Die phänomenologische Methode der Wesensschau und ihre Präzisierung als eidetische Variation

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Lohmar
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
Human Ability ◽  
Logical Investigations ◽  
Eidetic Variation

In this contribution I will discuss Husserl’s eidetic method, which is dedicated to discover the apriori structures of consciousness. The method of seeing essences of the Logical Investigations (1900) should mark the opposition of phenomenology as an apriori science of consciousness and empirical psychology. The eidetic method starts as an everyday human ability to recognize equalities in different things, but it can and must be refined to become the basic phenomenological method. In the lecture Phenomenological Psychology (1925) the eidetic method is specified as eidetic variation, which is characterized by the demand for unlimited variation of the starting example in phantasy. – The second part of my article is dedicated to critical considerations. One topic is the problematic interaction of an ideally infinite variation together with the necessary limitation of this variation (to avoid crossing the conceptual demarcations of the starting example). From this point of view questions concerning the true sense and unavoidable limitations of the eidetic method are discussed anew.

The Phenomenological Method of Eidetic Intuition and Its Clarification as Eidetic Variation

Husserl ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 110-138
Author(s):  
Dieter Lohmar
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
Intimate Connection ◽  
Eidetic Variation ◽  
Empirical Generalizations ◽  
Eidetic Intuition

This chapter investigates phenomenology’s “eidetic” methodology, which, when applied to the essential structures of consciousness, opposes an empirical psychology that must rest on empirical generalizations. It clarifies the sense in which eidetic intuition is a form of cognition and how it yields knowledge of a priori (necessary and universal) structures without falling into a kind of Platonism that hypostasizes what is essential to a type. It also explores the intimate connection between “free phantasy” or imaginative variation and the resultant eidetic intuition. In concluding, it discusses a series of potential difficulties with the notions of eidetic variation and intuition.

scholarly journals The Experience Qualities Approach to Leadership and Employee Well-being

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilkka Salmi ◽  
Ville Pietiläinen ◽  
Antti Syväjärvi
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Professional Organization ◽  
Organizational Studies ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Depth Interviews ◽  
Practical Implications

A phenomenological psychology approach in organizational studies has been somewhat overlooked, particularly in research on leadership and employee well-being. This study presents a new way of examining leadership and employee well-being. A novel experience qualities approach was utilized with the aim of revealing the authentic structure of human experiences, particularly experience qualities such as emotions, knowledge, and assumptions. This study investigated the role of leadership in creating employee well-being experiences in a professional organization. The data were collected from 23 in-depth interviews conducted with company leaders and employees in Finland and then analyzed using the phenomenological method. The results indicated affirmative similarities and differences (experience domains) in experience qualities of well-being between leaders and employees. By identifying different experience qualities of well-being, leaders can promote their own and employees’ well-being more precisely and effectively. Practical implications for leaders are discussed.

scholarly journals DIALOGIC PHENOMENOLOGY OF PAIN EXPERIENCE SAULIUS GENIUSAS THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PAIN. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2020 ISBN 978-0-8214-2403-2

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 328-341
Author(s):  
VITALIY LEKHTSIER ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Biological Sciences ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Ohio University ◽  
Pain Experience ◽  
The Social ◽  
Eidetic Variation ◽  
Franz Brentano ◽  
Dialogical Phenomenology ◽  
Methodological Principles ◽  
The One

The review focuses on Saulius Geniusas’ book, The Phenomenology of Pain. In this study, Geniusas develops his own systematic phenomenology of the experience of pain, based primarily on the conceptual resources of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. In doing so, the philosopher formulates and successfully implements original methodological principles of “dialogical phenomenology.” Such a phenomenology consists of, on the one hand, strict phenomenological analysis of pain based on the methods of epoché, phenomenological reduction and eidetic variation, and on the other hand, of actual and partly polemical inclusion of phenomenological point of view in the ongoing discussion of pain in the social and biological sciences. The author manages to do this by supplementing his eidetic analysis of the essence of pain experience with the method of “factual variations” and by appealing to the analytical optics of Husserl’s late genetic phenomenology. This way the book reflects—on strictly phenomenological grounds—numerous findings from the sociology and biology of pain. The book relies on the tradition of phenomenological research, offers a conceptual reconstruction of the key dispute about pain that took place in this tradition (between Franz Brentano and Carl Stump) and, in its turn, grounds the positive sciences of pain in the direct evidence of experience itself.

From Kant to Hegel via Philippe Pinel

Anxiety ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 77-96
Author(s):  
Bettina Bergo
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Sharp Contrast ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
The World ◽  
As If

This excursus reviews Kant’s treatment of Affectus and Leidenschafte (affects and passions) in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (lectures given over a span of many years). Having argued that empirical psychology was scientifically unfeasible and established his rational psychology as beyond the fictions of dogmatic metaphysicians, Kant could only treat affects from the perspective of practice in the world, like a behaviorism before its time. Nevertheless, his classification of passions ran as if parallel with psychopathologies—ordered according to representations, imagination, judgement, and reason. Building on his 1763 essay “Negative Magnitudes,” the anthropology was profoundly critical of affects, pointing to those “tensions constantly ready to explode,” and requiring vigilance. In sharp contrast, Hegel reintegrated passions into his mature Philosophy of Mind (1813) arguing that inclinations and passions overcame their subjective enclosure thanks to the idea of freedom. He supported his arguments using the French revolutionary psychiatry of Philippe Pinel. Pinel’s original taxonomy had the advantage of being monist; thus different from the binary of neurosis and psychosis, Pinel argued in favor of forms of “mania.” Crucial for Hegel was that even manias with delirium, grouping passions around an idée fixe, an indestructible kernel of rationality endured. This allowed Hegel to claim that freedom and nature were rooted in reason, and although reason might find itself tangled in contradictions it never entirely disappeared. This audacious claim resignified the function of reason as Geistlichkeit (spirituality) apt to integrate psychology into the dialectical movement of mind subjective.

Sketch for a Phenomenology of Dreaming

1993 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-143
Author(s):  
Cecile T. Tougas
Keyword(s):  
Lived Experience ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Major Work ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Internal Time ◽  
Fundamental Structure ◽  
Time Consciousness ◽  
Extended Sense ◽  
Logical Investigations

AbstractDreaming as lived experience qualifies as intentional life, despite its strangeness. Yet the dream-phenomena themselves receive little direct clarification consistent with Edmund Husserl's major work on conscious intentionality. With fundamental accomplishments of Husserlian phenomenology in play, how could a study of these neglected appearances begin? First it is necessary to describe the essential relevant Husserlian concepts. From Husserl's descriptions in his phenomenological psychology, his analysis of internal time-consciousness, and his theory of wholes and parts in Logical Investigations, the sense of intentionality as a streaming indivisible nexus, a double continuity of inseparable wholeness, becomes evident. Immersed in this self-awareness, we do not find it difficult to access dream-appearances and account for their connection in intentional life. A claim can be made for their presentational objectivity as well as for their "gnomonic" subjectivity. A systematic sketch of their typology or fundamental structure is thus possible without reducing dream-intentionality to something other than itself. Hence, a Husserlian sense of conscious lived experience is first presented. Dream evidence is then considered, despite possible bewilderment, in order to provide a clue to an extended sense of both subjectivity and objectivity. Lines toward a development of dream typicality are thereby indicated.

scholarly journals Psychologia opisowa na nowo odczytana? Szkic o metodzie w filozofii Leopolda Blausteina

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-91
Author(s):  
Witold Płotka
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Biography ◽  
Descriptive Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
The Third ◽  
Logical Investigations ◽  
The One ◽  
Selection Of

The main purpose of the article is to define the framework in which one can situate Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy. The author focuses on the question of the method which is used by Blaustein and he situates it in the historical-philosophical context. The article defends the thesis that Blaustein uses a method which can be labelled as a phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology that is close to, though not identical with, Edmund Husserl’s project as formulated in the first edition of his Logical Investigations and that is connected to Husserl’s 1925 lectures on the phenomenological psychology. The article is divided into four parts. In the first part, the author disputes the one-sided classifications of Blaustein’s philosophy either as a continuator of the analytical tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School, or as a mere repetition of Husserl’s achievements. In the next part, the author sketches an intellectual biography of Blaustein and on this basis he defines the context in which one has to situate this thought. In this regard, two further parts of the article are devoted to two sources of inspiration for Blaustein. In the third part, a selection of methods and concepts of descriptive psychology are examined, and in the last part of the article, references to Husserl’s phenomenology are explored.

Baumgarten and Kant on Clarity, Distinctness, and the Differentiation of our Mental Powers

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudolf A. Makkreel
Keyword(s):  
Careful Analysis ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
Mental Powers ◽  
The Mind

This chapter examines Baumgarten’s empirical psychology by comparing it with Kant’s discussion of the same material in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Through a careful analysis of both texts, Makkreel shows that while Kant clearly adopts much of the structure and terminology of his own empirical psychology directly from Baumgarten, he nevertheless reworks and reorganizes these in quite different ways. According to Makkreel, this can be explained by Kant’s removal of empirical psychology from the realm of metaphysics, and his repurposing of Baumgarten’s ideas for the sake of developing a pragmatic, and ultimately morally directed, theory for the cultivation of the mind.

Phänomenologie und Medizin

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-308
Author(s):  
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Life World ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
Anthropological Medicine ◽  
The One

This paper pursues two aims. First, it outlines the main intentions of a recently established research project dealing with problems of subjectivity in the field of medicine. Secondly, it discusses Viktor von Weizsäcker’s Gestaltkreis with a view to what this famous physician considers a phenomenological method appropriate to the special requirements of his field of work. Considering whether his ideas make sense from the point of view of a phenomenological philosophy, we try to explain some basic correspondences of phenomenology and Weizsäcker’s anthropological medicine. Doing this, we focus on two issues, namely objectivity and subjectivity, and theory and practice. Referring to the latter there are two meanings of ‚practice‘ which have to be carefully distinguished: natural experience embedded in our daily life-world activities on the one hand, and applications of (natural-)scientific knowledge on the other hand.

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