scholarly journals UK in European Security: New Opportunities or a Path to Nowhere?

Author(s):  
D. V. Shikhov

Despite Britain's traditionally ambivalent attitude towards deepening the European integration, in late 1990s - early 2000s London seemed to become a key driver of European defence and security cooperation. T.Blair and J.Chirac have set ambitious goals including the development of a European Rapid Reaction Force. However most targets have never been achieved due to concerns about undermining NATO's role and Britain's as well as other EU members' unwillingness to undertake real steps to strengthen defence and security cooperation. In late 2000s the prospects of defence integration within the EU were becoming more and more vague, and the D.Cameron coalition government opted for bilateral Franco-British cooperation. Today London remains among key opponents to the European defence but the paradox is that EU defence integration without Britain - which is along with France a leading EU military power-would be at least ineffective. With US activities gradually shifting from Europe to Asia-Pacific Britain may well take the lead in European security without any damage to Transatlantic Relations.

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 846-863 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Martill ◽  
Monika Sus

The purpose of this article is to understand the EU/UK security relationship after Brexit and the institutional form(s) it may take. Taking stock of the literature on the consequences of Brexit for European foreign affairs, this article employs a question-driven approach to examine uncertainties regarding the future EU/UK security relationship. These questions relate in particular to the United Kingdom’s commitment to European security after Brexit, the nature of post-Brexit developments within the Union, and the European Union’s willingness to afford the United Kingdom a substantial role after withdrawal. This article examines each of these questions in turn, before considering the viability of three frequently mooted institutional arrangements post-Brexit: UK participation in the CSDP as a third country; increased engagement with NATO that becomes the main platform for cooperation between the United Kingdom and the European Union; and the enhancement of bilateral ties between the United Kingdom and key European allies – especially France.


Significance At the same time, the EU will lose the United Kingdom’s vital role in coordinating intelligence and leading investigations. In addition, Brexit undermines the prospects for EU-UK security and defence cooperation based on institutionalised relations. Impacts Now that the politics of Brexit is less intense, the EU and United Kingdom have more capacity to focus on building pragmatic relations. The main EU nations will only join inter-governmental arrangements with London if such cooperation aligns with EU objectives. Regulatory and trade pressures could see European defence companies, such as Airbus, more reluctant to invest in the United Kingdom.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (6) ◽  
pp. 3-12
Author(s):  
Zhang DONGYANG ◽  

The status and prospects of development of trade and economic relations between Ukraine and China are considered. It is proved that bilateral cooperation in the trade and economic sphere has made significant progress. In 2012–2017, China was the second largest trading partner of Ukraine after Russia. However, the problem of imbalance in imports and exports between Ukraine and China has not yet been resolved. In addition, the scale and number of projects in which Ukraine attracts Chinese investment is much less than investments from European countries and the United States. It is justified that trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and China is at a new historical stage. On the one hand, Ukraine signed the Association Agreement with the European Union, and on January 1, 2016, the rules of the free trade zone between Ukraine and the EU entered into force. This helps to accelerate the integration of Ukrainian economy into European one. On the other hand, the global economic downturn requires the introduction of innovations in the model of cooperation. The Chinese initiative “One belt is one way” is one of the variants of the innovation model of cooperation. Its significance is to unite the Asia-Pacific region with the EU in order to join the Eurasian Economic Union, create a new space and opportunities for development and achieve prosperity with the Eurasian countries. All this forms unprecedented opportunities for development of bilateral economic and trade relations. It seems that to fully open the potential of Ukrainian economy and expand bilateral trade and economic cooperation, it is necessary to take into account such proposals as the establishment of the Sino-Ukrainian industrial park, the promotion of cooperation in the field of electronic commerce, the formation of the Sino-Ukrainian free trade zone and enhanced interaction within multilateral mechanisms (for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the interaction of China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 16 + 1 format).


Author(s):  
Joshua Byun

Abstract Why do some regional powers collectively threatened by a potential hegemon eagerly cooperate to ensure their security, while others appear reluctant to do so? I argue that robust security cooperation at the regional level is less likely when an unbalanced distribution of power exists between the prospective security partners. In such situations, regional security cooperation tends to be stunted by foot-dragging and obstructionism on the part of materially inferior states wary of facilitating the strategic expansion of neighbours with larger endowments of power resources, anticipating that much of the coalition's gains in military capabilities are likely to be achieved through an expansion of the materially superior neighbour's force levels and strategic flexibility. Evidence drawn from primary material and the latest historiography of France's postwar foreign policy towards West Germany provides considerable support for this argument. My findings offer important correctives to standard accounts of the origins of Western European security cooperation and suggest the need to rethink the difficulties the United States has encountered in promoting cooperation among local allies in key global regions.


2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 755-775 ◽  
Author(s):  
XINNING SONG

AbstractEuropean Studies in China developed very rapidly in the last twenty years. The reasons for that are not only because of the smooth evolution of EU-China relations and wider and deeper economic interdependence between two economic giants, but also the relevance of the European models to China's domestic political and social development, as well as China's external relations. The article reviews the evolution of the European Studies in China and finds out that more and more research on European affairs relates to China's internal and external development. Two major aspects of the learning process are exploited further. Firstly, European models for China's domestic political and social development, including European party politics and Democratic Socialism, European social policy and social security systems, and European regional policies. Secondly, European models for China's foreign policy and external relations, including European neighbourhood policy, European concept of effective multilateralism, Europe as an example of peaceful rise, and functionalism as the way to East Asian regional integration. The EU or Europe has higher profile in China than any other Asia Pacific country. From the domestic political and social development and China's preference in international affairs we can see the silhouette of the European models. Chinese would like to learn more from Europe than the United States. It also shows clearly that the role of the EU as a social power.


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