scholarly journals 儒道與生命倫理

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-98
Author(s):  
Sen PEI
Keyword(s):  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
The West ◽  
Full Account ◽  
Chinese Tradition ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
Modern Age ◽  
Digital Commons ◽  
Moral Strangers

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.誕生於北美的生命倫理學有著獨特的社會歷史文化背景，它是在科學技術發展的推動下，在西方資本主義發展以來個人主義的倫理傳統的基礎上，伴隨著後現代思潮發展起來的。然而由於文化傳統的不同，在中國生硬地套用西方理論，在實踐中反而會使人更加迷惘。在中國如何解決道德異鄉人共處的問題，如何建構中國本土化的生命倫理學，從與北美生命倫理學的產生背景比較的角度分析，我們得出了回溯傳統文化的結論。儒家思想作為中國傳統文化中最有影響力的一派，其價值取向和思維方式已經滲透到中國人生活的各個方面，因此在與西方生命倫理思想對話，以及建構當代的生命倫理學中儒家思想可以從以下三個方面作出貢獻：第一、倫理原則的普世性論證層面；第二、原則矛盾的解決層面；第三、具體問題層面。In this essay, I begin by addressing H. Tristram Engelhardt’s argument of the breakdown of the traditional consensus on moral and religious good. Engelhardt maintains that in the post-modern age, the possibility of constructing a full account of human good is almost impossible. People from different groups and communities engage with one another as moral strangers who need to negotiate moral arrangements. These negotiations are governed by the principle of autonomy, or the “principle of permission.” I contend that Engelhardt’s argument is also relevant in China, although from a different perspective. The traditional distinctions used to distinguish moral categories in the West very often do not fit into the context of Chinese tradition. I propose that we need to go back to our own cultural heritage, such as Confucianism, to deal with the problem of diversity and moral relativism in China, rather than being confined to a rationalized form of universal principles. Although Confucian moral judgment sometimes tends to be intuitive, it makes more sense when we are confronting specific moral dilemmas. Any moral principle, when compared with other moral principles, needs to be weighed and balanced in determining the optimal course of action.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 125 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Repression and Moral Reasoning: An Outline of a New Approach in Ethical Understanding

SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Nykänen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Related Phenomenon ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Essential Aspect

AbstractThe aim of the paper is to show that moral reasoning is not really reasoning in the sense usually assumed in moral philosophy. Instead, moral reasoning is one aspect of repressing conscience. The formal dimensions of moral reasoning function as a repressive depersonalisation of our sense of being an I who stands in a relationship to a you. For instance, “moral principle” invokes a formal and hence impersonal understanding of a moral problem. The thinking person loses her sense of being a particular person related to another particular person and focuses instead on the moral principles with their inherent, systematic implications. However, and as I will show in connection to so-called moral dilemmas, the thinking person does not actually act in the rational manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.

scholarly journals 從莊子生命哲學到生命倫理學四原則的互補整合

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-79
Author(s):  
Yunzhang LIU ◽  
Jinping ZHAO ◽  
Jia XIE
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Biomedical Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The West ◽  
Life And Death ◽  
Philosophy Of Life ◽  
Western Idea ◽  
Digital Commons ◽  
Bioethical Issues

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.構建中國生命倫理學基本原則所秉持的根本方法應是整合。筆者認為，莊子的生命哲學思想與比徹姆 (Tom L. Beauchamp) 和丘卓斯(James F. Childress) 的生命倫理四原則從不同的角度，為這種整合提供了理論資源。莊子的生命哲學內涵豐富，關注生命本身、關注生命的平等和關注生命存在的本真價值與意義；秉持生是適時，死是順應的自然主義生死觀；追求超越世俗的自由“逍遙”的生存狀態；重視“養生”、“可以盡年”，實踐無慾無為的養生觀；主張“以天地為棺槨”，反對“厚葬”的陋習等等，這些都具有積極意義。這些思想歸結起來就是要“和諧”。和諧是自然萬物的存在秩序，是人的身心健康的根本保障，也是我們在構建中國生命倫理學基本原則時所需要把握的核心價值。而比徹姆和丘卓斯的生命倫理四原則從醫療衞生事業的發展與醫療實踐的角度為我們提供了更清晰、更明確去解決生命倫理問題的原則指導。在此基礎上構建起來的中國生命倫理學基本原則是以“和諧”為中心的體現，在多領域中的原則總體，包括人與自然領域的“和諧生態”原則、人與社會領域的“和諧社會”原則、人與自身領域的“和諧人格”原則、人與醫學領域的“和諧醫學”原則等。運用這些基本原則指導人們的現實倫理生活，規範、分析和解決人們現實生活中存在的種種生命倫理問題，推進社會文明的進步與人類自我價值的提升。The four-principles approach to bioethics developed by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics is no doubt the most well known and influential example in the West of principle-based approaches to resolve ethical issues. The four principles are autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. This essay explores whether the four principles can be considered a universal core of morality that can be used in China to deal with current bioethical issues. It argues that although the four principles provide general guidelines, their implementation is much more complex. This essay attempts to show that Daoist thought, particularly Zhuangzi’s philosophy of life and death, conveys a certain sense of bioethics and carries profound moral implications that can overcome some of the limitations of principle-based ethics. The synthesis of the two traditions may help contemporary China to deal with various kinds of moral dilemmas. The Daoist notion of the interconnection among human beings and between human beings and nature challenges the Western idea of individualism and individual autonomy.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 553 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

scholarly journals YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: COMPARING JUDGEMENTS IN TROLLEY PROBLEMS INVOLVING ECONOMIC AND EMOTIONAL HARMS, INJURY AND DEATH

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie Gold ◽  
Briony D. Pulford ◽  
Andrew M. Colman
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Standard Pattern ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Trolley Problems

There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether it is morally permissible to harm one person in order to prevent a greater harm to others and, if not, what is the moral principle underlying the prohibition. Hypothetical moral dilemmas are used in order to probe moral intuitions. Philosophers use them to achieve a reflective equilibrium between intuitions and principles, psychologists to investigate moral decision-making processes. In the dilemmas, the harms that are traded off are almost always deaths. However, the moral principles and psychological processes are supposed to be broader than this, encompassing harms other than death. Further, if the standard pattern of intuitions is preserved in the domain of economic harm, then that would open up the possibility of studying behaviour in trolley problems using the tools of experimental economics. We report the results of two studies designed to test whether the standard patterns of intuitions are preserved when the domain and severity of harm are varied. Our findings show that the difference in moral intuitions between bystander and footbridge scenarios is replicated across different domains and levels of physical and non-physical harm, including economic harms.

scholarly journals 從儒家倫理學到“儒家生命倫理學”的距離

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-42
Author(s):  
Shuai WANG
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Confucian Ethics ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Digital Commons ◽  
Moral Choices ◽  
Confucian Moral

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.生命倫理學由於強調平等和尊重的價值而使個體在道德困境中的抉擇顯得尤為重要，同時道德困境本身也要求個體具有一定的道德抉擇能力。就此而言，構建“儒家生命倫理”可能面臨兩個挑戰：從生命倫理學科性質而言，儒家面臨的是關於西方式“個體”概念缺失的問題；另外從個體抉擇方面而言，儒家似乎又面臨著缺乏道德抉擇能力的困境。前者是生命倫理學科的本質要求，後者則似乎是儒學內部的理論困境。二者似乎表明，儒家與生命倫理學科不能相容。面對當下中國令人憂慮的道德現狀，澄清上述問題就顯得必要。本文將通過分析儒家倫理思想來澄清上述兩個挑戰。由於儒家理解世界的方式不同於西方，我們就不能以西方流行的生命倫理學科標準來衡量儒家倫理學說。文章指出，儒家將一般人與儒者區別開來，也並不以要求君子的道德標準來要求一般人。儒家將承擔道義的責任更多的賦予了代表“天命”的儒者，以道在倫常日用之中的實用理性精神為本質特徵，開創了儒家理解道德和解決道德困境的獨特維度。然而，鑒於當代儒家的遭遇，構建“儒家生命倫理”依舊任重道遠。Contemporary bioethics and moral principles often emphasize values such as human dignity, equality, and individual autonomy, particularly in the case of moral dilemmas. Given that traditional Confucian ethics does not speak of these values, the effort to construct “Confucian bioethics” today may face challenges from two aspects: (1) the notion of individualism, and (2) individual autonomy that makes moral choices possible. The paper contends that there is an ethical incommensurability between traditional Confucian moral philosophy and contemporary bioethics. This leads to the argument that one cannot simply apply the moral principles of bioethics to assess and judge Confucian ethics. It also contends that the Confucian ethical viewpoint represents a kind of elitism that sets up moral standards for a minority, rather than for everyone in society. Therefore, Confucianism by default will not be able to answer many of the questions raised by bioethics, which has been highly influenced by a modern democratic system.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 673 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

scholarly journals Ethos in Early Chinese Rhetoric: The Case of “Heaven”

Humanities ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Yong-Kang Wei
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Heritage ◽  
Chinese Society ◽  
Cultural Tradition ◽  
The West ◽  
Chinese Tradition ◽  
Rhetorical Tradition ◽  
Chinese Rhetoric ◽  
Human Desire ◽  
Collective Ethos ◽  
The Universe

Though applicable in many Western historical-cultural settings, the Aristotelian model of ethos is not universal. As early Chinese rhetoric shows in the example of cheng-yan or “ethos of sincereness,” inspiring trust does not necessarily involve a process of character-based self-projection. In the Aristotelian model, the rhetor stands as a signifier of ethos, with an ideology of individualism privileged, whereas Chinese rhetoric assumes a collectivist model in which ethos belongs, not to an individual or a text, but rather to culture and cultural tradition. This essay will be concentrating on the concept of Heaven, central to the cultural and institutional systems of early Chinese society, in an attempt to explore collective ethos as a function of cultural heritage. Heaven, it shall be argued, plays a key role in the creation of Chinese ethos. This essay will also contrast the logocentrism of Western rhetorical tradition with the ethnocentrism of Chinese tradition. The significance of Heaven in its role as a defining attribute of Chinese ethos is reflective of a unique cultural heritage shaped by a collective human desire in seeking a consciousness of unity with the universe. Just as there are historical, cultural, and philosophical reasons behind logocentrism in the West, so the ethnocentric turn of Chinese rhetoric should be appreciated in light of a cultural tradition that carries its own historical complexities and philosophical intricacies.

Military Operations on the North Front of Mount Taurus. IV.—The Campaigns of 319 and 320 B.C

1923 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Mitchell Ramsay
Keyword(s):  
West Coast ◽  
Asia Minor ◽  
Great Length ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
The West ◽  
Full Account ◽  
The Road ◽  
The North

In a footnote in J.H.S. 1918, p. 144, I stated the view that the battle (319 B.C.) in which Antigonus defeated Alketas and the associated generals took place in the αὐλὼν which leads from the N.E. corner of the Limnai towards Pisidian Antioch, carrying the southern or Pisidian road across Asia Minor eastward. This important route, regarded as a highway from the west coast to the Cilician Gates, is a recent discovery, though parts of it have been often described and traversed. In J.H.S. 1920, p. 89 f., I have argued that it was the road by which Xerxes' great army marched from Kritalla to Kelainai.There are two authorities on whom we depend for details of the battle of 319 B.C., Polyaenus Strat. 4, 6, 7 and Diodorus 18, 44; but both of these gather all their information from that excellent military writer Hieronymus of Cardia, the friend and historian of Eumenes. Polyaenus tells the story with soldierly brevity, relating only the chief military features: Diodorus diffusely and at great length; but so that we can recognise Hieronymus behind and beneath, and restore the full account as given by that writer.

Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-383
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Open Question

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.

A Cultural History of Objects in the Modern Age

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cultural History ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Global Changes ◽  
New Materials ◽  
The West ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Everyday Objects ◽  
Modern Age ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of

A Cultural History of Objects in the Modern Age covers the period 1900 to today, a time marked by massive global changes in production, transportation, and information-sharing in a post-colonial world. New materials and inventions – from plastics to the digital to biotechnology – have created unprecedented scales of disruption, shifting and blurring the categories and meanings of the object. If the 20th Century demonstrated that humans can be treated like things whilst things can become ever more human, where will the 21st Century take us? The 6 volume set of the Cultural History of Objects examines how objects have been created, used, interpreted and set loose in the world over the last 2500 years. Over this time, the West has developed particular attitudes to the material world, at the centre of which is the idea of the object. The themes covered in each volume are objecthood; technology; economic objects; everyday objects; art; architecture; bodily objects; object worlds.

當代生命倫理學危機的根源及解決方案——David Solomon文章評析

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-130
Author(s):  
Ruipeng LEI
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Foundational Principle ◽  
Digital Commons

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.David Solomon proposes in his article that deep divisions in our culture, which are reflected in the variety and opposition of foundational normative theories, are key to understanding the contemporary crisis in bioethics. Solomon examines two recent attempts to respond to this crisis of authority in bioethics and suggest that both proposals make the situation worse. However, his criticism of principlism, which has been dominant in bioethics since the 1980s, seems implausible. As observed by Aristotle, the rationale of a principle-based approach lies in the tensions between generality, considered judgment and ethical deliberation. The principle-based approach to meta-ethics is characterized as a dialectic between moral principles and considered judgment, which is analogous to Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium. The four principles formulated by Beauchamp and Childress are prima-facie binding, but subject to specification and balancing. It is possible for us to overcome these deep foundational disagreements in normative ethics by emphasizing the foundational principle held by the ancient Greeks; that is, our natural desire to live a good life.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 41 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Civil Divorce and the Catholic Lawyer

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 193-222
Author(s):  
Ligia De Jesus Castaldi ◽  
Robert Fastiggi ◽  
Jane Adolphe ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Law Students ◽  
Legal Services ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Marriage Nullity ◽  
Moral Questions

This article answers common moral questions on civil divorce and legal practice relevant to faithful Catholics in the legal field, such as whether a Catholic lawyer may be morally involved in civil divorce litigation and, if so, to what extent, in light of basic Catholic moral principles on marriage and civil divorce. It addresses moral dilemmas that Catholic legal practitioners, judges and law students may face in employment situations and divorce-related legal services. In addition, the article addresses civil divorce alternatives like reconciliation, declaration of marriage nullity and legal separation.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document