scholarly journals Ecstasy from a physiological point of view

1982 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 74-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaj Björkqvist

The biological study of man is one of today's most rapidly advancing sciences. There is no reason for not utilizing these methodologies of research and the knowledge already gained when studying ecstasy and other similar religious phenomena. Drugs have been used in all parts of the world as an ecstasy technique. Since mental states and physiological correlates always accompany each other, it is obvious that the human mind can be affected by external means, for instance by drugs. But the opposite is also true; mental changes affect the body, as they do in the case of psychosomatic diseases. Ecstasy is often described as an extremely joyful experience; this pleasure must necessarily also have a physiological basis. It is of course too early to say anything for certain, but the discovery of pleasure centres in the brain might offer an explanation. It is not far-fetched to suggest that when a person experiences euphoric ecstasy, it might, in some way or other, be connected with a cerebral pleasure center. Can it be, for example, that religious ecstasy is attained only by some mechanism triggering off changes in the balance of the transmitter substances? Or is it reached only via a change in the hormonal balance, or only by a slowing down of the brain waves, or is a pleasure centre activated? When a person is using an ecstasy technique, he usually does so within a religious tradition. When he reaches an experience, a traditional interpretation of it already exists.

2018 ◽  
pp. 51-86
Author(s):  
Walter Glannon

This chapter examines major psychiatric disorders as disorders of consciousness, memory, and will. All of these disorders involve disturbances in how the brain processes and integrates information about the body and external world. Distorted mental content in these psychopathologies impairs the capacity to consider different action plans, and to form and execute particular plans in particular actions. Dysfunctional mental states correlating with dysfunctional neural states impair the capacity for flexible behavior and adaptability to the environment. This dysfunction also impairs the capacity for insight into a psychiatric disorder and understanding the need for and motivation to seek treatment.


The main events and circumstances of human evolution are considered: classification of hominids, first descriptions, localization, chronology; artifacts characterizing their material and cultural activities; modern reconstruction of lifestyle and resettlement; and modern theories explaining the structural features of hominids and the processes of their occurrence. The manifestations of intelligent activity are discussed, in particular, their dependence from the structure of the body, the size, and complexity of the brain, for which comparisons with various animals are made. Particular attention is paid to unresolved or controversial issues. This material is necessary to assess the possibilities of the self-organization of complex systems theory (second chapter): if it adequately models the characteristics of a human's origin, then it can be used to understand the evolution of human mind and in the subsequent period, up to the current state.


1968 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 160-180
Author(s):  
R. J. Hirst

Life Science Library now claims to examine ‘the most complex of all biological organs: the human mind’, and scientists quite commonly make no distinction between mind and brain — they delight in talking about the brain classifying, decoding, perceiving, deciding or giving orders. And while resisting the conceptual muddle involved in talking of the brain doing what persons do, the identity hypothesis tries to provide a philosophically respectable basis for the equation of mind and brain, maintaining that ‘mind’ is just a term for a group of activities and dispositions, and that these in turn are in some sense to be identified with brain activities or traces. On the other hand, from the point of view of religion and traditional philosophy the suggestion is completely unplausible — creative or inventive thought, and aesthetic, moral or religious experiences seem so far removed from mechanical or physiological processes that a good deal of softening up is necessary if any kind of identity theory is to get a fair hearing. This softening up is best carried out by considering the difficulties in the main rival philosophical view, interactionism.


Can the imaginary brains described in Chapter 1 have only representations of perceived patterns, objects, and events? Can hierarchical structures of neurons also represent feelings, beliefs, emotions, and other higher mental states? Creating feelings requires giving emotional perceptions, memories, plans, beliefs, and intentions. How can this be achieved? How are perceived objects and events using their significance for the fate of the conscious system? Do they meet the various needs of the system? In this chapter we show that to achieve this goal, to feel qualia and to create phenomenal awareness, it is necessary to embody the mind. Mental states, such as thoughts and desires, contain intentional content that can be described by referring to something that we expect or believe. Another category are sensory feelings that do not contain intentional content but instead have different qualitative properties like perceptions, impressions, and sensations. The authors indicate four main domains of cooperation between the body and the brain, so that the mind generated in the system has phenomenal consciousness. These domains are 1) The homeostatic system. The body or housing may contain sensors informing the brain about the internal conditions of the body. The signals from these sensors can complement the information coming from the external senses. 2) The motor system. The housing and body, together with the motor system, allow an individual to manipulate objects in the environment and its own body in the environment. The effects of these manipulations can broaden the experience and allow for their evaluation. 3) Participatory analysis. The body or housing can be used to predict, analyze, and plan activities by making calculations through a physical process. 4) The global states of the organism. Internal power supply parameters, information-processing speed, dynamics of operation, and sensitivity thresholds for internal and external sensors can affect performance, the results of evaluation of sensations, and the shape of neural representations. This assumption makes it possible to explain how the imaginary mind can feel subjective impressions, the qualia that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness. The bodily reactions to the sensory stimuli reaching the brain can give value to individual feelings, and emotions. Feeling hardness or smoothness, assessing the attractiveness of smells, judging the importance of sounds, and evaluating the favor of the environment based on images all go beyond the direct response of the senses. The entire brain is involved in the creation of a conscious mind, along with sensory processing, control of movements, memories, predictions, and all other brain structures. This is an emergent phenomenon that is not reflected in any part of the brain's apparatus. In this chapter, the authors explain to what extent we can be aware of our feelings, how far we can understand the world around us and our place in it, how we can consciously direct our thoughts, and how we can focus attention on something.


1927 ◽  
Vol 73 (301) ◽  
pp. 257-265
Author(s):  
Margaret Scoresby-Jackson

The objects of this investigation were to find out in what respect the resistance to hæmolysis of the red blood-corpuscles differs in mental disease from the normal, and to make a contribution towards the elucidation of pathological mental states and their relationship to pathological states of organs of the body other than the brain.


1867 ◽  
Vol 13 (61) ◽  
pp. 44-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. M.

When we reflect that the sciences of astronomy, physics, and chemistry have only recently got rid of the metaphysical spirit, we cannot wonder much that physiology is not yet entirely emancipated from the pernicious thraldom. It was plainly impossible that physiology should be cultivated in the spirit of the positive method of investigation while the sciences upon the advance of which itsadvance is dependent were not sciences at all, but clouds of idle andshifting fancies. But there has been another and weighty reason why the science dealing with the structure and functions of the organism has remained so long in a metaphysical bondage: because psychology, the last stronghold and the forlorn hope of the meta physical method, is an important branch of it. Metaphysicians have for at least two thousand years been supremely self-satisfied to evolve, from the unfathomable depths of the inner consciousness, ingenious mazes of vague and ill-defined words which they have dignified with the name of mental philosophy; and the consequence has been that the physiologist, when he came in the course of his inquiries to the brain, contented himself with the anatomical de scription of it, and never dreamed of studying its functions as the mental organ. By a prescriptive right, sanctioned by the authority of generations, mind belonged to the metaphysician; and it naturally seemed sacrilegious to venture a scientific step in such holy ground. Not only so, but the mischievous influence of the metaphysical spirit spread beyond the department of psychology, and infected more or less strongly all physiological inquiries. However, this state of things could not last in face of the active progress of positive science; the or ans and functions of the body became objects of positive investigation, and even the brain no longer escaped scientific study. So it has come to pass that the germs of a mental science having a physiological basis have appeared, and now threaten to disturb the ancient ascendancy of metaphysical mental philosophy. The present position of matters is this: there are two systems of philosophy dealing with the same subject, but not having the slightest connection one with the other, and cultivated according to different methods by different men-metaphysical mental philosophy and positive mental science. A man might be deeply learned in all the wisdom of the former, and yet entirely ignorant of the very meaning of the simplest facts of the latter. It is hardly worth while considering seriously at the present day which of these rival systems is likely to prevail over the other; one of them is the latest issue of the advance of positive science, has its foundations deep rooted in the relations of natural laws, and exhibits a promising growth; while the other has moved in an everlasting circle, has no better foundations than the clouds and conceits of men's thoughts, and exhibits symptoms of active decay. Now and then it is skilfully galvanized into a spasmodic semblance of life, but each artificially excited convulsion is plainly the fore runner of an increase of the inevitable paralysis. Much remains to be done, however, before we can claim acceptance for a positive mental science. Not only is our knowledge of the structure and functions of the brain very defective, but there is nothing like exact information to be had regarding its pathology. It has been the fashion to give the name of some disease to a group of symptoms, without attempting to connect these with particular diseased states of the nervous centres. The pathology of all the diseases of the nervous system is, it must be confessed, in a most unsatisfactory condition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Mariusz Wojewoda

We use the term “person” when we want to point out that human existence is unrepeatable and unique. The assumption that man is a person constitutes a basis for the belief in the dignity, efficacy, and responsibility of the human individual. Karol Wojtyla built his conception of the person in the context of theological and philosophical discussions. Even though Wojtyła’s conception has been given a great deal of scholarly attention, it is worthwhile to juxtapose it with contemporary anthropological theories that derive from cognitive sciences. Cognitivists usually base their theories on biological and sociological premises. Some conclusions arrived at in the area of the cognitive sciences lead to mind-brain reductionism, a theory in which the human being is regarded as a body endowed with the function of the brain and as an entity whose individual traits are shaped by its social and cultural environment. This position undermines the ideas of free will and the substantial singularity of the human person. However, debates with this position have worked out a non-reductionist alternative, a theory known as emergentism. This theory treats the human mind as a distinct faculty, one which emerges as a phase in the brain’s development. Emergentists base their reasoning on the assumptions that the body is a unity and that the mind is not identical with it. It is my belief that emergentism can be fruitfully applied to the dynamic understanding of the person put forward by Wojtyła in the middle of the 20th century.


Author(s):  
Rollin McCraty

As pervasive and vital as they are in human experience, emotions have long remained an enigma to science. This chapter explores recent scientific advances that clarify central controversies in the study of emotion, including the relationship between intellect and emotion and the historical debate on the source of emotional experience. Particular attention is given to the intriguing body of research illuminating the critical role of ascending input from the body to the brain in the generation and perception of emotions. This discussion culminates in the presentation of a new, systems-oriented model of emotion in which the brain functions as a complex pattern-matching system, continually processing input from both the external and internal environments. From this perspective, it is shown that the heart is a key component of the emotional system, thus providing a physiological basis for the long-acknowledged link between the heart and our emotional life.


Author(s):  
Nikolas Rose ◽  
Joelle M. Abi-Rached

This chapter explores the diverse attempts to render “mind” thinkable by means of images. Advances in clinical medicine from the nineteenth century onward went hand in hand with the penetration of the gaze of the doctor into depths of the body itself. There are now many examples of analogous advances linked to the structural imaging of the brain—in the detection of tumors, the identification of lesions, and the mapping of the damage caused by injury or stroke. Thanks to such images, the mind of the neuroscientist, the neurologist, and the psychiatrist now seem able to “walk among the tissues themselves.” Yet, however similar the images of brain function are to those of brain structure, they mislead if they seem to allow the mind of the neuroscientist to walk among thoughts, feelings, or desires. Technology alone, even where it appears to measure neural activity, cannot enable the gaze to bridge the gap between molecules and mental states.


Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

This chapter analyzes the passages in which Spinoza develops his definition of the human mind. It begins by reading 2p11 as denying that the mind is something like a bearer of mental states. Next, the chapter argues that, in claiming that the mind is part of the infinite intellect, Spinoza is not referring to the mind’s activity but rather defending holism with respect to mental content. Through an examination of the wording of 2p12, the chapter shows that, contrary to most interpretations, Spinoza does not assume that the human mind perceives any affections of the body. The chapter concludes by showing how, by identifying the mind with the idea of the body, Spinoza solves the problem of the numerical difference between finite minds. Altogether, the chapter shows that, for Spinoza, the human mind is not an idea that God cognizes but the awareness by which we identify our own body.


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