that: (1) management reports on internal control (MRIC) are useful, (2) MRICs influence decisions, and (3) financial reporting is improved by adding MRICs. In addition, the paper examined whether responses varied based on: (1) the definition of internal control used (manipulated as broad, operational definition vs. narrow, financial-reporting definition) and (2) user group. The results indicate that financial statement users agree that internal controls are important. Respondents agreed that voluntary MRICs improved controls and provided additional information for decision making. Respondents also agreed that mandatory MRICs improved controls, but did not agree about their value for decision making. Using a broad definition of controls, respondents strongly agreed that MRICs improved controls and provided a better indicator of a company's long-term viability. Executive respondents were less likely to agree about the value of MRICs than individual investors and internal auditors.


2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (6) ◽  
pp. 2115-2149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Czerney ◽  
Jaime J. Schmidt ◽  
Anne M. Thompson

ABSTRACT According to auditing standards, explanatory language added at the auditor's discretion to unqualified audit reports should not indicate increased financial misstatement risk. However, an auditor is unlikely to add language that would strain the auditor-client relationship absent concerns about the client's financial statements. Using a sample of 30,825 financial statements issued with unqualified audit opinions during 2000–2009, we find that financial statements with audit reports containing explanatory language are significantly more likely to be subsequently restated than financial statements without such language. We find that this positive association is driven by language that references the division of responsibility for performance of the audit, adoption of new accounting principles, and previous restatements. In addition, we find that (1) “emphasis of matter” language that discusses mergers, related-party transactions, and management's use of estimates predicts restatements related to these matters, and that (2) the financial statement accounts noted in the explanatory language typically correspond to the accounts subsequently restated. In sum, our results suggest that present-day audit reports communicate some information about financial reporting quality.


2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dichu Bao ◽  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
G. Mujtaba Mian ◽  
Lixin (Nancy) Su

ABSTRACT Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key challenge for this literature is that researchers cannot observe the negative private information that managers possess. We tackle this challenge by constructing a proxy for managers' private bad news (residual short interest) and then perform a series of tests to validate this proxy. Using management earnings guidance and 8-K filings as measures of voluntary disclosure, we find a negative relation between bad-news disclosure and residual short interest, suggesting that managers withhold bad news in general. This tendency is tempered when firms are exposed to higher litigation risk, and it is strengthened when managers have greater incentives to support the stock price. Based on a novel approach to identifying the presence of bad news, our study adds to the debate on whether managers tend to withhold or release bad news. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.


Author(s):  
Yi-Hung Lin ◽  
Hua-Wei (Solomon) Huang ◽  
Mark E. Riley ◽  
Chih-Chen Lee

We find a negative relationship between aggregate CSR scores and the probability that firms restated financial statements over the period 1991-2012. We then break that period into three sub-periods in order to determine whether the relationship holds for all three sub-periods. During the sub-periods of 1991-2001 and 2002-2005, the negative CSR score - restatement probability relationship holds. The negative relationship disappears in the 2006-2012 sub-period. Additional analyses indicate CSR scores are significantly higher in the 2006-2012 sub-period, suggesting the disappearance of the relationship between aggregate CSR scores and financial statement quality may relate to changes in CSR assessments and the CSR reporting environment. Our findings update the literature linking CSR scores and financial reporting quality and identify the need for further research as to the reasons the link between these constructs disappeared.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin W Hoffman ◽  
John L. Campbell ◽  
Jason L. Smith

We investigate the stock market's reaction to events leading up to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) 2007 regulatory changes that reduced the scope of and documentation requirements for assessments of firms' internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR), as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The stated goal of these regulations was to reduce firms' and auditors' compliance costs with mandatory ICFR assessments, while maintaining the effectiveness of these assessments. We examine abnormal returns surrounding key dates leading to the passage of these regulations and offer two main findings. First, investors reacted negatively on key event dates, suggesting that investors viewed the regulations as likely to reduce financial reporting quality rather than to drive firm and audit efficiencies. Second, this negative market reaction is larger when ICFR effectiveness should matter most - when firms are more complex, have higher litigation risk, and greater fraud risk. In additional analysis, we find that restatements increase in the post-regulation time period, consistent with investors' concerns that the effect of the legislation would be a reduction in ICFR effectiveness. Overall, our results may imply that investors prefer stronger government regulation when it comes to the assessments of a firm's internal controls over financial reporting.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document