Moral Judgment and the Others-Concept

1978 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 283-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry L. Whiteman ◽  
Karl B. Zucker ◽  
Liam K. Grimley

198 students in Grades 7 through 12 were assessed for their level of moral reasoning and their perceptions of others. The respective instruments were James Rest's Defining Issues Test and the Paired Hands Test-Secondary developed by Karl Zucker and others. A one-way analysis of variance and correlation statistics showed a consistent relationship between students' level of moral development and their others-concept. Those students who had reached the higher (principled) stages of moral development perceived and/or felt more positively about other people than students who were at a lower stage of moral development. Students who were at the antiestablishment stage had an especially low others-concept. Since it is thought that a person's others-concept indicates how he feels about other people as well as how he perceives others, the results of this study suggest that the complex relationship between thoughts and feelings, and their respective roles in moral education should be reexamined. Perhaps a cognitive-affective-developmental model would be more helpful for developing approaches to moral education than the cognitive-developmental model currently supported by many authorities.

1997 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 967-975 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang-Ho C. Ji

This study investigated the relations among ethnicity, moral reasoning, and collectivism by administering the Defining Issues Test and the Individualism-Collectivism Scale to 165 Euro-American and Asian graduate students. To the data were applied analyses of variance, correlation, t test, and regression analyses. The analysis indicated that the Asian subjects had lower P scores on the Defining Issues Test so Kohlberg's model may not incorporate the concerns and experience of Asian people. The study also showed that scores on collectivism were not necessarily associated with low P scores.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Guadalupe Jean-Tron ◽  
Diana Ávila-Montiel ◽  
Horacio Márquez-González ◽  
Gina del Carmen Chapa-Koloffon ◽  
José Antonio Orozco-Morales ◽  
...  

Abstract Background. When we talk about morality, a question arises as to whether it is a natural characteristic of humans—that is, whether it is what people should pursue as individuals or whether it is a social construct. Kohlberg established six progressive stages of moral judgment that form three levels of moral development, showing the development of people’s thinking on moral issues that is characterized by the aforementioned criteria. Methods. This study’s objective was to compare the level of moral reasoning among graduate students in medicine with a group of young graduates from other degrees and a group of non-professional adults.The moral reasoning questionnaire (Defining Issues Test, DIT) designed by James Rest based on Kohlberg’s theory (Rest 1979) was applied. In total, 304 questionnaires were completed. Results. Depending on the population studied, differences have been found in the profile of moral development. The profile of family clinic users showed a very high predominance of subjects in category 1 at 70%, but only 4.5% in category 3, while in the group of pediatric specialty students, 37.5% were found in category 1 and 34% in category 3. They were the group with the highest percentage in this category. This vast difference could be because the differences in the age and socio-education levels of the beneficiaries are much wider than that of the residents. However, differences are also found if the profiles of residents are compared with those of master’s students because the latter comprised 56% in category 1 and 19% in category 3. We also found differences in the profiles of moral development based on the highest education level. Conclusions. Based on the results of this study, the population could be classified into three levels of moral development, the first level being the predominant one and the third the least common, as we expected prior to the study. The reason why some individuals reach the highest level while others do not remains a question to be addressed. The results show us that there is a difference in some populations depending on education level and even the type of degree pursued.


1997 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-836 ◽  
Author(s):  
Júlio Rique ◽  
Cleonice Camino

Authors in the cognitive developmental tradition (e.g. Damon & Hart, 1988; Snyder & Feldman, 1984; Turiel, 1983) have created models to explain transition between stages of development. This study introduces consistency and inconsistency of moral reasoning as patterns of moral thinking and presents implications for moral education. Consistency and inconsistency are determined by the level of “stage mixture” scored on the Defining Issues Test. A 2 × 2 quasi-experimental design was created. Participants were 52, 15-year-old male high school students. Moral judgement was the dependent variable. Consistency, inconsistency, and the experimental procedures were independent variables. Results showed a significant interaction between levels of consistency and educational methods ( P < .014), a developmental progression for the condition inconsistent experimental ( P < .004), and a predicted pattern of change for the condition consistent experimental ( P < .001). The authors concluded that consistency and inconsistency of moral reasoning require different assumptions for the promotion of moral development.


Author(s):  
Joshua May

This chapter argues that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions are not integral to moral judgment. There is ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making a moral judgment or for treating norms as distinctively moral. The chapter concludes that, even if moral cognition is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these should not be mistaken for emotions or their non-cognitive components. Non-cognitive elements in our psychology may be required for normal moral development and motivation but not necessarily for mature moral judgment.


1984 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 303-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. De Wolfe ◽  
Lee Anderson Jackson

After being classified by scores on the Defining Issues Test, an essay concerning capital punishment, and an Attitudes-toward-Capital Punishment Scale, subjects high and low in moral reasoning and for and against capital punishment evaluated on the Interpersonal Judgment Scale bogus strangers who supposedly had also written essays concerning capital punishment. Essays were varied to reflect attitudes similar to or opposed to the subject's own and to be presented on a similar or different (higher or lower) stage of moral reasoning. Strong main effects occurred in the direction of more positive evaluations of sources (bogus strangers) who were similar in attitude and who reasoned on a principled level. These results were interpreted to suggest that subjects may be favorably impressed by the structure of principled arguments independent of the effects of similarity. This is consistent with modeling as an influence in accounting for upward shifts in moral reasoning.


2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (7) ◽  
pp. 1440-1464
Author(s):  
James Weber

Most business ethics scholars interested in understanding individual moral cognition or reasoning rely on the Defining Issues Test (DIT). They typically report that managers and business students exhibit a relatively high percentage of principled moral reasoning when resolving ethical dilemmas. This article applies neurocognitive processes and Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, and its more recent revision, as theoretical foundations to explore whether differences emerge when using a recognition of learning task, such as the DIT or similar instruments, versus a formulation of knowledge task, such as the Moral Judgment Interview or similar instruments, to assess individual moral reasoning. The data show that significantly different levels of moral reasoning are detected when using a recognition-based versus formulation-based moral reasoning instrument. As expected, the recognition-based approach (using a DIT-like instrument) reports an inflated, higher moral reasoning score for subjects compared with using a formulation-based instrument. Implications of these results for understanding an individual’s moral reasoning are discussed.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karlena Ochoa ◽  
Joseph Rodini ◽  
Louis J Moses

Although the influence of intent understanding on children’s moral development has been long studied, little research has examined the influence of belief understanding on that development. In two studies we presented children with morally-relevant belief vignettes to examine the extent to which they incorporate both intent and belief information in their moral judgments. In Study 1 (N = 64), 5-year-old false belief (FB) passers rated agents with false beliefs as more positively intentioned in good intent trials (even though the outcome was bad) than in bad intent trials (even though the outcome was good). In contrast, 4-year-old FB passers were generally unable to integrate their belief understanding with their moral evaluations, performing no better on intention questions than FB failers. Neither age group significantly differentiated rewards and punishments as a function of intent when a false belief was involved. In Study 2 (N = 109 children, N = 42 adults), we found that by simplifying our study design and reducing the task demands, 4-year-old FB passers’ were able to make appropriate intent judgments. Yet, as in Study 1, all children had difficulty assigning punishment/rewards based on intent. For both moral intentions and moral consequences, 4- and 5-year-old false belief passers’ moral judgments differed from those of adults in several respects, indicating that moral reasoning develops substantially beyond the preschool years.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3(J)) ◽  
pp. 110-118
Author(s):  
Chikelu Okey Felix ◽  
Rosita Bint Arshad .

The relationship between moral reasoning and leadership style has received considerable attention for decades, however this has been not fully explicated as different leadership styles elist different ethical values. What constitutes moral behaviour is conflicting and subjective. This study examines public leaders’ degree of moral judgment associated with leadership styles in a public sector organization. To test the hypothesized relationship, data were collected using questionnaire survey distributed to 550 workers out which 300 were found worthy to be used. The Defining Issues Test (DIT2) and the Multifactor leadership questionnaire (MLQ X5) were completed by leaders and subordinates respectively. The PLS path analysis of the structural model indicates significant statistical relationship between cognitive moral development (CMD) and transactional leadership style (TSL) ( β= -0.214, P< 0.012). However, we argue that cognitive moral development is amiable to the individual qualities of the leader that might necessitate the application of particular leadership style and behaviour. We also found collaboration evidence that leaders high in cognitive moral development are perceived more as transformational leaders by their subordinates. Finally, we suggest that the dichotomies between moral reasoning and leadership style are hinged more on individual leadership values and motivational beliefs.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyemin Han ◽  
Kelsie J Dawson

Although some previous studies have investigated the relationship between moral foundations and moral judgment development, the methods used have not been able to fully explore the relationship. In the present study, we used Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) in order to address the limitations in traditional regression methods that have been used previously. Results showed consistency with previous findings that binding foundations are negatively correlated with post-conventional moral reasoning and positively correlated with maintaining norms and personal interest schemas. In addition to previous studies, our results showed a positive correlation for individualizing foundations and post-conventional moral reasoning. Implications are discussed as well as a detailed explanation of the novel BMA method in order to allow others in the field of moral education to be able to use it in their own studies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (49) ◽  
pp. 153-170
Author(s):  
Bisera Jevtić ◽  

The foster family is the primary agent of socialization in which the child’s personality without parental care is formed and shaped. In the existing social system, in which moral and social values are devalued, a particular challenge and task for today’s family is the moral devel- opment and moral education of its youngest members. The theoretical part of the paper not only presents the most important theoretical postulates and implications concerning moral development, but it also presents the characteristics of children without parental care as a par- ticularly sensitive target group. The foster care institution is presented as a temporary, alterna- tive, socially organized form of protection intended for children without parental care. In the empirical part of the paper, we study the influence of socio-demographic factors that describe the foster family and the child in foster care at the stage of moral judgment of the child pro- tected by this form of protection. The research was conducted to determine the relationship between the specific socio-demographic factors of the foster family and the foster child with the stage of moral reasoning of the child protected by this form of protection. The results of the research found in the empirical part of the paper indicate that the socio-demographic factors of the foster parent and the child are reflected only at certain stages of the child’s moral reasoning at foster care in the positive or negative direction, while at other stages, the correla- tions of the positive and negative directions were not obtained. The results obtained testify to the great heterogeneity of the foster care network and the individual specificities of children deprived of parental care, which implies the need and requirement to respect these specifics and to raise the criteria in the assessment of families who are motivated to foster care and to provide better foster carers training in order to meet one of the most important tasks, i.e. the moral development of the children they are directly caring for. Considering, on the one hand, the axiological dimension that moral education plays in the formation of the moral character of children and young people, the role that the current family arrangement as the primary agent of socialization plays in the moral development of children and, on the other hand, very little research on the moral development of children without parental care, through the realization of this research, we have recognized the contribution to the actualization of this problem of individual and social significance.


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