scholarly journals Sobre la imaginación productiva en la Crítica de la Razón Pura

2017 ◽  
pp. 133
Author(s):  
Diego Sanhueza
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason

Resumen:En este escrito se analizan los elementos de una teoría de la imaginación en la Crítica de la Razón Pura de Kant. La gran novedad del tratamiento que Kant le da a la imaginación consiste en postular la existencia de una imaginación productiva, es decir, una imaginación que es anterior y que está en la base de la imaginación empírica. En este artículo, se realiza este análisis en dos pasos: en primer lugar, se examina el significado dela noción de “imaginación”, distinguiéndola de las otras facultades (sen- sibilidad y entendimiento); en segundo lugar, se distinguen dos niveles en la imaginación misma, uno reproductivo y otro productivo.Palabras Clave: Imaginación - Síntesis - Producción - Percepción - ConceptoAbstract:In this paper, the elements of a theory of imagination are analyzed in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The great innovation of Kant’s treatment of imagination consists in proposing the existence of a productive imagi- nation, that is, an imagination which is prior and is at the basis of the empirical imagination. This article carries out the analysis in two steps: firstly, it reviews the meaning of the notion of “imagination”, distinguish - ing it from the other faculties (sensitivity and understanding); secondly, two levels are distinguished in the imagination itself, one reproductive and another productive.Keywords: Imagination - synthesis - production - perception – conceptResumo:Neste escrito, analisam-se os elementos de uma teoria da imaginação na Crítica da Razão Pura de Kant. A grande novidade do tratamento que Kant dá a imaginação é postular a existência de uma imaginação produtiva, ou seja, uma imaginação que é anterior e se encontra na base da imagi- nação empírica. Neste artigo, se realiza esta análise em duas etapas: em primeiro lugar, examina-se o significado do conceito de “imaginação”, distinguindo-a de outras faculdades (sensibilidade e entendimento); em segundo lugar, se distinguem dois níveis na imaginação mesma, um reprodutivo e outro produtivo.Palavras-chave: Imaginação - síntese - produção - percepção - conceito.

The Two Dogmas without Empiricism

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan W. Hall
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Theoretical Domain ◽  
The Third ◽  
New Form ◽  
Web Of Belief ◽  
Meaningful Sentence ◽  
Immediate Experience

AbstractIn Two Dogmas of Empiricism W.V. Quine begins his attack on the analytic/ synthetic dogma by criticizing Immanuel Kant’s conception of analyticity. After dismissing Kant’s interpretation as well as others, he articulates a view of the analytic/synthetic distinction that connects it to the other dogma of empiricism, reductionism. Ultimately, Quine rejects both dogmas in favor of a new form of empiricism which subscribes to neither one. Just as Quine believes it is possible to accept empiricism without the dogmas, I will argue that the Kantian can accept both dogmas while avoiding the forms of empiricism that Quine considers in his article. The paper is broken into four sections. First, I offer a brief overview of the two dogmas and their relationship to one another before examining Quine’s argument against ‘radical reductionism’, i.e., the position that every meaningful sentence is translatable into a sentence about immediate experience that is either true or false. The second section shows how one of Kant’s arguments from the Critique of Pure Reason anticipates the crux of Quine’s argument against radical reductionism. What is left after this argument is only an ’attenuated form’ of reductionism that Quine believes is identical to the analytic/synthetic distinction. In the third section, I explain how Kantians can draw the analytic/ synthetic distinction in a way that is consistent with this attenuated form of reductionism while avoiding the objections that Quine lodges against the two dogmas. I argue that this allows the Kantian to accept the dogmas while avoiding both the radically reductive form of empiricism as well as the form of empiricism that Quine endorses (web-of-belief holism). Finally, I will consider how this Kantian version of the analytic/synthetic distinction can be extended beyond the theoretical domain to practical and aesthetic sentences

Kant, Intervention and the ‘Failed State’

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 91-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Cavallar ◽  
August Reinisch
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Failed State ◽  
Important Development ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Political Works

Nowadays Kant's practical philosophy (including his political philosophy) is as highly regarded as his theoretical philosophy. This is an important development since the more constructive side of Kant's philosophy is to be found in his moral and political works. The main task of the Critique of Pure Reason is to clarify its concepts and to get rid of basic errors, and thus only ‘negative’. The moral and political writings, on the other hand, try to expand the scope of reason ‘for practical purposes’ (‘in praktischer Absicht’). Establishing principles of moral and political conduct, their main objective is not negative, but constructive.

Metaphilosophical Pluralism and Paraconsistency

1998 ◽  
pp. 5-12
Author(s):  
M.E. Orellana Benado ◽  
Andrés Bobenrieth ◽  
Carlos Verdugo
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Human Activity ◽  
Research Program ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Other Hand

In a famous passage, Kant claimed that controversy and the lack of agreement in metaphysics — here understood as philosophy as a whole — was a ‘scandal.’ Attempting to motivate his critique of pure reason, a project aimed at both ending the scandal and setting philosophy on the ‘secure path of science,’ Kant endorsed the view that for as long as disagreement reigned sovereign in philosophy, there would be little to be learned from it as a science. The success of philosophy begins when controversy ends and culminates when the discipline itself as it has been known disappears. On the other hand, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, many have despaired of the very possibility of philosophy constituting the search for truth, that is to say, a cognitive human activity, and constituting thus a source of knowledge. This paper seeks to sketch a research program that is motivated by an intuition that opposes both of these views.

Metaphilosophical Pluralism and Paraconsistency

1998 ◽  
pp. 30-37
Author(s):  
Andrés Bobenrieth ◽  
Orellana Benado Carlos Verdugo
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Human Activity ◽  
Research Program ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Other Hand

In a famous passage, Kant claimed that controversy and the lack of agreement in metaphysics—here understood as philosophy as a whole—was a ‘scandal.’ Attempting to motivate his critique of pure reason, a project aimed at both ending the scandal and setting philosophy on the ‘secure path of science,’ Kant endorsed the view that for as long as disagreement reigned sovereign in philosophy, there would be little to be learned from it as a science. The success of philosophy begins when controversy ends and culminates when the discipline itself as it has been known disappears. On the other hand, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, many have despaired of the very possibility of philosophy constituting the search for truth, that is to say, a cognitive human activity, and constituting thus a source of knowledge. This paper seeks to sketch a research program that is motivated by an intuition that opposes both of these views.

scholarly journals Kant's wager. Kant's strong belief in extra-terrestrial life, the history of this question and its challenge for theology today

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 261-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Losch
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Strong Belief ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Terrestrial Life ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

AbstractKant was not the first in whom the ‘starry heavens’ above us inspired awe and wonder. For Kant, who was firmly convinced of the existence of inhabitants of other worlds, these heavens were inhabited. He is certain that ‘If it were possible to settle by any sort of experience whether there are inhabitants of at least some of the planets that we see, I might well bet everything that I have on it. Hence I say that it is not merely an opinion but a strong belief (on the correctness of which I would wager many advantages in life) that there are also inhabitants of other worlds.’ In this statement by Kant in no less a work than the Critique of Pure Reason one can, on the one hand, recognize a reflection of Kant's earlier convictions and expositions, on the other hand, the context of the citation and the contemporary background are, of course, relevant. Following the example of Kant, this paper investigates the meaning of such reflections about inhabitants of alien worlds, which due to advances in planetary astronomy are today again on the agenda. Consideration of this subject also represents a challenge for theology.

Necessity, Existence and Transcendental Idealism

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 55-77
Author(s):  
Robert Greenberg
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Other Hand

The role of transcendental idealism in Kant's theory of knowledge has been both deliberately underrated1 and inadvertently exaggerated. If conceivably not necessary, its role in Kant's explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason is at least pivotal to the success of the explanation. On the other hand, though transcendental idealism depends on Kant's epistemological criterion of an existing object, or, simply, his criterion of existence, the criterion for its part is actually independent of the idealism. In fact, it may be because this independence has hardly been recognized that commentators have been unaware of the role the criterion may actually be playing in the continuing controversy over the correct interpretation of the idealism. Altogether, this article addresses both shortcomings – the underestimation and the exaggeration of the role of the idealism in Kant's epistemology. While it places the idealism at the centre of the epistemology, it also separates the criterion of existence from the idealism. In highlighting this contrast, the article explains how the criterion may actually be contributing to the persistence of the ongoing dispute over the correct interpretation of the idealism.

scholarly journals Categories and Logical Forms in Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction

MANUSYA ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-37
Author(s):  
Soraj Hongladarom
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Face

Compared with the other sections of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, the Metaphysical Deduction is among the most obscure and it seems that the section has not received as much critical and interpretive attention as its cousin, the Transcendental Deduction. This is rather surprising because it is at the Metaphysical Deduction that Kant crucial in establishing his program of justifying empirical knowledge in the face of radical skepticism. It is argued in this paper that the connection between the two types of logic is as follows: the logical forms, which belong to formal logic, are the ratio cognoscendi of the Pure Concepts of Understanding, since they provide the key to knowing the latter. On the other hand, the categories are the ratio essendi of the Logical forms, for it is the former that are the condition of the possibility of the latter.

scholarly journals The Aspect of Subjectivity in Scientific Thinking—Where Did It Actually Come From?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Hroar Klempe
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Thinking ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Folk Culture ◽  
The Third ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Main Figure

Subjectivity has always been a part of philosophical speculations. However, Immanuel Kant is mentioned as the main figure to bring in subjectivity in modern philosophy by comparing the Critique of Pure Reason with the Copernican revolution. We might include Descartes as well, and not least the followers of Kant, like Fichte and Hegel. Yet none of these end up with subjectivity as the only premise for thinking, but rather combine it with objectivity. Hence, subjectivity has appeared as a stranger in philosophy and yet not fully accepted. In this paper, I try to pursue the aspect of subjectivity by not looking at philosophy, but rather at psychology. The appearance of the term can be dated back to 1520 when the Croatian humanist Marcus Marulus published the thesis entitled “Psychology, the Nature of the Soul”. This thesis is lost, but by pursuing the appearance of the term, four different movements seem to contribute with and highlight an aspect of subjectivity. One is Humanism, the other is Reformation, the third is a focus on the empirical aspects of science and the fourth is the dissemination of folk culture to academics and aristocracy by means of the art of printing. The finding, therefore, is that psychology is not to be regarded as a discipline that grows out of philosophy, but rather as a discipline that conflicts philosophy, but nevertheless intervenes it and makes it progress.

Pleasure and Fit in Kant's Aesthetics

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 117-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth F. Rogerson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Scientific Understanding ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Empirical Concept ◽  
The Third ◽  
The World ◽  
The Status ◽  
The One

In the third Critique Kant shifts the focus in his enquiry from the status of factual statements in the Critique of Pure Reason and the grounding of moral imperatives in the Critique of Practical Reason to investigating two methods of considering the world which go beyond the strictly verifiable. This is a move from evaluating the interplay of a ‘determinate’ set of facts and intellectual preconditions to forming what Kant calls ‘reflective’ judgements on these facts. There are two major questions which the Critique of Judgement tackles. On the one hand Kant ambitiously considers how we might properly interpret a set of facts as comprising a larger teleological system and, on the other hand, he is interested in the seemingly quite separate issue of the appreciation of objects as beautiful. It is this latter issue which shall concern us here. Consistent with the reflective stand in the third Critique, Kant argues from the very outset that beauty is not an empirical concept with which we might describe the world. Beauty is not objective in the sense that size, colour or weight might be. Objective properties of this kind belong to the world of scientific understanding. Instead, he holds that judgements of aesthetic merit should be based upon the subjective pleasure we take in experiencing works of art and natural objects.

Die Zeit der Einbildungskraft - Die Rolle des Schematismus in Kants Erkenntnistheorie

Kant-Studien ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-462
Author(s):  
Rainer Schäfer
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Time And Space ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

Abstract In this paper, I focus on Kant’s doctrine of figurative synthesis. Figurative synthesis is the result of the activity of productive transcendental imagination. This is the chief problem of the so-called “second proof step” in Kant’s deduction of the categories according to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. The pure original synthetic apperception forms in the inner and outer sense - i. e. in time and space - by self-affection structures of order that make it possible to cognize empirical objects. The order of space and time through figurative syntheses (formal intuitions) must be distinguished on the one hand from space and time as forms of intuition and on the other hand from the order of the manifold given in space and time (intuition of particular contents). This clarifies the differences and relations between the constitutive noetic faculties of our knowledge apparatus.

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