On Believing Conspiracy Theories We Remember: Analyses of Two Large-Scale Surveys of Conspiracism in the French General Public
Why individuals believe in conspiracy theories is a theoretical question with practical implications. Research has mostly focused on individual differences and motives, and we know little about the effects of exposure to conspiracy theories on believing in them. Based on the truth effect literature, which has demonstrated that usually neutral uncertain trivia statements already heard (or perceived as already heard) are more likely to be judged as true than new ones, we hypothesized that repeated exposure to conspiracy theories can increase their believability. As an initial test of the idea that people might agree more with conspiracy statements already heard, we analyzed data from two surveys conducted in representative samples of the French population in which participants indicated both their adherence to and recognition of conspiracy statements. Participants agreed more with conspiracy statements they recognized as already heard, even when they were asked to indicate whether they had already heard the statements before indicating whether they agreed or disagreed with those statements. This truth effect was positively associated with a conspiracy mentality. Individuals may form beliefs in conspiracy theories through the truth effect, suggesting that the effect might generalize beyond unemotional and non-social plausible but uncertain trivia statements.