Enkele bedenkingen over de voorgeschiedenis van de Koningskwestie

Res Publica ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Guido Provoost

Studying the Belgian military and foreign policy from 1934 till 1937, one can conclude to the following working hypotheses. The conflict between the King (and His entourage) and the Cabinet about the competency over military policy and military command has had a large influence on the acute phase of the Question Royale 1940-1950.The policy of independence of 1936 which has been imputed later on to the King and for which He has been blamed, is rather contained in the military and foreign policy of the successive Belgian governments from 1930 on, inspired by Paul Hymans, minister of foreign affairs at that time.

2013 ◽  
Vol 05 (03) ◽  
pp. 5-16
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE

The new foreign policy team is more professional and with an Asian focus than its older counterpart. Although still fragmented, it may have stronger leadership and better coordination. This is critically important because China is at a defining moment as to its international role. Xi Jinping's closer ties with the military and his hands-on style may encourage assertive nationalism and more active role of the military in foreign affairs.


Significance Discussion included the Northern Alliance of four ethnic minority armed groups fighting the Tatmadaw in north-eastern Myanmar bordering China. The meeting exemplifies the military's formal and central political role in Myanmar’s foreign affairs. Impacts The civilian-led government will share responsibility (and blame) with the military for continued internal conflicts. Military crackdowns on ethnic militias and the Rohingya will cause foreign policy controversy for the civilian government. The Tatmadaw and civilian government could clash over defence expenditure levels.


2021 ◽  
pp. 581-592
Author(s):  
Igor K. Bogomolov ◽  

The article publishes a letter from the chairman of the Petrograd Military Censorship Commission, Nikolai Ivanovich Levitsky, to the manager of the Press and Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Iosifovich Lysakovsky (dated December 22, 1916). In the letter, Levitsky insists on the need to include representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the military censorship commission on a permanent basis. At the time, a different scheme was in effect: Levitsky sent diplomatic materials (newspaper and magazine articles, books, pamphlets, and cartoons) for verification to the Press and Information Department, which made its decision on their further fate. Levitsky pointed out the complexity and slowness of this scheme, which led to delays in printing, dissatisfaction of authors and editors. The main problem, Levitsky acknowledged, was insufficient competence of censors in foreign policy matters. Meanwhile, by the end of 1916, the topic of diplomatic censorship had become quite relevant. As the war drew to a close, more and more material appeared in press about the post-war world order and Russia's future relations with its allies and adversaries. Against this background, Levitsky advocated the inclusion of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as censors. The idea itself was not new: in the autumn of 1916, the headquarters of the Northern Front had submitted a project to reform the Petrograd military censorship in order to improve its efficiency. The main focus of the project was on expanding its staff and creating new departments in the Petrograd Military Censorship Commission. The representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also to be included in the commission. Levitsky’s proposals followed the emerging trend: enhanced staffing and centralization of the military censorship, closer interaction of departments in order to increase its effectiveness. Lysakovsky approved the suggestion. Since January 1917, five officials of the ministry had been sent to the Petrograd Military Censorship Commission for daily and round-the-clock viewing of the press. However, this cooperation did not last: after the February Revolution, Foreign Ministry officials were released from the censorship work following the actual cessation of the preliminary censorship of press in Petrograd. Nevertheless, the unrealized project became a harbinger of future organization of press censorship after the Bolshevik’s assumption of power. The published document shows that the February Revolution was only a break in the process of censorship centralization and strengthening control over the press by the Russian state.


2014 ◽  
Vol 06 (04) ◽  
pp. 13-25
Author(s):  
Ji YOU

The PLA role in China's foreign policy is integral and deep. Politically it follows overall civilian primacy in foreign policy-making. Militarily the PLA sticks to assertiveness/war aversion dynamics in tackling external security threats, especially over territorial disputes. Functionally, the PLA abides by a top-down division of labour with diplomats. The PLA role in foreign policy-making can be overtly influential, as national/security/military-related foreign affairs are generally more important.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
César Ross

<p>This article is based on an unpublished documents filed in the Historical Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile for the period 1974-1989. This analysis has enabled file review and refute an important part of the current debate.</p><p>This research allows us to affirm that the military regime not only practic a foreign policy "Praetorian ideological" as he claimed the debate so far, but a pragmatic policy. This policy will not only survive allowed in its period, but survived beyond its end.</p>


2019 ◽  
pp. 78-90
Author(s):  
Ihor Datskiv

The article deals with the relationship between the West Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Ukrainian People’s Republic during the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1921. Within this framework, the military-political union and the interaction in the diplomatic sphere between the UPR and the WUPR are examined. It is noted that the question of the Union of the WUPR with Dnipro Ukraine arose due to the large-scale aggression of Poland in the West and the offensive of the Bolsheviks from the East. However, it was envisaged that the WUPR would be granted broad autonomy with its own army and government. The WUPR received considerable military and material aid from the UPR, which contributed to the war with a much stronger enemy. It is argued that after the union was created, there was a need for harmonization and co-ordination of foreign policy of the states and their foreign affairs agencies. As a result, those institutions acquired all-Ukrainian status. However, this did not affect WUPR missions in the countries that emerged in the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, namely Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Other diplomatic missions become common for the UPR and the WUPR. The article states that over time certain controversies emerged as for the vision of foreign policy priorities of the WUPR and the UPR. The government and military leadership of the WUPR began to cooperate with the Bolsheviks. One of the reasons is the lack of power of the WUPR armed forces and the Bolshevik sympathy towards them. Besides, the increasing number of Galician and Dnipro Ukraine politicians and diplomats offered Y. Petrushevych to change his foreign policy orientation, distance himself from S. Petliura and be guided solely by his own interests. In turn, S. Petliura forged an agreement on behalf of the UPR on the recognition of Eastern Galicia as part of Poland and the rejection of previous acts of national unity. The article also deals with the process of establishing the military cooperation of the WUPR with the Bolsheviks and the agreements inter se. Keywords: WUPR, UPR, military-political alliance, diplomacy, foreign policy, Bolsheviks.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (Summer 2020) ◽  
pp. 115-130
Author(s):  
Can Kasapoğlu

As the incumbent Turkish administration strives to pursue more aspiring goals in foreign affairs, Turkey’s military policy is fast developing in line with this vision. The nation’s defense technological and industrial base can now produce various conventional weaponry. Of these, without a doubt, Turkey’s drone warfare assets have garnered the utmost attention among the international strategic community. In tandem, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have gradually gained an expeditionary posture with forward deployments across a broad axis, ranging from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the military’s doctrinal order of battle has been transforming to address the unfolding hybrid warfare challenges in Ankara’s hinterland. Turkey’s proxy warfare capabilities have also registered an uptrend in this respect. Nevertheless, Ankara will have to deal with certain limitations in key segments, particularly 5th generation aircraft and strategic weapon systems which, together, represent a severe intra-war deterrence gap in Turkey’s defense posture. The Turkish administration will have to address this specific shortfall given the problematic threat landscape at the nation’s Middle Eastern doorstep. This study covers two interrelated strategic topics regarding Turkey’s national military capacity in the 21st century: its defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) and its military policy, both currently characterized by a burgeoning assertiveness.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-79
Author(s):  
Nargiza Sodikova ◽  
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Important aspects of French foreign policy and national interests in the modern time,France's position in international security and the specifics of foreign affairs with the United States and the European Union are revealed in this article


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1891
Author(s):  
Todor Kalinov

Management and Command253 are two different words and terms, but military structures use them as synonyms. Military commanders’ authorities are almost equal in meaning to civilian managers’ privileges and power. Comparison between military command and the civilian management system structure, organization, and way of work shows almost full identity and overlapping. The highest in scale and size military systems are national ministries of defense and multinational military alliances and coalitions. Military systems at this level combine military command structures with civilian political leadership and support elements. Therefore, they incorporate both military command and civilian management organizations without any complications, because their nature originated from same source and have similar framework and content. Management of organizations requires communication in order to plan, coordinate, lead, control, and conduct all routine or extraordinary activities. Immediate long-distance communications originated from telegraphy, which was firstly applied in 19th century. Later, long-distance communications included telephony, aerial transmitting, satellite, and last but not least internet data exchange. They allowed immediate exchange of letters, voice and images, bringing to new capabilities of the managers. Their sophisticated technical base brought to new area of the military command and civilian management structures. These area covered technical and operational parts of communications, and created engineer sub-field of science, that has become one of the most popular educations, worldwide. Communications were excluded from the military command and moved to separate field, named Computers and Communications. A historic overview and analysis of the command and management structures and requirements shows their relationships, common origin, and mission. They have significant differences: management and control are based on humanities, natural and social sciences, while communications are mainly based on engineering and technology. These differences do not create enough conditions for defragmentation of communications from the management structures. They exist together in symbiosis and management structures need communications in order to exist and multiply their effectiveness and efficiency. Future defragmentation between military command and communications will bring risks of worse coordination, need for more human resources, and worse end states. These risks are extremely negative for nations and should be avoided by wide appliance of the education and science among nowadays and future leaders, managers, and commanders.


Author(s):  
Asle Toje

We do not want to place anyone into the shadow, we also claim our place in the sun.” In a foreign policy debate in the German parliament on December 6. 1897 the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow, articulated the foreign policy aspirations of the ascendant Wilhelmine Germany. This proved easier said than done. In 1907, Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office penned his famous memorandum where he accounted for “the present state of British relations with France and Germany.” He concluded that Britain should meet imperial Germany with “unvarying courtesy and consideration” while maintaining “the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe.”...


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