scholarly journals Protection of privacy in Malaysia: A law for the future

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Zuryati Mohamed Yusoff

<p>In Malaysia, the rights and liberties of the individual are recognised in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. However, the right to privacy does not have the express constitutional recognition enjoyed by other rights such as the right to life and liberty and freedom of expression. This thesis identifies gaps in the protection of privacy interests in the current legal framework. There is no self-standing law on privacy in Malaysia, though there are several laws which provide limited rights to privacy such as the laws on data protection and criminal law. The existing laws are inadequate to protect private information and to protect against the intrusion of privacy. The importation of foreign principles through the reception of English Common Law offers only limited protection. Malaysia should, therefore, have a specific law to protect privacy. With a view to attaining that goal for Malaysia, this thesis undertakes a comparative analysis of two different experiences of the development of the law of privacy. They are the privacy law in England, which is largely based on the law of breach of confidence, and the privacy law in New Zealand, which has a distinct privacy tort recognised in its case law. The conclusion is that those countries’ experience can inform developments in Malaysia, and that the best way for Malaysia to develop its law now is by the enactment of a specific Privacy Act.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Zuryati Mohamed Yusoff

<p>In Malaysia, the rights and liberties of the individual are recognised in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. However, the right to privacy does not have the express constitutional recognition enjoyed by other rights such as the right to life and liberty and freedom of expression. This thesis identifies gaps in the protection of privacy interests in the current legal framework. There is no self-standing law on privacy in Malaysia, though there are several laws which provide limited rights to privacy such as the laws on data protection and criminal law. The existing laws are inadequate to protect private information and to protect against the intrusion of privacy. The importation of foreign principles through the reception of English Common Law offers only limited protection. Malaysia should, therefore, have a specific law to protect privacy. With a view to attaining that goal for Malaysia, this thesis undertakes a comparative analysis of two different experiences of the development of the law of privacy. They are the privacy law in England, which is largely based on the law of breach of confidence, and the privacy law in New Zealand, which has a distinct privacy tort recognised in its case law. The conclusion is that those countries’ experience can inform developments in Malaysia, and that the best way for Malaysia to develop its law now is by the enactment of a specific Privacy Act.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Abby Ward

<p>This paper examines the potential impact of recent English privacy jurisprudence on the New Zealand tort of privacy. The paper contrasts the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s aversion towards an over-expansive privacy right expressed in Hosking v Runting with an increasing readiness to override freedom of expression in favour of privacy interests in the United Kingdom. Three central conflicts in the courts’ reasoning are addressed in detail, namely privacy’s relationship with public places, individuals with public profiles and mediums of publication. While developments in English privacy law highlight reasoning flaws and theoretical shortcomings in Hosking, the increasing influence European jurisprudence on English law may nevertheless justify some divergence in the two jurisdictions’ balancing of privacy and freedom of expression.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 03 (02) ◽  
pp. 60-67
Author(s):  
Assia BOUAMRA

The new millennium has brought about profound developments in society, reaching all fields through which means of communication have become, as a result of the digital revolution, basic pillars for the growth of countries' economies, which has affected the traditional human lifestyle socially, economically and culturally, and it became necessary to update the current legal arsenal to match the new bets, as the law Not in isolation from developments in the technological arena, it has become necessary to frame these technologies in order to protect the individual and society alike, as it is wrong to ignore the thesis of the effects of cyberspace on society and the law.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Abby Ward

<p>This paper examines the potential impact of recent English privacy jurisprudence on the New Zealand tort of privacy. The paper contrasts the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s aversion towards an over-expansive privacy right expressed in Hosking v Runting with an increasing readiness to override freedom of expression in favour of privacy interests in the United Kingdom. Three central conflicts in the courts’ reasoning are addressed in detail, namely privacy’s relationship with public places, individuals with public profiles and mediums of publication. While developments in English privacy law highlight reasoning flaws and theoretical shortcomings in Hosking, the increasing influence European jurisprudence on English law may nevertheless justify some divergence in the two jurisdictions’ balancing of privacy and freedom of expression.</p>


Author(s):  
Lidija Rozentale

There is a continuous debate in the public space on the need for a legal framework for the partnership institute to ensure equal legal security for the family, regardless of the existence or non-existence of the legal fact of its foundation. The fundamental aspects of the debate include the insufficient regulatory framework and vulnerability of partners before the law, divergent national views on partnerships as a union between opposite-sex partners, religious beliefs condemning non-marital relationships, including the existing property issues in the context of partnerships. According to the Author of the Paper, the existing partnerships in Latvia are discriminated in favour for the marriage due to the moral views and legal aspects, as the individual living in the partnership is restricted in terms of access to information and is vulnerable in terms of property rights. For example, when an individual lives in the partnership, he or she is denied the right to be informed about the health status of the other partner and the existing liabilities in credit institutions. In cohabitation, the individual is not recognised as a member of the family of the tenant for the purpose of the Law on Residential Tenancy and the potential consequences of the partnership may be the denied right to inheritance or tenancy.Main methods used: sociological method for analysing the compliance of laws and regulations with public interests and aims. 


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-32
Author(s):  
Thomas Keenan

Abstract Despite the ubiquitous coverage of the Libyan revolution throughout the last six months, very little has been said regarding the legal foundations for the rebels’ actions. Within the international legal framework, it must be asked whether the Libyan people even had a legal right in the first place to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. In fact, the existence of a right to rebel under international law is very much an unsettled matter. Among the sources of international law, a right to rebel is not enumerated in any of the principal international instruments. In truth, the only significant mention of the right is a passing but ambiguous reference in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A customary right of revolution is similarly absent, as many nations criminalize treason and other insurrectionary activities. Instead, if such a right exists in international law, it must derive from the well-enshrined right of self-determination. Th is right would thus constitute an additional exception to international law’s general prohibition on the use force, standing alongside self-defense and Security Council peace enforcement. Yet establishing a right of revolution would mark a significant departure from these other exemptions. In essence, the right of revolution represents an allowance for non-state actors to resort to force unilaterally for the protection of human rights. For this very reason, contemporary international law likely does not recognize a popular right to revolt. In light of international law’s fi rm restrictions on lawful uses of force, there is no evidence that the law currently acknowledges a novel exception for the individual enforcement of human rights. Th us, in the absence of a change in the law, the proper legal remedy for the Libyan people was not rebellion but rather an appeal to the international community.


Author(s):  
Laurence Brunet ◽  
Véronique Fournier

This chapter compares French and American approaches to assisted reproductive technologies (ART). These countries are a fascinating (and unexplored) mirror: the United States focuses on the individual, while France emphasizes the best interest of society as a whole. This results in an access to ART largely open in the United States, yet all costs are covered by patients, and an access strictly regulated by law in France (and quite restricted until recent changes), yet costs are fully financed. This chapter introduces readers to the legal framework of access to ART in France and its cultural foundations. It highlights the insistence on the “right to privacy” in the United States, a concept much less valued in France, and concludes with a discussion, using clinical cases, of the ethical issues underlying tensions between reproductive autonomy and public policymaking, which differ in both countries.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-170
Author(s):  
Edita Gruodytė ◽  
Saulė Milčiuvienė

Abstract In Lithuania rules for the anonymization of court decisions were introduced in 2005. These rules require automatic anonymization of all court decisions, which in the opinion of the authors violates the public interest to know and freedom of expression is unjustifiably restricted on behalf of the right to privacy. This issue covers two diametrically opposed human rights: the right to privacy and the right to information. The first question is how the balance between two equivalent rights could be reached. The second question is whether this regulation is in accordance with the law as it is established in the national Constitution and revealed by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania and developed by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The authors conclude that the legislator is not empowered to delegate to the Judicial Council issues which are a matter of legal regulation and suggest possible solutions evaluating practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights, and selected EU countries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (15) ◽  
pp. 111-125
Author(s):  
Yuriivna Timofeyeva

The article considers some issues of interpretation of the right to privacy in the practice of the ECtHR and its impact on the criminal law of Ukraine. Numerous violations of the articles of the Convention require systematic response of the state and appropriate changes in both legislation and changes in law enforcement practices. The violations relate in particular to problems of interpretation of the provisions of the Convention. Provisions of Art. 8 of the Convention are related to other provisions of the Convention and the development of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on certain issues. It is noted that the Convention is dynamic, it changes under the influence of society, its provisions change in the process of development and acquire new meanings. In particular, the ECtHR recognizes a violation of Art. 8 (right to respect for private life) in those contexts in which he has not previously recognized. In particular, interpretation of Art. 8 of the Convention in the context of the right to environmental safety in case significant harm to the persons health (cases Dubetska and others v. Ukraine, Grymkivska v. Ukraine), the right to beg in the context of the right to freedom of expression (Lakatush v. Switzerland). It is established that the development of these provisions requires analysis and consideration in the development of a new Criminal Code. At the same time, care must be taken to maintain a balance between freedoms and human rights and the security of society and the state. It is important that the rights enshrined in the Convention remain fundamental and do not go beyond the interests and needs of the individual. In addition, it is also necessary to take into account the national characteristics of the state.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (55) ◽  
pp. 592
Author(s):  
Paulo Gustavo Gonet BRANCO ◽  
Pedro Henrique de Moura Gonet BRANCO

ABSTRACTThe article addresses the peculiarities and complexities of the cyberspace regulation, acknowledging, but not endorsing, the utopic ideal of the cyberspace as a no-law virtual territory. It explores the variety of means of regulating people interconnections around the Globe through the Internet. It points up the need of due heteronomous protection of interests and claims linked to the core proposes of the Internet itself, such as those deriving from the freedom of expression and concerns with the right to privacy. The article takes as standing point Lawrence Lessig’s pathetic dot theory about the four forces that design the use of Internet potentialities. It then focuses on the Brazilian current basic cyberspace normative framework and refers it to Lessig’s theory, mentioning challenges yet to be met. It intends to share the Brazilian experience with the large English speaking auditory, pointing out how Brazilian legal framework relates to mainstream academic approach to Internet regulatory issues. KEYWORDS: Cyberspace Regulation; Internet; Pathetic Dot. RESUMOO artigo examina as peculiaridades e complexidades da regulação do cyberspace, aludindo ao ideal utópico desse espaço como um território virtual plenamente autônomo, mas não endossando essa postura. Explora a variedade dos meios de regulação das interconexões que a Internet propicia em todo o mundo. Assinala a necessidade de que interesses intimamente vinculados aos propósitos mesmos da Internet, como a liberdade de expressão e inquietações com direito a privacidade, sejam devidamente regulados de modo heterônomo. O artigo parte da teoria pathetic dot de Lawrence Lessig sobre as quatro forças que conformam o uso das potencialidades da Internet. Em seguida enfoca a estrutura normativa básica brasileira, referindo-a à teoria de Lessig e mencionando desafios ainda a serem enfrentados. O artigo intenta compartilhar a experiência brasileira com o mais largo auditório do público que se comunica em inglês, apontando como a estrutura normativa brasileira se relaciona com as mais modernas e importantes contribuições acadêmicas sobre regulação da Internet. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Regulação do Cyberspace; Internet; pathetic dot.


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