The Sources of Regional Power Nuclear Postures: Posture Optimization Theory

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Optimization Theory ◽  
Regional Power ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Empirical Record

This chapter identifies three main types of regional power nuclear postures, arrayed across a spectrum of capabilities and deployment procedures. This theory, the Posture Optimization Theory, explains why the existing regional nuclear powers have adopted the nuclear postures and strategies they have, and generates testable predictions about what type of nuclear posture future regional nuclear powers might adopt based on a set of readily observable variables. Because of the dearth of regional states that have acquired nuclear weapons, this exercise has inherent limitations. However, by testing the framework against the existing empirical record, we can determine whether it provides a plausible framework with which to explain the choices of existing regional powers and to predict the choices that future nuclear powers might make.

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang
Keyword(s):  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
Regional Power ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Weak Institutions ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
International Stability ◽  
The World ◽  
Modern Era

The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states—and potential future ones—manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia. The book identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, the book offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. It then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the book shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others. This book considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.

scholarly journals Looking Beyond a Nuclear-Armed Iran: The Major Implications of Nuclear Iran for the Middle East

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. p50
Author(s):  
Sayed Reza Hussaini
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
The West ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Cascade Effect ◽  
The Face ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Socioeconomic Consequences

Iran has pursued nuclear weapons for over four decades. The basic reasons for this quest have remained unchanged in the face of the most crippling sanctions. Almost three and a half years after Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Pact (JCPOA), Tehran officially announced that it has enriched uranium up to 60%, very close to the 90% suitable for nuclear weapons. Iran is highly likely to be the world’s next nuclear state. A nuclear-armed Iran will be emboldened to accelerate its aggressive activities in the region and act against its neighbors with little fear of retribution. Moreover, Iran’s network of proxies would adopt a more confrontational approach towards Israel. Besides, Iran’s politics of threat can have serious socioeconomic consequences for Israel.Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons could arguably set off a cascade effect, encouraging other major regional powers to move in the same direction. The West, particularly the United States, would seek to offset this risk by providing a “defenceumbrella”. HhhhjkhggHowever, some might be reluctant to be openly protected by the United Statesor would find the umbrella questionable and choose nuclear option for both security concerns and prestige.

Effective Hegemonic Influence in Africa: An Analysis of Nigeria’s ‘Hegemonic’ Position

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (7) ◽  
pp. 932-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olusola Ogunnubi
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Stability Theory ◽  
Qualitative Methodology ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Power Dynamics ◽  
Foreign Policy Analysis ◽  
Regional Power ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Hegemonic Stability ◽  
Level Of Analysis

This paper examines the utility of the hegemonic stability theory in understanding regional power dynamics within Africa. The study operationalizes the concept of regional hegemony by drawing insights from a comparative foreign policy analysis of African regional powers, with emphasis on Nigeria. Using a largely qualitative methodology supplemented with primary data, the paper examines the underlying assertions of Nigeria’s perceived ‘hegemonic’ influence. Through the use of the hegemonic stability theory as a theoretical lens, this paper argues that Nigeria’s foreign policy shows few signs of a continental hegemonic disposition. In applying this theory at a regional level of analysis, the study finds very little empirical evidence that it fits the African regional context. In short, hegemonic claims in Africa are mere (un)official rhetoric and lack substance.

scholarly journals India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Clary ◽  
Vipin Narang
Keyword(s):  
South Asia ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Delivery Systems ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Nuclear Strategy

Is India shifting to a nuclear counterforce strategy? Continued aggression by Pakistan against India, enabled by Islamabad's nuclear strategy and India's inability to counter it, has prompted the leadership in Delhi to explore more flexible preemptive counterforce options in an attempt to reestablish deterrence. Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. These include a growing number of accurate and responsive nuclear delivery systems, an array of surveillance platforms, and sophisticated missile defenses. Executing a counterforce strike against Pakistan, however, would be exceptionally difficult. Moreover, Pakistan's response to the mere fear that India might be pursuing a counterforce option could generate a dangerous regional arms race and crisis instability. A cycle of escalation would have significant implications not only for South Asia, but also for the broader nuclear landscape if other regional powers were similarly seduced by the temptations of nuclear counterforce.

Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability

2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 38-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang
Keyword(s):  
South Asia ◽  
South Asian ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Security ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
Regional Power ◽  
Differential Effects ◽  
Control Procedures ◽  
Stability Dynamics ◽  
And Control

A probe of various regional power nuclear postures reveals that such postures, rather than simply the acquisition of nuclear weapons, can have differential effects on deterrence and stability dynamics. The India-Pakistan dyad is a useful candidate for exploring these various effects because the three regional power nuclear postures—catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation—have interacted with each other in South Asia. In particular, Pakistan's shift from a catalytic posture to an asymmetric escalation posture in 1998 against a continuous Indian assured retaliation posture allows the effects of nuclear posture to be isolated in an enduring rivalry in which many variables can be held constant. The asymmetric escalation posture may be “deterrence optimal” for Pakistan, suggesting that nuclear postures do have different effects on conflict dynamics, but it has also enabled Pakistan to more aggressively pursue longstanding revisionist preferences in India, triggering more frequent and intense crises on the subcontinent. Furthermore, the command and control procedures that Pakistan undertakes to make its asymmetric escalation posture credible amplify this instability. These procedures generate risks to the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear assets, both at present and as India and Pakistan continue to dynamically evolve nuclear and conventional postures. The conclusions for South Asian and international security of this reality are grim.

Nuclear Strategy and Regional Stability in Southern Asia

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jalil Mehdi
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Security ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Optimization Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Regional Stability ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Strategic Competition ◽  
War Experiences

The essay aims to explain interconnections between international security, domestic politics and nuclear strategy of China, India and Pakistan. Most of the scholarship has been unable to probe the deep interconnections that inform the nuclear strategy of these three countries. The literature is based on a generalisation of the superpowers’ Cold War nuclear experience and an analysis of the other nuclear powers’ arsenal is made through the conceptual and theoretical categories offered by such literature. This article argues against using cold war experiences as a basis for conceptualizing regional powers’ nuclear strategies. It begins with a discussion on Posture optimization theory, applying it to understand nuclear strategies of the three Southern Asian nuclear powers and seeks to understand the nature of strategic competition between them and its effect on their respective nuclear postures.

Conclusion

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang
Keyword(s):  
Optimization Theory ◽  
Regional Power ◽  
Comparative Theory ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reiterates the findings explored in this book and discusses their implications. In doing so, the chapter stresses the significance of the posited optimization theory. This theory is the first comparative theory of regional power nuclear postures. Against the full universe of empirical cases involving selection of nuclear posture—a decision that unfolds deliberately over many years and often over many leaders—optimization theory is the most valid theory available. It is also the first broadly comparative theory for why states select the nuclear postures they do, suggesting that states may be rational to sacrifice deterrent power in certain security environments and under particular organizational and relative endowment circumstances. In addition, the chapter closes the volume by detailing some avenues for further research, as well as some concluding insights.

Deterring Unequally II: Regional Power Nuclear Postures and Crisis Behavior

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Regional Power ◽  
Conflict Escalation ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Crisis Behavior ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Better Than

This chapter probes questions regarding how nuclear weapons or nuclear postures affect crisis dynamics, by examining whether there is variation in states' decisions to escalate or de-escalate a crisis as a function of nuclear posture. That is, within a crisis, the chapter considers if some nuclear postures deter states from conflict escalation better than others. In answering this question, this chapter uncovers the mechanisms responsible for the relationship between regional nuclear postures and deterrence outcomes, ensuring that the correlations established in the statistical analysis are not just spurious but are real and causal. To do this, the chapter explores the findings from the large-n analysis in more fine-grained crisis settings.

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