scholarly journals When “Creeping Jurisdiction” Goes Awry: The Social Action Litigation to Ban Surrogacy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sital Kalantry

Significant scholarly attention has focused on the strong role played by the Supreme Court in the Indian constitutional democracy. Exercising its powers of judicial review, the Court will invalidate legislation if determines it to be in violation of the constitution. In the judicial appointments case, for example, it invalidated legislation that would have reformed the judicial appointments system. When there is no law, but the Court finds that certain circumstances in society violate the fundamental rights of certain groups of people, it may issue its own legislative-like guidelines. It did this in the internationally famous Vishaka case, in which it created guidelines on sexual harassment.

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 563-590
Author(s):  
Sanjay Jain ◽  
Saranya Mishra

Abstract The Supreme Court of India (SC) pronounced a momentous judgment in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan in 1997, categorically recognizing the menace of sexual harassment (SH) at workplace and constitutionally rendering it as being in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India 1950. The Court also provided a mechanism for redressal against SH, which was ultimately reinforced by Parliament with the enactment of Sexual Harassment at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013 (POSH Act). However, when it comes to allegations of SH against judges in the SC and High Courts by its employees, interns, or lower court judges, the response of the SC has been abysmal to say the least. There is a systematic pattern to suggest foul play and conspiracy in each such allegation, and judges, including even the Chief Justice of India (CJI), have not hesitated to openly indulge in victim-shaming and-blaming. In other words, the court has not been able to uphold its own jurisprudence on sexual harassment, which it expects to be scrupulously adhered to by other organs of the state. It is submitted that in not supporting the cause of victims alleging SH against judges, the other organs of the state are also party to this constitutional decay and serious infraction of fundamental rights. It leads us to ask the question, how can we guard against the guardians?


2000 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gad Barzilai

Some thirty years after the Bergman decision, Israel's constitutional structure and legal culture are still not responsive to minority needs or, more broadly, to the social needs of deprived communities. The liberal language and judicial review of Knesset legislation that were empowered by Bergman have not reconciled this problematic discrepancy between jurisprudence and social needs.The Bergman ruling signified the onset of a new era in Israel jurisprudence — the era of liberalism, in that it generated the notion of judicial counter-majoritarianism as the center, however problematic, of democracy. It was a modest ruling and a careful one, dwelling only on procedural deficiencies as cause for judicial abrogation of parliamentary legislation. Later on, after 1992, and propelled by the spirit of judicial activism, the Supreme Court adopted a more expansive judicial policy. It asserted the need for much more active judicial review of the substance of Knesset legislation and even the possibility of annulling it if it fell within the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Rao Imran Habib

In the modern democracies the protection of fundamental rights has gained immense importance. The fundamental rights are guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic states. The courts are empowered through the power of judicial review to protect fundamental rights against any violations of these. The concept of judicial review of executive actions emerged from the concept that the powerful executive can jeopardize the rights of the people for their political interests and there should be an independent forum to check the abuses of the human rights by the executive. In the modern era the power of judicial review has proceeded one step further as, in addition to the violation of fundamental rights, it has started examining the issues of good governance and disputes between state organs. Pakistan inherited the idea of judicial review of executive actions from the supervisory jurisdiction of English Courts to issue prerogative writs. Subsequently, Pakistan specifically incorporated the judicial review powers in the 1962 Constitution. The provincial high courts and the Supreme Court are entrusted with the power of judicial review; however, the Supreme Court can adjudicate upon matters of fundamental rights if they involve public importance. This research work examines the importance of judicial review of executive actions for the protections of fundamental rights. Then the evolution and exercise of judicial review of executive actions by the higher courts in Pakistan is analysed. This study finds that the superior courts in Pakistan have actively used this power to protect fundamental rights but in their drive to protect fundamental rights sometimes they have encroached into the jurisdiction of the other state institutions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (103) ◽  
pp. 381
Author(s):  
Kayamba Tshitshi Ndouba

Resumen:El presente artículo aborda algunos problemas entre política y derecho que genera la decisión parlamentaria en la concesión o denegación de los suplicatorios. Por ello, analiza la praxis de los suplicatorios tramitados por el Congreso de los diputados y el Senado hasta la fecha, poniendo énfasis en la doctrina emanada de las decisiones adoptadas por las comisiones parlamentarias competentes. Para profundizar en la interacción entre suplicatorio, política y derecho, el artículo indaga en los pasos cualitativos y saltos prominentes de la evolución de la jurisprudencia constitucional sobre los límites de la facultad de las Cámaras para conceder o denegar el suplicatorio. Recaba y sistematiza el tratamiento académico de los puntos clave del debate emanado de estos sucesivos pronunciamientos del TC: las implicaciones de esta jurisprudencia en relación a los postulados constitucionales de independencia y ordenación de los poderes del Estado, las definiciones de criterios jurídicos que han de inspirar y guiar a las Cámaras para autorizar o denegar el suplicatorio, la concreción del modelo y la estructura de ponderación aplicables en los casos de colisión de dos derechos fundamentales (en este caso, los arts. 23 y 24 de la Constitución española [CE]). Summary:I. Praxis of the Parliamentary Procedure for the Waiver of Immunity. II. The Request to Waive the Parliamentary Immunity Before the Constitutional Court. Issues With Undeniable Constitutional Significance. III. The Constitutional Court and the Judicial Review of the Requests to Waive the Parliamentary Immunity. 1. Interna corporis acta and fundamental rights. 2. «Trial of opportunity» and the formal «requirement of a statement of reasons». 3. The degree of providing an adequate statement of reasons in the denial court’s decision. 4. The question of weighing up different values against one another: fundamental rights and the Parliament members’ prerogatives. IV. The Doctrinal Debate on the Constitutional Court’s Jurisprudence. 1. Emptying the parliamentarian immunity and the issue of «checks and balance» of State’s constitutional powers.2. Opposing the parliamentary immunity and the right of judicial action: the issue of preferential treatment. Concluding: Judicial Review or Political Review? Abstract:This article addresses the existing problems generated by the parliamentary decision in the granting or denial of requests made by the Supreme Court to the Parliament, in order to remove an MP’s parliamentary immunity, so that (s)he can be prosecuted. Such problems are studied both from the perspective of law and of political science. To this end, this paper analyzes and updates the research done to date about the parliamentary praxis on this issue, highlighting the doctrine which emanates from the decisions adopted by the competent parliamentary committees. In order to understand well the interaction between the praxis, politics and law, this paper also examines the most prominent changes and milestones in the evolution of the constitutional case law on the limits of the Parliament’s capacity to grant or to deny the Supreme Court request asking Parliament to remove an MP’s parliamentary immunity so that (s)he can be prosecuted. For this purpose, the paper systematizes the key points of the academic debate concerning the successive decisions of the Constitutional court: the repercussions of this jurisprudence vis-à-vis the constitutional postulates of separation and independence of State powers, the legal criteria that such postulates must inspire and in order to guide the Parliament in its decision to grant or deny the petition, the concretization of the model and the balance needed in cases of collision of two fundamental rights (in this case, articles 23 and 24 of the Spanish Constitution).


1971 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-131
Author(s):  
Thierry Verhelst

SUMMARYFrancophone African constitutions generally make provision for fundamental rights. In criminal proceedings, the principle nulla poena sine lege is expressly incorporated in some, but not all, the constitutions. All the constitutions legislate against arbitrary arrest and detention; some legislate against brutality and torture. But these rights are subject to numerous exceptions and limitations.African countries generally distinguish between constitutional provisions and ordinary laws; the former are supreme, and may only be amended by special procedures. Constitutionality of legislation is generally judged in the francophone states by the Supreme Court or a special tribunal (this procedure differs from that in the parent French and Belgian constitutions). Within each Supreme Court there are normally several chambers or divisions: judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is generally the business of a constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court. There is often a political element in the nomination of the persons to serve on such a special constitutional court.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 451-458
Author(s):  
Michele Landis Dauber

Howard Gillman is unconvinced by my argument that New Deal lawyers turned to the history of federal disaster relief in support of key spending measures, such as the Social Security Act. Likewise, he is unpersuaded by Justice Stone's suggestion to Frances Perkins that she could “do anything under the taxing power.” I understand why Stone's comment grates on Gillman's modern ear; it grated on mine too. What is Stone talking about, and how could his comment be squared with our understanding of the pre–New Deal period as one of sharp limits to federal power imposed by the courts? Gillman's conviction that, in this era, the Supreme Court exercised substantial veto power over federal spending leads him to some critical misreadings of key cases and misstatements of fact. I appreciate the opportunity to respond to his comments and, in particular, to include some details regarding Supreme Court developments for which there was no space in the article itself.


2021 ◽  
pp. 251-266
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter highlights the origins and growth of Indonesian judicial review. Indonesia today is a constitutional democracy that has attained surprising success in eliminating hyper-presidentialism by implementing important checks and balances on presidential power; by separating executive, legislative, and judicial power; and by attaining rapidly an astonishing amount of decentralization since 1998. That degree of checks and balances and of decentralization has undoubtedly made Indonesians much freer than they were under President Suharto’s dictatorship. The Indonesian Constitutional Court seems to function well and enjoys the confidence of the people. Looked at from an American perspective, however, Indonesia is a constitutional democracy, which does not yet fully protect freedom of expression, freedom of religion, or economic freedoms to the extent that those freedoms are protected by the U.S. Supreme Court. Indonesia’s Bill of Rights and its system of judicial review originated for rights from wrongs reasons, because of borrowing, and because power is sufficiently divided in Indonesia, as a result of the separation of powers and federalism, so that there is political space in which the Supreme Court can operate.


1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan McGaughey

Abstract What explains the election of the 45th President of the United States? Many commentators have said that Trump is a fascist. This builds on grave concerns, since Citizens United, that democracy is being corrupted. This article suggests the long term cause, and the shape of ideology is more complex. In 1971, an extraordinary memorandum of Lewis Powell for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged that ‘[b]usiness interests’ should ‘press vigorously in all political arenas for support’. Richard Nixon appointed Powell to the Supreme Court, and a few years later, despite powerful dissent, a majority in Buckley v. Valeo held that candidates may spend unlimited funds on their own political campaigns, a decision of which Donald Trump, and others, have taken full advantage. Citizens United compounded the problems, but Buckley v. Valeo was the ‘Trump for President’ case. This provided a platform from which Trump could propel himself into extensive media coverage. The 2016 election was inseparable from the social ideal pursued by a majority of the Supreme Court since 1976. No modern judiciary had engaged in a more sustained assault on democracy and human rights. Properly understood, ‘fascism’ is a contrasting, hybrid political ideology. It mixes liberalism’s dislike of state intervention, social conservatism’s embrace of welfare provision for insiders (not ‘outsiders’), and collectivism’s view that associations are key actors in a class conflict. Although out of control, Trump is closely linked to neo-conservative politics. It is too hostile to insider welfare to be called ‘fascist’. Its political ideology is weaker. If we had to give it a name, the social ideal of Donald Trump is ‘fascism-lite’.


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