scholarly journals Moral Rationalism on the Brain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
The Brain

I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of the empirical evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics.

Neuroscience and Ethics

2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Matthew Liao
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Joshua Greene

Abstract. A number of people believe that results from neuroscience have the potential to settle seemingly intractable debates concerning the nature, practice, and reliability of moral judgments. In particular, Joshua Greene has argued that evidence from neuroscience can be used to advance the long-standing debate between consequentialism and deontology. This paper first argues that charitably interpreted, Greene’s neuroscientific evidence can contribute to substantive ethical discussions by being part of an epistemic debunking argument. It then argues that taken as an epistemic debunking argument, Greene’s argument falls short in undermining deontological judgments. Lastly, it proposes that accepting Greene’s methodology at face value, neuroimaging results may in fact call into question the reliability of consequentialist judgments. The upshot is that Greene’s empirical results do not undermine deontology and that Greene’s project points toward a way by which empirical evidence such as neuroscientific evidence can play a role in normative debates.

Remembering From-the-Outside

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher McCarroll
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Visual Perspective ◽  
Observer Perspective ◽  
The Status ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Way Of Thinking

This chapter sets out some key issues related to a philosophical analysis of point of view in memory. It does so by looking at examples of psychological, philosophical, and literary accounts of the phenomenon, as well as examples of the author’s own observer perspective memories. The chapter provides an overview of some of the empirical evidence related to visual perspective in memory. Despite these consistent empirical findings, however, a number of doubts and misconceptions about remembering from-the-outside still linger, especially concerning the status of observer perspectives in memory. This chapter outlines some of the skepticism to the possibility of remembering from-the-outside and points to a possible diagnosis of why such skepticism arises. This chapter points to a way of thinking about memory—to be developed through the course of the book—which eases the worries about remembering from-the-outside.

The Limits of Emotion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Frontotemporal Dementia ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Emotional Processing ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Integral Role ◽  
The Brain

Empirical research apparently suggests that emotions play an integral role in moral judgment. The evidence for sentimentalism is diverse, but it is rather weak and has generally been overblown. There is no evidence that our moral concepts themselves are partly composed of or necessarily dependent on emotions. While the moral/conventional distinction may partly characterize the essence of moral judgment, moral norms needn’t be backed by affect in order to transcend convention. Priming people with incidental emotions like disgust doesn’t make them moralize actions. Finally, moral judgment can only be somewhat impaired by damage to areas of the brain that are generally associated with emotional processing (as in acquired sociopathy and frontotemporal dementia). While psychopaths exhibit both emotional and rational deficits, the latter alone can explain any minor defects in moral cognition.

scholarly journals A neurocognitive model of ideological thinking

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Leor Zmigrod
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Motivational Factors ◽  
Cognitive Systems ◽  
Social Forces ◽  
Low Level ◽  
Cognitive Principles ◽  
High Level ◽  
Ideological Attitudes ◽  
The Brain

Abstract Ideological behavior has traditionally been viewed as a product of social forces. Nonetheless, an emerging science suggests that ideological worldviews can also be understood in terms of neural and cognitive principles. The article proposes a neurocognitive model of ideological thinking, arguing that ideological worldviews may be manifestations of individuals’ perceptual and cognitive systems. This model makes two claims. First, there are neurocognitive antecedents to ideological thinking: the brain’s low-level neurocognitive dispositions influence its receptivity to ideological doctrines. Second, there are neurocognitive consequences to ideological engagement: strong exposure and adherence to ideological doctrines can shape perceptual and cognitive systems. This article details the neurocognitive model of ideological thinking and synthesizes the empirical evidence in support of its claims. The model postulates that there are bidirectional processes between the brain and the ideological environment, and so it can address the roles of situational and motivational factors in ideologically motivated action. This endeavor highlights that an interdisciplinary neurocognitive approach to ideologies can facilitate biologically informed accounts of the ideological brain and thus reveal who is most susceptible to extreme and authoritarian ideologies. By investigating the relationships between low-level perceptual processes and high-level ideological attitudes, we can develop a better grasp of our collective history as well as the mechanisms that may structure our political futures.

scholarly journals Avicenna’s Ideas and Arguments about Mind and Brain Interaction

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Jamali ◽  
Mehdi Golshani ◽  
Yousef Jamali
Keyword(s):  
Causal Effect ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Controversial Issues ◽  
Islamic Philosophy ◽  
Recent Advances ◽  
Matter Interaction ◽  
Modern Physics ◽  
Physics Literature ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
The Brain

Mind and brain/matter interaction is one of the important and controversial issues in Islamic philosophy. In fact, in the resources of Islamic philosophy, one of the basic parts of philosophical discussions is related to mind’s nature and its interaction with the brain. Especially, in Avicenna’s philosophy, there are many articles and books which have addressed the topic of mind and brain and the relation between them. Avicenna was a profound philosopher, an expert physicist and a proficient physician of his time. Because of his experimental proficiency in medicine and surgery and his deep philosophical analysis, his discussion about mind and brain is very interesting for our time, due to recent advances in neuroscience. In this article, we have explained one of Avicenna’s arguments (in his famous opus “al-Isharat”) about the incorporeity of mind (self), which is very close to modern neuroscience and physics literature. In addition, we explain his model of mind and brain interaction. Avicenna described the mechanism of the causal effect of mind on the brain via a third identity, which works as an interface between them (in his main book “al-Shifa”). We try to illustrate his model by the use of some examples, inspired from modern physics. Also, we explore the philosophical constraints which must be considered in any model of mind-matter interaction, within the Islamic philosophy framework. In fact, we propose a new understanding of Avicenna’s philosophy which is in agreement with modern physics and neuroscience.

Spatiotemporal Model of Consciousness II: Spatiotemporal Alignment—Neuro-ecological Continuum and World–Brain Relation

2018 ◽  
pp. 195-236
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Spontaneous Activity ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Spatiotemporal Structure ◽  
Spatiotemporal Model ◽  
Time Consciousness ◽  
Spatiotemporal Scales ◽  
World Brain ◽  
The Brain

Consciousness is neuronal as it is based on the brain and its neural activity. This is what neuroscience tell us citing strong empirical evidence. At the same time, consciousness is ecological in that it extends beyond the brain to body and world – this is what philosophers tell us when they invoke concepts like embodiment, embeddedness, extendedness, and enactment. Is consciousness neuronal or ecological? This amounts to what I describe as “argument of inclusion”: do we need to include body and world in our account of the brain and how is that very same inclusion important for consciousness? I argue that the “spatiotemporal model” of consciousness can well address the “argument of inclusion” by linking and integrating both neuronal and ecological characterizations of consciousness. I demonstrate various data showing how the brain’s spontaneous activity couples and aligns itself to the spatiotemporal structure in the ongoing activities of both body and world. That amounts to a specific spatiotemporal mechanism of the brain that I describe as ‘spatiotemporal alignment’. Conceptually, such ‘spatiotemporal alignment’ corresponds to “body-brain relation” and “world-brain relation”, as I say. World-brain relation and body-brain relation allow for spatiotemporal relation and integration between the different spatiotemporal scales or ranges of world, body, and brain with all three being spatiotemporally aligned and nested within each other. Based on various empirical findings, I argue that such spatiotemporal nestedness between world, body, and brain establishes a “neuro-ecological continuum” and world-brain relation. Both neuro-ecological continuum and world-brain relation are here understood in an empirical sense and can be regarded as necessary condition of possible consciousness, i.e., neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC) (as distinguished from the neural correlates of consciousness/NCC). In sum, the spatiotemporal model determines consciousness by “neuro-ecological continuum” and world-brain relation (with body-brain relation being a subset). Taken in such sense, the spatiotemporal model can well address the “argument of inclusion”. We need to include body and world in our account of the brain in terms of “neuro-ecological continuum” and world-brain relation since otherwise, due to their role as NPC, consciousness remains impossible.

Interaction Model of Brain and Consciousness

2018 ◽  
pp. 105-126
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Vegetative State ◽  
Interaction Model ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Additive Interaction ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Nancy Cartwright ◽  
Level Of Consciousness ◽  
The Brain

In addition to the spectrum model, I also introduced an interaction model to characterize the brain’s neural activity (chapter 2). Is the interaction model of brain also relevant for consciousness? That is the focus in the present chapter. I here present various lines of empirical evidence focusing on disorders of consciousness like vegetative state, anesthesia, and sleep. Based on empirical evidence, I show that the degree of non-additive interaction between spontaneous and stimulus-induced activity indexes the level of consciousness in a seemingly rather fine-grained way; for that reason, it may be considered a neural correlate of the level of consciousness, i.e., NCC. In contrast, the spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure is rather a necessary condition of possible consciousness, that is, a neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC). The concept of NPC is further enriched by the concept of capacities for which I recruit Nancy Cartwright. I suggest that the brain’s non-additive interaction including the subsequent association of stimulus-induced activity with consciousness is based on the spontaneous activity’s capacity. Since that very same capacity, operating as NPC, can be traced to the spontaneous activity’s spatiotemporal features, I speak of “spatiotemporal capacity”. I conclude that the empirical data suggest a capacity-based approach (rather than law-based approach) to the brain and how it is related to consciousness.

Sensitive periods for music training from a cognitive neuroscience perspective: A review of the literature with implications for teaching practice

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eun Cho
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Early Onset ◽  
Teaching Practice ◽  
Musical Training ◽  
Music Educators ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Music Training ◽  
Early Childhood Music ◽  
Sensitive Periods ◽  
The Brain

This study addresses the issue of sensitive periods – a developmental window when experience or stimulation has unusually strong and long-lasting impacts on certain areas of brain development and thus behaviour (Bailey and Penhune 2012) – for music training from a neurological perspective. Are there really sensitive periods in which early musical training has greater effects on the brain and behaviour than training later in life? Many neuroscience studies support the idea that beginning music training before the age of 7 is advantageous in many developmental aspects, based on their findings that early onset of music training is closely associated with enhanced structural and functional plasticity in visual-, auditory-, somatosensory- and motor-related regions of the brain. Although these studies help early childhood music educators expand understanding of the potential benefits of early music training, they often mislead us to believe that early onset is simply better. Careful consideration on details of these research studies should be given when we apply these research findings into practice. In this regard, this study provides a review of neuroscience studies related to the issue of sensitive periods for childhood music training and discusses how early childhood music educators could properly apply these findings to their music teaching practice.

scholarly journals Iterative dilemmas demonstrate that there is more to sacrificial harm than utilitarianism and deontology.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dries Hannes Bostyn ◽  
Arne Roets
Keyword(s):  
Process Model ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Automatic Process ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Single Shot ◽  
Deliberative Process ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Do No Harm

When are sacrificial harms morally appropriate? The dual process model for moral cognition states that peoples’ judgments of sacrificial harm are driven by two competing processes: a fast, automatic process leading to deontological “do no harm” judgments, and a slower, deliberative process leading to utilitarian “minimize overall harm” judgments. Traditionally, research within moral psychology has investigated this issue by asking participants to render moral judgments on single-shot, sacrificial dilemmas. The present series of studies goes beyond this limitation by presenting participants with iterative versions of sacrificial dilemmas that involve the same set of targets across multiple iterations. Using this novel approach, and across four preregistered studies (n = 1538), we provide clear evidence that participants’ moral judgments are often motivated by a third, distinct moral concern that is not captured by the utilitarianism versus deontology dichotomy: a concern to spread out harm across all possible targets.

Sentence Processing

2019 ◽  
pp. 675-709
Author(s):  
Ina Bornkessel-Schlesewsky ◽  
Matthias Schlesewsky
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Sentence Processing ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Current State ◽  
Key Points ◽  
The Brain

Neurolinguistic approaches to sentence processing have recently begun to focus on neurobiological plausibility. Thus, rather than seeking primarily to establish mappings between linguistic and cognitive concepts and the brain, the question of how sentence processing is implemented by the brain’s unique biological hardware has become increasingly important. This chapter reviews the current state of the art with respect to the neurobiology of sentence processing, adopting both a neuroanatomical and a timing-based perspective. For both of these domains, the chapter provides an overview of current models and frameworks, as well as the empirical evidence supporting them. In each case, it highlights areas of consensus, as well as key points of difference between approaches where no consensus has yet been reached.

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