Judeophobic Antisemitism among British Voters, 2016-2020

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Allington

Through secondary analysis of survey data collected by YouGov for Campaign Against Antisemitism, this research note provides a longitudinal account of changes in Judeophobic antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Jews identified as Jews) in mainland Britain from 2016-2020. Because survey responses are aggregated by most recent general election vote, the dataset facilitates comparison between those who voted for each of Britain’s three main parties in the 2015, 2017, and 2019 UK general elections. (Those who voted for other parties, as well as those who did not vote and those for whom voting data are missing, are aggregated as a fourth category.) Amongst those who voted for the centrist Liberal Democrat party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism declined throughout the period. Amongst those who voted for the left-wing Labour Party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism began at a low level, rose to a peak in 2018, and then declined, returning to something close to their 2016 level by 2020. Changes amongst other voter groups were less clear-cut, although all voter groups saw a decline in Judeophobic antisemitism from 2019 to 2020. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze trends in antizionist antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Israel and its supporters), comparative figures for that form of antisemitism are provided for the years 2019–2020.

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Allington

Through secondary analysis of survey data collected by YouGov for Campaign Against Antisemitism, this research note provides a longitudinal account of changes in Judeophobic antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Jews identified as Jews) in mainland Britain from 2016-2020. Because survey responses are aggregated by most recent general election vote, the dataset facilitates comparison between those who voted for each of Britain’s three main parties in the 2015, 2017, and 2019 UK general elections. (Those who voted for other parties, as well as those who did not vote and those for whom voting data are missing, are aggregated as a fourth category.) Amongst those who voted for the centrist Liberal Democrat party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism declined throughout the period. Amongst those who voted for the left-wing Labour Party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism began at a low level, rose to a peak in 2018, and then declined, returning to something close to their 2016 level by 2020. Changes amongst other voter groups were less clear-cut, although all voter groups saw a decline in Judeophobic antisemitism from 2019 to 2020. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze trends in antizionist antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Israel and its supporters), comparative figures for that form of antisemitism are provided for the years 2019–2020.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Allington

Through secondary analysis of survey data collected by YouGov for Campaign Against Antisemitism, this research note provides a longitudinal account of changes in Judeophobic antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Jews identified as Jews) in mainland Britain from 2016-2020. Because survey responses are aggregated by most recent general election vote, the dataset facilitates comparison between those who voted for each of Britain’s three main parties in the 2015, 2017, and 2019 UK general elections. (Those who voted for other parties, as well as those who did not vote and those for whom voting data are missing, are aggregated as a fourth category.) Amongst those who voted for the centrist Liberal Democrat party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism declined throughout the period. Amongst those who voted for the left-wing Labour Party, levels of Judeophobic antisemitism began at a low level, rose to a peak in 2018, and then declined, returning to something close to their 2016 level by 2020. Changes amongst other voter groups were less clear-cut, although all voter groups saw a decline in Judeophobic antisemitism from 2019 to 2020. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze trends in antizionist antisemitism (that is, antisemitism articulated in relation to Israel and its supporters), comparative figures for that form of antisemitism are provided for the years 2019–2020.


Sociology ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (5) ◽  
pp. 915-933 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Mercea ◽  
Duygu Karatas ◽  
Marco T Bastos

We revisit the notion of activist persistence against the backdrop of protest communication on Twitter. We take an event-based approach and examine Occupy Gezi, a series of protests that occurred in Turkey in the early summer of 2013. By cross-referencing survey data with longitudinal Twitter data and in-depth interviews, we investigate the relationship between biographical availability, relational and organisational ties, and social and personal costs to persistent activism online and on location. Contrary to expectations, we find no clear-cut relationship between those factors and sustained commitment to participation in the occupation. We show that persistent activist communication did not feed into enduring organisational structures despite the continuous online activity observed during and beyond the peak of the Gezi occupation. The article concludes with reflections on the organisational ramifications of persistent communication and its significance in a political context posing high risks to participation in dissident politics.


1975 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay Meddin

This study is a longitudinal investigation of the relationship between age and subjective outlook. Over the years, a number of theoretical positions have been introduced to either account for or to minimize age differences in attitudes, values and beliefs. The author has organized these theories of aging into three basic sociological frameworks or models: the “generations” model, the “age status” model and the “illusion of differences” model. Using a relatively simple methodological design, hypotheses derived from these models were tested through secondary analysis of survey data. Strong support was found for the “generations” hypothesis, weak support for the “age status” hypothesis, and no support at all for the “illusion of differences” hypothesis.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Whiteley ◽  
Monica Poletti ◽  
Paul Webb ◽  
Tim Bale

This article investigates the remarkable surge in individual membership of the Labour Party after the general election of May 2015, particularly after Jeremy Corbyn was officially nominated as a candidate for the leadership in June of that year. Using both British Election Study and Party Members Project data, we explain the surge by focussing on the attitudinal, ideological and demographic characteristics of the members themselves. Findings suggest that, along with support for the leader and yearning for a new style of politics, feelings of relative deprivation played a significant part: many ‘left-behind’ voters (some well-educated, some less so) joined Labour for the first time when a candidate with a clearly radical profile appeared on the leadership ballot. Anti-capitalist and left-wing values mattered too, particularly for those former members who decided to return to the party.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-458
Author(s):  
Anmol Bhandari ◽  
Serdar Birinci ◽  
Ellen R. McGrattan ◽  
Kurt See

This paper examines the reliability of survey data on business incomes, valuations, and rates of return, which are key inputs for studies of wealth inequality and entrepreneurial choice. We compare survey responses of business owners with available data from administrative tax records, brokered private business sales, and publicly traded company filings and document problems due to nonrepresentative samples and measurement errors across several surveys, subsamples, and years. We find that the discrepancies are economically relevant for the statistics of interest. We investigate reasons for these discrepancies and propose corrections for future survey designs. (JEL C82, C83, D22)


1999 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 316-339

Thursday 28 May 1942 The Labour Party has been airing its views at its conference in London during the last two days — it stands for the usual things and its speakers bawl out the usual platitudes. In the old days one did not bother much about what was said at Labour conferences, but nowadays one realises that all this claptrap has a bigger and bigger following of people — unthinking people, I think. The left wing intelligentsia always strike me as the most unthinking of men: their theories are all based on the old worn out, futile, untrue assumption of equality — all men may be equal in the eyes of God, but He never made all men equal to the tasks which they are set. To institute a new order of society on the basis of equality is doomed to failure — because it implies bringing men down to the level of the least fit among them to cope with the problems of life. In such a society progress in the true sense of the word would, I am certain, be impossible — unless, indeed, it were possible to change all the human instincts. Is it likely that a man would give of his best if he were to gain no reward for his efforts? Would not the natural instinct of each one of us be to sit back and do as little as possible, if he knew that he would be kept by the State?Friday 29 May I went to a Boys Club near Byker Bridge and afterwards went on the Byker and Heaton Conservative Working Men's Club. Everyone there was very civil to me and I drank a lot of beer — I also spoke for about five minutes which I gathered was as much as they wanted. Several men came and talked to me, asking questions — clearly the Russian complex has taken possession of some of them — it is odd how quickly propaganda has an effect upon the crowd - one might think that Russia was of more importance to us than our own country.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten Strøby Jensen

Do political attitudes influence the likelihood of employees being members of a trade union, and to what extent is this the case in the Nordic countries with their high aggregate levels of membership? In this article, I address these questions using European Social Survey data from 2012. The results show that left-wing political attitudes have the most impact on the likelihood of trade union membership in Sweden and to a lesser extent in Denmark. In Norway and Finland, there is no statistically significant impact. I argue that the impact of left-wing political attitudes on unionization in Sweden and Denmark reflects a conception among employees that trade unions are normative organizations.


Author(s):  
Thomas Quinn

This chapter offers an account of the Labour Party between the 2015 and 2017 general elections. It explains why Jeremy Corbyn became Labour leader and how the party moved further to the left. It examines the very different responses to Corbyn’s leadership from within the party, and why he was both challenged for the party leadership by his MPs and able to defend his position with enormous support from the mass membership. It finishes by examining how, after languishing in the polls, Labour defied expectations on polling day by dramatically increasing its vote share.


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