scholarly journals Time, Physics and Neuroscience

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Di Sia
Keyword(s):  
Free Space ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Sequential Order ◽  
Physical Sense ◽  
The Brain

It has been suggested by some authors that time has no physical existence, but it would be an illusion. The human being uses clocks for measuring the numerical sequential order of the duration of material changes, namely the motion which runs in space. We experience a run of changes in the frame of the linear psychological time “past-present-future”, which has its basis in the neurological activity of the brain. We could link it with a concept of universe where there is neither physical past nor physical future. In this model of “time-free” space (in the physical sense) it exists only what we observe with our senses and measure with apparatuses.

Herbert Mac Cabe’s Philosophical Anthropology

Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-260
Author(s):  
Franco Manni ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Anthropology ◽  
External World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Language System ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Individual Human

From the ideas of Aristotle, De Saussure and Wittgenstein, philosopher Herbert McCabe elaborated an original anthropology. 'Meaning' means: the role played by a part towards the whole. Senses are bodily organs and sensations allow an animal to get fragments of the external world which become 'meaningful' for the behaviour of the whole animal Besides sensations, humans are ‘linguistic animals’ because through words they are able to 'communicate', that is, to share a peculiar kind of meanings: concepts. Whereas, sense-images are stored physically in our brain and cannot be shared, even though we can relate to sense-images by words (speech coincides with thought). However, concepts do not belong to the individual human being qua individual, but to an interpersonal entity: the language system. Therefore, on the one hand, to store images is a sense-power and an operation of the brain, whereas the brain (quite paradoxically!) is not in itself the organ of thought. On the other hand, concepts do not exist on their own.

Conclusion

2017 ◽  
pp. 279-292
Author(s):  
Thomas Fuchs
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Short Circuit ◽  
Living Organism ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

The ‘Conclusion’ summarizes fundamental concepts and insights of the book. The brain is presented as an organ of mediation, transformation, and resonance. Its functions are integrated by the living organism as a whole, or by the embodied person, respectively: persons have brains, they are not brains. The deadlocks of the mind–body problem result from a short circuit between mind and brain which follows as a consequence from the systematic exclusion of life. A combination of phenomenological, embodied, and enactive approaches seems best suited to overcome this deficit. In contrast to naturalistic reductionism, this leads to a personalistic concept of the human being which has its basis in intercorporeality: it is in the concrete bodily encounter that we primarily recognize each other as embodied subjects or persons.

scholarly journals QUEM ESTÁ NO COMANDO? NEUROCIÊNCIA, RESSONÂNCIA E DESAFIOS PARA A TEOLOGIA

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 611
Author(s):  
Rudolf Von Sinner
Keyword(s):  
Human Condition ◽  
The Body ◽  
Christian Theology ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Ancient Problem ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

RESUMO: A relação entre corpo e alma ou entre corpo, alma e espírito é um pro­blema antigo da antropologia, inclusive na teologia cristã. A questão continua em pauta hoje diante de novas descobertas e teorias nas neurociências. Praticamente migrou para a discussão da relação entre cérebro e mente. Hoje é consenso bastante amplo que quem comanda o corpo é o cérebro. Se aceitarmos isto, quem está no comando do cérebro? Sou eu, em primeira pessoa, minha alma, minha mente? Ou seria “ele”, em terceira pessoa, nosso próprio cérebro me determinando? E como ficaria na segunda pessoa – o ser humano como estando em relação a Deus a quem o chama de “tu”? Querendo superar preconceitos contra uma neurociên­cia determinista e uma teologia despreocupada com a ciência – e estas próprias posições, onde são defendidas –, o presente artigo procura tratar da condição humana em sua liberdade sempre precária e tolhida. Recorrendo à abordagem neurobiológica e psiquiátrica de Joachim Bauer, argumenta pela importância das relações do ser humano com o outro, com Deus e com o mundo, numa forma de ressonância (Hartmut Rosa). ABSTRACT: The relationship between body and soul or between body, soul and spirit is an ancient problem of anthropology, and also of Christian theology. In view of present day discoveries and new neuroscientific theories, the issue poses itself afresh. It practically migrated to the discussion of the relationship between brain and mind. Today, there is ample consensus that it is the brain that is in charge of the body. If we accept that, then who is in charge of the brain? Is it me, in the first person, my soul, my mind? Or is it “him”, in the third person, our own brain that determines me? And how about the second person – the human being in its relationship with God whom it calls “you”? Striving to overcome prejudices against a deterministic neuroscience, on the one hand, and a theology indifferent to science – and, indeed, such positions, wherever they are held – the present article seeks to deal with the human condition in its freedom, always precarious and restrained. Referring to neurobiological and psychiatric insights from Joachim Bauer, it argues for the importance of the relationship of the human being with the other, with God and with the world, in a form of resonance (Hartmut Rosa).

The Pilot's Problems

1959 ◽  
Vol 63 (588) ◽  
pp. 687-688
Author(s):  
Captain B. O. Prowse
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Almost All ◽  
The Brain

When considering the problems of take-off and landing from the pilot's point of view, the most important fact to remember is that he is a human being. This drawback immediately limits his capabilities in the operation of an aeroplane because the control of a pilot's actions is through the computer we call the brain. This computer, although extremely efficient in almost all functions, has nevertheless serious limitations when it comes, first, to speed of computation, and secondly, the number of functions it can compute at one time.Until now the speed of operation of aircraft has been compatible with the speed of computation of the human brain that is governing the pilot's reactions. Also the size and complexity of the aircraft and the operation have been compatible with the number of functions the brain can compute at one time

The Mind, the Brain and the Face

Philosophy ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 60 (234) ◽  
pp. 477-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Cockburn
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

‘Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious’.1 ‘The human body is the best picture of the human soul’. Anyone who believes that Wittgenstein's remarks here embody important truths has quite a bit of explaining to do. What needs to be explained is why it is that enormous numbers of people, people who have never had the chance to be corrupted by reading Descartes or Dennett, are willing, with only the slightest prompting, to speak in ways which appear to conflict dramatically with Wittgenstein's thought. Many people appear to find no difficulty at all in the idea that we could ascribe thoughts, sensations, emotions and so on to things which in no way resemble or behave like a living human being—for example to disembodied ‘minds’ or ‘souls’ or disembodied brains floating in tanks. And with a little more pressing many will agree that it is never to the living human being that these states are, strictly speaking, correctly ascribed; but, rather, to one part of the living human being—the brain, for example. Now if this incredibly widespread tendency is the expression of confusion then we need an explanation of its existence. We need this partly because without it it will be difficult to undermine the tendency; and partly because we might expect that such a widespread tendency is a distortion of some truth.

Catholic Hylomorphism, Disembodied Consciousness, and Temporary Bodies

2017 ◽  
Vol 91 ◽  
pp. 171-183
Author(s):  
Michael Potts ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Catholic Church ◽  
Intermediate State ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Alternative Position ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
The Catholic Church

This paper considers the possibility of a disembodied conscious soul, arguing that a great deal of current research converges in a direction that denies the possibility of a bodiless consciousness for human beings. Contemporary attacks on Cartesianism also serve as attacks on the view of some hylomorphist Catholics, such as Thomas Aquinas, that there can be a disembodied consciousness between death and resurrection, a view that violates the Catechism of the Catholic Church. However, there may be a way out for the Catholic hylomorphist which was suggested by Dante—the possibility of a temporary body. The first section of the paper will summarize the contemporary attack against both the Cartesian soul and physicalist systems that reduce the mind to the brain. The alternative position proposed is that the human being is a psychosomatic unity at the level of the organism as a whole, and that both mind-body and brain-body dualism should be avoided. Such a position, I will argue, supports the notion that a disembodied soul, including a disembodied consciousness, is not possible for human beings. Finally, I will discuss Dante’s views on temporary bodies and explore three ways of understanding a temporary body, any of which can preserve a conscious intermediate state between death and resurrection.

Meditations on Blade Runner

2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-122
Author(s):  
Michael Martin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Current Debate ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Blade Runner ◽  
The Brain

The 1982 film, Blade Runner, presents many questions conceming the position and relevance of the human being in the postmodern epoch. The audience is confronted with androids, called replicants, incredibly handsome "beings" whose language rises at times to poetic beauty, while the humans in the film are embarrassing physical and moral examples of the species. With whom will the audience identify or sympathize, the human or the simulacrum? The film further complicates this issue by incorporating traditional Christian symbols and language in relation to the replicants. The film seems to suggest that consciousness is the defining characteristic of humanness, whether one speaks of an organic human being or a replicant. Current debate between scientists, philosophers, and theologians centers on the question of consciousness and its relationship to the brain and, for some, the soul This essay addresses the dilemmas in the film, while keeping in mind the central question: What is a human being?

scholarly journals I. On the functions of the cerebellum

1864 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 177-179
Keyword(s):  
Medulla Oblongata ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Universal Application

The paper is divided into two Parts; the first gives the results of expe­riments on animals; the second, of observations upon the human being. Part I. Assuming that the great divisions of the brain preserve each the same function through the vertebrate kingdom, it is maintained that experiments which can be performed only on such of the lower animals as are very tenacious of life, will afford deductions of universal application. The method of proceeding with regard to each species was to remove, first, the whole encephalon, with the exception of the medulla oblongata; then in a similar animal only the cerebrum was taken away. The only difference between the two cases was in the fact that one animal had a cerebellum, and the other had not. A comparison was believed to show, in the powers which one had more than the other, the function of the organ the possession of which constituted the only difference.

Desde la mirada tradicional hacia la mirada sistémico-narrativa. / From the traditional approach towards the systemic-narrative perspective-

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (14) ◽  
pp. 9-32
Author(s):  
Ana María Zlachevsky
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Case ◽  
Life Experience ◽  
Traditional Approach ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Scientific Paradigm ◽  
Narrative Perspective ◽  
History Of Psychotherapy ◽  
History Of ◽  
New Vision ◽  
The Brain

Este artículo hace un breve recorrido sobre la historia de la psicoterapia desde la comprensión de la psique entendida al interior del cerebro, siendo hija del paradigma científico, hacia una mirada que entiende al ser humano siendo parte de un sistema y habitando en el lenguaje. Utilizando un caso clínico y aludiendo a la anti-psiquiatría termina mostrando lo complejo del uso de diagnósticos en psicoterapia, proponiendo como alternativa la mirada narrativa que enfatiza la idea de que “el problema es el problema”, el que se puede disolver al significar la experiencia vital de otra manera. This article succinctly illustrates the history of psychotherapy. It starts with the understanding of psyche assumed within the brain, under the scientific paradigm, towards another conception. This new vision recognizes human being as being part of a system and inhabiting language. Using a clinical case and alluding to anti-psychiatry movement the article argue against the use of diagnostics in psychotherapy. It proposes instead the narrative model as an alternative way to intervene. This paradigm emphasizes the idea that the person is not the problem, but “the problem is the problem”, and it may be dissolved by significance life experience in another way.

Subject, topic, given and salient: sentence-beginnings in Latin

1992 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 81-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Auditory Stimulus ◽  
Word Order ◽  
Native Speaker ◽  
Sequential Order ◽  
What Is Said ◽  
The Brain ◽  
The Way

This paper summarises the results of an investigation into sentence-beginnings made as part of an attempt to find an approach to word order which would be effective in revealing linguistic continuity as well as coping with the complexity of facts. Its point of origin is the intuition that for a native speaker the process of understanding what is said or written ought to be, at least within reasonable limits, both continuous and in some way in keeping with the order in which the utterance or text is presented.Utterances are linear and temporal, and the ear passes what it receives to the brain in a sequential order that matches the auditory stimulus itself, a fact reflected in the way we write and read; it would be anomalous (though by no means impossible within certian limitations) if the brain were toprocessthe incoming material in some other order. It is therefore worth considering the order in which discourse elements are represented.

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