HAZOP Study and Determination of Safety Integrity Level Using Fault Tree Analysis on Fuel Gas Superheat Burner of Ammonia Unit in Petrochemical Plant, East Java

Safety is an essential requirement in the course of production in the industry. Security in the factory needs to be considered, especially against malicious nodes such as burner. In this research analysis to determine opportunities hazard that could happen to superheat burner. The magnitude of the risk of harm must be balanced with the security system (SIS). So the system superheat burner analyzed by the method HAZOP and SIL safety level calculated through the method of FTA. Based on research conducted in this thesis, superheat burner has a high danger risk (high risk) component TT-1005 and PT-1018. The level of security superheat burner classified SIL 1 with PFD 4.38x10-2, so do redesign the SIS to achieve SIL 2. PFD system of 0.0099 is achieved by adding 2 ESDV on line check fuel gas and purges gas and increase the pressure switch on each function pressure switch. (PSHH, PSL, PSLL).Â

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Quantitative Determination of Safety Integrity Level on Offshore Metering and Custody Transfer Facility

Volume 2: Safety and Reliability; Pipeline Technology ◽

10.1115/omae2003-37268 ◽

2003 ◽

Author(s):

Alejandro Di´az-Herna´ndez ◽

Mari´a Eloisa Pe´rez Medina ◽

Rafael Melo Gonza´lez

Keyword(s):

Petroleum Industry ◽

Fault Tree Analysis ◽

Insurance Companies ◽

Minimal Cut Sets ◽

Reliability Parameters ◽

Safety Integrity Level ◽

Primary Element ◽

Oil Tanker ◽

Innovative Concept

A quantitative way for determining the Safety Integrity Level of Safety Instrumented System (SIS) on Offshore Metering and Custody Transfer Facility in Campeche Bay Mexico is presented in this work. The methodology that was employed in order to assess and determine the Reliability parameters of SIS; which was carried out in three steps: 1. Identify undesirable events that can damage to personnel using the API-14C and to, the facility and the environment (by oil spill in hoses when the oil tanker is filled), 2. Estimate the severity and consequences of risk, using safety layer matrix of ISA S84.01 and, 3. Quantify the severity of each risk identified with the fault tree analysis. This last step uses the minimal cut sets, an innovative concept in petroleum industry, this provides valuable information about possible combinations of fault events, that can result in a critical failure of the system. The period of maintenance of the main SIS components (sensors, logic solver and final element), was reduced applying redundancy in the primary element. Furthermore, the results obtained of this analysis can be used by insurance companies or institutions that certify under standards of process quality and safety.

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Hazop Study and Fault Tree Analysis for Calculation Safety Integrity Level on Reactor-C.5-01, Oil Refinery Unit at Balikpapan-Indonesia

Asian Journal of Applied Sciences ◽

10.24203/ajas.v5i2.4634 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 5 (2) ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Silvana R. Dacosta ◽

Al-Asyâ€™ari I. I. ◽

Ali Musyafa ◽

Adi Soeprijanto

Keyword(s):

Fault Tree Analysis ◽

Fuel Mixture ◽

Reactor System ◽

Oil Refinery ◽

Raw Material ◽

Security Level ◽

Engine Fuel ◽

Reactor Unit ◽

Fuel Gas ◽

Safety Integrity Level

plat former reactors are reactors that are in the plat forming unit is designed for developing your specific hydrocarbon molecules that are used in catalytic engine fuel in boiling point range naphtha and fuel mixture to produce components with a higher octane value. Plat former reactor system failure may disrupt operations in the oil processing refinery unit. These circumstances will cause the supply plaformat as products of the plat forming unit valued high octane which is the main raw material of gasoline blending system is reduced. Resulting in decreased production consequency large losses. The failure of the reactor system can also be harmful to the operator, the environment and there is a possibility of reactor unit may explode. To avoid these risks we conducted studies identify hazards that occur in the process rector Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis and calculate the value of safety integrity level (SIL). In this study reviewed three nodes Overview consisting of node stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3. Based on the results of identification are thirteen instruments on the third node, which includes equipment; PC-193, FI-005, PC-194 and FI-010. Standards-based Service Oriented systems have Unacceptable risk criteria and the criteria of likelihood 4 Consequences worth three. As for the evaluation of SIL is known that C-5-01 reactor system has two safety Integrity Function (SIS) located in the path of fuel gas and pilot gas lines of the reactor heater. Both SIS has a vote = 1oo3 architecture with similar characteristics, and a review of the SIS has a security level SIL = 2 with a value of PFD = 0.00103.

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Fast calibration of CBED patterns for quantitative analysis

Proceedings, annual meeting, Electron Microscopy Society of America ◽

10.1017/s0424820100149209 ◽

1993 ◽

Vol 51 ◽

pp. 674-675

Author(s):

M.A. Gribelyuk ◽

M. Rühle

Keyword(s):

Reciprocal Lattice ◽

Accurate Determination ◽

Incident Beam ◽

Crystal Thickness ◽

Structure Model ◽

Beam Direction ◽

Transmitted Beam ◽

Reciprocal Vector ◽

On Line

A new method is suggested for the accurate determination of the incident beam direction K, crystal thickness t and the coordinates of the basic reciprocal lattice vectors V1 and V2 (Fig. 1) of the ZOLZ plans in pixels of the digitized 2-D CBED pattern. For a given structure model and some estimated values Vest and Kest of some point O in the CBED pattern a set of line scans AkBk is chosen so that all the scans are located within CBED disks.The points on line scans AkBk are conjugate to those on A0B0 since they are shifted by the reciprocal vector gk with respect to each other. As many conjugate scans are considered as CBED disks fall into the energy filtered region of the experimental pattern. Electron intensities of the transmitted beam I0 and diffracted beams Igk for all points on conjugate scans are found as a function of crystal thickness t on the basis of the full dynamical calculation.

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