Covid-19, Philosophy and the Leap Towards the Posthuman

Critical Understanding ◽

Human Ontology

A discursive canon around transhumanism and posthumanism as beliefs in the efficacy and necessity of technology as the beneficial transformer of human life “for the better” is well-established in the Western philosophical tradition. However, none of the theorists and protagonists of this technological reconfiguration of humanity could ever have predicted that what they envisaged would be propelled into manifestation with as dramatic and phenomenal momentum such as has been ushered in by the mainly technology-driven interventions introduced in various measures globally to curb the SARS-CoV2 virus. The effect of these responses to the pandemic, it is here demonstrated, have set humanity into a technogenesis, a transformative ontological process headed towards a machinistic and de-anthropic life idealised by posthumanists. Apropos, a set of three intertwined tasks are here executed. Firstly, I explicate my foregoing claim, namely, how at the helm of the variety of measures to control Covid-19 is a discernible socio-scientific movement that is directed at inaugurating and regularising a posthumanist consciousness and de-anthropic modes of sociality. Secondly, I venture a critical understanding of “the Covid-19 moment” that exposes the quadripartite alliance of a postmodernist Western philosophy, technoscience, commercial interests, and politics as the systemic drivers of this technocratic philosophical anthropology. Thirdly, or rather concurrently, taking the work of Nick Bostrom as the theoretical heuristic advocating human technological transformation, I normatively alert of the ramifications of this emerging human ontology.

‘A passion can only be overcome by a stronger passion’: Philosophical Anthropology before and after Ernst Cassirer

European Review ◽

10.1017/s1062798705000803 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 13 (4) ◽

pp. 557-575 ◽

Author(s):

JOHN MICHAEL KROIS

Keyword(s):

Human Life ◽

Philosophical Anthropology ◽

The Body ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Cultural Activity ◽

Human Beings ◽

Ernst Cassirer ◽

Physical Study ◽

Before And After

‘Philosophical anthropology’ was initiated in the late 1920s as an alternative to abstract philosophical definitions of human nature (‘animal rationale’) and to the exclusively empirical, physical study of anthropology. Philosophical anthropology focused upon what it meant to be a human being. Its founders concentrated upon the situated existence of human beings and their ability to think beyond and to deny even what was actually vitally important to them. For Cassirer, these efforts remained too abstract because they failed to take the breadth of human cultural activity into account. The decisive feature of human life is neither reason nor language. These are derivative from symbolism, not the other way around. Human beings are best described as ‘animal symbolicum’. The error of earlier anthropological conceptions was not that they venerated reason, but that they ignored the body and so separated reason from emotion. The concept of symbolism, as Cassirer conceived it, overcame this dualism. His philosophical anthropology has been vindicated today in many areas of empirical research, but replacing the concept of ‘reason’ with that of ‘symbolism’ was no minor revision to the Western philosophical tradition, and the amplification and application of this new outlook has barely begun.

Synthesis of Cultures of the East and West in the Philosophy of B.D. Dandaron

RUDN Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.22363/2313-2302-2020-24-3-502-511 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 24 (3) ◽

pp. 502-511

Author(s):

Mergen Sanjievich Ulanov

Keyword(s):

Practical Aspect ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Western Philosophy ◽

Russian Philosophy ◽

Russian Society ◽

Religious Philosophy ◽

Philosophical System ◽

East And West ◽

East West

The article deals with the phenomenon of synthesis of East and West cultures in the religious philosophy of B.D. Dandaron - one of the most famous representatives of Russian Buddhism in the XX century. The beginning of the spread of Buddhist teachings in Russian society is also connected with his extraordinary personality. Dandaron was engaged in active yoga, tantric practice, and also gave instructions to those who were interested in Buddhism. As a result, a small circle of people began to form around him who tried to study and practice Buddhism. Dandaron was also engaged in Buddhist activities, studied Tibetan history and historiography, and described the Tibetan collection of manuscripts. It is indicated that Dandaron not only made an attempt to consider Buddhism from the perspective of Western philosophy, but also created his own teaching, which was called neobuddism. As a result, he was able to conduct a creative synthesis of Buddhist philosophy with the Western philosophical tradition. In fact, he developed a philosophical system that claims to be universal and synthesized Buddhist and Western spiritual achievements. Trying to synthesize the Eastern and Western traditions of philosophical thought, Dandaron turned to the well-known comparative works of the Indian thinker S. Radhakrishnan and the Russian buddhologist F.I. Shcherbatsky. The author also notes the influence on the philosophy of neobuddism of the ideas of V.E. Sesemann, a neo-Kantian philosopher with whom Dandaron was personally acquainted. The idea of non-Buddhism had not only a philosophical and theoretical, but also a practical aspect, since the consideration of Buddhism from the perspective of Western philosophy helped to attract people of Western culture to this religion. In General, Dandarons desire to create a universal synthetic philosophical system was in line with the philosophical and spiritual search of Russian philosophy, and was partly related to the traditional problem of East-West, which has always been relevant for Russia.

Jacques Derrida: The Double Liminality of a Philosophical Marrano

Religions ◽

10.3390/rel10020068 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 10 (2) ◽

pp. 68 ◽

Author(s):

Emilie Kutash

Keyword(s):

Jacques Derrida ◽

The Other ◽

French Language ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Western Philosophy ◽

Helene Cixous ◽

Liminal Space ◽

Philosophical Position ◽

The One

There is an analogy between two types of liminality: the geographic or cultural ‘outside’ space of the Marrano Jew, alienated from his/her original religion and the one he or she has been forced to adopt, and, a philosophical position that is outside of both Athens and Jerusalem. Derrida finds and re-finds ‘h’ors- texte’, an ‘internal desert’, a ‘secret’ outside place: alien to both the western philosophical tradition and the Hebraic archive. In this liminal space he questions the otherness of the French language to which he was acculturated, and, in a turn to a less discursive modality, autobiography, finds, in the words of Helene Cixous, “the Jew-who-doesn’t know-that-he-is”. Derrida’s galut (exile) is neither Hebrew nor Greek. It is a private place outside of all discourse, which he claims, is inevitably ethnocentric. In inhabiting this outside space, he exercises the prerogative of a Marrano, equipped to critique the French language of his acculturation and the western philosophy of the scholars. French and Hebrew are irreconcilable binaries, western philosophy and his Hebrew legacy is as well. These issues will be discussed in this paper with reference to Monolingualism of the Other and Archive Fever as they augment some of his earlier work, Writing and Difference and Speech and Phenomena.

PETER J. KING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CANON: AN AFRICANIST APPRECIATION

Phronimon ◽

10.25159/2413-3086/3812 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 16 (1) ◽

pp. 62-76 ◽

Author(s):

Malesela John Lamola

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Culturally Sensitive ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Western Philosophy ◽

African Philosophy ◽

Post Colonial ◽

Critical Observation ◽

Universal Approach ◽

Universal Measure

From a perspective of an advocacy for a multi-culturally sensitive epistemology, as well as from the context of the politics of decision-making on which thinkers get inaugurated into a community of what is regarded as standard-bearers of what passes as philosophy, Peter Kingâ€™s One hundred philosophers: The life and work of the worldâ€™s greatest thinkers (2004) is instructive. He creatively breaks the boundaries of the traditional canonical criteria of Western philosophy and installs into a singular chronological compendium thinkers from Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas as philosophers whose works set the frontiers of philosophic erudition. Our critical observation is that King profoundly subverts the myth and challenges the doctrine of positing European thinkers as bulwarks of a universally superior epistemic system. Drawing from the amply documented protestation of African philosophy against the supremacist tendencies of the hegemonic Western academy, as well as from Walter Mignoloâ€™s critical framework on the proclivity of a colonial epistemology to masquerade as universal, this essay critically highlights the historico-cultural mechanisms whereby the Western philosophical tradition sets itself as the arbiter and universal measure of what passes as philosophy, or a philosopher. Kingâ€™s book is presented as a commendable negation of this tendency and as a demonstration of a culturally equitable and pluraversal (as opposed to the Eurocentric universal) approach to the recognition of philosophical genius. The essay is a contribution to the demands for the transformation of the conceptualisation of philosophy in the post-colonial academy.

â€œWHEN EVERYTHING STARTS TO FLOWâ€: NKRUMAH AND IRIGARAY IN SEARCH OF EMANCIPATORY ONTOLOGIES

Phronimon ◽

10.25159/2413-3086/3815 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 16 (2) ◽

pp. 1-20 ◽

Author(s):

Louise Du Toit

Keyword(s):

Symbolic Order ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Western Philosophy ◽

Luce Irigaray ◽

Current Analysis ◽

Western Philosophical Tradition

A more explicit, comprehensive and sustained dialogue between the African philosophical and Western feminist traditions would yield insights at once rich and useful to both traditions, and beyond, e.g. to the African feminist tradition. Here, I place the work of Belgian philosopher Luce Irigaray in discussion with Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumahâ€™s conception of â€œconsciencismâ€. What they most saliently share is an understanding of how the dichotomies central to traditional Western philosophy (mind-body and idealism-materialism) have been key in the structural exclusion and oppression of the â€œothersâ€ of this dominant tradition. Both are convinced that Western metaphysics serve ideological purposes and help to perpetuate relations of domination. Both struggle with the question of how to effectively resist this specific violence of the Western philosophical tradition without repeating its logic. Most importantly for the current analysis, in their search for sources for resistance and emancipation, Nkrumah and Irigaray do not remain with diagnoses; instead both assume or construct a fluid ontology outside of, or beyond, this dominant symbolic order.

Reason without feelings? Emotions in the history of western philosophy

Filozofija i drustvo ◽

10.2298/fid1802253k ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 29 (2) ◽

pp. 253-274

Author(s):

Aleksej Kisjuhas

Keyword(s):

Modern Philosophy ◽

Middle Ages ◽

Classical Antiquity ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Western Philosophy ◽

Contemporary Philosophy ◽

Age Of Reason ◽

History Of ◽

Philosophy Of Emotions

The paper critically analyzes the interplay between reason and emotions in the history of Western philosophy, as an inadequately ambivalent interrelationship of contrast, control and conflict. After the analysis of the philosophies of emotions and passion amongst the most important philosophers and philosophical works of classical antiquity and the Middle Ages, the paper presents ideas on this interrelationship within the framework of modern philosophy, or during the so-called Age of Reason. Finally, the paper analyzes the character of emotions in the contemporary philosophy, while examining possibilities for the history of (philosophy of) emotions and feelings, but also the possibilities for overcoming the undue opposition of reason and emotions, which was present in the dominant Western philosophical tradition.

Imaginative universals and human cognition in The New Science of Giambattista Vico

Culture & Psychology ◽

10.1177/1354067x15575795 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 21 (2) ◽

pp. 185-206 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Mariagrazia Granatella

Keyword(s):

Human Life ◽

Human Cognition ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Giambattista Vico ◽

New Science ◽

Rational Thought ◽

And Control

Universals have occupied a central role in philosophy ever since the Socratic quest for definitions. The need to find concepts both universal and shareable is rooted in the Western philosophical tradition, in order to capture and control the disorder that besets human life. In other words, Universals occur as part of a rational attitude by which to substantiate knowledge and its evaluation. My aim in this paper is to confront Vico’s discovery of imaginative universals with the classical paradigm of rational thought that, formed by abstraction from empirical experience, reduces the knowledge to a rigorous process of inference. Against this barbarism of reflection, what Vico does in his works is to chart out possible new ways in which science can innovate itself.

Cultivating Reason

10.1093/oso/9780190682675.003.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Harvey Siegel

Keyword(s):

Critical Thinking ◽

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Social Epistemology ◽

Historical Record ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Epistemic Dependence ◽

Philosophical Work ◽

Educational Ideal

The Western philosophical tradition has historically valorized the cultivation of reason as a fundamental intellectual ideal. This ideal continues to be defended by many as educationally basic. However, recent philosophical work has challenged it on several fronts, including worries stemming from relativistic tendencies in the philosophy of science, the apparent ubiquity of epistemic dependence in social epistemology, and broad critiques of objectionable hegemony launched from feminist and postmodernist perspectives. This chapter briefly reviews the historical record, connects the cultivation of reason to the educational ideal of critical thinking, spells out the latter ideal, and evaluates these challenges. It ends by sketching a general, “transcendental” reply to all such critiques of reason.

Introduction

10.1093/oso/9780198823629.003.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad

Keyword(s):

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Phenomenological Tradition ◽

The Third ◽

The Subject ◽

To Come

The Introduction outlines the various chapters. It then situates the question of ‘body’ in the modern Western philosophical tradition following Descartes, and argues that this leaves subsequent responses to come under one of three options: metaphysical dualism of body and subject; any anti-dualist reductionism; or the overcoming of the divide. Describing the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty as a potent example of the third strategy, the Introduction then suggests his philosophy will function as foil to the ecological phenomenology developed and presented in the book. Moreover, one approach within the Western Phenomenological tradition, of treating phenomenology as a methodology for the clarification of experience (rather than the means to the determination of an ontology of the subject) is compared to the approach in this book. Since classical India, while understanding dualism, did not confront the challenge of Descartes (for better or for worse), its treatment of body follows a different trajectory.

Anthropocentrism without a centre?

Archaeological Dialogues ◽

10.1017/s1380203800000957 ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 119-122 ◽

Author(s):

Julian Thomas

Keyword(s):

Being And Time ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Human Beings ◽

Unusual Structure ◽

History Of ◽

Unique Relationship ◽

Made In ◽

Number Of Authors ◽

The Way

I am grateful to Håkan Karlsson for his thoughtful commentary on some of the issues concerning Heidegger and archaeology which were raised in a previous issue of this journal, and find myself fascinated by his project of a ‘contemplative archaeology’. However, one or two points of clarification could be made in relation to Karlsson's contribution. Firstly, as a number of authors have pointed out (e.g. Anderson 1966, 20; Olafson 1993), the gulf between Heidegger's early work and that which followed the Kehre may have been more apparent than real. While his focus may have shifted from the Being of one particular kind of being (Dasein) to a history of Being (Dreyfus 1992), the continuities in his thought are more striking. Throughout his career, Heidegger was concerned with the category of Being, and the way in which it had been passed over by the western philosophical tradition. It is important to note that in Being and time the analysis of Dasein essentially serves as an heuristic: the intention is to move from an understanding of the Being of one kind of being to that of Being in general. What complicates the issue is the very unusual structure of this specific kind of being, for Heidegger did not choose to begin his analysis with the Being of shoes or stones, but with a kind of creature which has a unique relationship with all other worldly entities. ‘Dasein’ serves as a kind of code for ‘human being’ which enables Heidegger to talk about the way in which human beings exist on earth, rather than becoming entangled in biological or psychological definitions of humanity. In this formulations, what is distinctive about human beings is that their own existence is an issue for them; Dasein cares, and this caring is fundamentally temporal.